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ABSTRACT 
 
The Global Environmental Moment: 
Sovereignty and American Science on Spaceship Earth, 1945-1974 
 
by 
 
Roger Eardley-Pryor 
 
This dissertation argues that the still-existent political contours of 
international engagement on global environmental issues were forged in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, in what I call the global environmental moment, during 
planning for and in the actions taken surrounding the first intergovernmental 
conference on the world environment: the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm Sweden in June 1972. Throughout the 
prior years of planning for the UNCHE, relatively less developed nations of the 
global South, led by Brazil, demanded that all environmental efforts must support—
not limit—endeavors toward economic development, and along with other members 
of the Unite Nations, refused to relinquish their national sovereignty for the sake of 
global environmental protection. Ultimately, the UNCHE produced a Declaration, an 
Action Plan, and a new United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to coordinate 
environmental planning within the UN; yet these outward successes institutionalized 
non-binding, disjointed, and underfunded efforts that split the global North and 
  xii 
South over the means for attaining global environmental protection. With the UN 
conference refusing to alter the status quo of geopolitical organization and impotent 
against stemming the environmental impact of economic development, large 
numbers of non-governmental organizations, politically active scientists, and 
environmental advocates of all stripes also descended on Stockholm to voice their 
own opinions on the causes and solutions to ongoing environmental degradation. 
Yet, the alternative conferences in Stockholm where these outliers met also fractured 
in political conflicts between advocates for the global South and those promoting 
environmental remedies popular in the global North. Collectively, the collapse of the 
global environmental moment amid these political and ideological differences 
created the historical ruts in which debate on global environmental issues have 
continued to tread ever since. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, 
nor more doubtful of success, 
nor more dangerous to handle, 
than to initiate a new order of things. 
— Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 1505. 
 
Anyone who proposes to cure the environmental crisis undertakes thereby 
to change the course of history. 
— Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle, 1971. 
 
 
In the summer of 1972, the city of Stockholm, Sweden became host to a 
global environmental circus. This circus transpired inside grand government meeting 
halls, instead of under colorful tents, from June 5 to 16, 1972. It featured some 1,200 
delegates from the governments of 114 nations—including most of the world’s 
heavily industrialized nations and its less-developed countries (LDCs)—over a 
dozen intergovernmental agencies, nearly 500 officially recognized environmental 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), untold numbers of non-official 
environmental activists, popular environmental scientists, two bus-loads of 
counterculture commune dwellers, and well over a thousand journalists to report for 
the world Stockholm’s performances. The purpose of this gathering was a collection 
of conferences organized to address the environmental crisis threatening survival on 
what many called Spaceship Earth, and to determine appropriate actions toward 
correcting global environmental problems. This dissertation examines the rise of a 
planetary framing for environmental concern about Spaceship Earth, and the 
opposing political reactions by actors in the industrialized North and the 
  2 
underdeveloped South as they prepared for and engaged in Stockholm’s 
environmental circus. 
In Stockholm, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) provided the primary anchor around which a carnival of other 
environmental colloquiums arose. The so-called alternative conferences included the 
Dai Dong Independent Conference for environmental experts and scientists, and the 
semi-official Environment Forum for NGOs and environmental activists to address 
their respective positions on the global crisis. As a whole, Stockholm’s 
environmental circus included main events and sideshows; it featured some 
predictable performances but also a few surprises; and it saw a mix of conflict and 
collaboration. But, as this dissertation argues, the events leading up to Stockholm 
and those that occurred there all created a lasting legacy that carved the contours of 
global environmental politics then and since. 
 Several reports about Stockholm’s cotillion of environmental conferences 
characterized the scene as akin to a festival. Britain’s New Statesmen magazine, New 
York’s Village Voice, and Time magazine all referred to the collective events as 
“Woodstockholm.” British reporter Stanley Johnson named the non-UN gatherings 
“rival sideshows,” and he later expanded his inclusion of the official UNCHE 
meeting as embodying a “Stockholm Funfair.” Canadian writer Wade Rowland 
described the participants in Stockholm’s environmental events as formal foreign 
ministers and international diplomats in pin-striped business suits, who were 
surrounded by a “colorful collection of Woodstock graduates, former Merry 
Pranksters and other assorted acid-heads, eco-freaks, save-the-whalers, doomsday 
  3 
mystics, poets, and hangers-ons.” Peter Stone, the senior information advisor to 
Maurice F. Strong, the Secretary-General of the UNCHE, described Stockholm as 
having “many of the attributes of a theatrical festival,” including elegant sets, reams 
of script, heroes, villains, and, at least among some hippie protestors, “even a bit of 
off-stage nudity.” The Washington Post commented, “if the conference should 
indeed leave a historic imprint, it will be largely as a happening.”1 In terms of 
environmental politics, however, Stockholm’s historical imprint remains much 
deeper and larger than previously appreciated. 
Still, after more than two years of serious preparations for Stockholm, and 
after nearly two weeks of environmental meetings there, Britain’s Stanley Johnson 
considered the alternative conferences as “something of a shambles.” Regarding the 
entire affair, including the UN meeting, he proclaimed to have “witnessed a gigantic 
ritual, a three-ring circus played out in the three conference sites.” Peter Stone 
similarly outlined Stockholm’s circus-like events as having taken place in a series of 
outer and inner rings. If anyone should have had a handle on the environmental 
events in Stockholm, it seems the UNCHE’s senior information advisor Peter Stone 
should. Yet even Stone concluded, “I have not yet met anyone who did not express a 
feeling of bewilderment at trying to find out what actually did go on at Stockholm. 
                                                
1 Stanley Johnson, “Stockholm 1972,” New Statesman, June 2, 1972, 742-743; Ross Gelbspan 
and David Gurin, “Woodstockholm ’72: The Subject Is Survival,” Village Voice, May 11, 1972; 
“Woodstockholm,” Time, June 19 1972, 55; Stanley Johnson, “Stockholm Funfair,” New Statesman, 
June 9, 1972; Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World: The Life and Times of the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Co. Ltd., 1973), 1; Peter Stone, 
Did We Save the Earth at Stockholm? (London: Earth Island Ltd., 1973),17; Claire Sterling, “UN 
Environment Conference: A Happening,” Washington Post, June 17, 1972, A13. 
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Everybody had a feeling that they had missed something vital.”2 Indeed, something 
vital has been missed about the events in Stockholm and those leading up to it. The 
reference to Stockholm as a multi-ringed circus offers a hint as to why something 
vital about those environmental engagements was missed then, and has been 
overlooked since. 
 
A Whole-Systems View on Stockholm’s Environmental Circus 
In a collection of essays titled Pandora’s Hope, the French philosopher of 
science Bruno Latour suggested the image of a multi-ringed rosace to illustrate what 
he construed as the circulatory system for producing accurate knowledge in a 
particular realm. Latour proposed that the various rings of a given domain embodied 
at least five components, including the mobilization of a research field, typically a 
scientific discipline; the contributions of a transnational community of experts who 
could be scientists, intellectuals, or policymakers sometimes identified as an 
“epistemic community”; the establishment of boundary-crossing affinities formed 
outside the expert community in order to acquire influence; and, finally, the 
inclusion of public participation. A center ring in Latour’s rosace established various 
nodes and links to the other rings and held the knowledge producing system 
cohesively. In order to understand a particular system of knowledge production, 
Latour encouraged historians, social scientists, and natural scientists alike to remain 
aware not only of the core ring identifying the specific realm, regime, or domain of 
knowledge produced, but to include awareness of the various interconnections 
                                                
2 Stanley Johnson, “Stockholm Roundup,” New Statesman, June 16, 1972; Peter Stone, Did We 
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between the rings as well as perceive the ensemble as a whole.3 In short, they must 
account for the whole system of interactions in order to comprehend the import of 
what knowledge was produced. One must envisage the whole system, not just one 
part. 
We can apply a similar approach to the multi-ringed environmental circus in 
Stockholm in the summer of 1972, and the various dynamics that crested and 
culminated there. Like Latour’s rosace, the circumstances leading up to Stockholm 
and those that transpired there included the mobilization of environmental science, 
the efforts of boundary working knowledge brokers who aimed to gain influence by 
linking various communities or by co-opting their authority, as well as participation 
by diverse publics and governments from around the world. In order to understand 
Stockholm’s importance for global and international environmental politics, and to 
comprehend the knowledge that Stockholm’s green-ringed circus produced 
collectively, we must see it through a wide historical lens that accounts for its 
inspiration, the years of preparation for its events, and the actual action that occurred 
in Stockholm at the historical dawn of global environmental politics. In my historical 
analysis of early global environmental politics, I use the world global as shorthand 
                                                                                                                                     
Save the Earth at Stockholm? (London: Earth Island Ltd., 1973), 132-133, 136-137. 
3 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 103. For the concept of epistemic communities and their role in 
forming international policy, specifically environmental policies, see Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: 
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46:1 
(1992), 1-35; Peter M. Haas, “Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic 
Communities,” Millennium Journal of International Studies 19:3 (1990), 347-363; Peter M. Haas, 
Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Coordination (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990). For the application of Latour’s rosace to the production of 
knowledge surrounding climate change, see Amy Dahan Dalmedico and Hélène Guillemot, “Climate 
Change: Scientific Dynamics, Expertise, and Geopolitical Challenges” in Global Science and 
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for phenomena that move toward the planetary, and like Latour’s rosace, requires a 
worldwide frame of reference.4 As Latour might say, we cannot understand the 
process of knowledge production leading up to the Stockholm conferences—nor the 
actual knowledge produced there—without comprehending the whole system and 
the interconnections between its rings. 
This dissertation offers an in-depth history of the processes that led up to the 
environmental circus in Stockholm, the interconnecting events and conflicts that 
transpired at Stockholm in three different conferences there, and the political 
legacies that all of these developments produced for international environmental 
politics. The audience for this dissertation includes environmental historians 
interested in the dawn of international and global environmental politics in the post-
World War II period.5 It includes historians of science interested in the behavior of 
scientists as political actors, in this case both environmental scientists and social 
scientists.6 And it includes diplomatic historians who have begun integrating the 
                                                                                                                                     
National Sovereignty: Studies in Historical Sociology of Science, edited by Grégoire Mallard, 
Catherine Paradeise, and Ashveen Peerbaye (New York: Routledge, 2009), 213-214. 
4 I use the term “international” when dealing explicitly with issues between sovereign nations, 
but I prefer the term “global” when emphasizing the agency of actors and ideas beyond inter-state 
relations. For multiple and sometimes contradictory interpretations on the meaning and content of 
global environmental history, see “What Is Global Environmental History? Conversation with Piero 
Bevilacqua, Guillermo Castro, Ranjan Chakrabarti, Kobus du Pisani, John R. McNeill, Donald 
Worster,” edited by Gabriella Coronia, in Global Environment 2 (2008), 228-249; J. Donald Hughes, 
“Global Dimensions of Environmental History,” The Pacific Historical Review 70:1 (2001), 91-101. 
5 Though they include only brief references to events in Stockholm, for environmental histories 
that address post-World War II international politics, see J.R. McNeill, Something New Under the 
Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New York, W.W. Norton, 2000), 
especially 325-356; J. Brooks Flippen, “Richard Nixon, Russell Train, and the Birth of Modern 
American Environmental Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 32:4 (September 2008), 613-638; Thomas 
Robertson, The Malthusian Moment: Global Population and the Birth of American Environmentalism 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012). 
6 For studies incorporating the role of scientists as experts in international politics, although 
mostly limited in their analysis on environmental and social scientists, see Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik's 
Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2008), especially 199-218; John Krige, American Hegemony and the 
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environment and diplomacy in their scholarship but remain slow to recognize the 
role that environmental issues played in the shift of the world’s dominant political 
axis from East-West to its current North-South alignment.7 
This dissertation argues that the still-existent political contours of 
international engagement on global environmental issues were forged in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, in what I call the global environmental moment, during 
planning for and in the actions taken surrounding the first intergovernmental 
conference on the world environment: the UNCHE, held in Stockholm Sweden in 
June 1972. Throughout the prior years of planning for the UNCHE, relatively less 
developed nations of the global South, led by Brazil, demanded that all 
environmental efforts must support (not limit) endeavors toward economic 
development, and along with other nations in the UN, refused to compromise their 
national sovereignty for the sake of global environmental protection. Ultimately, the 
UNCHE produced a Declaration, an Action Plan, and a new United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) to coordinate environmental planning within the UN. 
Yet these outward successes institutionalized non-binding, disjointed, and 
                                                                                                                                     
Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Allan A. Needell, 
Science, Cold War and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the Balance of Professional Ideals 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press, 2000). 
7 For analysis and encouragement on integrating these two fields, see Kurk Dorsey, “Dealing 
with the Dinosaur (and Its Swamps): Putting the Environment in Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic 
History 29:4 (2005), 573-587; Mark Lytle, “An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic 
History,” Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 279–300. The best examples of environmental 
diplomatic histories include Richard P. Tucker, Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the 
Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Jacob 
Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear 
Age (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008); J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., 
Environmental Histories of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, 
and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (Athens, GA: University 
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underfunded efforts that split the global North and South over the means of attaining 
global environmental protection. With the UN conference refusing to alter the status 
quo of geopolitical organization and impotent against stemming the environmental 
impact of economic development, large numbers of non-governmental organizations, 
politically active scientists, and environmental advocates of all stripes also 
descended on Stockholm to voice their own opinions on the causes and solutions to 
ongoing environmental degradation. Yet, even the alternative conferences in 
Stockholm where these outliers met also fractured in political conflicts between 
advocates for the global South and those promoting environmental remedies popular 
in the global North. Collectively, the collapse of the global environmental moment 
amid these political and ideological disputes created the historical ruts in which 
debate on global environmental issues have continued to tread ever since. 
 
Historiographic Intervention 
Perhaps because of the confusing circus-like atmosphere of Stockholm or 
because of the topic’s relative newness, historians have yet to give these first 
conferences on the global environment serious and sustained analysis. When 
environmental events from Stockholm do appear in historical monographs, it 
typically features cursory mention of only the UNCHE (rarely the alterative 
conferences) and the UNCHE’s supposed accomplishments—what I identify as 
merely nominal acclimation on the Declaration on the Human Environment, an 
unavailing Action Plan with its 109 vague recommendations, and the ineffectual 
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UNEP.8 I know of no historical monograph like this dissertation, which examines in 
depth the rise of global environmental concern, the political conflicts that arose from 
it, and the various events that occurred in Stockholm as a result, both within the UN 
conference and beyond it.9 
Rather than historians, political scientists and other scholars interested in 
international environmental governance were the first to analyze Stockholm-related 
developments, usually in the context of more recent events. Yet here, too, much 
political science scholarship lacks both detailed analysis and historical perspective, 
especially on the events preceding the Stockholm conferences and forums, but also 
on the conferences and forum themselves. When discussions of Stockholm do appear 
in political science and related scholarship on global environmental politics, those 
works often celebrate Stockholm uncritically as a resounding success, or they briefly 
reference it merely as a precursor to better-known events nearly two decades after 
Stockholm. For example, without comprehensive analysis of what actually transpired 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s regarding Stockholm and the political stagnation it 
                                                                                                                                     
Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
8 Exceptions among historical scholarship that do reference the Environment Forum, only one of 
the alternative conferences in Stockholm, typically include little more than a paragraph or two. See 
Frank Zelko, Make It A Greenpeace! The Rise of Countercultural Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 135; David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and 
the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2011) 165-166; Michael Egan, Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival: The 
Remaking of American Environmentalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 134; J. Brooks 
Flippen, Nixon and the Environment (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 173. 
9 Two books about events in Stockholm, a journalistic account and a memoir-like interpretation, 
appeared without much historical perspective a year after Stockholm. See Wade Rowland, The Plot to 
Save the World: The Life and Times of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Co. Ltd., 1973); Peter Stone, Did We Save the Earth at Stockholm? 
(London: Earth Island Ltd., 1973). And although it was written by a political scientist and not a 
historian, the best general overview of events leading up to Stockholm in 1972 and especially the 
events up through the early 1990s remains John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement 
(West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), especially Chapter 5. 
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spawned for international environmental politics, political scientists Caroline 
Thomas and Marvin S. Soroos promoted the UN’s achievements in Stockholm as “a 
milestone” in international relations and a “major landmark” for institution building, 
yet without suitable analyses, they move their narratives to events in the 1980s and 
1990s.10 Other scholars seem to overlook the importance of events in early 1970s 
entirely. For instance, Paul Wapner wrote that, “throughout the 1980s … it became 
increasingly clear that environmental groups could not save wildlife, biologically 
rich areas and stunning landscapes in the South unless they also worked to help 
citizens in the South prosper economically and enjoy the fruits of socioeconomic 
development.” He continued to note with regard to global environmental affairs that 
“during the 1980s” the global South “recognized how many international 
environmental actions threatened to stymie its own development plans.”11 Yet, as 
this dissertation shows, both of these developments clearly occurred first in the early 
1970s during the preparatory process for Stockholm. 
Similarly, Sheila Jasanoff wrote, “it was not until the later 1980s that a global 
conception of environmental protection rooted itself in Western consciousness,” 
which she claims occurred alongside the supposedly new notion of sustainability.12 
                                                
10 Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1992), 21; Marvin S. Soroos, “Global Institutions and the Environment: An 
Evolutionary Perspective,” in The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, edited by 
Norman J. Vig and Regina S. Axelrod (Washingon, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999), 27-51, 
here 28. 
11 Paul Wapner, “After Nature: Environmental Politics in a Postmodern Age,” in Handbook of 
Global Environmental Politics, edited by Peter Dauvergne (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005), 
471-485, here 472. 
12 Sheila Jasanoff, “Image and Imagination: The Formation of Global Environmental 
Consciousness,” in Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, 
edited by Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 309-337, here 
324. 
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As this dissertation explains, a global conception of environmental protection 
engrained itself far earlier, especially with concerns in the late 1950s about atomic 
fallout, which developed throughout the 1960s in an environmental revolution that 
ultimately climaxed in Stockholm.13 Admittedly, the 1980s did witness the 
popularization of the term sustainable development, especially with the publication 
in 1987 of Our Common Future by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED). Otherwise known as the Brundtland Report—named after 
the chair of the WCED, Norway’s former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland—
this influential UN-sponsored document famously defined sustainable development 
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs,” thus seeking a balance 
between human needs and environmental limitations.14 This concept then played a 
central role in the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 
commonly known as the Rio Earth Summit. Yet, again, as this dissertation shows, 
the roots of the concept of sustainable development extend back at least twenty years 
to the early 1970s, when LDCs from the global South, led by Brazil, made 
development the necessary central component in any unified efforts in the UN 
toward global environmental management and international environmental political 
progress. 
                                                
13 For the deeper intellectual roots on environmental consciousness, if not global prior to World 
War II than certainly at national and regional scales, see Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A 
History of Ecological Ideas, Second Edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); 
Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, Fourth Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
14 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 43. 
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Occasionally, when events from the global environmental moment of the 
early 1970s provide merely a pretext for the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and later events, 
representations of Stockholm can appear demonstrably false. For instance, Robert G. 
Fleagle wrote that “the Stockholm conference could be characterized as the 
environmental scientific community of developed countries talking to government 
officials about measures to reduce global environmental degradation, with 
representatives of developing countries in a largely observing role.” Fleagle 
continued to claim that the UN’s 1992 Rio conference finally provided the initial 
occasion where “the mutual and conflicting interests of developed and developing 
countries came together and were addressed frontally.”15 In fact, the scientific 
community in Stockholm remained relegated to the under-examined peripheral 
conferences, while political representatives from LDCs dominated both the planning 
for and practices of the UNCHE—the actual site where the interests of industrial 
nations and LDCs initially met under the 1970s rubric of “Development and 
Environment.” This dissertation reveals how both of Fleagle’s claims totally ignore 
the global political dynamics and developments at the dawn of global environmental 
politics surrounding Stockholm. 
Despite limited historical understanding of details on the development and 
premature paralysis of global environmental politics in the early 1970s, political 
scientists’ analyses on its later machinations typically fall into one of three general 
categories. Those categories generally include studies on the importance of states 
and institutions to regimes for global environmental governance, studies focused on 
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the environmental issues of political economy, and studies concentrating on the roles 
of civil society and science.16 This dissertation provides a historical focus on the 
origins of all three of these themes, with recognition of state behavior in helping 
shape the initial and still-existent contours of global environmental politics, its 
grounding in the dynamics of political economy between North and South, and the 
early efforts of environmental scientists and non-state organizations to provide 
alternative solutions to global environmental problems. In his literature review of 
global environmental politics back in 1998, political scientist Michael Zürn noted 
correctly that, “world politics is much more than intergovernmental politics and 
includes a wider range of actors than states, and world politics is not only about 
power and material interests but is also about nonmaterial interests, ideas, 
knowledge, and discourses.”17 Notwithstanding that reality, many of the existing 
studies on global environmental politics lack an appreciation of the deeper history of 
its collective dynamics. 
As such, this dissertation offers what some scholars identify as historical 
political ecology. According to a long-standing definition by geographers Harold 
Brookfield and Piers Blaikie, political ecology aims to unify “the concerns of 
ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses a 
constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also 
                                                                                                                                     
in the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 192. 
16 Peter Dauvergne, “Research in Global Environmental Politics: History and Trends,” in 
Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, edited by Peter Dauvergne (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2005), 8-32; Ronald B. Mitchell, “International Environment,” in Handbook of International 
Relations, edited by Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons, and Walter Carlnaes (London: Sage Publications, 
2002), 500-516. 
17 Michael Zürn, “The Rise of International Politics: A Review of Current Research,” World 
Politics 50:4 (July 1998), 617-649, here 618. 
  14 
within classes and groups within society itself.” When adding archive-based 
historical analysis to such research, however, Karl Offen expanded those aims by 
identifying historical political ecology as an “interpretation of society-nature 
relations in the past … how and why those relations have changed (or not changed) 
over time and space, and the significance of those interpretations for improving 
social justice and nature conservation today.” Diana K. Davis further noted that most 
studies of historical political ecology, like this dissertation, “deliberately relate their 
research to contemporary situations.” As pioneering environmental historian Donald 
Worster has said, “we will not get out of the global environmental crisis the way we 
got into it. But if we don’t understand how we got into it, we will never find a way 
out. That is why we need historians.”18 My hope is that this dissertation offers some 
slight aid in thinking our way out of our current trajectory toward continued global 
environmental problems by showing how contemporary political deadlock on those 
issues appeared far earlier than previously recognized by most and within particular 
historical contexts. Given new contemporary contexts, perhaps this history will help 
other scholars and environmental actors move beyond the politics of over forty years 
ago. 
 
                                                
18 Harold Brookfield and Piers Blaikie, Land Degradation and Society (London: Methuen, 1987), 
17; Karl Offen, “Historical Political Ecology: An Introduction,” Historical Geography 32 (2004), 19-
42, here 21; Diana K. Davis, “Historical Political Ecology: On the Importance of Looking Back to 
Move Forward,” Geoforum 40 (2009), 285-286; Donald Worster in “What Is Global Environmental 
History? Conversation with Piero Bevilacqua, Guillermo Castro, Ranjan Chakrabarti, Kobus du 
Pisani, John R. McNeill, Donald Worster,” edited by Gabriella Coronia, in Global Environment 2 
(2008), 228-249, here 245.  
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Structure and Summary of the Dissertation 
The structure of this dissertation moves through three main sections. Its 
initial section includes two chapters that explain the conceptual and scientific 
impetus behind the global environmental moment in the development of perspectives 
that envisioned ecological, social, and political systems as interconnected at 
worldwide scales. The popular metaphor of a fragile and imperiled Spaceship Earth 
signified this systems perspective, which coincided in the late 1950s and throughout 
the 1960s with new realizations about ways that modern sciences and technologies 
created environmental threats to those global systems. The next main section focuses 
on social and political reactions to newly realized environmental hazards, first by 
nations of the industrialized global North, followed by opposite political reactions 
from relatively less developed countries of the global South. This section addresses 
those political dynamics during the years of planning before the UN’s first 
intergovernmental global environmental conference scheduled for Stockholm in 
1972. It moves back and forth between concerns in the global North about the 
negative environmental impact of economic growth, and demands from the global 
South for intensifying economic development. The final section features three 
chapters that highlight some of the actors and events in Stockholm, including the 
deliberations of nation states within the UN, conflicts within non-governmental 
organizations outside the UN, and debates by politically active environmental 
scientists who travelled to Stockholm. Politically, the global environmental moment 
crested and culminated with the planning and performance of those events 
surrounding Stockholm’s environmental circus. It was there that the existing divides 
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between North and South on the rights and responsibilities for global environmental 
problems were institutionalized, and where any potential unity over global 
environmental challenges fractured, both inside and outside the UN. 
To establish the conceptual and scientific foundations for the global 
environmental moment, Chapter 1 focuses on the development of systems thinking 
in twentieth-century science and technology and its evolution into an epistemology 
of global interconnection. Rather than separating or breaking down complexity into 
various components, systems thinking analyzes complex problems holistically in 
terms of their interdependent relations. The ascent of various scientific systems 
approaches during World War II contributed to the Allied victory, including 
Operations Research for organizing battles and the movement of men and material. 
The wartime development of another systems approach called cybernetics seemed to 
offer a science-based tool for comprehending, commanding, and controlling the 
behaviors of both machine technologies and living organisms. The parallel 
development of systems approaches in twentieth-century ecology, and its integration 
with cybernetic philosophies, promoted comprehension of the Earth’s 
biogeochemical systems as integrated with humanity’s technological and social 
systems. By the end of the 1960s, thinking in terms of systems had migrated beyond 
its original scientific and technological confines to signify an epistemology of 
holistic interconnection that was embodied by the symbol of Spaceship Earth. This 
popularized and holistic understanding of global interconnection triggered new 
realizations and concerns about the stability of the economic and ecological systems 
on which humanity depended. The development of global systems perspectives 
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among scientists and political leaders in the industrialized West was essential to the 
rise of global environmentalism and what became the global environmental moment.  
Chapter 2 examines the growing realization, especially in the industrialized 
global North, that humanity’s powerful technological and industrial systems 
threatened the ecological collapse of Earth’s interdependent systems. The most 
powerful instrument for instigating that realization was the global environmental 
hazard of radioactive atomic fallout. From the mid-1950s through the early 1960s, 
fears about nuclear fallout, and its newly realized spread across vast continental and 
oceanic distances, created worldwide awareness and concern about the 
interconnected global environment. Building from fears about global nuclear fallout 
and the new danger of deadly radioactive particles in children’s bones, additional 
environmental warnings by scientists evolved to include prognostications about 
massive famines and human die-off from overpopulation, as well as threats about 
future silent springs from the spraying of deadly chemicals. Popular environmental 
scientists and activists like Linus Pauling, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Paul 
Ehrlich, and other experts like economists Kenneth Boulding and Barbara Ward 
argued that humanity’s failure to recognize and protect the systems of environmental 
interconnection on Spaceship Earth were leading to planetary-scale eco-catastrophes. 
These warnings, and the worldwide scale of impact on which they spoke, all 
contributed to what soon flowered into the new global environmental moment. 
This global environmental moment—a time that saw the dawn of a new 
environmental consciousness that spread globally to crescendo in a cluster of popular 
and political responses in Stockholm over the best means of solving global 
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environmental challenges—first originated in and addressed the particular concerns 
of the world’s affluent and industrialized nations. Chapter 3 details how continued 
scientific admonition and growing public concern about widespread environmental 
hazards produced a multitude of popular and political responses, including the 
development in some influential nations in the global North of a grassroots 
environmental movement and new diplomatic efforts by their governments to 
coordinate international environmental policies for ameliorating those hazards. By 
the end of the 1960s, at the insistence of Sweden, the UN agreed to host a worldwide 
UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE)—the UN’s first single-issue 
conference at an intergovernmental and global scale—to address these growing 
environmental anxieties. Spurred by the continued warnings by leading 
environmental scientists and economists, growing numbers of political and popular 
actors in industrialized nations—in the United States, in Europe, and in Japan—
questioned the costs of unrelenting growth and economic development, which had 
served as their unifying article of faith in the economic boom following World War 
II. Yet the explosion of environmental concern among nations and citizens in much 
of the global North inspired the first Earth Day in the United States, major political 
reform in Japan, and the formation of new national environmental agencies and 
institutions. As planning for the UNCHE slowly commenced in 1970, indications 
across the global North signaled a possibility for forming new global institutions to 
redirect and limit economic growth as part of the process for saving Spaceship Earth 
from environmental catastrophe. 
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However, for the majority of people living in relative poverty in the global 
South, their focus remained not on protecting the global environment but on 
promoting their economic development. While Chapter 3 reveals how influential 
actors in the largest and most dynamic industrial economies in the global North 
suggested redirecting and controlling economic growth in the name of the 
environment, Chapters 4 and 5 detail how nations from the global South, led initially 
by Brazil, used their numerical influence within the UN to co-opt the early evolution 
of global environmental politics to advance their immediate desires for economic 
development—even as environmental experts and systems analysts in the global 
North continued their calls for limiting economic growth. 
Chapter 4 shows how Brazil reordered the UNCHE’s early preparatory 
process by including the concerns of LDCs, namely by inserting economic 
development into the UN’s international environmental policymaking. By doing so, 
Brazil helped lay the conceptual foundations for what later became the UN’s primary 
agenda for environmental policy: sustainable development. In the first years of the 
1970s, diplomats from Brazil’s Foreign Ministry ensured that development became 
the dominant focus in the UN’s emerging global environmental discourse, and they 
fiercely defended Brazil’s national sovereignty to exploit national resources to 
advance its development. Brazil also introduced the concept of additionality, which 
suggested wealthy nations in the global North should take responsibility for global 
environmental pollution by providing additional funding to the global South for 
environmental protection beyond established commitments for foreign aid and 
international development. 
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By the end of 1970, the UNCHE’s newly appointed Secretary-General, 
Maurice Strong centered conference planning on his notion that “the process is the 
policy.” Rather than wait for the actual UNCHE to address political conflicts on 
global environmental issues, Maurice Strong’s emphasis on the conference planning 
process meant Brazil’s arguments about the sanctity of sovereignty and for 
environmental policies to promote, not limit, economic growth might ultimately 
shape the UNCHE’s eventual achievements. Strong’s first priority, however, 
remained making the UNCHE an actual global conference, which meant including 
wary LDCs in its planning process. By the beginning of 1971, Brazil’s early efforts 
to reshape the UNCHE led to the introduction of a new major conference subject on 
“Environment and Development.” Endeavoring to capture full LDC participation, 
Strong made this new topic central to the UNCHE and planned a series of meetings 
with LDCs for 1971 to incorporate their views on the UNCHE’s planning process. 
The tensions inherent in “Environment and Development” were on full 
display throughout 1971, featuring several significant events of the global 
environmental moment. Chapter 5 provides a detailed focus on those events with 
perspectives from both the global North and South. In June 1971, one year before the 
Stockholm circus commenced the following summer, Maurice Strong organized a 
meeting in Founex, Switzerland, where economic development experts from LDCs 
documented their reasons for a global synthesis of development and environment. 
The Founex seminar’s report, Development and Environment, helped enlist for the 
UNCHE the full participation of LDCs. However, the same month as the Founex 
meeting, publication of a book called World Dynamics by Jay Forrester, a computer 
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modeler and systems scientist at MIT, renewed debate in the global North on the 
projected dangers of economic growth leading possibly to the collapse of Spaceship 
Earth’s environmental systems. Amid that excitement, the United States that summer 
suddenly renounced its central position in the Bretton Woods economic system of 
currency valuation, which, for the first time since the end of World War II, created 
an opportunity for major renegotiation of the global economic order. Perhaps the 
UNCHE would provide a forum to re-align the global economy with the realities of 
global environmental interconnection.  
By the end of 1971, after heated debate between ambassadors of Brazil and 
the United States in the UN General Assembly that year, Brazil and other LDCs 
successfully embedded the priority of development in all environmental planning 
with UN General Assembly Resolution 2849. In order to avert any economic 
renegotiations at the UNCHE that might try to limit economic growth for the sake of 
environmental protection, this resolution made concrete the demands by LDCs to 
ensure the protection of both sovereignty and development in the UNCHE’s 
proposed Declaration and its recommendations for action. This LDC triumph limited 
any ambitions by environmental activists for the UNCHE to institutionalize the 
environment forcefully within a UN framework. I identify that resolution as the 
place where the conceptual roots for what later became the UN’s sustainable 
development agenda were first formalized. Despite additional publication in early 
1972 of popular studies in the global North that questioned the environmental 
dangers of economic growth, including the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report, 
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the UNCHE became circumscribed in its options for finding solutions to global 
environmental problems even before it began. 
Despite the UNCHE’s inability to question the role of economic development 
as part of global environmental policymaking, Chapter 6 shows how the actual 
events that occurred in Stockholm during the UNCHE’s ten days of meetings 
included some surprises and unexpected conflicts. For instance, while participating 
in their first major UN gathering in Stockholm, the communist People’s Republic of 
China sought to make the UNCHE a forum for critiquing the U.S. war in Vietnam 
and, to do so, re-opened debate on the fragile draft of the UNCHE Declaration. 
Several days of tedious conflict over new and sometimes radical amendments to the 
Declaration threatened to destroy the UNCHE entirely. Literally at the midnight 
hour, following an inspiring speech by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, nations 
at the UNCHE finally approved by acclamation its slightly revised Declaration on 
the Human Environment, its Action Plan with 109 recommendations, and its 
establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), later 
headquartered in Kenya as the first UN institution located in a LDC. 
Despite political scientists’ often uncritical celebration of the UNCHE as a 
watershed in global environmental politics, a closer look reveals continued conflict 
over the issues of growth and a mixed assessment on the success of LDCs in 
securing their development-centered rhetoric throughout the UNCHE’s final 
documents. To be fair, massive international media attention to the UNCHE 
successfully promoted a new global environmental awareness, and widespread 
support of the UNCHE’s documents projected a successful image of the UN 
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establishing international accord toward resolving the global environmental crisis. 
But the UN’s non-binding language merely reinforced the pre-UNCHE status quo, 
with wealthy nations avoiding LDC injunctions for additionality and little actual 
progress toward resolving the growing global environmental problems that inspired 
the UNCHE in the first place. As such, the UNCHE offered an empty victory and its 
rhetorical institutionalization of development into environmental policy signaled an 
end to the global environmental moment. In the wake of the UNCHE, solutions to 
global environmental problems within the UN were significantly narrowed to 
revolve henceforth almost entirely in terms of more money, more technology, and 
more management, without questioning the social and economic values that 
contribute to global environmental challenges. In sum, the UNCHE enabled some 
progress toward nature protection and spurred global awareness of environmental 
challenges, but it did little to resolve the main problems at the root of the global 
environmental crisis: the social systems of development that reinforce inequality and 
reproduce patterns of ecological degradation. 
But, as revealed in Chapters 7 and 8, the UN was not the only locus of action 
in the global environmental moment, nor the only forum participating in 
Stockholm’s environmental circus. Due in part to the UN’s refusal to reconsider the 
sacredness of national sovereignty and its inability to seriously explore conflicts 
between economic development and environmental protection, other actors in the 
global environmental moment arrived in Stockholm to debate and offer their own 
solutions for saving Spaceship Earth. Chapter 7 takes a step back before the UNCHE 
to trace the history of a unique non-governmental organization (NGO) named Dai 
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Dong, founded in 1969. Dai Dong was established and directed by a man named 
Alfred Hassler, who actively sought the advice and participation of environmental 
scientists and systems thinkers in promoting peaceful solutions to the global 
environmental crisis outside the limitations of the UN. As a life-long pacifist and 
leader in the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Alfred Hasser founded Dai 
Dong as a transnational peace organization that appreciated the systems thinking 
framework of the global environmental moment and thus aimed to synthesize 
ecosystem ecology with notions of social justice. 
Dai Dong expressed Hassler’s conviction that only a transnational fellowship 
embodying Earth’s interdependent systems and rejecting the divisions of national 
sovereignty could find solutions for the world’s interconnected crises of war, 
overpopulation, its exploitation of natural resources by heedless economic 
development, and its related environmental destruction. Hassler thus became a 
knowledge broker of environmental science and ethics, especially through Dai 
Dong’s promotion of the Menton Statement, which outlined his convictions for 
transnational solutions to environmental and other global challenges and was 
ultimately signed by thousands of the world’s biologists. After the Menton Statement 
launched Dai Dong’s meteoric rise in global environmental politics in 1971, 
Hassler’s disapproval of the UN’s insistence on national sovereignty encouraged Dai 
Dong to sponsor its own Independent Environmental Conference in Stockholm 
during the UNCHE in June 1972. Dai Dong’s Independent Conference featured 
some thirty environmental experts from both the global North and South. At 
Stockholm, however, the Dai Dong conference fractured amid conflicts between 
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scientists originally from LDCs and experts from the North, particularly over 
Hassler’s cherished issues of national sovereignty and neo-Malthusianism. After its 
unsuccessful attempt to create transnational unity during Stockholm’s environmental 
circus, Dai Dong soon disbanded and by 1974, Alfred Hassler slipped into his 
retirement from his prior peace and environmental activism. The rapid rise and fall 
of Dai Dong offers contemporary lessons on the limits of transnational 
environmentalism while its comparison to other global environmental NGOs like 
Friends of the Earth reveals how environmental activism and national sovereignty 
need not exist in total opposition. 
Chapter 8 also takes a step back before the UNCHE to explore the 
acrimonious debate between environmental scientists and activists Barry Commoner 
and Paul Ehrlich over the causes of the global environmental crisis—and, therefore, 
the means to its solution. After reviewing the roots of their conflict at the dawn of 
the global environmental moment, this chapter explains the context of their 
participation in Stockholm’s environmental circus in 1972. Both Commoner and 
Ehrlich appeared at the Environment Forum in Stockholm, a semi-official alternative 
conference for environmental NGOs, held simultaneously during the UNCHE. At 
the Environment Forum in Stockholm, Ehrlich began speaking about population 
control when his stage was overtaken by a group of radical Third World scientists 
affiliated with Commoner and led by an Iranian biologist, Taghi Farvar, who was 
Commoner’s star graduate student and who, earlier, had created divisions at Dai 
Dong’s Independent Environmental Conference in Stockholm. At the Environment 
Forum, Farvar and his collective of Third World scientists justified their 
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commandeering of Ehrlich’s talk as an anti-imperialist assault against Ehrlich’s neo-
Malthusian calls for coercive population control. In Stockholm, the Commoner-
Ehrlich debate became not only a conflict between leading experts over the science 
behind the environmental crisis; it evolved into a conflict over national sovereignty 
and the right of recently decolonized LDCs to confront the environmental crisis on 
their own terms. In that way, the conflicts displayed during the Environment Forum 
actually reflected similar conflicts between the global North and South during the 
UNCHE planning and its events in Stockholm. 
 
Legacy of the Global Environmental Moment 
Seen as a heterogeneous whole, the various conferences of Stockholm’s 
environmental circus constituted a missed opportunity in which nation states, 
scientists, and civil society were unable to agree on how environmental realizations 
would fit into the future path of social and economic development on Earth. Instead 
of the major changes to human values, economics, and international politics that the 
correction of global environmental hazards demanded, the major structures of 
modernity emerged unimpeded; the status quo of industrial development and 
economic growth led by sovereign nation states remained the same as it had been 
before realization of the environmental crisis. 
New issues like climate change and the destruction of Earth’s atmospheric 
ozone layer have arisen since the dawn of the global environmental moment in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet today’s global environmental politics over how to 
save Spaceship Earth still remain fractured in debate over the issues of additionality, 
  27 
the sovereign rights of resource use, the responsibility of who should pay to protect 
the global commons, whether environment and development can be reconciled, and, 
for some, even conflict over whose science is right or wrong on global 
environmental issues. As the climax of the global environmental moment, 
Stockholm’s failures left the legacy in which, today, global environmental politics 
remains deadlocked in debate between North and South over variations of similar 
unresolved environmental concerns and threats first addressed in Stockholm, forty 
years earlier. 
By highlighting the early scientific and conceptual framing of Spaceship 
Earth and by providing a detailed study of global political dynamics over how to best 
manage Spaceship Earth both before and during Stockholm’s environmental circus, 
this dissertation seeks historical answers to when and why global environmental 
politics became stagnated on the North-South divide over what corrective actions 
should be taken and who should pay for them. It highlights the complex links 
between stories and ideas about environmental change over time, the science and 
knowledge used to bolster those stories, and the political, social, and economic 
forces motivating the use of one particular story over another. This dissertation 
therefore traces the history of whose knowledge, discourse, and science became 
dominant over time, why it happened the way it did, who won and who lost in this 
process, and what legacies it established for contemporary frameworks of 
environmental diplomacy. This detailed study of the global environmental moment 
begins with the rise of Spaceship Earth to help us understand where it and its 
precious cargo have traveled since.  
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Chapter 1 
 
SEEING SYSTEMS, GOING GLOBAL: 
Systems Thinking and the Rise of Spaceship Earth 
 
 
I know that age to age succeeds, 
Blowing a noise of tongues and deeds, 
A dust of systems and of creeds. 
—Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Two Voices, 1832. 
 
“If someone were to analyze current notions and fashionable catchwords, he 
would find ‘systems’ high on the list. The concept has pervaded all fields of 
science and penetrated into popular thinking, jargon, and mass media.” 
—Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Introduction to General System Theory, 1967. 
 
 
Just five days before his sudden death at age sixty-five, in the summer of 
1965, Adlai Stevenson delivered his last public speech before the world community 
of the United Nations (UN), which he had helped create two decades earlier. 
Stevenson, then American ambassador to the UN, delivered his final oratory in 
Geneva to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN’s 
central forum for international social and economic issues. Before representing the 
United States in the UN, Stevenson helped found the UN in the late 1940s; he served 
as governor of Illinois; and twice, in 1952 and again in 1956, he had accepted the 
Democratic nomination in unsuccessful bids for the U.S. Presidency. In 1965, before 
the ECOSOC council, Stevenson emphasized the need for international politics to 
expand both economic development and benevolence. Our survival, he believed, 
depended on such expansion of thought and deed. Stevenson’s long speech detailed a 
world divided not just between East and West—between the Cold War’s 
communism and democracy—but a world split North and South—between nations 
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rich and poor. Stevenson’s final statement on the global stage concluded with a now-
famous warning about the planetary need for political and ecological 
interdependence. 
In the original notes for his speech, Stevenson underscored particular points 
of interconnection and mutual reliance. “We travel together,” Stevenson 
emphasized, “passengers on a little space ship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves 
of air and soil; all committed for our safety to its security and peace; preserved from 
annihilation only by the care, the work, and I will say, the love we give our fragile 
craft.” Stevenson portrayed humanity as a unified species on planet Earth, and, 
famously, he extended the imagery of planet Earth as a spaceship, later designated 
Spaceship Earth. He concluded with a warning about the global split in wealth 
between North and South: “We cannot maintain [our fragile craft] half fortunate, half 
miserable, half confident, half despairing, half slave—to the ancient enemies of 
man—half free in the liberation of resources undreamed of until this day. No craft, 
no crew can travel safely with such vast contradictions. On their resolution depends 
the survival of us all.”19 Just before leaving this world, Stevenson warned that 
Spaceship Earth, and human survival on it, required recognition of its inherent 
interdependencies on a worldwide scale. 
                                                
19 Adlai Stevenson, “Strengthening the International Development Institutions,” July 9, 1965, in 
The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, Vol. VIII: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965, edited by 
Walter Johnson (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 814-828, quote on 828, with emphasis 
in the original typewritten copy that Stevenson used when delivering the speech. This speech was also 
published in Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1965, just after Stevenson died. Stevenson alluded 
to Abraham Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech from June 1858, where Lincoln declared “A house 
divided against itself cannot stand,” which itself alludes to Biblical statements in the three synoptic 
gospels. 
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In the tumultuous years that followed, throughout the late 1960s and early 
1970s, this vision of Spaceship Earth—as a fragile craft, interconnected and 
requiring great care for the ongoing survival of its passengers—grew as part of a 
burgeoning environmental movement. Environmental concerns in the 1960s first 
blossomed in the industrialized nations of the global North, but by the end of the 
decade, they spread to encompass nations, organizations, and individual actors all 
across the planet.20 That initial wave of worldwide environmental awareness and 
concern produced what I call the global environmental moment, in which 
international and intergovernmental environmental conferences soon met to debate 
and reassess the environmentally destructive trajectories of modernization and 
industrial development—most notably at several conferences that arose in relation to 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), held in 
Stockholm, Sweden. Yet, how did the actors who planned and participated in these 
meetings develop their world-scale vision? What scientific framing enabled their 
conception of Earth as a vast system of interdependent systems? In short, what were 
the scientific and conceptual genealogies that fostered the symbol of Spaceship 
Earth? 
This chapter argues that the conceptualization of Spaceship Earth, which 
helped nourish the global environmental moment, built on the technological and 
scientific developments associated with the discourse of systems thinking during 
World War II and in the early decades of the Cold War—especially the post-war 
intersection of ecosystem ecology with the supposedly universal language of 
                                                
20 John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & 
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cybernetics. In 1965, Adlai Stevenson introduced a global audience at the UN 
ECOSOC council to his vision of Spaceship Earth—a planetary-scale conception of 
social, political, economic, and ecological interconnection and interdependence. 
Stevenson’s sudden death after his speech helped popularize for the world the 
vernacular of Earth as a spaceship. However, this chapter explains how that imagery 
emerged from the scientific discourse of systems thinking, which had evolved over 
several decades during and after World War II to eventually identify Earth and 
everything upon it as part of a unified system. 
It is no coincidence that a US ambassador to the UN espoused this planetary-
scale vision of integrated social, ecological, and technological systems. While the 
Soviet Union first launched humanity into the space age with Sputnik I, it was 
American science and technology that, in 1968, first sent humanity outside of 
Earth’s orbit and, in 1969, enabled men to walk on the moon and return safely back 
to Earth. While flying on those voyages and upon looking back at our home planet, 
many of the men involved in those great adventures—and they were all men—
experienced a profound realization about Mother Earth’s stark beauty against the 
black void of space. For the first time in our species existence, they saw our planet as 
a whole, as inherently unified by lands and seas without political boundaries, and 
endowed with resilient yet fragile biological systems of interconnection that made 
Earth a living planet. In so doing, American science and technology helped midwife 
                                                                                                                                     
Sons, 1995); Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York: Longman, 2000). 
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a new planetary consciousness on the unified nature of life on our shared planet, 
which Stevenson described as the fragile little craft on which we traveled together.21 
Stevenson’s imagery of Earth as a spaceship signified a new means of 
thinking globally in terms of interconnection and interdependence. Systems thinking, 
or what historian Thomas Hughes described as “the systems approach,” envisioned 
all of reality in the holistic terms of systems—a vision that could be extended to 
encompass all of the Earth itself as a unified system.22 Systems thinking did not 
directly equate with global thinking, but the evolution of thinking in terms of 
systems in the post-World War II period did expand conceptually to envision 
interconnections at a planetary scale. Historian Paul N. Edwards noted that “it is 
really only since the Second World War that that ‘the world’ has become a system in 
political, economic, and cultural terms.”23 Systems thinking provided the key 
conceptual and, importantly, scientific basis for understanding the Earth and its 
living inhabitants as integrated and interdependent, both ecologically and politically. 
Bolstered by the authority of science, post-war systems thinking thus became a 
primary factor in producing the global environmental moment that later culminated 
in Stockholm’s collection of conferences on the global environmental crisis.  
The rise of systems thinking emerged initially from the exigencies of global-
scale warfare and the development of new technologies during the Cold War. 
                                                
21 Robert Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2008). 
22 Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Parthenon, 1998), 141-195. 
23 Paul N. Edwards, “The World in a Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early Computerized 
Global Systems Models,” in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes, Systems Experts and 
Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 221. 
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Scientific systems thinking, and what evolved into the concept of Spaceship Earth, 
find their roots in the convergence of several scientific developments, first from the 
quantified operations of organizing world wars, and then with the invention of new 
mathematical theories about commanding and controlling machines and animals, 
alike. The success of systems thinking in those ventures paralleled its evolution in a 
host of different disciplines, especially ecology and the earth sciences. The 
expansion of systems thinking established new realizations about Earth as an 
integrated system, just as systems engineers were constructing spaceships that, for 
the first time, blasted humans beyond the biosphere. By the mid-1960s, systems 
thinking also resonated with a broad public and among professionals in civil 
government. For many professionals, especially in the industrialized world, the 
systems approach had become a prevalent epistemological view of ecological, 
technological, and social behaviors. By the end of the 1960s, thinking in terms of 
systems had migrated beyond its original scientific and technological confines to 
signify a social and ideological perspective of holistic interconnection—a vision 
embodied by the symbol and discourse surrounding Spaceship Earth.24  
 
Quantified Systems for Global Understanding  
What is a system? At its most basic, a system is an organized or connected 
group of objects. As a concept, it can be applied to any number of organized forms, 
                                                
24 Robert Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2008), 155-160; Linda Sargent Wood, A More Perfect Union: Holistic Worldviews and the 
Transformation of American Culture after World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Debora Hammond, The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems 
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from the particles of atomic physics or the living organisms of biology, to the 
prevailing political, economic, or social order. A system’s collection of objects is 
interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over 
time. A system, therefore, is a set of relations whereby the adjoined objects feedback 
on each other to produce an outcome. The system may be nudged, constricted, 
provoked, or induced by outside forces. But the system’s response to those forces is 
characteristic of itself. The same outside forces applied to a different system would 
likely produce an entirely different response.25 
The relationship between structure and behavior determines how a system 
works and what results it will produce. A system with a complex structure typically 
exhibits a complex behavior—the more complex the system’s structure, the more 
complex its behavior. Complex systems also tend to produce more complex final 
results. Understanding the relations between structure and behavior provides insight 
for how to restructure a system to produce different patterns of behavior and obtain 
different results. Understanding and thinking in terms of systems enables the 
identification of the root causes of complex problems, which creates opportunities 
for the solution of those complex problems.26 
Early systems methods applied mathematical formulas to multiple variables 
as a means to, for example, manage the most effective use of resources for the 
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25 Donella H. Meadows, edited by Diana Wright, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River 
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2008), 1-34. 
26 Donella H. Meadows, edited by Diana Wright, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River 
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production of goods or for their most efficient distribution. Historian of technology, 
Thomas P. Hughes, revealed a nascent consciousness of systems thinking in several 
mechanical developments: in the engineering and early development of electrical 
power networks, in Fredrick W. Taylor’s efforts to improve efficiency, and in Henry 
Ford’s intensive methods of industrial production in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.27 These roots of systems thinking emerged from the quantified 
forces of mechanical engineering. In addition to advancing technological 
development, rational quantification came progressively to signify authoritative 
knowledge and scientific legitimacy. 
 Quantification provided a logical basis for objectivity, and its increased use 
in science added to the legitimacy of science in defining nature’s basic laws. For 
centuries, philosophers and scientists alike noted that nature seemed to behave in 
accord with the quantifiable rules of mathematics, which in turn seemed to translate 
the language of nature.28 Yet, as historian Paul N. Edwards noted, “even long after 
the Scientific Revolution, when ‘the world’ had become for many an immense but 
finite globe, comprehending the forces that act upon it as a whole—as a system—
remained for the most part beyond reach.”29 Developments in the mid-twentieth 
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century helped bring an understanding about those global systems within reach. The 
success of the systems approach for comprehending vast and diverse forces of 
integration eventually led systems thinking to evolve from its hard quantification in 
science and technology to a softer and generalized conceptualization about imperiled 
ecological, economic, and political systems of integration on Spaceship Earth. 
Most historical accounts credit the exigencies of World War II for the 
technical and institutional flowering of the systems approach, where it enabled more 
efficient movement of men and material, and increased the effectiveness of aerial 
bombardments and defense.30 In a global war that required massive systems of 
production for assaults in multiple arenas of battle, Allied military planners sought 
rationalized and objective war operations. Professional scientists and mathematicians 
thus applied their quantification and computation abilities to help coordinate the 
activities of diverse actors across dynamic theaters of global warfare. During World 
War II, systems thinking appeared in various forms and under different names, 
including operations research, systems engineering, cybernetics, systems analysis, 
and systems dynamics. Physicists and mathematicians became particularly valuable 
for their skills in modeling probabilistic systems. Through the language of numbers, 
quantification, and mathematics, scientists drafted into wartime projects emphasized 
                                                
30 For the flowering of systems thinking in World War II, see Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. 
Hughes, Systems Experts and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, 
World War II and After (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), especially David A. Mindell, 
“Automation’s Finest Hour: Radar and System Integration in World War II,” pp. 27-56, and Erik P. 
Rau, “The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States during World War II,” pp. 57-92.  
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the objectivity of their systematic approaches, which lent twentieth-century systems 
thinking scientific credibility.31  
For example, the British, soon followed by the Americans, applied a 
quantitative systems approach to maximize the efficiency of their war efforts, 
especially against German U-boats. American war planners, who described this 
systems approach as operations research, or simply OR, eventually applied it to 
almost all of their war planning efforts. Essentially, OR used mathematical analysis 
to synthesize simultaneously the observational data on all the elements of logistical 
and tactical war planning. Instead of maximizing the performance of individual 
elements in a system, OR’s quantitative analyses offered military commanders the 
best possible combinations of those elements, which extended the application of 
existing weapons or improved the efficiency of existing systems of production.32 
British and American scientists applied an OR systems approach by 
analyzing German U-boat diving patterns in tandem with the results of Allied 
reconnaissance methods. After creating mathematical formalizations of the problem, 
teams of wartime scientists and mathematicians ascertained ideal aerial searching 
strategies, determined optimal patterns and sizes for naval convoys, and established 
new fuse settings for depth charges. The synthesis of their applied OR adjustments 
immediately tripled the Allied destruction of German U-boats, leading German 
forces to assume incorrectly that Britain had designed a deadly new explosive. 
                                                
31 Theodore M. Porter, “Quantification and the Accounting Ideal in Science,” Social Studies of 
Science 22:4 (November 1992): 633-652; M. Fortun and S. S. Schweber, “Scientists and the Legacy 
of World War II: The Case of Operations Research (OR),” Social Studies of Science 23:4 (November 
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British and American scientists, however, had simply used a quantified systems 
approach to better manage their war efforts.33 
Due to its successes, the systems methodologies of OR expanded rapidly 
with analytical evaluations of other complex organizations and operations, both 
biological and technological. Historians M. Fortun and S. S. Schweber explained that 
OR eventually became “an integral element in the planning of the major campaigns - 
including strategy and logistics, the training and management of manpower, the cost 
effectiveness of weapons, and the allocation of resources.” OR approaches initially 
synthesized biology and technology by integrating in its calculations both human 
personnel and the machines and technologies of war. The systems studies of OR not 
only helped identify where to most effectively amass men at battlefronts, it also 
offered technological solutions. For instance, the OR approach outlined the most 
favorable formation for pilots flying bombing squadrons, the most advantageous 
armoring and arming of airplanes, and the best or likely location for human-aimed 
anti-aircraft artillery. By the end of the war, the U.S. Army Air Force had created 
OR divisions in all of its units.34 After the war, the 1947 book Science at War 
celebrated the “reduction of war to a rational process” and emphasized the 
importance of systems thinking to World War II. “Systematic scientific work on 
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known weapons,” it argued, “paid larger and quicker dividends. It beat Hitler.”35 
Systems thinking during World War II proved eminently successful tool for seeing 
and manipulating interconnections across vast scales when fighting a global war.  
 
A Universal System of Command and Control 
Cybernetics, another important systems approach that later intersected with 
the social sciences and ecology as part of the concepts coalescing into Spaceship 
Earth, also emerged during World War II. Cybernetics arose out of Allied efforts to 
design antiaircraft devices as servomechanisms—a mechanical device that senses its 
environment and automatically adjusts its action or output accordingly. Before the 
development of antiaircraft servomechanisms, the inept accuracy of antiaircraft guns 
wasted vast amounts of ammunition attempting to bring down disappointingly few 
enemy aircraft—aircraft that became increasingly faster and more maneuverable. To 
solve that problem, wartime engineers, mathematicians, and physicists collaborated 
to design and construct servomechanisms that combined the new technologies of 
environment-sensing radar and calculating analog computers with artillery cannons. 
Analog computers, applied to artillery guns, calculated an enemy plane’s probable 
future position based on inputs from radar. The servomechanism quantified and 
combined this information to automatically adjust the cannon’s next shot. The design 
process for creating antiaircraft servomechanisms built on of well-known concepts 
for self-regulating and self-reinforcing feedback. Feedback in self-regulating systems 
                                                
35 J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 
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like thermostats occurred when the mechanical system’s action in an environment 
affected that environment and fed back to affect the system’s future action, thus 
making a circuit or loop of cause-and-effect. During the design and construction of 
these antiaircraft devices, the potential application of feedback controls to human 
operators eventually inspired an entirely new mode of systems thinking called 
cybernetics.36 
Norbert Wiener, a mathematics professor at MIT, played a central role in the 
development and promotion of cybernetics. In 1941, Wiener joined an 
interdisciplinary team of scientists under U.S. government sponsorship at MIT’s 
Radiation Laboratory, where they explored the challenges of servomechanism 
design. Servomechanisms sought an interactive and automated anti-aircraft system 
that could respond to changing dynamics in its surrounding environment based on 
limited information, which was constantly updated, fed back into the system, and 
recalculated again. Out of efforts to predict an aircraft’s future trajectory from its 
velocity and current location, Wiener, along with American engineer Julian Bigelow 
and Mexican neurobiologist Arturo Rosenblueth, formulated a very general 
statistical theory of prediction and control based on incomplete information. This 
theory, which they called feedback control, provided the basis of servomechanism 
designs that placed soldiers, calculating machines, and artillery power into a single 
integrated system. By developing a theory that could control dynamic behavior of 
machines co-operated by humans, Wiener, Bigelow, and Rosenbluth next realized 
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the theory could apply directly to humans, and perhaps to any biological organism 
with a central nervous system that operated in an environment and adjusted its 
behavior according to changes in that environment.37 
Weiner, Bigelow, and Rosenblueth comprehended that, in general, 
information feedback not only helped their machines predict future positions of 
moving aircraft, it also helped humans predict an aircraft’s future position. By 
extension, then, the theory of feedback control seemed to offer a mathematical 
system equally applicable to controlling calculating machines as to a nervous 
system’s calculations for controlling an animal’s behaviors, including the human 
animal. Conceptually, the theory of information feedback integrated humans and 
machines in a unified system of command and control; both machines and organisms 
could be considered and treated as components of manageable systems, even 
integrated in a single system. In 1942, Rosenblueth presented their theory to a small 
interdisciplinary meeting organized under the sponsorship of the Josiah Macy Jr. 
Foundation. Leading psychologists, neurologists, and social scientists, including the 
anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, attended the meeting and left 
excited. They wanted further explorations on feedback concepts and their potential 
application to various fields of inquiry.38 
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In 1943, Wiener, Bigelow, and Rosenblueth published a foundational paper 
that compared servomechanisms’ purposeful behavior as similar to the behavior of 
living organisms through the functions of negative feedback. Negative feedback, 
they explained, consisted of information cycled through a dynamic, self-corrective, 
and purpose-oriented system. The cycled information replenished a device, a human, 
or another organism with information on the effects of an earlier adjustment to its 
surrounding environment, which it could then use to refine and control future 
adjustments towards its goal.39 Structurally, machines and organisms may be 
different, but they could be classified similarly as purposeful and, based on their 
prior actions, predictive. Behavior became purposeful when the cycles of 
information and adjustment guided a machine or organism toward a goal. Out of 
these realizations emerged a new systems science that Wiener later named 
cybernetics.40 
Wiener based the term cybernetics on the Greek root kybernetes, meaning 
“steersman” or “helmsman,” with his clear emphasis on guiding, directing, and 
controlling the direction of a ship. No surprise, then, that the following decades saw 
widespread extension of systems thinking beyond these scientific confines to help 
shape the global systems metaphor of Spaceship Earth. According to Wiener, 
cybernetics promised “control and communication in the animal and the machine.” 
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Wiener’s further development of cybernetic ideas during World War II attracted the 
attention of key thinkers in a several fields, including that of his friend and colleague 
at MIT, John von Neumann. Von Neumann, a mathematician and polymath, made 
pioneering contributions to a variety of sciences, from pure mathematics to quantum 
physics, and from economics to computer programming. During World War II, von 
Neumann served as a principle member of the Manhattan Project to build the world’s 
first nuclear bomb, and he later calculated key steps of nuclear physics involved in 
the thermonuclear reactions of hydrogen bombs.41 Although cybernetics was rooted 
in machine theories of information, it offered for Weiner, von Neumann, and others 
a mathematical approach that appeared applicable universally to all self-organizing 
and self-regulating systems, from biological systems of cells to the social systems of 
civilizations, and therefore from neuroscience and social psychology to economics 
and ecology. Here we see the emergence of a science-based systems thinking that 
aimed grandly, if naively, to provide a universal language applicable to all reality.42 
In January 1945, as World War II drew to a close, Weiner and von Neumann 
organized a meeting with selected colleagues to further explore the application of 
cybernetics to other fields, including as a unified mathematical formulation to 
describe the control of both mechanical devices and biological systems. The interest 
and excitement generated at that meeting encouraged the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation 
to fund, beginning in 1946, a series of interdisciplinary conferences eventually titled, 
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“Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social 
Systems.” Macy Conference attendees included a diverse group of twenty to thirty 
regular participants with a handful of invited interdisciplinary guests. Attendees 
included philosophers, engineers, mathematicians, psychologists, neuroscientists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, and ecologists.43 The ten Macy Conferences held 
between 1946 and 1953 played a significant role in spreading the concepts of post-
war systems thinking—especially cybernetics, but also the systems approach 
generally—from the confines of mathematics, and engineering to a host of other 
academic disciplines. As historian Peter J. Taylor has argued, the Macy Conferences 
popularized in many academic fields “the perspective that complex systems can be 
treated as self-regulating feedback systems.”44  
Early advocates of cybernetics like Weiner and von Neumann purposely cast 
it as a meta-theory, or an explanation of how everything is connected to everything 
else—a phrase that biologist and environmental activist Barry Commoner would 
adopt twenty-five years later when defining his laws of ecology.45 The cybernetic 
concepts of negative feedback for self-regulating systems were nothing new. What 
was new, however, was the generalization of these ideas into universal principles 
that applied to the quantification of artificial and organic materials, and the 
embodiment of these concepts in entirely new orders of technology like 
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servomechanisms and early computers. Cybernetics quickly became allied with a 
collection of technical and theoretical endeavors in the post-war information 
sciences, including OR, computer science, game theory, and information and 
communication theory. Philosopher of science Geof Bowker noted that the concepts 
of cybernetics were elusive, yet “this elusive quality itself bolstered the universality 
of the language, making cybernetics a general approach to the world.”46 The 
concepts of communication and control developed at the Macy Conferences 
extended not just to information technologies, but to the natural and social sciences 
as well.47  
One social scientist, Lawrence Frank, an economist and Macy Conference 
regular, wrote in 1948 of the Macy Conference explorations that “we are engaged, 
today, in one of the major transitions or upheavals in the history of ideas, as we 
recognize that many of our older ideas and assumptions are now obsolescent and 
[we] strive to develop a new frame of reference.”48 The unifying feature for the 
interdisciplinary complex of ideas accompanying cybernetics, and the new and 
developing frame of reference to which Lawrence Frank alluded, was the recognition 
of controlling systems of systems, or an attention to and integration of whole 
systems, including those that moved toward the planetary scale of Spaceship Earth. 
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The cybernetic concept’s appreciation of whole systems and its theoretical 
integration of technology with the biological systems of nature soon factored into the 
related development of systems thinking in the field of ecology. 
 
Ecological Epistemologies 
In 1971, when Barry Commoner outlined his laws of ecology for a popular 
audience then concerned about humanity’s impact on Spaceship Earth’s 
environmental systems, he explained “our ability to picture the behavior of such 
systems has been helped considerably by the development, even more recent than 
ecology, of the science of cybernetics.”49 For Commoner and others concerned about 
the stability of Spaceship Earth, cybernetics helped them “see” the interaction of 
complex environmental and technological systems at a global scale. The application 
of cybernetics to ecology first occurred at a Macy Conference in 1946, as part of the 
work of G. Evelyn Hutchinson, a British-born ecologist at Yale University. By the 
late 1940s, even before the Macy Conferences explored unifying concepts of 
cybernetic feedback in other fields of natural and social science, Hutchinson was 
already thinking about the planetary-scale interconnections of living systems with 
inert systems, including human technological systems. Yet Hutchinson’s 
contributions built upon a deeper evolution of ecological thinking that synthesized 
biology with physical and chemical interactions. Before we get to Hutchinson’s 
intersection of cybernetics with ecology in the 1940s and the evolution of ecological 
systems thinking into the symbol of Spaceship Earth, we must first explore the 
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separate development of a systems approach in ecology, which had evolved since at 
least the nineteenth century.50 
In 1866, upon reading Darwin’s theory of evolution, the German zoologist 
Ernest Haeckel coined the term “ecology” (oekologie) in his synthetic, two-volume 
work, General Morphology of Organisms (Generelle Morphologie der Organismen). 
Haeckel used the Greek root oikos, meaning household or family, as reference to 
studying an animal’s relations with its organic home or environment. The linguistic 
inception of ecology was also analogous to economy, from the Greek notion of 
oeconomicus, meaning rules and laws (nomos) of the house (oikos), which dealt with 
the efficient management of resources through interconnected market relations. Over 
a century later, the forces of ecology and economy would clash during the global 
environmental moment as a conflict between “Environment and Development.” But, 
at their linguistic roots, both ecology and economy signified systemic notions of 
interconnection.51 
In the early twentieth century, ecological researchers embraced an organic 
model of interaction between living organisms and their environments, which in 
retrospect appears as a very generalized form of systems thinking. American 
ecologist Frederick Clements developed influential ecological theories by 
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envisioning plants as a developing community that eventually climaxed in a stable 
system of natural harmony. In 1905, Clements described the entirety of a plant 
community, such as a forest and all of its various living components, as a singular 
“complex organism.” Clements also saw the interacting parts of a plant community 
corresponding to the interactions of cells in an individual organic body. He believed 
large plant communities progressed through a unified life cycle similar to the 
processes of a single organism. Clements argued that, as a holistic unit, a plant 
community worked ultimately toward maturity and the maintenance of its whole 
entity in a stable, homeostatic state of equilibrium that he described as a plant 
community’s “climax.” Later ecologists like Paul R. Ehrlich rejected Clements’s 
conception of stable climax communities, particularly in terms of animal 
populations. However, Clements’s ideas played a significant role in promoting 
popular notions about the “balance of nature” seeking an enduring ecological 
equilibrium. Later in the century, ideas of ecological equilibrium would feed 
arguments for saving Spaceship Earth by limiting economic growth that upset 
supposed environmental balances.52 
Also in the early twentieth century, other ecologists like Charles C. Adams at 
the University of Chicago saw both plants and animals in a similar set of systemic 
relations, though less in terms of Clementsian stasis and more in terms of energy 
exchanges. In 1913, Charles C. Adams published his Guide to the Study of Animal 
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Ecology, which outlined a “dynamic-process” of animal ecology built around the 
thermodynamic flow of energy and the circulation of matter. For Adams, organisms 
were dynamic energy transformers. Borrowing concepts from chemistry and particle 
physics, Adams built his notion of biological interconnection up from the elementary 
particles of atoms, beyond Clementsian climax communities, and ultimately toward 
seeing the entire web of organic matter in an interrelated system of systems. Adams 
wrote, 
From electrons, atoms, molecules, chemical compounds, colloids, 
cells, tissues, organs, individuals, and culminating in the community 
and association, is seen in each dynamic center or microcosm, about 
which revolves other systems, in turn revolving as a part of a larger 
system in ever widening expansion, each in turn subordinate to a 
higher order of dominance, the culmination of interacting systems.53 
 
Adams viewed the processes of ecological change as hierarchic and as 
comprehensively biological, geological, chemical, and physical, whereby energy 
changed form and circulated through both the environment and the organism. This 
ecological notion of an energy-circulating system of systems likewise provided 
grounding for later ideas about Spaceship Earth as a global collection of systems that 
needed care and management for the continued survival of those systems. 
All of these interdisciplinary notions of environmental dynamics encouraged 
British ecologist A. G. Tansley to coin the term “ecosystem” in 1935. The ecosystem 
concept sought to understand biological environments in their totality by including 
all the living organisms, and all the non-living components that interact with living 
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organisms in a particular bounded area, as functioning in an ecological system. 
Writing in the leading journal Ecology, but borrowing from physics, Tansley saw 
conglomerates of plants and animals as “the living nuclei of systems.” But, 
importantly, he moved his analysis beyond Clementsian concepts that focused only 
on living communities. Instead, Tansley incorporated “the whole system (in the 
sense of physics), including not only the organism-complex, but also the whole 
complex of physical factors forming what we call the environment of the biome—
the habitat factors in the widest sense.” For later ecologists, the widest sense of this 
whole system extended to the whole Earth. But in 1935, Tansley’s contribution was 
to categorize the complex biomes of an organism as “the basic units of nature on the 
face of the earth,” which he named an ecosystem.54 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, before attending the Macy Conferences on 
cybernetics, British ecologist at Yale, G. Evelyn Hutchinson, became increasingly 
intrigued by Tansley’s idea of ecosystem ecology. After Tansley identified the basic 
units of nature in terms systems, Hutchinson sought to develop complex models and 
mathematics to isolate and quantify those basic units. Such a quantitative systems 
approach to ecology required drawing theoretical lines across nature. It placed a 
boundary around an ecosystem in order to better measure and calculate the diverse 
interactions and flows of energy within it. Yet Hutchinson recognized that Tansley’s 
ecosystem concept could be applied, at least in theory, to the study of biological 
relations at any scale, up to and including the scale of Spaceship Earth. In the 1940s, 
as industrialized nations engaged in a global-scale war, Hutchinson sought to further 
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integrate his quantitative and interdisciplinary approach to ecology with other 
interdisciplinary systems of science.55  
Hutchinson was already thinking in terms of interrelated systems on a 
planetary scale thanks to his introduction in the 1930s to the writings of Vladimir I. 
Vernadsky,. Vernadsky, a Russian geologist born in 1863, was a member of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences until his death in 1945. Vernadsky was among the first 
to promote a planetary concept of the “biosphere,” where inert and living matter 
were mutually formative and part of physico-chemical elements that shaped all of 
Earth’s evolutionary patterns. Vernadsky saw living things as a unified planetary 
entity, and he argued that life functioned as Earth’s primary geological force. As 
early as the 1920s, Vernadsky explained how life took energy from the sun, 
transformed it, and, in the process, redistributed the planet’s inert matter. Vernadsky 
thus described the entire biosphere as an integrated system that could be studied 
systematically through a combination of quantitative analyses that he termed 
biogeochemistry.56 Prolific and well respected in the Soviet Union, Vladimir 
Vernadsky remained little-known by Western scholars until his son, George 
Vernadsky who taught Russian history at Yale, introduced the elder Vernadsky’s 
writings to fellow Yale professor, the ecologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson. 
In the early 1940s, Hutchinson, with George Vernadsky’s help, translated 
some of Vladimir Vernadsky’s writing into English and published them in American 
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journals. Hutchinson described Soviet geologist Vladimir Vernadsky as “one of the 
most remarkable scientific leaders of the present century.”57 Hutchinson was 
especially taken by Vernadsky’s biogeochemical approach, which described Earth’s 
biological and geological dynamics in terms of physics and chemistry. In 
Hutchinson’s own publications, he quoted large sections from Vernadsky’s global 
analysis of biogeochemistry, which, according to Vernadsky, sought to reduce “a 
precise quantitative mathematical expression of … living nature in its indissoluble 
connection with the external medium,” or its environment. Hutchinson saw here 
something akin to his desire to quantify and measure the energy flows through 
ecosystems. He likewise sought to reduce “living nature” to, in the words of 
Vernadsky, the “energetical expressions of the work it does in the space of life upon 
our planet.”58 Perhaps, Hutchinson thought, Vernadsky’s desire to quantitatively 
analyze the energy transfers of Earth’s biogeochemical processes could best be 
accomplished through Tansley’s ecosystem approach.  
A former student of Hutchinson’s named Raymond Lindeman produced the 
first actual proof-of-concept for ecosystem ecology, which Hutchinson pushed for 
publication in 1942, shortly after Lindeman’s death. Lindeman had identified a 
Wisconsin lake as an ecosystem and studied the food-cycle relationships of both its 
biotic and abiotic components.59 Lindeman identified his work as “closely allied 
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with Vernadsky’s ‘biogeochemical’ approach.” Lindeman’s study included both 
living and non-living matter and traced throughout the lake ecosystem the phyisco-
chemical transformations of solar energy—from the sun’s conversion into food by 
“producers,” then eaten by “consumers,” and broken down into basic chemical 
elements by “decomposers.”60 
Hutchinson, who fought the reluctant editors of Ecology for the posthumous 
publication of Lindeman’s article, eventually convinced the editors that Lindeman’s 
groundbreaking study legitimated ecosystem ecology with rigorous empiricism and 
quantification. In an addendum to that publication, Hutchinson celebrated how 
Lindeman “came to realize … that the most profitable method of analysis lay in the 
reduction of all the interrelated biological events to energetic terms.”61 This new 
focus in ecology, lamented by some, marked a shift further away from Clements’s 
organic model of community and cooperation, and toward quantitative 
measurements of energy flowing throughout an ecosystem.62 
In the period after World War II, the quantified methodologies of the 
ecosystem approach helped legitimate ecology as a precise and objective science, 
and one that embraced a systems approach that had proved so successful in 
advancing other fields, like cybernetics. In the eyes of Hutchinson, however, the 
field of ecology still remained split between two calculating foci: the systems 
approach for measuring energy flows, and a quantitative focus on the population 
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dynamics of organisms in a particular area. For Hutchinson, the new science of 
cybernetics offered a theoretical synthesis for those two foci in ecology. 
Hutchinson’s application of cybernetics for ecological thinking provided another 
important stepping stone in fostering what by the mid-1960s became the concept of 
Spaceship Earth, which combined at a global scale the technological systems of 
humanity with nature’s ecological systems. 
 
Cybernetic Ecosystems, or Nature as Machine 
Hutchinson’s ideas to synthesize ecology via the seemingly universal 
approach of cybernetics coalesced in October 1946 with a paper titled, “Circular 
Causal Systems in Ecology,” which he delivered to an interdisciplinary Macy 
Conference on cybernetics at the New York Academy of Sciences. Hutchinson 
presented to this Macy Conference at the invitation of anthropologist Gregory 
Bateson, who knew Hutchinson from their early boyhood friendship in England. The 
science of interconnection, it seemed, often grew out of the personal interconnection 
of its scientists, particularly in Hutchinson’s career. Hutchinson’s paper had two 
sections. The first described Vernadsky’s “biogeochemical approach” to ecology as a 
fusion of biological and physical processes that explained the global distribution of 
chemicals in measurable, mathematical terms. His second and more speculative 
section offered a “biodemographic approach” to ecology, which Hutchinson 
developed through equations proposed for studying animal populations. He united 
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the two approaches through cybernetic feedback loops, which he called systems of 
circular causal paths.63 
Hutchinson argued that groups of organisms were governed by cybernetic 
feedback loops, and, as a result, these groups were “self-corrected within limits.” 
When an existing ecosystem’s biogeochemical limits were surpassed, he explained, 
violent oscillations would reduce populations and drive some of its components to 
extinction. A new system, now without those lost components, would then replace 
the old system. In short, Hutchinson described groups of organisms as systems with 
feedback loops that encouraged their self-regulation and persistence. Hutchinson 
thus synthesized the divergence between systems ecology and population ecology 
through the theory of cybernetic feedback. And at the same time, he emphasized the 
importance of an ecosystem’s biological limits. Not only did he promote a cybernetic 
vision of nature behaving similar to a servomechanism machine, he anticipated the 
environmental concern about the planetary limits to growth on Spaceship Earth.64 
Hutchinson’s Macy Conference presentation also suggested a means for 
controlling nature. If the components of an ecological system could be synthesized in 
a universal mathematical theory that also controlled machines, than an ecological 
system at any scale, from the local to the global, could theoretically be managed, 
manipulated, and controlled like a machine. According historian Peter J. Taylor, 
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cybernetic systems thinkers like Hutchinson “conceived of nature as a machine and, 
at the same time, acknowledged the purposive and regulatory character of that 
nature-machine.”65 A cybernetic vision of ecology enabled the weaving together of 
living and nonliving systems such that biological relations no longer remained 
separate from factors governing technological systems, or for that matter, from 
factors governing humanity’s social systems. In short, a systems approach to 
cybernetic ecology linked the environmental sciences to technocratic management. If 
properly quantified and understood through systems thinking, the control of any 
system seemed possible.  
Throughout the 1950s, this understanding of nature as a machine morphed 
easily into a systems approach both for the purposeful engineering and reordering of 
ecological systems, and, eventually, for efforts to engineer and reorder the global 
interactions of politics and economic development. Science philosopher Geof 
Bowker explained of cybernetics discourse, which applies to the general expansion 
of other systems thinking, “instead of the laboratory being barricaded off from the 
world, the world will become a laboratory.”66 These notions, in turn, provided a 
primary foundation for the synthesis of ecological systems thinking that supported 
the concept of Spaceship Earth. System thinking even played a role in developing 
the technological systems involved in constructing actual spaceships. Yet, the 
conceptual metaphor of Spaceship Earth could never have taken flight without the 
spread of system thinking, especially ecosystem ecology, to wider audiences beyond 
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the veterans of wartime science and outside the interdisciplinary meetings of the 
Macy Conferences.  
The spread of the ecosystem concept to wider audiences, and its rise to 
prominence within the science of ecology, owes a great deal to the work of two 
brothers, Howard T. Odum and his older brother Eugene P. Odum, both ecologists 
heavily influenced by Evelyn Hutchinson’s cybernetic view of systems ecology. 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the popularization of ecosystem ecology in 
the Odum brothers’ widely regarded research helped lay the groundwork the 
eventual popular understanding and acceptance of the Spaceship Earth metaphor in 
the mid-1960s. And with the Odum brothers, here too, we can trace the personal 
systems of interrelation back to Evelyn Hutchinson. Back in 1947, Hutchinson took 
the younger Howard Odum on as a graduate student, and directed him toward a 
biogeochemical study of the chemical element of strontium, which Howard Odum 
completed in 1950. By the end of that decade, as Chapter 2 explains in more detail, 
the movement of the radioactive isotope strontium 90 throughout ecosystems and 
into human bodies became an issue of worldwide concern, and also provided a key 
explanatory tool of ecosystem dynamics of public fearful about its radioactive 
dangers. However, in the early 1950s, after completing his doctoral research with 
Hutchinson, Howard Odum explained Hutchinson’s ideas of cybernetic ecosystems 
to his older brother, Eugene Odum, also an ecologist. In 1953, Eugene Odum took 
the ideas of Hutchinson’s cybernetic ecosystem in his brother’s notes from graduate 
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school to write and publish the first book on ecology with the ecosystem as its 
central organizing concept.67 
Eugene Odum’s enormously influential textbook, Fundamentals of Ecology, 
expressed several ideas drawn clearly from the work of Tansley, Vernadsky, 
Lindeman, Hutchinson, and his younger brother Howard. Early in the book, for 
instance, the elder Odum defines an ecosystem in terms drawn from Hutchinson’s 
presentation at the 1946 Macy Conference. Eugene Odum wrote that an ecological 
system or ecosystem was “any entity or natural unit that includes living and 
nonliving parts interacting to produce a stable system in which the exchange of 
materials between living and nonliving parts follows circular paths.” Odum further 
described the ecosystem as “the largest functional unit in ecology, since it includes 
both organisms (biotic communities) and abiotic environment, each influencing the 
properties of the other and both necessary for maintenance of life as we have it on 
earth.”68 Eugene Odum also argued that Earth constituted the largest ecosystem, and 
that humans’ social and technological systems could drastically alter that system, 
thereby making human interactions with complex biogeochemical cycles central to 
the stability and long-term survival both of existing ecosystems and human societies 
on Earth. For several years, Odum’s textbook based on cybernetic notions of 
ecosystem ecology had few competitors. It was used widely, reprinted several times, 
revised twice, and was translated into numerous languages.69 
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Odum brothers’ teaching and writing 
spread Hutchinson’s cybernetic ecosystem ideas, which, during that time, became 
the dominant paradigm in ecology. In the United States, the escalating and 
increasingly global Cold War spurred an influx of post-World War II government 
funding for scientific research, which included opportunities for ecologists to apply 
and test their ecosystem insights. In the mid-1950s, the Odum brothers benefited 
from these government expenditures in Cold War science, notably through their 
pioneering studies on energy-exchanges of radioactive particles through the 
ecosystems of thermonuclear test sites.70 The spread of ecosystem ecology even saw 
it applied as a means to explain and integrate thinking on other issues, including 
social ones. 
By the early 1960s, with growing public anxieties about environmental 
threats—especially from nuclear fallout as detailed in Chapter 2—ecological systems 
thinking became a welcome model that integrated humans and their technologies in 
global environmental considerations. By the mid-1960s, such conceptualizations 
helped promote the planetary metaphor of Spaceship Earth as a collective system of 
systems, including not just its ecological systems but humanity’s social, political, 
and technological systems as well. The cybernetic notion of nature-as-machine 
simplified complex systems to only a few components, which, in turn, reinforced a 
deterministic perception of natural, social, and technological organization. The 
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quantitative focus of ecosystem ecology thus encouraged a technocratic approach to 
managing both the natural environment and the human technologies acting within 
and upon it. Historian Debora Hammond explained that, as the impacts of human 
intervention into natural processes became increasingly problematic throughout the 
1960s, “ecological concepts were gradually integrated into the theoretical 
frameworks of the social sciences. … [A]n ‘ecological approach’ in these fields 
came to mean taking into account a larger framework. In economics, for example, it 
meant taking into consideration social, political, psychological, and other 
components of human interaction.”71 During the early decades of the Cold War, the 
popularization of ecosystem ecology helped a generalized form of systems thinking 
migrate from its quantitative roots as a tool in World War II, to a conventional 
framework for comprehending complex and large-scale interrelationships. As a 
result, the concept of Spaceship Earth thus came to carry the aura of objective 
scientific authority, even if it was merely a political symbol that could be deployed 
subjectively by anyone with a global ax to grind. 
 
Earth Science and Beyond 
By the time Spaceship Earth came into use in the mid-1960s, the term 
“system” applied generally to the ecological, the technological, and the social. Like 
the new conception of Earth as an integrated biosphere, human technological 
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systems had also become global in scope. As a metaphor, Spaceship Earth framed 
the problems of global industrial civilization in terms of humanity’s relationship to 
the environment and to each other. It explored human dynamics within the biosphere 
and the technosphere, and it did so in terms of humanity’s planetary survival. But, in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the metaphor of Spaceship Earth would never have 
been as potent if not for the construction of actual spaceships and the dawn of the 
Space Age.  
Beginning in the late 1950s and running throughout the 1960s, the further 
spread of global systems thinking, especially with regard to technological 
development, occurred through new human endeavors to explore outer space. The 
dawn of the Space Age, the moment when humanity made its first technological 
leaps beyond the biosphere, traditionally dates to October 4, 1957, with the Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik I, the world’s first human-created satellite. Immediately 
following the Soviet triumph, a space race ensued with fierce competition from the 
United States for predominance in space exploration.72 
The U.S.-Soviet space race emerged from the Cold War rivalry between the 
two nations. For both competing superpowers, leadership in space advancements not 
only implied technological superiority, it remained closely tied to national security 
interests due to rocketry’s destabilizing threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 
Equally important, however, supremacy in space also symbolized for the 
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superpowers a sense of ideological superiority. Both for policy-makers and a 
planetary public often caught in the crosshairs of global Cold War conflicts, 
domination of space suggested which system of social, political, and industrial 
economic modernization—Soviet communism or American capitalism—deserved 
global dominance and should earn emulation by the new nations born amid post-
World War II decolonization.73 And, as an upshot, launching the Space Age and 
running the space race not only blasted humankind beyond Earth’s boundaries, it 
inspired a new understanding of the systems supporting life back on Earth. 
The launch of Sputnik I and the ensuing space race has, in popular media 
coverage, nearly eclipsed the extensive activities of global scientific investigation 
and international cooperation during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), out 
of which the Space Age emerged. The IGY, which ran from July 1957 to December 
1958, was modeled on prior scientific inquiries of Earth’s poles during the 
International Polar Years of 1882-1883 and 1932-1933. The IGY expanded 
drastically those polar expeditions by including the entire planet within its scientific 
purview.74 Lloyd V. Berkner, an American physicist, proposed the IGY back in 1950 
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as a means to gather planetary scientific data, supposedly in the name of science as a 
peaceful and transnational search for universal knowledge. However, as an ardent 
Cold Warrior, Berkner’s covert purpose remained gathering global environmental 
data as a tool for American science to better wage the Cold War.75 When he first 
promoted the IGY publically in 1954, he masked its backdrop of Cold War 
militarism. Instead, he described the IGY’s goals in the rhetoric of scientific 
internationalism. In 1954, with UN forces still nursing wounds from the Korean War 
and with Cold War concerns having become thermonuclear, Berkner declared that, 
“Tired of war and dissension, men of all nations have turned to ‘Mother Earth’ for a 
common effort on which all find it easy to agree.”76 Envisioned in such a way, the 
IGY’s increase of environmental knowledge would, ideally, also help foster global 
social cohesion and understanding. The Mother Earth of the IGY eventually evolved 
into the Spaceship Earth of the 1960s, thanks in part to the IGY’s promotion of 
geoscience as a tool to better understand and manipulate Earth’s dynamic forces, as 
well as its role in launching the Space Age. 
The IGY’s diverse activities were organized by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions, a non-governmental collective of national scientific bodies and 
transnational scientific associations that—no surprise—Lloyd V. Berkner headed 
between 1957 and 1959. The coordination effort involved more than 4,000 research 
stations worldwide, either already operating or created as part of the IGY, some of 
which helped identify how humanity’s technological and industrial systems 
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negatively impacted the ecological systems of Spaceship Earth. For instance, a new 
research project created as part of the IGY included establishment of the Mauna Loa 
Observatory in Hawaii: the first program featuring continuous measurement of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. As part of the IGY, the inquiry into the 
need to measure atmospheric carbon content at a global scale encouraged nuclear 
physicist, Hans Suess, and Roger Revelle, then head of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography, to declare in 1957 that, “Through his worldwide industrialized 
civilization, man is unwittingly conducting a vast geophysical experiment on the 
Earth's climate.”77 The systems thinking and the construction of technological 
systems that accompanied the IGY intersected with and contributed to the growing 
consciousness of the global environment, which in turn inspired reconsideration of 
humanity’s influence over those planetary systems. 
Even though much IGY activity concentrated on Earth’s polar regions, 
including the permanent occupation of Antarctica as a peaceful science reserve, the 
IGY’s international investigations yielded interdisciplinary data from across the 
globe. Important results from the IGY involved appraisal of upper atmospheric 
winds, measurements of Earth’s magnetic field, discovery (and subsequently the 
covert nuclear explosion by American scientists) of the Van Allen radiation belts, 
charting ocean currents and depths, and discovery of the mid-Atlantic ridges, which 
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helped substantiate the theories of plate tectonics that undergird modern geology.78 
Collectively, these scientific investigations further enabled the comprehension of 
Earth as an integrated system of biogeochemical systems. In short, the IGY helped 
advance both the objective and conceptual realization of Spaceship Earth as an 
integrated system of global systems.  
The IGY also promoted disciplining Earth’s systems for greater control of 
those systems. This deeper scientific understanding of Earth’s natural systems was 
made possible by the development of new scientific and technological systems, not 
unlike the initial development of cybernetics from servomechanism designs. The 
most dramatic technological events planned as part of the IGY were the launches of 
Sputniks I and II in October and November 1957, and the American response with 
the launch of its first satellite, Explorer I, in January 1958. Here again, we see 
another manifestation of post-war systems thinking operating at a planetary scale. As 
a whole, the scientific discoveries and technological accomplishments of the IGY 
contributed substantially to a new understanding of the natural systems that 
comprised Spaceship Earth and to the emergence of a truly global scale for 
geoscience.  
The physical geosciences or earth sciences were among the privileged fields 
during the Cold War to receive incredible investment from the governments of 
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United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. According to historian 
Spencer Weart, the Cold War’s potential for armed conflict anywhere on the globe 
inspired military commanders’ realization that “they needed to understand almost 
everything about the environments in which they operated, from the ocean depths to 
the top of the atmosphere.”79 As a result, IGY’s production of knowledge in the earth 
sciences was embedded equally in transnational scientific organizations and 
competing national interests. Historian Allen A. Needell explained how successes 
during the IGY and later strides in space exploration bolstered scientific and 
technical intelligence, while simultaneously serving as “a vehicle of foreign policy, 
[and] as a means of providing certain information required by the military.”80 
Massive investments for the nuclear arms race and the associated space race led to 
construction of vast technological systems that simultaneously threatened 
humanity’s thermonuclear destruction and enabled humans to explore outer space.81 
Investments for space exploration accelerated after U.S. President John F. Kennedy 
declared to Congress in May 1961 his goal of sending a manned mission to the moon 
and back before the end of the 1960s.82 Part of the initial impetus for the space 
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program may well have been to secure international prestige. But the Cold War 
investments in nuclear capability, aerospace, and earth science also produced 
unprecedented tools for understanding the Earth as a unified system. 
Ironically, the technological advancements for better understanding how to 
destroy the enemy in World War II and in the Cold War produced a new image of 
the planet and new ways of understanding the complex relationships on it. “Amidst 
the materiality of destruction,” explained historian of science Michael Dennis, “came 
the possibility of reconfiguring our understanding of our own planet.”83 As Dennis 
argued, the production of scientific knowledge was sometimes accompanied by new 
social relations. Through the IGY, and in the space race it helped launch, knowledge 
and social order were intertwined in a process of co-production that helped 
propagate the new social, political, technological and ecological conception of 
Spaceship Earth. Additionally, the communications technologies that systems 
thinking enabled, especially via artificial satellites, contributed to the sense that 
Earth was a single system with increasing interconnection.  Systems thinking 
provided the foundation on which Spaceship Earth was built. Yet, along with the 
success of systems thinking in detail-oriented fields like astrophysics, engineering, 
and earth sciences, a still-academic but more generalized form of systems thinking 
sought to further unify the different disciplines.  
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The Skeleton of Science 
The interdisciplinary academic approach known as General Systems Theory 
also emerged during the post-war decades and flourished throughout the 1960s. It 
offered yet another example of systems thinking’s dispersion, which helped further 
lay the conceptual foundation for the concept of Spaceship Earth. In 1956, at the 
annual meeting of the American Society for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 
the world’s largest general scientific society, anthropologist Margaret Mead joined 
idiosyncratic economist Kenneth Boulding as a founding member of a new 
interdisciplinary organization called the Society for General Systems Research 
(SGSR).84 Back in 1942, Mead had became intellectually entranced when she heard 
Arturo Rosenblueth first present an early outline on cybernetic feedback controls that 
he, Julian Bigelow, and Norbert Weiner developed while constructing 
servomechanisms. Mead found herself so engrossed by a scientific theory “precise 
enough to be used in problem solving, but abstract enough to cross disciplinary 
boundaries,” that she did not notice she had broken her own tooth during the 
presentation until after it concluded.85 As a regular attendee to the Macy Conferences 
over the next decade, Mead pursued cybernetics’ cross-disciplinary applications to 
social sciences. With the creation of the SGSR in 1956, she found another group of 
scholars interested in the ability of systems thinking to integrate disciplines and offer 
new insights. Co-founder Kenneth Boulding, a British-born economist then at the 
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University of Michigan, also found the general systems approach an apt means of 
integrating and understanding complexity. 
According to Kenneth Boulding, first president of the SGSR, the objective of 
General Systems Theory was, as its name implied, to highlight general similarities in 
the theoretical constructions of different disciplines, and to develop theoretical 
models that applied generally to a variety of those different disciplines. In short, 
General Systems Theory applied a systems framework to all disciplines as a means 
to unify and make relatable their underlying ideas. For SGSR members, General 
Systems Theory offered an adaptable theoretical framework that focused on the 
interrelationships between the parts of a system, as well as the relations between 
systems and their encompassing environments. This general view of systems 
thinking, while still scientific, represented a significant departure from the 
reductionist approach of traditional science.86 
Traditional science often understood and observed the natural world by 
fragmenting it into its smallest components and reducing knowledge into the 
specialization of specific disciplines, often with little interaction between the 
fragments. While appreciating the importance and detailed advances made available 
by such specialized knowledge, advocates of General Systems Theory, like Kenneth 
Boulding, sought to develop generalized yet applicable frameworks for synthesizing 
different fields of knowledge. Boulding was a life-long pacifist, an expert on conflict 
resolution and peace, and a nonconformist economist who rebelled against a narrow 
focus on commodities and gross domestic product in traditional economics. His view 
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on economics expanded to include not just the value of goods, but wider measures 
that included the social and psychological roots of human value. He claimed “there 
is no such thing as economics, only social science applied to economic problems.”87 
In 1956, Boulding described General Systems Theory as the “skeleton of science” 
because it aimed “to provide a framework or structure of systems on which to hang 
the flesh and blood of particular disciplines and particular subject matters in an 
orderly and coherent corpus of knowledge.” At its most ambitious, Boulding hoped 
General Systems Theory could “develop something like a ‘spectrum’ of theories—a 
system of systems.”88 
Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, the popularity of General Systems 
Theory grew, ironically, in tandem with the spread of systems thinking into specific 
disciplines. In 1957, the SGSR had only 147 members. But, by the mid-1960s, with 
the explosion of systems thinking into a host of ventures—from computer science to 
business management, from cybernetics to civil governance, and from ecosystem 
ecology to the construction and launching of spaceships—SGSR membership grew 
by a factor of ten to around 1000. The society’s most distinguishing characteristic 
was likely its ability to unite for meaningful discourse such a diverse collection of 
scholars, researchers, and practitioners. Members came from a broad spectrum of 
academic disciplines: mathematics, electrical engineering, administrative theory, 
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biophysics, ecology, psychiatry, psychology, economics, sociology, history, and 
philosophy of science.89 
By the mid-1960s, several academic programs in systems research had been 
established in close association with SGSR, including the Systems Science Institute 
at the University of Louisville in Kentucky; the Department of Systems Science at 
the State University of New York in Birmingham; the Cybernetics Systems Program 
at San Jose State University in California; the Social Systems Science Program at the 
University of Pennsylvania; the Institute for Advances Systems Studies at California 
State Polytechnic University; the Systems Science Program at Portland State 
University in Oregon; the Whole Systems Design Program at the University of 
Antioch in Seattle, Washington; and the Saybrook Institute in San Francisco, 
California.90 These programs reflect the institutionalization of systems thinking into 
academia, all of which promoted the unity of knowledge over its dislocation into 
different disciplinary silos. Seeking the theoretical unity of knowledge provided the 
bedrock for the discourse on the social, political, and ecological unity embodied by 
the symbol of Spaceship Earth.   
By the 1960s, systems thinking became for many in and out of the academy 
not only the skeleton of science, but an amorphous framework for understanding the 
interactions and complexity of all reality. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian-born 
theoretical biologist, agreed. In the late 1940s, Bertalanffy had developed a model of 
living organisms as open systems that maintains themselves in steady states of 
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enduring imbalance via constant interaction with their surrounding environments. 
His open systems perspective emphasized interactive relationships rather than 
mechanistic reductionism, and it helped lay the groundwork for what became 
General Systems Theory. By 1967, Bertalanffy could confidently declare that, “If 
someone were to analyze current notions and fashionable catchwords, he would find 
‘systems’ high on the list.” The concept of systems thinking, he announced, had 
“pervaded all fields of science and penetrated into popular thinking, jargon, and 
mass media.”91 As part and parcel of the discourse about Spaceship Earth and a key 
conceptual grounding for the global environmental moment, a general application of 
thinking in terms of systems had, by the 1960s, become a commonplace approach to 
understanding reality, both in and outside significant sections of academia. The 
approach even found application for solving problems in the realms of industry and 
civil society. 
 
Social and Industrial Dynamics  
Increasingly, a variety of professionals influenced by the technological and 
theoretical successes of systems scientists conceptualized the world around them in 
terms of systems. Where these actors may have once seen an airplane in isolation, 
they now conceived it as part of a larger system that involved airfields, fuel depots, 
maintenance facilities, air-traffic controllers, pilots, and passengers, to say nothing of 
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the systems of research and production that went into constructing the airplane’s 
technologies. This systems view of the world developed into a variety of systems-
based techniques for managing social and technological systems, including further 
advancements in quantitative operations research, systems engineering design, and 
systems analysis, which compared, contrasted, and evaluated project proposals 
through intricate cost-benefit determinations.92 By the early 1960s, the systems 
approach, in its multifarious forms of management and control, had expanded far 
beyond the military realms of war-planning, nuclear war research, and aerospace 
engineering. Many of the tens of thousands of the scientists, engineers, and project 
managers who helped construct and manage Cold War weapons systems and 
aerospace systems took their learning experiences on the systems approach and 
applied them to other projects. Not just confined to the United States and Great 
Britain, the systems approach also spread abroad to other industrialized allies, 
notably to France and Sweden.93 
Additionally, the development of digital computers from the technological 
application of cybernetics fostered the integration of information processing and 
coordination of scheduling through the digitized systems techniques of feedback and 
response. Despite the bulk of early computers, by the early 1960s, these computer-
enabled techniques nonetheless became essential to diverse users: first, in designing 
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and implementing the military’s complex air and intercontinental ballistic missile 
defense systems, but also in the development of meteorology and climatology.  As 
historian Paul N. Edwards argued, computers and military systems of nuclear 
defense co-evolved to help shape a systems discourse that spread during the Cold 
War—a discourse that came to see battlefields, the world, and, eventually, human 
culture itself all as multi-layered, closed systems able to be managed and 
controlled.94 The advance of technical systems and the spread of global systems 
thinking into the thought and culture of society during the 1950s and 1960s reflected 
the profound adaptability and growing ubiquity to the systems approach. 
Advocates of the systems approach at influential organizations in the United 
States and in several of its leading universities, especially at MIT, developed and 
applied systems methods to managerial techniques for civil government and 
industry. For instance, the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California initially 
adapted quantified methods of operations research for defense planning against 
nuclear attacks. But, by the mid-1950s, RAND codified and rationalized a suite of 
systems techniques on the premise that systems thinking offered a rational response 
for control of growing societal complexity. RAND soon earned hefty research 
contracts that allowed them to straddle the borders between academia, industry, and 
military defense.95 
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Systems approaches also offered opportunities to maximize efficiency and 
profit for large corporations and industrial producers. For example, after helping 
pioneer the development of digital computing for the U.S. military in the 1950s, 
systems scientist Jay Forrester joined MIT’s Sloan School of Management to apply 
scientific systems approaches to business management. Forrester analyzed cyclical 
changes in the relationships between factory production and employment. In 1958, 
he argued that a company should be viewed "not as a collection of separate functions 
but as a system in which the flows of information, materials, manpower, capital 
equipment, and money set up forces that determine the basic tendencies toward 
growth, fluctuation, and decline.” By the early 1960s, Forrester developed this 
systems approach into a model-based theory he called "industrial dynamics.”96 
Industry, economic development, and society all became interlinked through a 
systems framework. 
Almost simultaneously, as the systems approach found increased use in 
industrial, social, and ecological analysis, and even in the construction of spacecraft, 
systems thinking also spread into urban planning and corporate management. 
Systems scientists, aerospace engineers, and defense intellectuals alike 
opportunistically migrated from the war room to the boardroom, or from the research 
laboratory to the halls of city government. For example, at MIT, Jay Forrester, 
                                                                                                                                     
early development of RAND, see Martin J. Collins, Cold War Laboratory: Rand, the Air Force, and 
the American State, 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
 
96 Forrester cited in Paul N. Edwards, “The World in a Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early 
Computerized Global Systems Models,” in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes, eds., Systems, 
Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and 
After (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 236. See Jay Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1961). 
  76 
expanded his systems approach of industrial dynamics in attempts to model all the 
complex interactions of entire cities, which he called “urban dynamics.”97 In the 
mid-1960s, the pressing problems of housing, infrastructure, and unemployment in 
American cities led systems advocates to bundle systems approaches and apply them 
in America’s Great Society programs.98 
According to historian Walter A. McDougal, the application of technocratic 
systems techniques in the late 1950s and 1960s created an “alliance of military 
hawks and social activists … [who both] endorsed federal action on the principle that 
the state could best foster new knowledge, power, and economic growth through 
planned management.”99 The odd alliance of civil and military systems advocates 
took methods for fighting the Cold War and applied them to the War on Poverty, 
seizing vast sums of federal, state, and city government largess in the process. For 
example, in 1966, California and other state governments spent about $11 million on 
systems analysis studies, with New York State alone expending $4 million.  That 
same year, seventeen cities and regional authorities spent a similar amount on 
systems analysis contracts, with Baltimore and Philadelphia each appropriating more 
than $2 million.100 
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Sociologist Robert Lilienfeld argued that the extension of systems thinking to 
social applications in the 1960s worked unintentionally but effectively to justify 
claims to power and prestige by society’s technocratic elite. As a result, Lilienfeld 
and other critics identified systems thinking as the ideology of highly rationalized, 
technological, and institutional bureaucracies of power.101 Yet, detached from its 
scientific basis in quantified analysis—or, at best, loosely connected to the authority 
of systems science as a means to comprehend all reality—systems thinking by the 
end of the 1960s also provided a common language for the disempowered to demand 
changes to global economic systems; for grassroots activists and students to rebel 
against oppressive social and political systems; and for environmental advocates to 
warn that Spaceship Earth was headed toward ecological collapse unless the 
worldwide reach of humanity’s economic, social and geopolitical systems were soon 
revised. The evolution of systems thinking into all of these realms thus helped make 
the global environmental moment possible. 
 
Seeing Global Systems 
Systems thinking synthesized new scientific approaches to understanding 
complex relations. It also served as a guide for constructing the complex 
technologies of the Cold War—from the physical and conceptual developments 
accompanying the design and manufacture of weapons systems for nuclear 
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deterrence and attack, to the creation of actual spaceships that, for the first time, sent 
representatives of Earth’s life forms beyond the biosphere on which all life 
depended. The surge in systems thinking in post-World War II sciences, from 
ecology to economics, and its spread as a general tool for conceiving complex and 
global interrelations, provided a conceptual model that identified Earth’s biosphere 
as inherently interconnected with humanity’s technosphere and with what some 
economists called its econosphere.102 
Bolstered by the authority of science, post-war systems thinking was thus a 
primary factor in producing the global environmental moment that culminated in 
Stockholm’s collection of conferences on the global environmental crisis. By the 
mid-1960s, the systems approach had migrated from the quantified realms of 
Operations Research and cybernetics for waging global warfare, and from the 
biogeochemical processes that informed ecology and the earth sciences, to the 
technologies that would send spaceships to the moon. After widespread use as a tool 
for military planners, technocratic engineers, and even for managers of industrial and 
civil bureaucracies, the methods of scientific systems thinking evolved into a more 
generalized and philosophical lens that seemed applicable to almost any 
circumstance. This more philosophical lens of systems thinking saw nearly all 
aspects of the world as parts of a holistic, dynamic, and interdependent system of 
systems. Importantly, systems advocates saw systems at all scales, from the local to 
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the global, as things to be managed for improvement.103 Systems, it seemed, were 
everywhere and everything. Systems thinking thus provided an essential 
epistemology for framing reality on Spaceship Earth. 
In 1965, when Adlai Stevenson delivered his final address to a global 
audience in the UN ECOSOC council, he described Earth as a “fragile craft” and 
“little spaceship” that humanity needed to love better in order to survive their shared 
voyage into the unknown future. Consciously or not, Stevenson drew upon a deeper 
history of systems thinking that blossomed during World War II and proliferated into 
a variety of scientific disciplines and bureaucratic institutions. By invoking this 
ideology of integration in the UN, Stevenson helped spread a new metaphor for 
understanding the interconnection of the planet’s ecological and human systems, 
which soon came to be called Spaceship Earth. Yet, even in the years before 
spaceships brought back the first powerful photographs of an Earthrise, the evolution 
of systems thinking had already encouraged a new vantage point from which humans 
could conceive of the Earth as a whole system.104 
Seeing the world in terms of integrated systems helped lay a foundation for 
fostering the global environmental moment. The Spaceship Earth metaphor that 
Adlai Stevenson helped shepherd into popular and political consciousness signaled a 
new way of thinking about the consequences of science and technology, the 
                                                
103 Debora Hammond, The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General 
Systems Theory (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2003); Robert Lilienfeld, The Rise of 
Systems Theory: An Ideological Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978). 
104 Robert Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2008); Neil Maher, “Shooting the Moon,” Environmental History 9:3 (2004): 526-531; Denis 
Cosgrove, “Contested Global Visions: One-World, Whole-Earth, and the Apollo Space Photographs,” 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84:2 (June 1994): 270-294. 
  80 
functions of international politics, the mechanics of the global economy, and the fate 
of human survival on our increasingly interconnected planet. At the same time, 
another necessary contributor to the global environmental moment was the threat 
that humanity’s powerful technological and industrial systems threatened the 
ecological collapse of Earth’s interdependent systems. Chapter 2 explains how 
seeing systems and thinking globally intersected with growing realizations about 
humanity’s environmental incursions on a worldwide scale, initially through the 
spread globally of radioactive fallout from thermonuclear atomic testing. 
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Chapter 2 
 
SYSTEMS FAILURE: 
Fallout and Eco-Catastrophe on Spaceship Earth 
 
 
Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news 
Hath but a losing office, and his tongue  
Sounds ever after as a sullen bell … 
— William Shakespeare, Henry IV, part II. 
 
“Man is finally going to have to face the fact that he is a biological system 
living in an ecological system, and that his survival power is going to depend 
on his developing symbiotic relationships of a closed-cycle character with all 
the other elements and populations of the world of ecological systems.” 
 — Kenneth E. Boulding, “Earth as a Spaceship,” 1965. 
 
 
While the last chapter presented a history of the conceptual and scientific 
framing for “seeing” global systems—as represented by the symbol of Spaceship 
Earth—this chapter addresses how various experts raised alarms about ways that 
new human actions and technologies threatened both the environmental stability 
Spaceship Earth and humanity’s survival on it. Warnings about the spread of 
environmental dangers across all of Spaceship Earth provided the necessary kindling 
for igniting the global environmental moment. In an age threatened by possible 
nuclear holocaust, planetary ecological disruption, vast disparities in wealth, and 
political turmoil amid sweeping social change, the symbol of Spaceship Earth 
increasingly implied a growing concern that the global systems on which life 
depended faced potential collapse from human activities, like the explosion of 
atomic bombs in the open atmosphere, the exponential growth of industrial pollution, 
and the expansive application of toxic chemicals throughout Earth interconnected 
ecosystems. For scientists and political actors to summon the symbol of Spaceship 
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Earth not only signified global interconnection, it suggested the precariousness of a 
planetary ecosystem exposed to human intervention. 
From the 1940s through the 1960s, the reconfiguration of Earth in terms of 
whole systems—through cybernetics, through the ecosystem concept, through 
Vernadsky’s notion of a planetary biosphere, and through the space-age icon of 
Spaceship Earth—seemed to offer a means for integrating humans and their social 
systems into the planet’s natural history of evolution. Yet humanity, which had 
obviously evolved inside the biosphere along with all other living matter, also 
seemed to operate outside Earth’s natural evolutionary forces. Reproducing the 
power of stars in atomic explosions and blasting rockets, satellites, and astronauts 
beyond the biosphere proved that human animals, who were of the Earth, could 
create technologies that seemed somehow outside of nature, beyond its limits. 
Clearly humans were capable, whether consciously or unconsciously, of altering the 
face of the planet in ways that might suit their needs and desires, but also in ways 
that could threaten the endurance of ecosystems on which their survival depended. 
Back in 1935, early ecosystem ecologist Alfred Tansley had wrestled with 
the place of humanity in nature. “It is obvious,” Tansley wrote, “that modern 
civilized man upsets the ‘natural’ ecosystems … on a very large scale.” However, he 
continued, “it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to draw a natural line 
between the activities of the human tribes which presumably fitted into and formed 
parts of ‘biotic communities’ and the destructive human activities of the modern 
world. Is man part of ‘nature’ or not? Can his existence be harmonized with the 
conceptions of the ‘complex organism’?” For his part, Tansley concluded that 
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humankind’s role remained mixed, so that human activity found its proper place in 
nature “as an exceptionally powerful biotic factor which increasingly upsets the 
equilibrium of preexisting ecosystems and eventually destroys them, at the same 
time forming new ones of very different nature.”105 Similarly, the whole-system 
framework of Spaceship Earth offered a way to identify humans as part of nature, 
responding to their environment in various ways, including construction of 
ecologically disruptive technological, social, and political systems, all with a purpose 
toward improving the basic conditions of survival. 
Yet, as this chapter explains, in the late 1950s and into the 1960s—with the 
spread of world-scale systems thinking in science, technology, and civil application, 
with the threat of world-scale apocalypse from thermonuclear war, and with growing 
awareness of humanity’s disruptive impact on natural environments—more voices in 
the academy, in politics, and across broad publics wondered whether humanity’s 
increasingly affective existence could be harmonized with the organic Earth. 
Throughout the early decades of the Cold War, the increasing scope of human 
technologies and the scale on which they affected the biosphere seemed to threaten 
the conditions of survival. One scholar on whole-Earth systems thinking noted that, 
“In the age of nuclear weapons and other global technologies, massive power and 
communications networks, and complex world-wide economic relations, the 
implications of system failure were unprecedented in their potential for disaster.”106 
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The question then became, not whether humans were or were not a part of nature, 
but whether the human-influenced, global-scale, techno-ecological systems on Earth 
were moving toward planetary collapse, and, if so, how those systems should be re-
adjusted to ensure survival. 
This chapter reveals how several biological and environmental scientists, 
along with some leading economists—mostly from the United States, but all from 
the industrialized global North—sounded various environmental alarms about the 
future sanctity of Spaceship Earth. Politically concerned scientists and activists like 
Linus Pauling, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, and other experts like 
economists Kenneth Boulding and Barbara Ward argued that humanity’s failure to 
recognize and protect the systems of environmental interconnections on Spaceship 
Earth were leading to planetary-scale eco-catastrophes. They warned about the 
planet’s poisoning from the products of war and industry, from synthetic chemicals, 
from surging human populations and their economic exploitation of Earth’s finite 
resources. From the mid-1950s throughout the 1960s, fears about nuclear fallout, and 
its newly realized spread across vast continental and oceanic distances, stood out as 
the foremost concern about the global environment. Building from fears about global 
nuclear fallout and deadly radioactive particles in children’s bones, the various 
environmental warnings by scientists evolved in the 1960s to include threats about 
future silent springs from the spraying of hazardous pesticides, as well as prophesies 
of massive famines and human die-off from overpopulation.  
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Collectively, these concerns about humanity’s unchecked devastation of an 
interdependent Spaceship Earth inspired the global environmental moment—a time 
that witnessed the rise of a new environmental consciousness that began in the 
industrialized world and quickly spread globally, to culminate in a cacophony of 
popular and political responses in Stockholm, where national governments, civil 
society, and leading scientists clashed over the best means for solving global 
environmental challenges. The global environmental threats explained in this chapter 
provided a primary impetus for the international action in the global environmental 
moment addressed in ensuing chapters. This chapter begins with realizations about 
the dangers of radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions, and their surprising 
spread around the planet through Earth’s biogeochemical pathways. 
 
The Atomic Age and the Age of Ecology 
Increasingly, environmental scholars emphasize the Cold War’s pivotal 
contributions to the growth of environmental thought in the twentieth century. 
Similarly, foreign relations scholars increasingly integrate the rise of 
environmentalism and the vast scale of environmental change due to the Cold War 
into their narratives.107 This shared focus on Cold War exigencies has helped expand 
and better integrate explanations for the rapid rise of the post-World War II era’s 
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new ecological consciousness beyond the traditional instigators of postwar affluence, 
distaste over pollution, countercultural protest, and shifts in political liberalism.108 
For example, the massive funding of science during the Cold War enabled the vast 
expansion of expert knowledge about the Earth and its interconnected 
biogeochemical systems. Yet, as noted by J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, “by 
conferring on scientists a special position within society,” the Cold War dialectically 
produced “its own, severest critics.”109 For the lay public, however, the greatest 
Cold-War instigator of modern environmentalism was, without question, the military 
tool most associated with the Cold War: nuclear weapons. 
Exploding nuclear devices in the open atmosphere, and the radioactivity that 
early tests unleashed, also remains intimately intertwined with the growth of 
twentieth-century ecology and environmentalism. From 1945 to 1980, over 500 
open-air nuclear explosions and tests were conducted at various sites around the 
globe—from the American Southwest to Soviet Kazakhstan, from French Algeria to 
the Australian Outback, and from the South Pacific islands to inland China. Each 
massive explosion released radiation with 150 different fission products that turned 
tiny debris caught up in the blast into radioactive particles, generally called fallout, 
some of which fell immediately near the test sites. Depending on the yield of the 
blast, however, significant amounts of radioactive fallout often went sailing into the 
atmosphere. This dangerous debris would then circulate around the planet’s 
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stratosphere before falling back to earth, exposing humans and the environment to its 
radioactivity.110 Due to long half-lives, particularly hazardous forms of fallout 
included novel isotopes like strontium-90 and iodine-131, created in the atomic 
explosion, unknown previously in the biosphere, and eventually deadly to life when 
immediately exposed or when absorbed over time in significant quantities. The 
global spread of these materials throughout ecosystems and into human bodies 
occurred without full public or private consideration of their risks by policy-makers, 
by scientists, or by unknowingly exposed publics. 
No wonder, then, that Donald Worster’s classic treatise on ecological 
thought, Nature’s Economy, declared that along with the dawn of the Atomic Age 
from testing Earth’s first nuclear explosion, simultaneously, “the age of ecology 
opened on the New Mexico desert, near the town of Alamagordo, on July 16, 1945.” 
With atomic weapons, Worster continued, humans not only released cancerous 
radioactive fallout, eventually used as an unexpected tool for tracing and better 
understanding ecosystem dynamics; they created “a technological force that seemed 
capable of destroying much of the life on the planet.”111 That destructive force, and 
its radioactive byproducts, helped inspire social movements to prevent using that 
technology, both for the preservation of humanity and of the environment. 
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Even before World War II ended in the wake of two nuclear blasts over 
Japan, some of the scientists who helped birth atomic bombs in the secret Manhattan 
Project feared the fatal uses of its awesome power, even if used to help end the 
devastation of World War II. For instance, only one day after the first successful 
atomic test in New Mexico in 1945, Hungarian-American nuclear physicist Leo 
Szilard urged against using the new atom bomb in war and called for its international 
control.112 American policymakers, however, had other plans. Two atomic bombs, of 
course, blasted fire and radioactivity over Japan, flattening Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and instantly vaporizing over 100,000 people. While World War II ended shortly 
thereafter, many more blasts soon followed. Not on Japanese cities and their war-
weary inhabitants, but in a long regime of open-air experimental tests conducted to 
better understand and improve America’s new atomic tool. 
 Only weeks after the two fission bombs fell upon Japan, the United States, 
then the world’s only nuclear nation, announced its unilateral intentions to continue 
ongoing atomic tests. American scientists and the triumphant military selected as 
their test locations the Bikini and Enewetok atolls, far into the South Pacific.113 In 
July 1946, less than a year after the end of World War II, the United States exploded 
two atomic bombs on the Bikini atoll under the code-name Operation Crossroads. In 
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the first nuclear explosions in peacetime, Crossroads tested the effects of nuclear 
attack against a ghost fleet of captured Japanese navel vessels.114 Additional 
American tests occurred in the South Pacific in 1948, but in 1949, the Soviet Union 
tested their own atomic weapon in what is now Kazakhstan. Proof of Soviet atomic 
power shocked Americans and the world, thereby escalating the stakes of an already 
intensifying Cold War. Other industrial powers, including the British and French, 
sped up their programs to create and test nuclear own bombs, despite the high 
economic costs during their post-war recovery. Meanwhile, as the United States 
prepared for a vast expansion of their own atomic testing in the South Pacific, it also 
opted to pursue creation of thermonuclear fusion bombs, a weapon with a thousand 
times the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. 
American physicist, Edward Teller, the so-called “father” of thermonuclear 
bombs, explained that testing atomic explosives was “usually carried out in beautiful 
surroundings,” like Bikini atoll. These militarized landscapes “must be isolated,” 
Teller explained, for this simple reason: “radioactive fallout.”115 Atomic experts like 
Teller knew of deadly radiation from nuclear materials long before the Manhattan 
Project.116 But fallout from nuclear explosions was a new danger, not well 
understood. Even with testing atomic bombs in the open air and ocean, most experts 
assumed radioactive fallout would dilute passively in the immediate environment 
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and would not travel beyond the proving ground. Atomic experts assured as much to 
inquisitive publics. As late as 1952, the same year that American scientists 
successfully tested the first thermonuclear device, the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (USAEC) assured that “these explosives created no immediate or long-
range hazard to human health outside the proving ground,” despite solid evidence to 
the contrary.117 
Realizations about environmental interconnections soon revealed surprises 
about the impacts of atomic testing. Radiobiological monitoring of marine life 
around South Pacific test sites, initiated in 1946, eventually produced new 
knowledge about radioactivity’s ecological pathways and its dissipation in nature. 
Surveys at Bikini, including some conducted by ecologists Eugene and Howard 
Odum, revealed how living biota stored radioactivity in their tissues and passed their 
accumulated contamination upwards along food chains toward humans.118 The 
simple solution seemed not to go near atomic test sites, and to not eat plants or 
animals near the site that had bioaccumlated the radioactivity in their tissues. Such a 
solution, however, was foiled by the growing understanding that radioactive particles 
could travel extremely long distances before raining as fallout on unsuspecting 
locations far away from the nuclear testing.119 
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By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the discovery that dangerous fallout 
traveled and fell far beyond the site of a nuclear explosion helped trigger awareness 
of worldwide environmental interconnection, which served as a foundational 
building block of the global environmental moment. While that discovery actually 
occurred just weeks after the world's first atomic explosion in July 1945, at the 
Trinity test site, the dangers of long-range and even global fallout remained little 
known publically. The process of understanding fallout as a global environmental 
hazard began unexpectedly in a manufacturing plant that produced photographic 
films. 
In the summer of 1945, one month after the Trinity test in the New Mexican 
desert, the Eastman Kodak Company in the state of New York discovered 
radioactive contamination in the paper packaging of its sensitive photographic films. 
During World War II, Kodak had initiated internal radiation monitoring after 
contaminated paper began damaging some of their sensitive films, which occurred 
occasionally with recycled paper and cardboard from war-plants that prepared 
radium-lit instrument dials. In August 1945, Kodak registered radioactivity in its 
packaging, yet the paper had not come from recycled materials. Instead, the paper 
that Kodak received that August had been produced in Indiana and made from 
freshly cut corn stalks grown in Iowa. Fallout from the world’s first atomic 
explosion had traveled nearly 1,000 miles away from the highly secret atomic test in 
New Mexico the month prior to radiate the Iowa corn that eventually entered 
Kodak’s facility as paper. Despite publication of this occurrence in a 1949 science 
journal, the systematic monitoring of long-range fallout did not begin until February 
  92 
1951, once again a result of radiation testing by the Kodak Company in New 
York.120 
By the end of 1950, the U.S. government had selected a large area north of 
Las Vegas, Nevada for continental testing of nuclear weapons in the event that future 
conflict from the heighted Cold War might cut off American access to its Pacific 
testing sites. Domestic weapons testing began in the United States with Operation 
Ranger in January 1951, with more tests scheduled later that year. Almost 
immediately after the nuclear explosions from Operation Ranger, radioactive fallout 
spread and fell across much of the United States, particularly in Rochester, New 
York, where workers at the Eastman Kodak Company again discovered the sudden 
exposure of its films.121 
In late January 1951, less than thirty-six hours after the first nuclear tests at 
the new Nevada Test Site, the Kodak manufacturing plant in Rochester, New York 
registered levels of radioactive contamination, this time in its air filters. Kodak 
quickly reported the atomic breech to a surprised USAEC. During its own 
monitoring at ground-zero, the USAEC found insignificant residual radiation and 
little local fallout after that initial Nevada test. As a result, USAEC had considered 
off-sight nuclear testing unnecessary. The first Nevada atomic explosion, however, 
had been conducted at high-altitude, spewing radioactive bomb materials into the 
stratosphere. Atmospheric jet streams subsequently carried the radioactive debris 
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across the continent, when it then fell to the Earth in a vast snowstorm that blanketed 
much the American northeast, including the Kodak plant in Rochester.122 
Immediately upon Kodak's notice of New York’s radioactive snow and air, a 
scientist named Merril Eisenbud, director of the USAEC's New York Health and 
Safety Laboratory (HASL), was both curious and concerned. Wondering about the 
range of the oddly radioactive content in the recent snowstorm, Eisenbud used his 
contacts with industrial companies and universities to collect and analyze additional 
snow samples from St. Louis, Cleveland, Rochester, Albany, New York City, and 
Boston. Within three days, Eisenbud and a colleague at HASL produced a map 
showing a surprisingly vast pattern of radioactive fallout. That single atomic 
explosion in Nevada, nearly one month earlier, had deposited fallout all across the 
Midwest and northeastern United States, where the vast majority of Americans lived. 
A request from the Kodak Company for warnings about future radioactive events 
convinced Eisenbud of the need for systematic long-range fallout monitoring.123 
Later in 1951, both Kodak and Eisenbud learned of a new series of Nevada 
atomic tests planned for that fall, code-named Operation Buster-Jangle. Despite the 
earlier evidence Eisenbud produced on the far distances that potentially deadly 
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fallout had traveled earlier that year, he learned that the USAEC still had no plans 
for monitoring Buster-Jangle’s fallout beyond the 200 mile range of the Nevada Test 
Site. Upon Eisenbud’s insistence, the USAEC agreed to support HASL for 
monitoring out to 500 miles. Unsatisfied, Eisenbud devised and established his own 
monitoring network spread much farther out at sixty-one different weather stations 
throughout the United States.124 
Based on his experience with the exposure of Kodak films to radioactivity, 
Eisenbud devised a novel but simple method of testing for fallout deposition. He 
simply fitted most stations with a stand that held a flat tray, almost like serving a TV 
dinner, on which he placed gummed Kodak film. The films were simply exposed to 
the air, collecting whatever fallout and other debris the weather dropped from the 
sky. After an established timeframe in the wake of the Nevada tests, the disparate 
weather stations folded and mailed the films in envelopes to Eisenbud’s laboratory in 
New York. There, the HASL analyzed the films to infer levels of individual 
radionuclides from the fallout samples.125 
The analysis from the collective fallout films revealed the spread of 
dangerously radioactive iodine-131, cesium-137, and strontium-90 across large 
swaths of the continental United States, not simply near the Nevada test site. For the 
series of atomic tests the next year in 1952, the fallout-monitoring network expanded 
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to over 100 weather stations—this time spread all around the world. All of them used 
Eisenbud’s film-measurement process. To his great surprise, fallout had become a 
worldwide phenomenon, especially the spread of strontium-90. In the few years 
since the Earth’s first atomic explosions in 1945, previously unknown and 
carcinogenic particles of radioactive fallout had traveled throughout the planetary 
atmosphere, all across Spaceship Earth, to contaminate not just places where atomic 
testing occurred, but to pollute swaths of the entire planet. Here, was initial scientific 
evidence of human technology’s unintended production of a global environmental 
hazard, yet understanding of its ecological pathways remained limited. Only a select 
few knew of its dangers, and Cold War imperatives at the time prioritized national 
security over environmental security. By the mid-1950s, however, after an atomic 
test accident, the dangers of fallout became both public knowledge and a political 
controversy, and eventually a key instigator for global environmental awareness.126 
 
Global Fallout Creates Global Controversy 
The USAEC, facing a new global hazard, developed a detailed understanding 
of fallout’s flow throughout ecosystems thanks to the federally funded work of 
ecologists like the Odum brothers. Their work helped identify the radioactive isotope 
strontium-90 as nuclear fallout’s greatest long-term threat to humans because of its 
twenty-nine-year half-life, and its ability to follow metabolic calcium pathways 
throughout the global environment. In the wake of an atomic blast and after raining 
as fallout onto soils, strontium-90 traveled as calcium would, being absorbed from 
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soil into plants and then into animals, ultimately moving up food chain into human 
bodies, often through milk and calcium-rich vegetables. Strontium-90 isotopes then 
accumulated in human bones—especially in the growing bones of milk-drinking 
children—all the while releasing carcinogenic radiation internally over a period of 
nearly thirty years. After concentrating in bone and teeth, strontium-90 produced 
deadly bone cancers, cancer of soft tissues near bones, and leukemia. Throughout the 
1950s and early 1960s, increased understanding of this deadly threat, and growing 
realizations about its surprising spread globally, pushed planetary environmental 
awareness toward the global environmental moment.127 
In the early 1950s, fallout threats from atomic testing escalated across 
multiple fronts, to mention nothing of the catastrophic and pervasive danger that 
nuclear weapons might be used not for testing but in worldwide war. In November 
1952 during Operation Ivy on Eniwetok Atoll in the South Pacific, the United States 
exploded the world’s first thermonuclear bomb, elevating Cold War tensions and the 
dangerous spread of dangerous fallout. Afterward, the USAEC forbid thermonuclear 
testing in Nevada due to concerns about fallout’s effects on Americans. However, 
the thermonuclear success created a new national need to obtain more precise 
measurements for designing and testing future hydrogen weapons in the Pacific.128 
In 1953, a series of continental tests in Nevada code-named Upshot-Knothole 
were designed to better assess and measure the effects of atomic explosions. The 
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Upshot-Knothole’s tests in the spring of 1953, fired from 300-foot towers, produced 
for the first time a giant atomic fireball that swept up vast amounts of debris from the 
desert floor, which rained as radioactive fallout across large swaths of Utah and 
Nevada. Some estimates indicated that eighty percent of offsite fallout from U.S. 
continental testing came directly from the Upshot-Knothole series. While the threats 
of fallout remained mostly unknown to the public in 1953—and, for that matter, still 
not well understood by the USAEC—the Upshot-Knothole debacle caused the 
USAEC to establish tighter restrictions on continental weapons testing, including for 
the first time analysis on expected weather patterns, which heavily influenced the 
degree and direction of fallout. However, just two months after Upshot-Knothole 
concluded, the Soviet Union detonated its first thermonuclear device, and in 1953, 
the United Kingdom tested its first fission bomb. These events escalated Cold War 
dangers, intensified the race for creating and testing increasingly powerful nuclear 
weapons, and thereby elevated the amount, spread, and threat of radioactive 
fallout.129 
Also in 1953—amid these increasing dangers and with initial evidence but 
limited data of fallout as a planetary threat—the USAEC together with the U.S. 
military and systems analysts at RAND in Santa Monica, California inaugurated a 
secret study named Project Sunshine. Project Sunshine conducted a worldwide 
survey to determine the levels of strontium-90 contamination created by atomic 
testing. It included international soil and ocean sampling, stratospheric air sampling 
from balloons and planes, and monitoring of raw and pasteurized milk, among other 
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data collection strategies. Project Sunshine confirmed that motley geophysical 
dynamics, many of which experts barely understood, carried fallout far beyond test 
sites where it fell and worked its way up food chains to saturate human foods. 
Across the world, unsuspecting publics and especially children were consuming and 
accumulating strontium-90. As a totally novel phenomenon, no one knew whether 
the amounts of accumulation were acceptable or would be lethal. They simple knew 
strontium-90 could eventually cause cancer and now permeated the planet. The 
ongoing study remained classified until its unveiling in 1957 amid the global data 
collection efforts of the IGY that year. However, it was before that, in 1954, when 
the radioactive dangers of fallout impressed itself on the public consciousness, 
eventually spurring a major public controversy over fallout and fueling massive 
participation in a global social movement to curb atomic testing. That widespread 
and influential social movement against atomic testing proved to be a precursor to 
what became a related social movement for protecting the global environment.130 
In 1954, Japanese victims once again ushered in a new awareness of nuclear 
weapons’ deadly power—this time not as victims from nuclear bombs used in war 
but simply from Americans’ atomic testing. That year, the USAEC returned to 
Bikini atoll for a new round of thermonuclear testing, code-named the Castle series. 
In the shot named Bravo, the first of the Castle series tests on March 1, U.S. atomic 
scientists exploded a device nicknamed Shrimp and anticipated a sizeable six-
                                                
130 Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 102-104; Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: 
The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 181-184; Egan, Barry Commoner, 51-52; Lawrence S. Wittner, 
  99 
megaton yield. Surprisingly, Bravo far exceeded the scientists’ expectations, blasting 
a massive yield of fifteen megatons, one thousand times larger than the device that 
leveled Hiroshima and still the largest atmospheric detonation ever conducted by the 
United States. With the aid of unexpected winds, the Bravo shot spread immense 
amounts of highly radioactive debris from Bikini, far beyond the USAEC’s declared 
danger zone, exposing the South Pacific’s unsuspecting and unprotected native 
islanders to fallout hundreds of miles away.131 
Far more famously, a group of Japanese men also fell victim to Bravo’s 
uncontrolled explosion. Outside the USAEC’s danger zone but within reach of 
Bravo’s fallout, radioactive ash also showered upon the crew of the Fukuryu Mara, a 
Japanese fishing trawler whose name translated ironically as the Lucky Dragon. By 
the time the vessel returned to port two weeks later in Yaizu, Japan, nearly all 
unlucky crewmembers suffered advanced stages of radiation sickness, and one died 
six months later during hospital treatment. By the time the Lucky Dragon reached 
home with its harrowing news, contaminated fish from other vessels had already sold 
at ports all across Japan. The event collapsed Japan’s fish market and inflamed 
painful memories of prior atomic traumas. News of the United States’ uncontrolled 
atomic testing, with its cancerous and far-reaching radioactive fallout, spread like a 
firestorm in media outlets around the world. Here, the early Cold War period, 
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provided a clear example of uncontrolled technology unintentionally threatening 
human health, economies, and large sections of the environment.132 
The Bravo debacle first indicated to a broad global public that atomic 
explosions were not singular and locally contained events; they produced a lasting 
danger that threatened people far and wide, even future generations. It was through 
the fear of fallout that the nuclear threat combined with a powerful new fear of 
cancer from environmental poisoning. As such, fear of the nuclear dragon converged 
with a collection of anxieties about the implications of science on society in an 
increasingly globalized civilization, and potentially worldwide dangers growing 
technological powers posed for the security and sanctity of life on Spaceship Earth. 
Reaction to the Bravo event almost immediately ignited worldwide protests to ban 
nuclear weapons, or if more realistically, to at least limit the increasingly real and 
now patently public dangers of fallout from atomic testing.  
Dr. Albert Schweitzer, who received the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize, delivered 
his Nobel lecture titled "The Problem of Peace" in November 1954—the same year 
that the Bravo shot’s unexpected atomic yield rained fallout across a vast expanse of 
ocean, on Pacific islanders and Japanese fishermen, and catapulted the threat of 
atmospheric atomic explosions into global consciousness. In his peace lecture, 
Schweitzer spoke of the scientific and technological horrors of modern war, 
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especially the “vast forces liberated by the splitting of the atom.” Given 
radioactivity’s mutating effect on living things, he warned that nuclear weapons not 
only threatened the horrific possibility of perhaps world-ending nuclear holocaust in 
war, but the new evidence from Bravo that “large-scale tests could unleash 
catastrophes threatening the very existence of the human race.” Perhaps then, 
Schweitzer argued, in the face of such universal threats, humanity could come to 
terms with the necessity of creating a world in which global war would become—
must become—an impossibility. Yet, he believed these shared threats alone would 
not unify the world toward peace. Only the ethical extension of humanity to all 
peoples, a prevailing spirit of humanism, could liquidate war and ensure increased 
attainment of happiness for all people. Schweitzer had loosely extended realizations 
about globally interconnected ecosystems and the dangers of fallout from the Bravo 
test and applied them to global politics as a requisition for world peace. He adjusted 
a scientific systems-thinking framework to a holistic social imperative toward peace 
and the end of atomic explosions, to save humanity from war and protect the planet’s 
ability to support life.133 
Over the next several years, throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, a 
massive citizens’ movement against nuclear weapons spread around the world, all 
while scientists in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere continued learning new 
ways that geophysical forces dispersed radioactive fallout throughout the global 
environment. The Bravo event initiated a major controversy between leading 
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scientists, international activists, and national governments over “safe-levels” of 
fallout.134 Fierce supporters of the USAEC and the American Cold War, like Edward 
Teller, acknowledged the reality of fallout but tended to claim its levels posed little 
harm. In February 1955, the USAEC released a report saying as much. But despite 
the lingering taint of McCarthyism, other more politically active scientists, like 
Nobel laureate in chemistry Linus Pauling and biologist Barry Commoner, 
challenged the Cold War logic of increased armaments at all costs. Many scientists 
criticized the claims of government, noting that any amount of radioactivity might 
cause cancer, so no clear threshold of safety was possible. And they questioned 
whether the few nuclear nations had the natural right to militarize and contaminate 
the global commons of air, land, and sea with ongoing and increasingly powerful 
atomic tests. Atomic fears inspired scientific and political activist to protect people 
across the planet, which in turn meant protecting the global environment.135 
 
Fallout Politics and Scientific Activism 
Spurred by an omnipresent fear of atomic annihilation and newly realized 
dangers to human health from testing nuclear weapons, a fleet of antinuclear 
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organizations sprung up across the industrialized global North, including Britain’s 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Japan’s Gensuikyo, the United States’ 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), the Dutch Committee for 
the Abolition of the Atomic Bomb, and West Germany’s Struggle Against Atomic 
Death. Transnational pacifist and religious organizations, from Pope Pius XII to the 
International Fellowship of Reconciliation, along with leaders in Latin America, 
India, and even in some non-governmental groups in communist nations collectively 
expressed their distaste for nuclear weapons and concerns over the deadly threats of 
testing. Renowned humanitarians and intellectuals like Schweitzer, Norman Cousins, 
and Bertrand Russell joined to advocate against atomic madness. Leading physicists, 
including Albert Einstein, Joseph Rotblat, Eugene Rabinowich, and Soviet physicist 
Andrei Sakharov lend scientific authority the antinuclear campaigns. Collectively, 
their incessant advocacy informed and rallied many millions of citizens on nearly 
every continent.136 
The fallout controversy soon became a global issue with global 
consequences. If the explosive release and spread of man-made radioactivity through 
Earth’s geophysical forces had made fallout a global phenomenon, so too was the 
scientific and social movement opposing nuclear weapons and testing. By the early 
1960s, the evolution of worldwide antinuclear activism would evolve into related 
activism for protecting the global environment. But, before atomic protests provoked 
environmental activism and became a point of political debate over global 
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environmental problems, the controversy over fallout first had to become a political 
issue itself. 
In 1956, nearly a decade before his famous speech saying we travel together 
on Spaceship Earth, Adlai Stevenson officially made nuclear testing a political issue 
in the United States. Having lost the 1952 presidential election to General Dwight 
Eisenhower, Stevenson again became the Democratic nominee in 1956. Since Bravo, 
Stevenson had grown concerned about the dangers from fallout. While campaigning 
across the country, Stevenson kept his research aids busy sending inquiries to 
leading domestic and international scientific experts. He accumulated data and 
searched for answers to his questions on the ways nuclear fallout contaminated fields 
where cattle grazed, followed calcium pathways, and ended up in milk given to 
children by unsuspecting mothers. In April 1956, before the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors and against the advice of his campaign managers, Stevenson 
sought to “strike a blow for humanity” by speaking vigorously against testing 
thermonuclear weapons. He called for an international test ban agreement, overseen 
by the United Nations. “We desperately need today,” Stevenson said, “a rebirth of 
ideas.” In light of the global dangers from fallout and heedless nuclear testing, 
Stevenson scolded, “We have lost the moral initiative and the rest of the world 
knows it.”137 While Eisenhower avoided public discussion of testing, Stevenson 
dedicated an entire television address on the perils of H-bomb testing titled, “The 
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Greatest Menace the World Has Ever Known.” To Stevenson’s disfavor, a host of 
Cold War instabilities that year, including the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the 
Suez Crisis in Egypt, helped Eisenhower win re-election. Despite the loss, Stevenson 
pressed his point to end testing in 1957 with articles in popular magazines, like 
Look.138 
Politically active scientists also made headlines promoting an end to atomic 
testing and the need for unclassified information to help American citizens make 
their own informed decisions about its risks. Barry Commoner, a plant biologist at 
Washington University in St. Louis, became heavily involved in public campaigns to 
inform citizens on the difficult scientific issues involved in nuclear testing, fallout, 
and its health threats. This included his work in the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS). Through the AAAS, Commoner organized an 
Interim Committee on the Social Aspects of Science, which expanded to become the 
Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, where he worked 
closely with Margaret Mead orchestrating symposiums on fallout and other 
environmental threats over the next decade. Linus Pauling, a biochemist who became 
a Nobel laureate for his work on the nature of chemical bonds, also became a highly 
public and authoritative proponent against the moral imperatives of cancer-inducing 
atomic tests, delivering lectures across the nation on nuclear dangers.139 
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In 1957, Pauling traveled to St. Louis to deliver a speech on the role of 
science in the modern world. Upon meeting there with Commoner to discuss the 
dangers of fallout, Pauling, Commoner, and Washington University physicist 
Edward U. Condon drafted in Barry Commoner’s office a petition for an 
international agreement to end nuclear weapons testing. The statement, which 
carried clear global environmental themes, noted how “each nuclear bomb spreads 
an added burden of radioactive elements over every part of the world.” The petition, 
written specifically for scientists to sign, requested their help in mediating scientific 
information to a public not entirely aware of the environmental health and safety 
implications of fallout. Pauling sent the petition to collect signatures and within two 
weeks over twenty-six hundred American scientists had signed it. Upon its 
international circulation, the petition secured signatures from over 11,000 scientists 
in forty-nine nations, including thirty-seven Nobel laureates, more than a fifth of the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, ninety-five fellows of the Royal Society of 
London, and over 200 members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Pauling soon 
left his position at Cal Tech to become an apostle against nuclear dangers, publishing 
the book No More War! in 1958 and clashing repeatedly in magazines, books, and 
television with pro-nuclear zealot, Edward Teller. Pauling eventually presented his 
petition, signed by thousands of the world’s authoritative scientific experts, to the 
United Nations to encourage its demand to end nuclear weapons testing.140 Pauling’s 
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actions for influencing the UN with the authority of scientists became a model ten 
years later for activists concerned about the global environment.141 
Barry Commoner also continued his political efforts against nuclear testing to 
create an informed citizenry for the long-term health both of American democracy 
and its people. Like Pauling’s famous confrontations with nuclear enthusiast Edward 
Teller, Commoner also clashed with other scientists, particularly those working 
under the auspices of the USAEC. In 1958, Commoner helped found the Greater St. 
Louis Committee for Nuclear Information (CNI) to present facts about fallout and 
other nuclear issues for an American public deeply confused over the debate and 
controversy between leading scientists on the issue. Similar organizations sprung up 
around the nation to form a leading grassroots instrument in the campaign against 
nuclear testing. Commoner delivered public talks and wrote influential articles on 
“The Fallout Problem,” published in Science in 1958. Later that year, the Committee 
for Nuclear Information began its publically powerful Baby Tooth Survey, which 
collected thousands of children’s teeth from across the country to examine their 
strontium-90 levels. By measuring and confirming children’s widespread absorption 
of radioactivity from atomic testing, Commoner helped inform the public about the 
dangers of fallout and about intricate interconnections between human actions and 
the environment.142 
By following the biological pathways of nuclear fallout, Commoner and 
others developed an increased appreciation for large-scale ecological relationships. 
                                                
141 See Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
142 Barry Commoner, “The Fallout Problem,” Science 127 (May 2, 1958), 1023-1026; Egan, 47-
73. 
  108 
Through his work with CNI and the Baby Tooth Survey, Commoner studied the 
environmental pathways of fallout from atomic testing, including its global spread 
on jet streams throughout the atmosphere, its descent to the earth and absorption 
through the soil into plants, and eventually into human bodies. His expertise as a 
plant biologist and his research as an anti-nuclear activist led Commoner to describe 
the test explosions of nuclear weapons as “the greatest single cause of environmental 
contamination of this planet.”143 So, eventually, did much of the world, thanks in 
part to the efforts of Commoner, Pauling, and other concerned scientists. The 
massive anti-nuclear campaign to which Commoner and Pauling contributed helped 
lay the groundwork for widespread understanding of worldwide ecological 
interconnections, which in turn inspired the social and political activism of the global 
environmental moment. 
Jacob Hamblin has argued that, “the fallout controversy was a major turning 
point in global environmental awareness.” Not only did it inspire the activism of 
politically engaged scientists, it also seized the attention and concern of laymen and 
national governments around the world, including their representatives to the UN. 
Additionally, as Hamblin noted, the fallout controversy “raised questions of 
culpability and responsibility. It suggested that the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and, in fact, all nuclear powers had the ability to take actions with far-reaching, 
unpredictable, and deadly consequences even in peacetime,” and with implications 
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that could negatively impact future generations.144 Indeed, over the ensuing decade, 
Barry Commoner became one of the leading voices of the global environmental 
movement that began in industrialized nations with nuclear histories, and soon 
spread with global considerations—in part because of the global implications of 
atomic fallout. Commoner admitted later that it was the USAEC that had turned him 
into an environmentalist.145 
In 1958, American President Eisenhower appeared torn between worldwide 
popular concern against the harmful effects of testing, and his desire not to permit 
hysterical public opinion to, as he put it, crucify the United States “on a cross of 
atoms.” Early in 1958, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced its future plans for a 
temporary moratorium on testing to begin at the end of that October. By the summer 
of 1958, public opinion and political opportunity combined to shape Eisenhower’s 
own announcement to temporarily halt American testing. The President admitted in a 
meeting to pro-nuclear stalwarts, including Edward Teller, that, “new thermonuclear 
weapons are very powerful; however, they are not … as powerful as is world opinion 
today.” With a new realization over the meaning of national security, Eisenhower 
agreed temporarily to halt nuclear explosions by the end of 1958.146 
In anticipation of the impending moratorium, the governments of the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union quickly concluded a flurry of final nuclear tests, 
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more than ever before, which generated previously unprecedented amounts of global 
fallout. The British tested five thermonuclear bombs at its South Pacific test site on 
Christmas Island; the Soviets tested some thirty bombs at its two interior test sites; 
while the United States alone exploded over seventy bombs between its two test sites 
in the Pacific and Nevada, as well as three secret explosions launched from rockets 
and detonated in the upper atmosphere above the South Atlantic Ocean. But true to 
their word, at the end of October 1958, nuclear explosions around the world 
temporarily ceased.147 Fallout, the first widely recognized global environmental 
problem, would still rain from the sky after the final flurry of testing in 1958. But 
momentum built for a permanent political solution to this planetary environmental 
hazard. 
 
Fallout’s Gateway to Global Environmentalism 
Through the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, efforts toward 
solving the worldwide problem of atomic fallout, with its clear environmental 
implications, helped inspire widespread awareness about solving other global 
environmental problems. 
In 1959, amid the growing public protest and concern against atomic 
weapons, the three nuclear powers engaged in negotiations for a formal international 
test ban treaty in hopes of making permanent the temporary ban from late 1958. As 
they did, however, the antinuclear movement continued to grow apace, and for good 
reason. During the testing moratorium, in February 1960, France successfully 
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conducted its own atomic explosion in the Sahara desert of its Algerian colony.148 
After more than a year without atomic explosions, the French nuclear detonation 
spurred a resumption of nuclear testing, first by the Soviets and quickly followed by 
the United States. 
The renewed spate of testing between 1961 and 1962 was both greater in 
number and power than any prior collection of explosions, producing devastating 
amounts of atmospheric global fallout. These tests included the largest bomb ever 
exploded then or since: the Soviet Union’s enormous “Tsar Bomba,” estimated at 
nearly sixty megatons, a single thermonuclear device equivalent to nearly 4,000 of 
the bombs that annihilated Hiroshima. For its part, the United States detonated over 
100 weapons in both the kiloton and megaton range.149 And while the dangers from 
nuclear testing grew, so did the threat of their actual use in war. In October 1962, 
American and Soviet policymakers narrowly avoided a full-scale nuclear holocaust 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. That October, even as thermonuclear testing 
proceeded posthaste during the crisis, the world nearly slipped down an atomic abyss 
to its a cataclysmic end.150 
That next month, in September 1962, a quiet science writer and former 
marine biologist with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service published a controversial and 
transformational book titled Silent Spring. Environmental scholars compulsorily cite 
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Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as helping ignite what exploded over the decade into 
widespread awareness and concern for the global environment.151 Carson’s 
paradigm-shifting analysis was originally published in the New Yorker throughout 
1962, and then, that September, as an immediate bestselling book. Silent Spring 
urged against the widespread application of cancerous, persistent, and 
bioaccumulating chemical pesticides, especially synthetic chlorinated hydrocarbons 
like DDT. But similar to Barry Commoner, Carson used widespread fears about 
fallout and atomic anxieties to promote new conceptions about environmental 
relations. As argued by historian Ralph H. Lutts, “People in the United States and 
throughout the world were prepared or pre-educated, to understand the basic 
concepts underlying Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring by the decade-long debate over 
radioactive fallout preceding it. They had already learned that poisons, in this case 
radioactive ones, could create a lasting global danger.”152 Carson simply expanded 
that public understanding to consider additional human-induced environmental 
hazards, in her case, the extensive application of chemicals that she labeled “a new 
kind of fallout.”153 
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In Silent Spring, Rachel Carson clearly linked the public’s keen awareness 
about the threats of nuclear fallout to highlight related dangers about chemical 
pesticides. Carson dedicated Silent Spring to outspoken anti-nuclear advocate Dr. 
Albert Schweitzer by including his admonition that “Man has lost the capacity to 
foresee and to forestall. He will end by destroying the earth.” For her own appraisal, 
Carson declared that, “Along with the possibility of the extinction of mankind by 
nuclear war, the central problem of our age has therefore become the contamination 
of man’s total environment with such substances of incredible potential for harm—
substances that accumulate in the tissues of plants and animals and even penetrate 
the germ cells.” Those substances were novel classes of synthetic chemicals used all 
around the world, and their connection to fallout was overt. With humanity’s “now 
universal contamination of the environment,” she argued, “chemicals are the sinister 
and little recognized partners of radiation in changing the very nature of the world—
the very nature of life.” Carson wondered, “We are rightly appalled by the genetic 
effects of radiation; how then, can we be indifferent to the same effect in chemicals 
that we disseminate widely in our environment?”154 
With her authoritative scientific evidence, Carson convinced millions of 
readers that “the parallel between chemicals and radiation is exact and inescapable.” 
Noting pathways also followed by strontium-90, Carson detailed how chemicals 
applied to crops, gardens, or trees similarly leached into the soil and water to enter 
living organisms and food systems, thereby “passing from one to another in a chain 
of poisoning and death.” Silent Spring’s parting words lamented, “It is our alarming 
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misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself with the most modern and 
terrible weapons, and that in turning them against the insects it has also turned them 
against the earth.”155 Through the related examples of radioactive fallout and 
chemical pesticides, Carson helped make explicit humanity’s connections to nature, 
while also opening up new ways of conceptualizing the global scale of that bond. 
Carson lay bare how humanity's technological ingenuity could have devastating 
planetary repercussions. 
At once enlightening, controversial, culturally influential, and immediately 
popular, Silent Spring sold half-a-million hardcover copies in the United States—
rare for a scientific work of nonfiction—and it remained on the New York Times 
best-seller list for thirty-one weeks. Silent Spring was also rapidly translated into 
numerous languages and sold throughout most the industrialized world. Translations 
were sold in Germany in 1962; in France, Italy, Denmark, Holland, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1963; and in 1964 it became available in Spanish and Portuguese for 
readers in Europe and South America. Additionally, popular newspapers and 
magazines around the world carried abridged selections of Silent Spring. Hundreds 
and thousands of readers, who may never have touched her book, read significant 
sections of it in their regional newspapers, along with numerous reviews that 
appeared widely, from communist Hungary and Yugoslavia to all the nations in 
Western Europe.156  
                                                                                                                                     
6, 37. 
155 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002, 1962c), quotes from 208, 
6, 297.  
156 “Silent Spring, International Bestseller,” as part of Mark Stoll, “Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
a Book that Changed the World” Environment & Society Portal, 
  115 
To a powerful degree, Carson’s scientific research educated her world of 
readers in beautiful, accessible, and devastating prose how an array of modern 
practices—including but not limited to nuclear testing and pesticide application—
endangered the web of life that maintained human and environmental health. 
Although environmental scholars have revealed the much deeper roots of the 
environmental consciousness that arose throughout the 1960s, nearly all such 
scholars credit Silent Spring as one the most influential contributions that galvanized 
widespread public concern and support for environmental issues, in part by 
communicating clearly the main ideas of ecosystem thinking to a wide public 
audience.157 Looking back from 1969, as the environmental movement gathered 
global momentum, British conservationist Max Nicholson—himself an early 
international figurehead of the new environmentalism—described Silent Spring as 
“probably the greatest and most effective single contribution” to “informing public 
opinion on the true nature and significance of ecology.”158 
In the early 1960s, while systems thinking slowly moved from scientific 
laboratories to managerial boardrooms to the realms of civil government, Carson’s 
bestselling book evangelized to an enormous audience the holistic relations of 
ecosystem ecology, the essential interdependences that connected humans to their 
environments, and the deadly consequences of destroying those relations. As a 
result, Silent Spring helped reshape public and political thought, both in the United 
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States and abroad, about the unsettling impacts that science, technology, industrial 
expansion, and abiding national governments had on the natural environment. 
Moving from one environmental and political crisis to another, U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy immediately faced questions about the use of dangerous 
chemicals named in Silent Spring, while his administration simultaneously pursued a 
nuclear test ban agreement to end global fallout. To address the wave of criticism by 
the chemical industry and some chauvinistic scientists against Carson’s scientific 
claims, Kennedy dispatched the Life Sciences Panel of the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC) to evaluate her work. In May 1963, one month after 
CBS aired a lengthy television documentary on Silent Spring, PSAC released its 
report confirming that, frighteningly, all the dangers described by Carson were 
true.159 Validation from a group leading scientific authorities elevated public concern 
of environmental threats, including the link between the chemical dangers in Silent 
Spring and the radioactive dangers of atomic fallout. In July 1963, in an effort to 
curb growing international agitation against one of those environmental dangers—
atomic fallout—Kennedy re-initiated disarmament negotiations for a treaty to end or 
at least limit nuclear testing by the world three most powerful nuclear nations. 
In August 1963, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to a 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which essentially ended their creation of fallout by 
forbidding their nuclear testing in the open air, above the atmosphere, or in the sea, 
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while still permitting underground testing.160 In addition to allowing continued 
nuclear testing underground, the LTBT was also limited by not including the newly 
atomic France, and later China, both of who continued to detonate atmospheric 
nuclear explosions into the mid-1970s and early 1980s, respectively. Nonetheless, 
Barry Commoner described the LTBT as “the first victorious battle in the campaign 
to save the environment—and its human inhabitants—from the blind assaults of 
modern technology.”161 Similarly, Kennedy celebrated the LTBT as much for its 
abolition of global fallout from the big three contributors, as for its contribution to 
significantly reducing world tension. Finalized amid the international popularity of 
Silent Spring, the LTBT was simultaneously the world’s first international treaty on 
the control of nuclear weapons and world’s first global agreement for environmental 
protection.162 
In September 1963, after concluding negotiations for the LTBT, President 
John F. Kennedy addressed the UN General Assembly in New York, in what would 
be his final speech there. Kennedy celebrated the LTBT for helping create “an 
atmosphere of rising hope” and  “a moment of comparative calm.” The treaty, which 
by then had already earned signatures from nearly 100 nations, led Kennedy to 
celebrate how “people the world over … are thankful to be free from the fears of 
nuclear fallout.” He described the LTBT as “a milestone – but it is not the 
millennium. We have not been released from our obligations – we have been given 
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an opportunity.” Before the world’s nations at the UN, Kennedy saw that 
opportunity as a global effort to safeguard the environment and work to eliminate 
“plunder and pollution, the hazards of nature, and the hunger of children.” Having 
already helped secure protection against global fallout, Kennedy imagined “a 
worldwide program” organized through the UN to “protect the forest and wild game 
preserves now in danger of extinction for all time.” The UN provided the ideal 
institution for these endeavors, he explained, because “The earth, the sea, and the air 
are the concern of every nation.” Seeking to expand the success of the LTBT, 
Kennedy made a specific demand “to prevent the contamination of air and water by 
industrial as well as nuclear pollution.”163  
But nine weeks later, Kennedy was killed and his vision to protect the global 
environment against industrial pollution faded within the UN. It would take the UN 
nearly a decade before its members would formally meet in Stockholm to address the 
world’s ongoing environmental challenges and threats. In the meantime, however, a 
powerful environmental advocacy movement spread throughout the industrialized 
world, especially in the United States, which built upon the lessons of atomic fallout 
and Silent Spring to encompass a planetary perspective on the health and future 
survival of Spaceship Earth’s global environment. 
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Explosions of Environmental Concern 
In the wake of the LTBT, many of the same actors, ideas, and actions 
involved in advocating against nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and early 1960s 
transitioned from fallout to address other environmental threats. In 1963, Barry 
Commoner and zoologist E.W. Pfeiffer, who both led scientists’ efforts against 
atomic testing, founded the Scientists’ Institute for Public Information (SIPI) to 
continue and expand their efforts at informing the public on scientific issues and 
dangers. Barry Commoner, for instance, expanded his focus on fallout to embrace a 
host of newly realized environmental hazards. In his popular book from 1963, 
Science and Survival, Commoner wrote, “The new hazards are neither local nor 
brief. Air pollution covers vast areas. Fallout is worldwide. Synthetic chemicals 
remain in the soil for years. Radioactive pollutants now on the earth’s surface will be 
found there for generations. … Excess carbon dioxide from fuel combustion 
eventually might cause floods that could cover much of the earth’s present land 
surface for centuries.”164  
By 1964, Commoner was arguing that fallout and water pollution presented 
very similar cases. That same year, his St. Louis Committee on Nuclear Information 
changed its name to the Committee on Environmental Information. In 1964, the SIPI 
board voted to include public information programs on the effects of the large-scale 
use of pesticides and herbicides, as well as programs on air and water pollution, in 
addition to its already existent programs on nuclear radiation. The SIPI board’s 
policy statement warned how the hazards of nuclear radiation and the “general 
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contamination of the environment reflect a deep seated problem regarding the social 
effects of modern science and technology.”  Of great concern for these now 
ecologically concerned scientists was the “tendency of the growing power of science 
to be used in large-scale technological applications without adequate scientific 
knowledge of their eventual effect on the capability of the environment to support 
society.”165 To better explore the biological implications of humanity’s 
environmental intrusions, Commoner founded in 1966 the Center for the Biology of 
Natural Systems with a $4.5 million grant from the Public Health Service. Before the 
end of the decade, Commoner’s shift to environmental advocacy made him known 
internationally as a leading authority on the ecological challenges posed by polluting 
industrial technologies and economic development, which he eventually castigated 
as the leading causes of a growing global environmental crisis.166 
Other concerned scientists, with different environmental concerns, joined the 
fray. In January 1965, a charismatic biologist at Stanford University named Paul R. 
Ehrlich, who’s specialization was butterflies, gave his first public address on 
environmental challenges, which first outlined publically his dire concerns about 
global population growth. Ehrlich’s speech, titled “The Biological Revolution,” was 
inspired by Rachel Carson’s remarkable success where other scientists had failed: 
making environmental issues a widespread public concern. Carson had done so by 
publishing a popular book that ignited public activism and produced policy changes 
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on ways pesticides were regulated. Biologists, Ehrlich encouraged, “must come out 
of our ivory towers and take an active part in the political life of our society. 
Following Rachel Carson’s lead, we must fight abuses where they occur.” Seeking 
similar public engagement and influence for his own concerns about population 
growth, Ehrlich’s speech addressed the need for biologists to reshape public policy 
with their special knowledge and ensure the long-term survival of humanity against 
escalating environmental degradation.167 
Also clearly influenced by the worldwide movement against atomic bombs 
and fallout, Ehrlich advised against the growth of certain new technologies, namely 
nuclear weapons, which had given humans “the means for self-extermination.” But it 
was Ehrlich’s biological worldview that inspired his warning against overpopulation. 
If human populations continued at their accelerating rate to modify nature, dominate 
other species, and increase their numbers, than humans, just like all other species 
whose populations outgrow their environments, would suffer inevitable die-offs. 
Ehrlich argued that, without major changes to human reproduction patters and better 
treatment of Earth’s interconnected ecologies, humanity would soon crash against 
nature’s finite limits with “disastrous consequences.” This speech, which contained 
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the seeds of forceful arguments Ehrlich would soon make famous, launched his 
career as a public environmental activist.168 
Months after calling for “Biological Revolution,” in the summer of 1965, 
Ehrlich left for a year of research and travel across the globe. His international 
expedition for butterflies brought him to parts of East Africa, Asia, and the South 
Pacific, including visits in Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, 
and India. While expecting to find tropical paradises, instead he found extreme 
poverty, environmental devastation, and clear signs of failed efforts of American 
modernization and development projects abroad. In particular, the seething crowds 
in India, which at that time was suffering a dire food crisis, made a drastic 
impression on Ehrlich as to the dangers of overpopulation. Viewed through a 
biological lens, Ehrlich became increasingly convinced that too many people created 
environmental degradation, social instability, and conflicts for limited resources that 
could easily erupt into war. Given the new realities of nuclear weapons and their 
catastrophic consequences for threatening all life on planet Earth, Erhlich came to 
see the worldwide population as a ticking planetary time bomb.169  
Upon his return to Stanford at the end of 1966, Ehrlich escalated his public 
advocacy on the environmental and social dangers of global overpopulation. Ehrlich 
scheduled more occasions to deliver public addresses, to which he introduced his 
harrowing experiences in India. In the process, he grew increasingly convinced that 
global catastrophe lay only a few years over the horizon. He felt even greater 
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urgency in 1967 after reading Famine 1975! by William and Paul Paddock. Their 
book used a host of new statistics and modern documentation to expand globally the 
revitalized Malthusian argument that, no matter the technological solutions 
attempted, food supplies would soon outpace growing human demands, resulting in 
inevitable famine with disastrous political consequences. As with Ehrlich’s personal 
experiences, the growing numbers of people in India played a major role in their 
argument.170 
By April 1967, Ehrlich told the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, 
“During the past year it had become shockingly apparent that the battle to feed 
humanity is being lost.”171 Here lay the origins of what became Ehrlich’s own 
bestselling book, The Population Bomb, which he published in 1968. Yet, when 
Ehrlich published that book in 1968, he opened with a slight revision of his earlier 
admonitions to definitively prophesize a dire future: “The battle to feed all of 
humanity is over,” he said; it was no longer merely being lost.172 Such fiery rhetoric 
of impending doom from a leading ecologist brought widespread concern, especially 
in the United States, about the possible collapse of global environmental systems. 
Ehrlich’s fame as a biologist had come from his insight in 1964 of 
“coevolution,” where organisms—in his case, butterflies and plants—evolved in 
relationship to each other. Coevolution became an important contribution to 
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evolutionary and ecological theory. This powerful concept about the vital bonds 
between living things shaped Ehrlich’s concerns about the global growth of 
environmentally abusive human populations because, with mutual dependence in the 
single web of life, destruction one place threatened the entire system.173 Ehrlich’s 
world tour for butterfly research in 1965 provided him an opportunity to examine 
Third World poverty, overpopulation, and environmental deterioration on a global 
scale. Over the next several years, Ehrlich’s immensely popular publications and 
public addresses, most of them co-written with his wife Ann, earned him both fame 
and growing opportunities influence his fellow passengers traveling on an 
environmentally imperiled Spaceship Earth. 
Indeed, it was during this time in the mid-1960s, and in the context of new 
conceptions about our worldwide ecological interconnections, that the symbol of 
Spaceship Earth emerged. In 1965, Adlai Stevenson introduced the UN to his notion 
that we all journey together on our fragile planetary spaceship. Stevenson, however, 
was not the only one at that time integrating scientific concepts about systems to 
make bold recommendations on how to best manage the planet. That same year, in 
1965, Kenneth Boulding and Barbara Ward—both economists with strong 
sensitivities to the interdependencies of global systems—separately sounded alarms 
about the need for whole-Earth thinking to ensure humanity’s future survival on 
Spaceship Earth. 
                                                
173 Paul R. Ehrlich and Peter Raven, “Butterflies and Plants: A Study in Coevolution,” Evolution 
18 (1964), 586-608. See also, Paul R. Ehrlich, The Machinery of Nature (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1986), 145-146. 
  125 
In May 1965, Boulding delivered a brief lecture titled “Earth as a Space 
Ship.” Just weeks before Stevenson’s speech in Geneva to the UN ECOSOC 
Council, Boulding described to a small academic committee in Washington state 
how the conceptual and technological successes of systems thinking over the prior 
two decades, and new realizations about our ecological interconnections, combined 
to reorder humanity’s perception of itself, as well as its place in the world. Along 
similar lines of thought as Adlai Stevenson, Boulding declared “Earth has become a 
space ship, not only in our imagination but also in the hard realities of the social, 
biological, and physical system in which man is enmeshed.” Although Boulding’s 
academic expertise lay in economics, his advocacy of a systems thinking and 
growing realizations about global environmental hazards spurred his belief that, if 
humanity was to survive on Spaceship Earth, “Man is finally going to have to face 
the fact that he is a biological system living in an ecological system, and that his 
survival power is going to depend on his developing symbiotic relationships of a 
closed-cycle character with all the other elements and populations of the world of 
ecological systems.” Boulding proclaimed that preserving the integrity of Earth’s 
essential ecological systems would require profound changes to humanity’s social 
behaviors and its governing political systems. As a life-long pacifist and given his 
new realizations of Earth as a spaceship, Boulding concluded that “We cannot afford 
unrestrained conflict, and we almost certainly cannot afford national sovereignty in 
an unrestricted sense.” Instead, Boulding suggested a systems solution and called for 
rapid establishment of “cybernetic or homeostatic mechanisms” for planetary politics 
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and the global economy to ensure the long-term survival of humankind on Earth.174 
Whether he knew it or not, Boulding had laid the battlegrounds of political debates 
for the global environmental moment that played out over the next several years in 
the journey toward Stockholm. 
Later, in the fall of 1965, British economist and Columbia University 
professor Barbara Ward delivered a series of lectures, later published as a book she 
titled, Spaceship Earth. Ward’s lectures, written during her residential fellowship at 
Brookhaven National Laboratories in New York, appraised the impact of modern 
science on society, which she framed in the context of unitary systems. “In our world 
today,” she began, “all the irresistible forces of technological and scientific change 
are creating a single, vulnerable, human community.” Modern science and 
technology, she announced “have created so close a network of communication, 
transport, economic interdependence—and potential nuclear destruction—that planet 
Earth, on its journey through infinity, has acquired the intimacy, the fellowship, and 
the vulnerability of a spaceship.” In short, for international development economist 
Barbara Ward, the colliding impetuses of the modern world meant Spaceship Earth 
needed much better care if humanity hoped to survive their shared journey 
together.175 
Ward reached conclusions similar to fellow economist Kenneth Boulding and 
to her good friend Adlai Stevenson. Given the global interdependences and the 
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planetary-scale threats now possible with humanity’s technological power—
including the threats of nuclear technology, the chemical applications in modern 
agriculture, and the increasing pollution from industrial production—Barbara Ward 
believed the only hope for humanity’s survival on Spaceship Earth demanded a new 
global politics focused on “restoring a reasonable balance of power between 
continents, a reasonable balance of wealth between the planet’s developed North and 
underdeveloped South, a reasonable balance of understanding and tolerance between 
the world’s rival creeds.” The realization that Spaceship Earth, and everything and 
everyone on it, functioned collectively as a unified system of systems meant that 
humanity had reached “a planetary point of no return.” Humanity’s best hope, 
according to Ward and other whole-Earth thinkers, seemed to be a better global 
balance and equilibrium of Earth’s various ecological, economic, and especially its 
political systems. Global environmental politics found its initial imagery in the 
symbol of Spaceship Earth.176 
The next spring, in March 1966, Kenneth Boulding further expanded on the 
economic and environmental consequences of the new science-based planetary 
consciousness. Boulding elaborated his ideas in a talk titled, “The Economics of the 
Coming Spaceship Earth,” delivered to a forum on “Environmental Quality in a 
Growing Economy,” hosted by Resources for the Future in Washington D.C. 
Boulding built upon the new appreciation that human technology’s global reach, and 
its accompanying systems concepts, had rendered the Earth as a closed system. Such 
global systems approach called into question the traditional measures of success, 
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especially in terms of economics. Boulding believed that, for the most part, 
economists had “failed to come to grips with the ultimate consequences of the 
transition from the open to the closed earth.”177 For millennia, humans had followed 
a pattern of continual expansion into new frontiers with general disregard for the use 
or waste of natural resources.178 Boulding described such practices as the “cowboy 
economy,” and he associated its exploitation of natural resources “with reckless, 
exploitative, romantic, and violent behavior.”179 Cowboy economics, the standard 
economic ideology across most of the globe, remained possible only with the 
continued existence of new frontiers to expand into, with new resources to exploit 
and exhaust. However, humanity’s global dominance and the new perception of 
Earth as unitary and closed, both ecologically and economically, produced a new 
understanding of Earth’s limits. Such limitations, Boulding believed, would 
eventually demand a new global economic order that worked within Earth’s closed, 
ecological bounds. Failure to integrate humanity’s “econosphere” within Earth’s 
limited biosphere, Boulding argued, would produce catastrophe for both. 
In contrast to the destructive cowboy economy, Boulding called for a 
transition to what he described as a “spaceman economy, in which the earth has 
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become a single spaceship, without unlimited reservoirs of anything, either for 
extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore, man must find his place in a 
cyclical ecological system.” In the spaceman economy, industrial production and 
consumption would be “minimized rather than maximized,” and the measures of 
success moved beyond economics to include and cultivate “the state of the human 
bodies and minds included in the system.”180 In short, Boulding had proposed an 
entirely new mode of action and integration, quite different from the traditional 
models of economic development and continual growth. 
For economists like himself, Boulding acknowledged how the “idea that both 
production and consumption are bad things rather than good things is very strange.” 
But failure to appreciate the new economics of Spaceship Earth had already 
produced problems approaching planetary proportions. Boulding offered a growing 
toll of cowboy-created pollution: “Los Angeles has run out of air, Lake Erie has 
become a cesspool, the oceans are getting full of lead and DDT, and the atmosphere 
may become man’s major problem in another generation, at the rate at which we are 
filling it up with gunk.” He warned that the “fouling of the nest which has been 
typical of man’s activity in the past on a local scale now seems to be extending to the 
whole world society.”181 Survival on Spaceship Earth, Boulding concluded, required 
systematic changes of planetary scale. 
*** 
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With increased awareness of planetary interconnection and new attention to 
various threats on the sustainability of modern life, passengers on Spaceship Earth 
entered what I call the global environmental moment. The global environmental 
moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s was born from visions of the whole world 
as a vast yet singular network of systems, seeing Earth as a fragile spaceship 
dependent on wise use of its limited resources and attentive to protecting—not 
destroying—its life-sustaining environments. This profound environmental vision 
found newfound meaning and encouragement for drastic international action, 
especially in the wake of awareness from global atomic fallout, the heedless spread 
of chemical toxins, possible catastrophe from overpopulation, the unchecked 
exploitation of Earth’s natural capital from economic development, and the apparent 
attainment of ecological endpoints for absorbing humanity’s apparent disavowal of it 
biological limits. At the end of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, as the ensuing 
chapters address, many of the world’s industrialized nations demanded 
intergovernmental action to confront these global environmental challenges, which 
induced both conflict and collaboration as they moved toward the environmental 
circus in Stockholm. 
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Chapter 3 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTIONS: 
Industrialized Nations and Global Crisis 
 
 
“We are building a movement … a movement that values people more than 
technology, people more than political boundaries and political ideologies, 
people more than profit.” 
— Dennis Hayes, national coordinator of the first Earth Day, April 
1970. 
 
“If anything very constructive is going to be accomplished along this line [of 
global environmental protection], the interest and initiative will have to 
proceed from a relatively small group of governments… The devastation of 
the environment is primarily, though not exclusively, a function of advanced 
industrial and urban society. The correction of it is primarily a problem for 
the advanced nations.” 
 — George F. Kennan, “To Prevent a World Wasteland,” April 1970. 
 
 
For many people around the world, the year 1968 was one that “rocked the 
world.”182 Especially for youth, 1968 resounded with hopeful expectations of 
progressive social change through transformational politics. Widespread 
international opposition to U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War contributed 
significantly to social movements on many continents. To the many youth involved 
in those social protests, revolutionary change felt near at hand. In 1968, dissident 
student and counterculture uprisings against disparate forms of cultural and political 
authoritarianism exploded around the world, in France, Mexico, and Nigeria; in 
Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and West Germany; in the United States, Poland, and 
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elsewhere. While such clamoring for change felt exciting for some, for others, 1968 
induced a foreboding sense of insecurity.183 
The year opened violently in Vietnam with the Tet Offensive, and disorder 
reverberated throughout the year and around the world in brutal street clashes and 
assassinations of beloved world figures, including Martin Luther King, Jr. Also in 
1968, Paul Ehrlich’s best-selling screed against overpopulation, The Population 
Bomb, first arrived in bookstores and flew off their shelves. Prophesying doom, 
Ehrlich warned readers that, “In the 1970s, hundreds of millions of people will starve 
to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now.”184 Increasing human 
demands appeared to overuse and abuse nature with projections of dire 
consequences. Polluting industrial technologies, overpopulation, and poisonous 
chemicals increasingly despoiled the world’s interconnected environment. If such 
devastation and loss of resources continued, Spaceship Earth might move beyond 
limited hostilities toward worldwide war. Humanity may have narrowly survived the 
Cold War’s Cuban Missile Crisis, but with a new and very hot war then raging in the 
jungles of Indochina, social upheaval on the streets across the world, and a ticking 
population bomb ready to blow, was Spaceship Earth in 1968 bound for catastrophe?  
By the late 1960s, the global environmental moment commenced with 
escalating anxiety—especially in industrialized nations of the global North—that the 
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interconnected ecological, technological, social, and economic systems of Spaceship 
Earth needed serious alterations to avoid systemic collapse. Over the next several 
years, various political reactions to these planetary concerns fabricated the structures 
of modern international environmental politics. This chapter explains how leading 
environmental scientists and experts from the global North, influential world leaders 
of industrialized nations, as well as millions of citizens initially questioned once-
sacred impulses for unrestrained economic development amid new environmental 
awareness. Continued warnings by ecological scientists and advocates about the 
environmental dangers of economic development encouraged government diplomats 
in Europe, the United States, and Japan to propose new domestic and international 
institutions for correcting widespread environmental degradation, including plans for 
the United Nations (UN) to convene a worldwide conference on global 
environmental issues. Reactions to environmental apprehensions in the global North 
inspired various visions for the form and content of environmental institutions to 
revise the structures of development, with limited desire for participation from less 
developed countries (LDCs) of the global South, but little initial consideration of 
their perspectives. This chapter reveals how, from 1968 through 1970, an apparent 
environmental revolution first unfolded in the world’s industrialized powerhouses, 
particularly the United States and Japan, which steered Spaceship Earth into the 
global environmental moment with indications of radical alterations to the 
international economic order.  
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Ecological Experts Assess Economic Development 
 To avert what appeared to be a looming environmental catastrophe, Sweden’s 
foreign ministers put forward an idea for global conference. Just before 1968 
dawned, in December 1967, Swedish diplomats Inga Thorssen and Börje Billne 
informally suggested that the UN, instead of hosting what they perceived as another 
wasteful conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should rather hold an 
intergovernmental conference on the manifold challenges for the human 
environment. Throughout 1968, the idea for a United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) percolated within the UN’s institutional machinery. 
After further consideration within the Swedish government, its representatives again 
raised the issue in May 1968. This time, Sweden prepared a formal and persuasive 
memorandum on the gravity of environmental problems to the 45th session of the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the forum in Geneva where UN members 
addressed prominent issues of social and economic concern before those issues 
moved to the UN General Assembly in New York.185 
It was only a few years earlier, in 1965 that American ambassador to the UN, 
Adlai Stevenson, famously told the ECOSOC that “We travel together, passengers 
on a little space ship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves of air and soil; all 
committed for our safety to its security and peace; preserved from annihilation only 
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by the care, the work, and I will say, the love we give our fragile craft.”186  In July 
1968, to protect Spaceship Earth from annihilation, ECOSOC Resolution 1346 
(XLV) recommended that, indeed, the UN should host an intergovernmental 
environmental conference. It should provide a forum where governments and 
international organizations could debate how best to “limit and, where possible, to 
eliminate the impairment of the human environment.”187 Further discussion on what 
came to be known as “the Swedish matter” awaited debate in the UN General 
Assembly, which would meet toward the end of 1968. 
Before that debate, however, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) would host its planned Intergovernmental Conference of 
Experts on the Scientific Basis for the Rational Use and Conservation of the 
Resources of the Biosphere, otherwise known as the Biosphere Conference. 
UNESCO’s Biosphere Conference was, of course, not the first group of experts to 
address issues of environmental protection, conservation, and natural resource use. 
Just two years earlier, in 1966, Kenneth Boulding had told a forum on 
“Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy” that planetary pollution and 
reckless resource use in the current consumptive “cowboy economy” would soon 
require creation of a “closed” or stable-state “spaceman economy.”188 Henry Jarrett, 
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chairman of that forum concluded that, “if national and world problems continue to 
increase at anything like present rates, it is only a question of time until pressures 
upon both environmental quality and supplies of natural resource products become 
intolerable.”189 Two short years later, UNESCO’s Biosphere Conference met to 
address humanity’s growing impact on the interconnected biosphere and to discuss 
the most rational use and conservation of Spaceship Earth’s limited resources.  
The Biosphere Conference, held in Paris from September 4-13, 1968 
gathered more than 300 delegates from sixty countries who worked in various fields 
in science, management, and diplomacy. Organized by Frenchman Michel Batisse, 
the conference featured active participation from various UN agencies, including its 
host agency, UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). The conference also included cooperation from 
international non-governmental organizations like the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Council of Science’s 
International Biological Program (IBP). After nine days of meetings, UNESCO’s 
conference of experts produced twenty recommendations that combined their hopes 
and fears on the “Rational Use and Conservation in Assistance Projects for 
Developing Nations.”190 If enacted, their conclusions, especially those related to 
economic development, carried implications both for the global North and for the 
world’s LDCs. 
                                                
189 Jarrett, Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, vii. 
190 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for the Rational 
Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere: Recommendations, UNESCO House, 
September 4-13, 1968, Carnegie Mellon University Digital Collections. 
  137 
One recommendation included unanimous encouragement for the UN 
General Assembly to support the international conference suggested by Sweden in 
the ECOSOC. The Biosphere experts expressed their hope that the proposed UN 
conference could create “a Universal Declaration on the Protection and Betterment 
of the Human Environment,” similar to the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights.191 Although the experts recognized that human-induced environmental 
changes had taken place throughout human history, they warned that impact on the 
biosphere had recently reached a critical threshold and required collaborative 
correction involving all nations. Their realization of an interconnected biosphere 
shaped their belief that current and careless means of economic development must 
be changed. 
The UNESCO experts’ final recommendations challenged the status quo of 
economic growth, given its recently realized effect on the environment. Although 
they recognized, on one hand, the desires of LDCs to confront demographic and 
environmental challenges with traditional economic development, the experts 
admitted “fearing, on the other hand, that intensive exploitation of the natural 
resources of these [developing] countries, and the necessary developments of 
industrialization could cause irreversible perturbations in an environment which is 
still little disturbed and whose balance is fragile.” As such, the conference 
recommended that “ecological interactions should duly be taken into account in all 
large-scale development projects.” The experts’ final recommendation thus called 
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for global coordination of economic development and for “the rational utilization 
and conservation of resources of the biosphere … for the good of mankind.”192 At 
the end of the 1960s, in what the UN had previously declared as its first 
Development Decade, environmental concern over the effects of economic 
development increasingly became a topic of international debate among leading 
ecologists and economists. 
By December 1968, momentum had gathered for international action on 
environmental degradation and reconsideration of traditional patterns of economic 
development. On December 3, 1968, the UN General Assembly in New York passed 
Resolution 2398 (XXIII), “Problems of the Human Environment,” which decided 
definitively to convene the UNCHE in 1972. In recognition of “grave dangers” 
posed by modern scientific and technological developments, the UN General 
Assembly was “convinced that increased attention to the problems of the human 
environment is essential for sound economic and social development.” In 
anticipation of the 1972 UNCHE, the General Assembly requested the ECOSOC 
provide a background report on global environmental problems. And it expressed 
“strong hope” that relatively poorer LDCs would benefit from international 
cooperation and scientific expertise from the wealthy industrialized nations, as they 
all began to combat environmental problems. While the resolution recognized LDC 
interest in mobilizing environmental knowledge and experience from industrialized 
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nations, concern about the essential role and value of development in light of 
ecological threats continued to mount.193 
Days after the UN decision to convene the UNCHE, another meeting of 
international experts gathered from December 8-11, 1968 at Airlie House outside of 
Washington D.C. They met to investigate the ecological costs of introducing 
industrial technology into LDCs and to assess holistically the consequences of 
international development. The 1968 Airlie House Conference on the Ecological 
Aspects of International Development was sponsored jointly by the Conservation 
Foundation—then headed by Russell E. Train, fated the next month to become 
President Nixon’s chairman of the first U.S. Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ)—and by the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems at Washington 
University in St. Louis, Missouri—the research center founded and directed by 
biologist and environmental activist, Barry Commoner. Additional world-renowned 
environmental experts attending the Airlie House conference included IUCN 
ecologist and UN consultant, Raymond F. Dasmann; Smithsonian ecologist and 
UNESCO consultant, Lee Talbot; and organizer of UNESCO’s Biosphere 
Conference, Michel Batisse, among many others. They joined international 
development experts, including Kenneth Boulding and Swedish economist Gunnar 
Myrdal, to examine specific case studies of development-led technological intrusions 
into various LDC environments, from Southeast Asia to East Africa, from Latin 
America to the Middle East, and from the Southern Mediterranean to the Indus 
Valley. 
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The proceedings of the 1968 Airlie House conference—edited by Barry 
Commoner’s Iranian graduate student, M. Taghi Farvar, and John P. Milton, director 
of International Programs for the Conservation Foundation—challenged “the very 
validity of the values, goals, and methods of development.” With numerous case 
studies, the conference presentations indicated that “the bulk of international 
development to date has often been destructive,” and that “the environmental side 
effects of technology are often even more serious in the less-developed than in the 
developed countries.” Example upon example of unplanned “ecological backlash” 
led to Barry Commoner’s appraisal—which he titled, “On the Meaning of Ecological 
Failures in International Development”— that “these widespread ecological mistakes 
are not the random accidents of progress, but rather the systematic consequences of 
some deep fault in our approach to technological development.”194 The various 
systems entwined in economic development and technological intrusions, 
Commoner proposed, were the primary contributors to environmental destruction 
around the world. Having helped confront dangers of nuclear testing earlier in the 
decade, Commoner’s new mission became attacking the un-ecological systems of 
development previously associated with the colonialism but continued, in his eyes, 
under a new guise of global economic development.  
Economist Gunnar Myrdal, an international development scholar, announced 
that the conference presentations and discussions afforded him “a new education in 
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the historical narrowness of development economics.” Now thinking ecologically, 
Myrdal realized that development “implies disequilibrium,” yet the “ideal must be to 
have it in dynamic balance. In other words, we need to have as much equilibrium as 
we can have.” Economist Kenneth Boulding concurred. “All these ecological horror 
stories,” Boulding announced, “have important lessons that I hope will plug into the 
international development process.” Half-joking, Boulding suggested an appropriate 
title for the conference volume might be,  “Developmental Horror Stories or, Is Man 
a Fugitive Species?”195 The conference’s barrage of negative case studies indicated 
that the ideology of progress, both in terms of science and development, must be 
questioned and reoriented. In essence, these experts—like those earlier at the 
UNESCO Biosphere Conference—called for a worldwide environmental revolution 
to revise the traditional patterns of economic growth along more ecological lines of 
balance and stability. 
Attendees to the Airlie House conference concluded that private industry and 
international agencies had been “negligent in guiding the development and 
application of man’s tools.” Those responsible for international economic 
improvement projects, they determined, could no longer afford to ignore the 
ecological problems of development. New ecological awareness called for “a 
fundamental re-evaluation of global environmental relationships and to the 
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development of sound values and goals” by establishing “technology in equilibrium 
with the biosphere,” similar to Kenneth Boulding’s earlier call for a “spaceman 
economy.” Lynton K. Caldwell—an American political scientist who soon drafted 
the pioneering U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969—declared 
in his presentation that development “is hazardous, not only to ecological variety and 
stability in developing areas, but to the very objectives of development itself.” 
Noting the inadequacy of existing institutions to cope with “a growing global crisis 
of the environment,” Caldwell believed it necessary to “restructure the machinery of 
international technical assistance” to better steer Spaceship Earth. If the “analogy of 
the spaceship is valid,” he concluded, then “a universal political order is needed … 
[with] institutions for world-wide environmental control.” Along those lines, 
Caldwell highlighted happily both the recent Biosphere Conference and the UN’s 
decision days earlier to convene the UNCHE in 1972. A representative from the UN 
who attended the Airlie House meeting promised to bring the conference’s 
realizations back to those responsible for designing the scope and content of the 
proposed UNCHE.196 While barely a glimmer of an idea, the UNCHE seemed 
destined for serious reappraisal of economic development in light of international 
evidence of its environmental damage—at least, if these environmental experts from 
the global North had their way with it. 
 Barry Commoner chaired the concluding Airlie House panel to assess the 
conference’s revolutionary implications for international development programs. 
Frenchman Michel Batisse noted how the revolutionary French students in May 
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1968 had, like this conference, questioned the very value of development and 
whether it should even occur. On the issue of development, Raymond F. Dasmann, a 
senior ecologist with IUCN and consultant to the UN and UNESCO, suggested the 
need to “change our goal away from maximizing production and toward … 
improvement of the quality of life.” M. Taghi Farvar, an Iranian who later completed 
his PhD with Commoner on the ecological implications of development in Central 
America, concluded that “the ‘rope’ we offer to the less-developed nations is 
rotten.”197 For Farvar and others, economic development, at least as commonly 
attempted by industrialized actors, seemed less a solution for LDC troubles and more 
an ecological trouble-maker. 
In closing the conference, Barry Commoner gave the final words to Kenneth 
Boulding, who had become the conference’s unofficial poet laureate. Boulding’s 
benediction, titled “A Ballad of Ecological Awareness,” summarized the Airlie 
House conference’s lessons and warnings in a rather wooden but lighthearted poem 
that, nonetheless challenged the economic status quo for the sake of planetary 
survival: 
Ecological awareness leads to questioning of goals: 
This threatens the performance of some old established roles. 
So to raise the human species from the level of subsistence 
We have to overcome Covert Political Resistance. 
So we should be propagating, without shadow of apology, 
A Scientific Discipline of Poleconecology. 
… 
There are benefits, of course, which may be countable, but which 
Have a tendency to fall into the pockets of the rich, 
While the costs are apt to fall upon the shoulders of the poor. 
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So cost-benefit analysis is nearly always sure, 
To justify the buildings of a solid concrete fact, 
While the Ecologic Truth is left behind in the Abstract. 
… 
Development is fatal to the local and specific; 
A single culture spreads from the Atlantic to Pacific. 
So preserving every specimen of life is quite essential 
If we’re not to break the bank of evolutionary potential. 
… 
If it’s just the noise of progress that is beating in our ears 
We could look beyond the turbulence and soothe our gnawing fears. 
Man is drowning in his own success, and hapless is his hope 
If our science and technology is but a rotten rope. 
 
Infinity is ended, and mankind is in a box; 
The era of expanding man is running out of rocks; 
A self-sustaining Spaceship Earth is shortly in the offing 
And man must be its crew—or else the box will be his coffin!198 
 
For Boulding, Commoner, and many of the world’s renowned environmental 
experts—almost all from nations in the industrialized North—the Airlie House 
conference in December 1968 suggested that the social, technological, and 
ecological systems of Spaceship Earth needed immediate planetary overhaul, or the 
human species might find itself extinct. If LDC voices remained unrepresented, 
ecologists’ concerns and recommendations carried serious consequences for nations 
rich and poor. 
 Later that December, in the final days of 1968, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) met for its annual meeting, that year in Dallas, 
Texas. Many participants in the recent Airlie House conference on ecology and 
international development attended the AAAS meeting, which itself featured several 
seminars addressing environmental anxieties. The AAAS’s leading journal, Science, 
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had just published Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons,” which 
suggested Spaceship Earth’s survival required mutual coercion to limit once-sacred 
liberties, especially against the freedom to breed and to control the unrestrained 
exploitation of natural resources.199 In Dallas, one AAAS panel with a standing-
room only audience earned a frightful front-page review in the New York Times. 
Held just days after astronauts aboard Apollo 8 orbited the moon and snapped the 
first Earthrise photos from space, the article explained that, in several hours of 
presentations, “experts in environmental science warned today that ‘unanticipated 
hazards’ of spreading technology threatened man’s existence.” Barry Commoner, 
fresh from his revelations at Airlie House and a prominent figure at the AAAS 
meeting, announced in Dallas that unless humanity inaugurated major changes to 
socio-technical systems at a global scale, “we run the risk of destroying this planet as 
a suitable place for human habitation.”200 When science fiction author Arthur C. 
Clarke wrote that “the world that existed before Christmas 1968 has passed away as 
irrevocably as the Earth-centered universe of the Middle Ages,” he spoke not only of 
humanity’s new place among the stars, but of a new consciousness for its survival 
back on Earth.201 With the power of new technologies sending humans beyond the 
biosphere, what would life on Earth look like in the near future? Was humanity’s 
technological and economic development really destroying the life-support systems 
for passengers on Spaceship Earth? 
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The New York Times began 1969 with three visions of the future framed by 
the new planetary consciousness. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Polish-born professor of 
government and communist affairs, foresaw a speculative search for meaning as 
humanity moved toward a technetronic—or post-industrial—society. Glenn T. 
Seaborg, a Nobel-winning nuclear chemist and chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, offered optimistic fables of technological prowess and staid overtures 
of affordable, endless energy amid other visions of technological achievement.202 
René Dubos, however, wondered “Is This Progress … or Self-Destruction?” 
Alongside images of industrial complexes spewing pollutants, the French-born 
microbiologist and director Environmental Biomedicine at Rockefeller University 
cited Spaceship Earth’s “limitations” and warned that “unless we act drastically, and 
very soon,” humanity risked self-annihilation “resulting from life in a closed 
environment which is every day more crowded, polluted, depleted and desecrated.” 
Dubos painted harrowing portraits of industrial “progress” producing environmental 
poisoning. Previously localized, such desecration, he intoned, “now affects the 
whole earth.” “Despite past achievements and promises for the near-future,” Dubos 
prophesized an era of environmental doom unless humanity ended its “biological 
warfare against nature.”203 In the wake of Apollo 8 and continued warnings by his 
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fellow environmental scientists, Dubos summoned the symbol of Spaceship Earth as 
an imperiled and closed system. Here again, an environmentalist from the global 
North called for total overhaul of global systems to ensure its survival.  
Also in January 1969, American conservationist David Brower performed a 
final act of defiance before his firing as director of the Sierra Club and his founding 
of Friends of the Earth. Eschewing proper approval, Brower used Sierra Club funds 
to purchase a two-page display advertisement advancing the “urgent idea … before 
it’s too late,” to preserve the entire planet as an “Earth National Park.” For his part, 
Brower imagined Spaceship Earth “as a kind of conservation district within the 
Universe; a wildlife preserve of sort, except we are the wildlife, together with all 
other life and environmental conditions that are necessary constituents of our 
survival and happiness.” Emphasizing the “need to think of the organic wholeness of 
nature, not man apart from that,” Brower encouraged American readers to write 
newly inaugurated President Richard Nixon about the international dangers of 
economic expansion and development. “Nations should place high priority on the 
development of blueprints for the economics of peaceful stability,” Brower intoned. 
“Exhortations for a ‘vigorous, growing economy’ by international leaders must be 
placed in the context of an Earth of fixed size. Only so much growth is possible 
before the natural balance is destroyed and all growth with it.”204 Later that month, a 
massive oil blowout inked several newspaper headlines and saturated the once-
sparkling coast of Santa Barbara, California with evidence of Brower’s own 
exhortation that nature’s exploitation needed rational restriction. Within the United 
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States, home to Earth’s most advanced industrial economy, questions on the 
planetary implications of growth grew increasingly from lone voices in the 
wilderness into a chorus. While that chorus echoed in the affluent societies of the 
global North, it seemed so concerned about an impending environmental doom that 
it gave little to no consideration of LDC concerns as to the proposed end of their 
economic development. Nonetheless, the chorus grew to include people and 
politicians throughout the United States and in Europe. 
 
Mobilizing Environmental Awareness 
Not just in the United States, but across industrial Europe, environmental 
awareness and concern spread rapidly. For those along the English Channel, the 
1969 oil blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel recalled similar ruin two years 
earlier, when an oil supertanker named the Torrey Canyon crashed and coated 
England’s Cornwall coast in crude before winds swept the sludge over to France’s 
Brittany coast. Political scientist Richard Falk described it as “the Hiroshima of the 
environmental age.” The cleanup cost for taxpayers contributed to the 1969 
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, and the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.205 That 
year, English ecologist Sir Frank Fraser Darling introduced a broad audience on 
human-environment relationships by delivering the BBC’s influential Reith Lectures 
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on the theme of “Wilderness and Plenty.” After attending Barry Commoner’s Airlie 
House conference on ecology and development, Darling’s lecture on “The 
Technological Experiment,” outlined the ecological consequences of the industrial 
revolution and the environmental hazards involved with uncontrolled economic 
development, while his analysis on “Global Changes – Actual and Possible” and 
“Where Does Responsibility Lie?” addressed needed alterations to humanity’s 
mishandling of the global commons.206 
Other Europeans also spoke up to propel the environmental revolution in the 
global North. In Scandinavia, articles by Swedish soil scientist Svante Odén raised 
alarms about atmospheric industrial effluents crossing borders and falling as acid 
rains, which may have inspired Swedish diplomats to request holding the 
UNCHE.207 International conservationist Max Nicholson continued providing his 
planetary perspective. In the late 1940s, Nicholson and UNESCO director Julian 
Huxley helped form the Scientific International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN); Nicholson then co-founded the World Wildlife Fund; and he served as a 
longtime director-general of the Nature Conservancy before working as the convener 
for conservation of the International Biological Program. In 1969, Nicholson happily 
reported seeing Europe and North America engaged in a contemporary 
“environmental revolution,” and he described the first generation of 
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environmentalists as “New Masters of the World.”208 In light of Spaceship Earth, the 
new environmentalism was unabashedly global in scope. But if Nicholson was right, 
the New Masters of the World would be rather similar to the Old Masters given 
environmentalism’s distinct appeal in the industrialized North. 
Also in 1969, the environmental revolution spread in the new era of East-
West détente to influence the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the 
commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of signing the North Atlantic Treaty, 
President Nixon told his Northern allies how advanced nations like theirs shared 
both the “benefits and the gathering torments of a rapidly advancing industrial 
technology.” Together, he declared, “the industrialized nations share no challenge 
more urgent than that of bringing twentieth-century man and his environment to 
terms with one another – of making the world fit for man, and helping man to learn 
how to remain in harmony with the rapidly changing world.”209 Pushed strongly by 
United States insistence, NATO—the world’s most powerful military organization in 
history—established that spring its new Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society (CCMS), designed specifically to engage the new onslaught of 
environmental challenges. 
For Nixon, the environment offered a political issue like motherhood that no 
one would oppose, and where the United States could exert leadership. Additionally, 
with increasing concern over the environmental affects of economic development, 
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Nixon’s international pursuit of environmental issues, and his efforts to 
institutionalize them within NATO’s CCMS, could allow him to appear pro-
environmental without having to make any sweeping changes in the US economy. 
Nixon also intended the CCMS to advance his policies of détente via international 
environmental cooperation. Part of his goal for promoting détente included increased 
dialog on any and all fronts with the Soviets. As long as they remained in dialog on 
various fronts, possible tensions could resolved and hope remained for eventual 
cooperation and mutual agreement. NATO, for Nixon, therefore offered an 
institution for engaging both allies and enemies on an issue of mutual concern: the 
environment.210 
Though initially reluctant, European allies in the Northern Alliance agreed 
and began marching toward environmental action on a number of environmental 
research projects. A State Department telegram to the U.S. Mission to NATO later 
explained, “Our rational is simply that all industrially advanced societies, regardless 
of the social systems, share increasingly urgent environmental problems, many of 
which cross national boundaries and can only be solved in international context.”211 
While the environment became “fodder in the process of East-West détente,” its 
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affect on North-South relations remained unclear, especially as questions on the 
implications of industrial growth continued percolating in the global North without 
much input from LDCs.212 
In March 1969, even the International Development Review—a magazine 
dedicated to the promotion of international economic development—warned that 
“International Development Can Destroy the Environment.” Citing ecological 
failures from development projects in Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Vietnam, Peru, 
and Brazil, it advocated effective “controls on air, water, and land” as part of all 
future development programs.213 That year, Iranian M. Taghi Farvar edited selected 
papers from the Airlie House conference and labeled their development pitfalls as an 
“unforeseen international ecologic boomerang.”214 Barry Commoner reiterated those 
lessons to a separate conference sponsored by the U.S. National Commission for 
UNESCO and titled, “Man and His Environment: A View Toward Survival.” 
Commoner warned the US UNESCO commission that ecologically damaging 
“technologies are now so massively embedded in our system of industrial and 
agricultural production that an effort to make them conform to the demands of the 
environment will involve serious economic dislocations.”215 Ecology and economy, 
though interrelated, appeared in conflict. 
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Stanford biologist, Paul Ehrlich, who expressed greater concern with the 
ecological consequences of overpopulation, also spoke to the US UNESCO 
gathering about economic reconsiderations. After suggesting the addition of a 
temporary sterilant to food and water supplies as a means to control run away 
population, he even encouraged the United States to withhold economic aid to 
countries not trying to limit their own populations. Reverberating the rhetoric of 
Kenneth Boulding, Ehrlich called for “a fundamental change in economic 
philosophy,” specifically to transition from the current “cowboy economy” toward a 
stable-state spaceman economy. “Extreme political and economic pressure,” Ehrlich 
concluded, “should be brought on any country or international organization 
impeding a solution to the world’s most pressing problem.”216 Leading 
environmental experts clearly advocated drastic decisions of domestic and 
international consequence. Yet, their viewpoints on how to proceed differed 
markedly. Here marked the initial meeting of Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich. 
While both believed Spaceship Earth faced a dire environmental crisis, Commoner 
remained focused on technological intrusions to nature and the social systems that 
governed them, while Ehrlich remained focused on overpopulation. Their continued 
conflict, addressed in Chapter 8, helped make the environmental moment and 
amplified until its climax in Stockholm.217 
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Amid continued questioning over the environmental impact of economic 
development, administrators who funded international development projects for the 
influential Ford and Rockefeller Foundations took note of the new environmental 
revolution, though they were admittedly “not sure how to approach this entire 
domain,” particularly regarding the UN. In New York, they asked their Scandinavian 
connections in the UN how the announced but undefined UNCHE might redefine 
international development practices.218 The UN, after all, became an apostle of 
development in the 1960s, throughout the UN Development Decade.  But the 
environmental anxieties expressed by UN Secretary-General U Thant Had confused 
them. “I can only conclude from information that is available to me as Secretary-
General,” U Thant had warned earlier in 1969, “that the members of the United 
Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and 
launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human 
environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required 
momentum to world development efforts.”219 But if the root of the environmental 
and population crises lay in the very processes of economic development, as 
indicated by veterans from the Airlie House conference and other environmental 
spokesmen, and if humanity had only one decade to solve these crises before global 
collapse, how then could reasonable solutions to the crisis encourage development 
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and industrialization? The upcoming UNCHE would have to address these questions, 
both for the success of the UN’s first intergovernmental single-issue conference, and 
possibly, for the survival of humanity. 
Among the information available to U Thant when he made his bold 
prediction included was an ECOSOC publication titled, “Problems of the Human 
Environment.” In May 1969, ECOSOC had released its report, prepared hastily to 
meet requirements established UN resolution 2398 (XXIII). As the first major 
planning document for the upcoming UNCHE, the ECOSOC report seemed to 
combine the diatribes by Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich in specifying three 
primary problems behind the environmental crisis: increased population growth, 
growing urbanization, and the accelerated impact of industrialization. The latter 
received particular attention. The side effects of  “uncontrolled industrialization,” the 
report emphasized, were “a direct cause of many serious environmental problems.” 
For example, reliance on the combustion of fossil fuels over the past century had 
“brought a 10 per cent increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide.” Yet, with increased 
rates of combustion, the report predicted levels could rise beyond “25 per cent by the 
year 2000 A.D.” Though admitting uncertainty of the effects “upon world weather 
and climate,” the report warned the consequences of such an increase “could 
eventually be catastrophic.”220 Yet, other existing evidence of environmental crisis 
was already acute. From the compound effects of urban crowding to the poisonous 
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pesticides used in rural farming, no nation was isolated from growing global 
pressures. 
An UNCHE was needed, the ECOSOC report claimed, because the triple 
threats of accelerating population, urbanization, and industrial incursions, “with their 
associated increase in demands for space, food, and natural resources” required 
careful planning and coordinated action at “local, regional, national and international 
levels.” The UNCHE, planned for 1972, would analyze and address the “economic 
results of failure to take action, as well as the costs involved in attacking these 
problems.” Though recognizing the expected high cost of actions toward 
environmental protection and improvement—and the expected reluctance for such 
funding from LDCs—the ECOSOC determined “the alternative to such a program is 
accelerating human misery and mortality.” To avoid such misery, the report 
declared, the UNCHE would offer an intergovernmental forum for eventual 
“international or regional agreements on specific environmental problems,” and the 
“formulation of practical and long-term governmental policies and international 
action.”221 The ECOSOC report first oriented the upcoming UNCHE toward the 
environment concerns echoing throughout the global North. Additionally, initial 
intentions for the first worldwide conference on the environment indicated action 
toward planetary policies. Those policies, it seemed, would apply equally to wealthy 
industrialized nations, as well as the relatively poor LDCs, despite their clamoring 
for increased development. 
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After the report’s release, members of Sweden’s UN delegation complained 
in private meetings that “one of the big problems” for the UNCHE was “successfully 
convincing leaders of the developing countries that that it is important to take 
ecological and environmental factors into consideration.” No surprise there, 
especially when Sweden’s UN ambassador Sverker Åström told the UN General 
Assembly that the UNCHE’s “great potential importance” would be for all countries 
to realize that “large scale application of modern technology, necessary as it is for 
economic progress, has certain deleterious side-effects.”222 Despite LDC 
trepidations, and perhaps caught up in the fearful rhetoric of the global 
environmental moment, in December 1969, the nations of the UN General 
Assembly—rich and poor alike—approved another resolution regarding the 
UNCHE.223 The resolution affirmed the conference’s main purpose was to encourage 
and to provide guidelines for action, both by national governments and international 
organizations, with particular attention to “enabling” LDCs to forestall 
environmental impairment. Importantly, the resolution also established a twenty-
seven nation Preparatory Committee with a mix of LDCs and industrialized nations 
including Brazil, Argentina, India, Iran, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States. Future planning for the actions and possible international 
conventions for the UNCHE fell on this influential Preparatory Committee. Finally, 
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the UN resolution also accepted Sweden’s offer to host the 1972 UNCHE in 
Stockholm. 
Despite renewed approve for the UNCHE in the UN General Assembly, and 
agreement by several LDCs to participate in planning via the UNCHE Preparatory 
Committee, Sweden expressed private concerns. Days after UN approval to host the 
UNCHE in Stockholm, in a private meeting, Lars-Goran Engfeldt, a member of 
Sweden’s UN mission told funding administrators from the Rockefeller Foundation 
that “special attention” for future UNCHE planning would have to focus on “How to 
persuade international and national development agencies to take ecological and 
environmental aspects of development fully into account in their planning,” and 
“how to persuade national and local leaders in the developing countries to take 
ecological and environmental aspects into account in development planning.”224 
Successfully saving Spaceship Earth, and importantly, success for a global 
environmental conference required global participation. Yet, for LDCs with primary 
interests in economic expansion, the initial rhetoric surrounding the UNCHE 
appeared dubious at best. At worse, environmental protection seemed a convenient 
excuse for industrialized countries to further control economic growth, possibly 
freezing international development. LDCs allowed UNCHE planning to proceed, but 
as new policies emerged in response to environmental concern in industrialized 
nations, LDCs began wondering if neocolonialism was growing green. 
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Environmental Revolution: United States and Europe 
In 1970, across nations in the global North, revolutionary rhetoric and action 
toward environmental regulation reached fever pitch proportions, particularly in the 
United States.225 By January 1970, the U.S. Congress had passed and President 
Nixon had signed the transformative and now widely emulated National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), drafted originally by Airlie House veteran 
Lynton Caldwell. The legislation made environment a government prerogative and 
required, for the first time ever, environmental impact statements for any proposed 
action by agencies of the federal government. It also stressed the need for 
international cooperation and government support for such initiatives. That month, 
Nixon appointed Russell Train, chairman earlier of the Airlie House conference, to 
direct his new executive-level Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), tasked with 
coordinating America’s federal environmental efforts and developing new 
environmental policies. Nixon also made Russell Train his personal envoy to initiate 
a new phase in international relations on collective environmental action.226 To aid 
these initiatives, Nixon’s Secretary of State William P. Rogers created an Office of 
Environmental Affairs within the Department’s Bureau of International Scientific 
and Technological Affairs. That January, Rogers appointed Christian A. Herter, Jr.—
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an executive with Mobil Oil, a specialist in international law, and son of former 
Secretary of State for President Eisenhower—as his special assistant for international 
environmental affairs.227 
Together, Train and Herter midwived what J. Brooks Flippen described as 
“the birth of modern American environmental diplomacy.”228 Environmental 
diplomacy for conservation and the protection of wild animals was nothing new.229 
Yet, in global economic boom in the post-World War II period, modern 
environmentalism had moved beyond its earlier confines for simplistic nature 
conservation to embrace a host of complex environmental issues affecting human 
health and happiness, especially those relating quality of life, including clear air and 
water, and reducing exposure to new industrial toxins and pollution.230 Modern 
environmental diplomacy thus entailed international negotiation over issues 
including pollution standards as well as the use of natural resources, especially 
human induced environmental impacts that transgressed national boundaries and 
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required international cooperation for their resolution or control.231 With the 
appointment of Russell Train to the White House’s new CEQ, and appointment of 
Christian Herter, Jr. as the State Department’s lead envoy for international 
environmental affairs, the U.S. government signaled that environment problems had 
become both a domestic and international priority. 
On January 12, 1970, Nixon’s first State of the Union address in the new 
decade laid the stakes of the new environmentalism. The “great question of the 
seventies,” Nixon told the joint session of Congress and millions watching on 
television, was whether humankind would “make our peace with nature and begin to 
make reparations for the damage we have done to our air, to our land, and to our 
water.” The United States, Nixon assured, would answer affirmatively. But doing so, 
with new realizations on the environmental impact of economic development, 
demanded new conceptions of wealth and growth. Although the United States was, 
by most measures, the world’s wealthiest nation, Nixon insisted that quantity of 
wealth did not equate with happiness, and economic growth was only good when it 
enhanced the “quality of life.” Remarkably, Nixon encouraged policymakers to 
develop a new “national growth policy” that took account of these new 
environmental realizations. The Republican leader of the world’s largest economy 
assured he sought “not to abandon growth, but to redirect it.” Redirecting growth, 
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Nixon noted, required regulating and reformulating the invisible hand of the pricing 
system. 
Nixon’s surprising rhetoric in his State of the Union reflected just how high 
the environmental revolution and the warnings of influential environmental scientists 
had reached. Riffing on the environmental tragedies articulated by biologist Garrett 
Hardin, Nixon explained how protecting the global commons entailed environmental 
controls and accompanying costs.232 “We can no longer afford to consider air and 
water common property, free to be abused by anyone without regard to the 
consequences,” Nixon announced. Instead, he continued, we must “now treat them 
as scarce resources … This requires comprehensive new regulations. It also requires 
that, to the extent possible, the price of goods should be made to include the costs of 
producing and disposing of them without damage to the environment.” Restoring 
nature to its natural state, Nixon admitted, would be “comprehensive and costly,” but 
acting now would “prevent disaster later.” Though unclear exactly how to reconcile 
what he admitted as the “contradiction between economic growth and the quality of 
life,” Nixon remained confidant that the United States could provide global 
leadership for agreeing how to do so. Reiterating America’s global perspective and 
ambition, Nixon concluded by quoting Thomas Jefferson, who in 1802 said, we act 
“not for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race.”233 
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Nixon’s rhetoric on reconciling economic growth with the new 
environmental concerns did not go unheeded. Fortune magazine followed Nixon’s 
address with a special issue on the environment. It, too, admitted that “the market as 
now set up is rigged against the environment … There is a huge, unintentional 
incentive to pollution.”234 Newsweek reminded readers that those unintentional 
incentives occurred in international contexts with planetary consequences. In 
January 1970, Newsweek’s cover story on “The Ravaged Environment” featured one 
of the now-famous photos of the whole earth. The new environmental revolution, it 
seemed, also entailed an economic revolution—one possibly led by the world’s 
leading industrial economy. 
In terms of international policy, similar suggestions for action came from 
Englishwoman Barbara Ward, a Baroness and an international development 
economist at Columbia University. Ward often advised international leaders, 
including the Pope; she had encouraged a Spaceship Earth analysis of 
interdependence in the mid-1960s; and, early in 1970, she called for an international 
agency to regulate ecological problems stemming from industrial development. 
Citing revelations from Barry Commoner, Kenneth Boulding, and the Airlie House 
conference, Ward determined that “the ecological failure of so many development 
projects” resulted from a “narrow and incomplete character of economic analysis.” 
That narrow analysis, she noted, seemed unable to account for how “increased 
industrialization accelerates the depletion of the world’s resources and the pollution 
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of the global ecosystem.”235 The economy also earned her blame for global 
environmental problems. How, then, might those complex problems be solved? 
Ward suggested controlling the processes of economic development to 
achieve a combination of the “best quality of living for optimum numbers” with a 
“high material standard of living.” To do so, she encouraged establishing a new and 
powerful “international agency … within the structure of the global ecosystem,” one 
that, like the borderless nature of Spaceship Earth, required some dissolution of 
national borders and jurisdictions. The global environmental crisis, she thought, 
required reordering not just the international economy, but redefining the sanctity of 
sovereignty. “A high degree of national sovereignty would have to be ceded,” she 
foretold, “when the international agency proscribed a local redistribution of land 
productivity, the cessation of certain agricultural methods, or certain levels of 
industrial pollution.”236 In this ripe moment of ecological concern, Barbara Ward, an 
internationally regarded development expert, warned against the environmental 
dilemmas caused by economic development and suggested revolutionary solutions 
with global implications for all nations, rich and poor. 
At least in the global North, the environmental revolution seemed to know no 
national boundaries. It also drew in national spokesmen in Europe. In February, 
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ministers of the Council of Europe met at the European Conservation Conference in 
Strasbourg, where they discussed how to harmonize creatively “conservation and 
development.”237 As an international organization, the Council of Europe facilitated 
trans-European co-operation, particularly in terms of legal standards, charters, and 
conventions. As a result, their meeting reflected a European inclination to establish 
new international standards and policies on the environmental implications of 
economic growth. The ministers and conference attendees—who included royal 
princes, government bureaucrats, directors of national environmental institutes, and 
various members of national academies of science—inaugurated there the “European 
Conservation Year 1970.” The new American language on modern 
environmentalism, which was replacing the limited focus only on conservation, had 
yet to make the rhetorical leap to Western Europe. Yet, as reflected by the Council of 
Europe’s range of subjects, conservation in Europe clearly included the new 
environmentalism. The conference debate in Strasbourg ranged on diverse topics of 
environmental management, from industry to leisure and from agriculture to 
urbanization, but the opening speeches all demanded action. Jacques Duhamel, the 
French Minister of Agriculture, declared the time for academic discussion was over. 
“Public opinion has reached saturation point,” he announced, and, importantly, both 
“our happiness and our survival” were at stake.238 
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The Royal Prince of Liege in Belgium concurred. After all, he conceded, this 
year-long focus on the environment was to put Europeans “on their guard and even, 
let us admit, making them so uneasy that they will support large-scale action … 
without fear of upsetting, if need be, certain economic taboos.” The Belgian prince 
acknowledged rapid population growth as a culprit in the environmental crisis, but 
he cut to the chase: “above all it is the technological upheaval which makes man 
hope for more material good fortune and therefore induces him to produce and 
consume still more.” The prince chastised humanity for making “a god of economic 
growth,” yet not paying its full price. “Shall I be out of order,” the Prince of Liege 
asked, “if I suggest a new attitude to meet this frenzy of economic development?” 
He called for planned action and “financial sacrifice” of a “universal and worldwide 
nature.” Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, tapped the rhetoric of atomic anxiety 
and, along the lines of Barry Commoner, applied it to new environmental concerns. 
Price Philip bemoaned the “fallout from the technological explosion” that had 
“littered Europe with immense industrial complexes belching pollution.” 
Environmental incursions needed more study, he maintained, but “research and 
action must go on at the same time. … We cannot postpone decisions any longer.” 
Similarly, the Prince of the Netherlands warned that “powerful interests whose 
businesses will be affected” would cast doubt on scientists’ environmental warnings. 
Nonetheless, he advocated a “holding operation” while expediting solutions to the 
“main causal problems.”239 Caught up in the environmental revolution, and without 
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irony or appreciation of their immense affluence compared to most passengers on 
Spaceship Earth, North and South, several European princes openly questioned the 
costs of growth and called for a new economy of ecological equilibrium.  
On the issue of industrial development, conference discussions 
acknowledged its many benefits when used wisely. Yet, industry’s “irrational 
exploitation” of natural resources, they added, now threatened to destroy several 
species including, perhaps, human beings. Clément Bressou, a member of the Institut 
de France, saw industry spreading globally. Yet, he believed survival in worldwide 
“industrial civilization” was possible only “if it had an ethic other than the profit 
motive.” His basis for future world survival, therefore, demanded “a scientific 
understanding of … environmental equilibrium.” Dutch professor D.J. Kuenen, 
director of Holland’s National Institute for Nature Management believed that 
“society is ready to pay the costs of eliminating pollution,” but, to do so collectively, 
they must first “persuade industrialists.” Perhaps, he suggested vaguely that the 
Council of Europe could bring together ecologists and industrialists “to talk things 
over and to establish what needs to be done.”240 However it would be accomplished, 
they all seemed to agree that, for the sake of survival, industry needed an 
environmental reckoning. 
Another thing most conference attendees concluded was that solutions to the 
international crisis required international controls, possibly along the lines of 
reformulating sovereignty as suggested by Barbara Ward. The Secretary-General for 
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the Council of Europe, Luco Tončić-Sorinj, an Austrian, and Dr. V. Westhoff, a 
Dutch delegate and professor of biology, both called on the Council to help 
formulate “internationally agreed norms and binding rules” to save the environment 
from contamination. Likewise, Valfrid Paulsson, Director General of Sweden’s new 
Environmental Protection Agency, and later President of the UNCHE in Stockholm, 
then urged “uniform legislation” for the international coordination of natural 
resource use. When the conference proceedings appeared in November 1970, Mr. 
J.M.A.H. Luns, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Chairman of the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, advised that “all sectors of our 
societies should be ready to support the policy measures that would inevitably entail 
heavy financial sacrifices, as well as restrictions on the individual's right to do what 
he or she likes with our common natural heritage.”241 The environmental revolution, 
it seemed, threatened to reorder not only economic relations and national 
sovereignty, it might redefine natural rights. 
Near the end of the European Conservation Conference, attendees asked 
Henry J. Kellerman—an American observer sent from the State Department’s new 
Office of Environmental Affairs—whether President Nixon’s new environmental 
emphasis saw things similarly. Back in Washington, while the Conservation 
Conference met in France, Nixon had delivered to Congress his first “Special 
Message” on the environment. While the President had focused almost entirely on 
domestic environmental concerns, he nonetheless reiterated a need for government 
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regulation to control industrial pollution.242 Back in Europe, Kellerman was less 
forthcoming. “A final solution of the pollution problem,” Kellerman stated, “may be 
achieved only after considerable heart-searching by American politicians and 
public.” But, along those lines, Kellerman admitted the U.S. government was now 
questioning “whether it can really continue to allow the indiscriminate growth of all 
sectors of the economy, or whether some positive selectivity will be required in 
order to reduce the risk of further damage to the environment.”243 The remarkable 
rhetoric against economic growth by government diplomats from nations across the 
global North reflected the seriousness of environmental anxieties at revolutionary 
dawn of the global environmental moment. 
A few days after the European Conservation Conference concluded, Nixon’s 
report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy for the new decade confirmed his own 
seriousness in formulating international agreements to stem the tide of global 
environmental degradation. After highlighting his forcing of NATO to face “the 
gathering torments of a rapidly advancing industrial technology,” the President 
declared a need for additional environmental “institution building, and international 
regulatory agreements.” Rhetorically, Nixon appeared convinced. He affirmed that 
“Environmental problems are secondary effects of technological change; 
international environmental cooperation is therefore an essential requirement of our 
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age.”244 The remaining questions were now what institutions should be built, and 
what exactly should international environmental agreements agree to do? 
 
International Institutions and Environmental Action 
Early in 1970, Dr. Lee DuBridge, the science advisor to President Nixon, 
offered his own answers. At the President’s request, DuBridge oversaw preparation 
of a government report titled, “Protecting the World Environment in Light of 
Population Increases.” Before delivering his report on protecting the world 
environment to the President, DuBridge ensured it earned broad support through the 
government. DuBridge gained endorsement from directors of the Departments of 
State; Interior; Agriculture; Health, Education, and Welfare; the Office of 
Intergovernmental Relations; the National Science Foundation; and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (US AID). Russell Train, chair of the new CEQ, also 
concurred with the reports findings and recommendations. DuBridge, in a letter to 
Nixon accompanying the report, noted that, given the nature of the interconnected 
biosphere, “no single country can solve its environmental problems alone.” Yet, like 
the President’s recent addresses, DuBridge acknowledged that industrialized nations, 
“with the tools and products of modern technology,” affected the environment at a 
far greater rate than the LDCs. The United States, with responsibility as a “great 
scientific and technological power,” should therefore “take a lead role in mobilizing 
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necessary international action to protect the world environment.”245 Some of his 
recommendations, however, carried international financial implications. 
 DuBridge’s widely approved report stated that “Unwise development may 
carry with it latent threats to human welfare and to the environment.” New and 
seemingly sudden realizations about environmental degradation meant “rapidly 
entering a new era in which the international framework for directing attention to 
environmental questions will affect the pattern of development on the spaceship 
Earth for decades to come.” Toward those ends, the report recommended that U.S. 
foreign assistance programs, especially US AID, should now include “environmental 
considerations” in their aid to LDCs. The report also suggested all international 
financing institutions and U.S. foreign investors do likewise. As for institution 
building, the report encouraged U.S. environmental leadership in the UN, especially 
for its upcoming UNCHE to develop there new “internationally agreed criteria and 
standards for air and water quality.”246 DuBridge and the heads of several key 
agencies in the U.S. government encouraged the President to use American power 
and knowledge in the new global environmental moment. They suggested doing so 
through multilateral cooperation on the global environment through the existing 
political infrastructure of the UN. 
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 Along those lines, in March 1970, the twenty-seven-nation Preparatory 
Committee for the UNCHE, established three months earlier, met in New York for 
the first of its four formal planning sessions. Consideration of UNCHE program 
content clearly reflected environmental concerns of the global North; the UNCHE 
program then revolved mostly around means for pollution control, particularly 
industrial pollution. Similar to DuBridge’s report to President Nixon, the initial 
recommendations of the UNCHE Preparatory Committee also affirmed that 
“pollution control can best be achieved through international cooperation.” To 
accommodate such controls, the UNCHE working group noted that “certain 
international regulatory ‘legislative’ action may be needed … in the form of 
conventions or agreement.” Such a program, however, seemed to scare off LDCs 
from an interest in the UNCHE. Despite its claim to have taken “due account” of 
environmental stresses caused by regional and national differences in social and 
economic development, the Preparatory Committee still admitted a need to “to 
ensure adequate representation from developing countries.”247 With apparent LDC 
disinterest, the first meeting for UNCHE planning seemed destined only to address 
environmental issues of concern in the global North. Additionally, as environmental 
anxiety in the global North peaked, the UNCHE appeared intent on institutionalizing 
international environmental standards and conventions multilaterally via the UN. 
One of the deans of American diplomacy, however, offered a different view. 
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 In 1947, George F. Kennan, intellectual father of America’s Cold War 
containment policy, had made famous his call to check Soviet expansion in the pages 
of Foreign Affairs, the leading American journal for analysis of foreign policy and 
global affairs. In 1970, amid growing hysteria over environmental crisis, Kennan 
again turned to Foreign Affairs to propose how “To Prevent a World Wasteland.” 
Then a faculty member at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, 
Kennan had like many other Americas became fearful of “the growing chorus of 
warnings from qualified scientists” that “industrial man” threatened catastrophe for 
“the entire ecology of the planet,” and human civilization with it. Believing the crisis 
warranted immediate response, Kennan, as a realist, rejected DuBridge’s multilateral 
approach via the UN. Instead, typical of Kennan’s elitist, even racist, ideologies and 
his contempt for piddly LDCs, Kennan proposed elite action.248 
For Kennan, resolving global environmental problems would only be slowed 
by global participation. International environmental action and protections, like his 
suggested action to internationally protect democracy against communist 
encroachment, should be conducted by the world’s most powerful nations. “Roughly 
the ten leading industrial nations of the world,” Kennan advised, should capitalize on 
détente and independently constitute “something in the nature of a club for the 
preservation of natural environment.” This industrial club, he envisioned, would then 
create a new institution, first to advise other nations on environmental amelioration 
and establish international environmental standards. “Someone, after all, must decide 
                                                
248 George F. Kennan, “To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal,” Foreign Affairs 48:3 (April 
1970), 401-413, here 401; on containment, see “X” (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25:4 (July 1947), 566–582.  
  174 
at some point what is tolerable and permissible here and what is not,” he affirmed. 
Eventually, Kennan foresaw how this new institution would expand its function 
“from that of an advisory agency to that of the single commanding International 
Environmental Authority.” The new Authority would then engage “vigorously and 
impartially, in the work of enforcement of rules and standards.”249 For Kennan, it 
seemed, industrial crisis justified industrial coercion. If the early UNCHE plans 
nominally sought LDC participation even if it dismissed LDC interests for Northern 
environmental concerns, Kennan’s institutional solution to global environmental 
crisis would eliminate LDC participation entirely. 
 Kennan argued strongly against involving the UN in his proposal for 
Northern environmental institutional hegemony. Admittedly, no government could 
solve the global crisis alone, but, to Kennan, gaining sanction from the entire 
international community “would scarcely be a promising undertaking.” Using the 
UN to institute environmental action, instead of establishing an Environmental 
Authority by industrial leaders, would mean involving “a host of smaller and less 
developed countries which could contribute very little to the solution of the problems 
at hand.” Furthermore, including LDCs would “involve formidable delays and heavy 
problems of decision-taking,” when drastic environmental action was needed now. 
The industrial superpowers should establish their own international organization to 
oversee global environmental and industrial processes, if not with the participation 
of all, for the betterment of all. “In problems of international organizations, as in 
war,” Kennan maintained, “one does well to follow the Napoleonic principle: ‘On 
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s'engage et puis on voit’ [First you engage, and then you see.]” As a grand realist in 
American foreign relations, Kennan concluded that “To engage oneself means, in 
this instance, to bring into being the personality. The rest will follow.”250 In 
Kennan’s view of preponderant American power, his global Environmental 
Authority would simply establish its own rules and, eventually, the LDCs would fall 
into line. Lines, indeed, had been drawn as to how to institutionalize efforts toward 
solving global environmental problems. But it remained unclear how the industrial 
or the less developed nations would respond. 
 Not only some American academic elites, but also its general public grew 
anxious for environmental action. On April 22, 1970, American environmental 
awareness and concern exploded in a nationwide outpouring of celebration and 
protest for the world’s first Earth Day. Just fifteen months after the Airlie House 
conference and the initial images of Earth from space, Earth Day saw everyday 
Americans across the entire nation take to the streets in what was then the largest 
single-day public protest in U.S. history. Even Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson, 
who originated the idea for Earth Day a year earlier, was surprised, calling the 
occasion a “truly astonishing grass-roots explosion.”251 The first Earth Day drew an 
estimated twenty million participants across the United States—roughly a tenth of 
the national population—with involvement from over ten thousand schools and two 
thousand colleges and universities. In the week of Earth Day, newspapers, 
magazines, and television all gave environmental events unprecedented attention. 
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Public broadcasting stations committed entire days worth of programming to the 
need for environmental protection. All three of America’s major television stations, 
and one television crew from Japan, granted significant coverage to huge Earth Day 
gatherings in New York, Washington DC, even Birmingham, Alabama, all of which 
featured relentless speeches by politicians, professors, even union leaders like Walter 
Reuther.252 
 As part of the era’s impetus for social and political transformation, Earth Day 
reflected how environmental issues had rapidly mobilized new publics for radical 
reform and institutional action. Indeed, the small organization created to orchestrate 
and nationally coordinate the first Earth Day took the name Environmental Action. 
The Environmental Handbook, an original paperback created to accompany the first 
national environmental teach-in, appeared only three months earlier yet sold more 
than a million copies before the end of April. Along with Paul Ehrlich’s warnings 
about impending “Eco-Catastrophe!,” it reprinted admonitions from Kenneth 
Boulding and others for stabilizing economic growth.253 Along those lines, Dennis 
Hayes, the twenty-five year old national coordinator for Environmental Action, 
announced on Earth Day, “We are building a movement … a movement that values 
people more than technology, people more than political boundaries and political 
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ideologies, people more than profit.”254 This exuberant new environmental 
movement, according to historian John McNeill, arose “in a context of 
countercultural critique of any and all established orthodoxies.” But, at its root, Earth 
Day—and the simultaneous flowering of international concern about people’s 
relations to the biosphere—also constituted “a complaint against economic 
orthodoxy … It was a critique of the faith of economists and engineers, and their 
programs to improve life on earth.” For new adherents to this ecological insight, the 
popularity of Earth Day’s events contributed collectively to “a general sense that 
things were out of whack and business as usual was responsible.”255 For millions of 
citizens demanding domestic and international action to save Spaceship Earth, 
business as usual needed to change, particularly its narrow focus on economic 
growth and industrial development. 
 While questions of how to institute and enforce international environmental 
standards remained unclear, in July 1970, just after America’s 194th birthday, 
President Nixon took action. Under Reorganization Plans No. 3 and No. 4, both 
executive orders submitted to Congress, Nixon captured political capital 
domestically by creating a new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and, within 
the Department of Commerce, he established simultaneously the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). According to Nixon’s Congressional 
submission, the new EPA amalgamated the federal government’s disparate pollution 
                                                
254 Dennis Hayes quoted in National Staff of Environmental Action, eds., Earth Day: The 
Beginning (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), xv. 
255 J.R. McNeill, “The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 
1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, edited by Niall Ferguson, Charles S. 
  178 
control authorities under an independent agency for the principle purpose “to set and 
enforce” environmental protection standards. The EPA thus centralized the 
government’s “critical standard-setting functions” for the betterment of life in the 
United States and on Spaceship Earth.256 
In the federal reorganization plans, Nixon reiterated his earlier messages that 
“Arresting environmental deterioration is of great importance to the quality of life in 
our country and in the world.” Nixon’s domestic establishment of EPA eventually 
offered a model later adopted and adapted by other nations, including Japan. It also 
offered possible encouragement for international institutions that might likewise 
reorganize and regulate for global environmental quality. If the exact form of an 
international environmental organization remained up for debate, the fact that such 
an institution must appear seemed increasingly apparent. As Claire Sterling, the 
Italian-based reporter on the global environmental crisis for the Washington Post, 
noted: “If the planet is to be reasonably livable somewhere around the year 2000, we 
are going to have to have planetary rules, planetarily devised, imposed, and 
policed.”257 As in other areas—economic, bellicose, or environmental—America’s 
actions for a centralized environmental agency set an important precedent, both for 
industrialized nations and for the rest of the world, especially as the world’s largest 
and most dynamic economy. 
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How then would Japan, another of the world’s largest and most dynamic 
industrialized economies, respond in the global environmental moment? Since its 
defeat in World War II, Japan had maintained devout focus on the imperatives of 
increasing Gross National Product. Yet, amid the revolutionary rhetoric about the 
environmental problems posed by unrestrained economic development in much of 
the global North, Japan also found itself swept up in the environmental revolution, 
with consequences for its internationally focused economy.  
 
Japan, Industrial Pollution, and International Trade 
 Among the industrial capitalist core in the global North, no nation 
experienced greater sustained economic growth between the end of World War II 
and 1970 than Japan. One hundred years earlier, in the 1870s, Japan began rapid 
industrialization under the Meiji Restoration. By 1940, Japan expanded its reach for 
resources into a massive, well-armed empire over much of the Asian Pacific. Defeat 
in World War II ended Japan’s military imperialism, but its industries rose from their 
atomic ashes to ignite a new stage of “miraculous” economic growth. Between 1954 
and 1963, Japan’s national production more than doubled with annual average GDP 
growth of 9.4%, compared to American growth in the same period of 2.8% and 
English growth of 2.5%. Between 1965 and 1970, Japan’s growth rate grew to hover 
comfortably between eleven and thirteen percent; and between 1950 and 1970, 
booming sales of Japanese goods abroad tripled their share of the world’s total 
exports. Despite having lost their Pacific empire, by 1968, Japan became an 
economic superpower—not only as the industrial and commercial leader of East 
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Asia, but as the third largest economy on the planet, soon to be second-largest 
behind the United States. Yet due to the concomitant rise of environmental 
degradation alongside its industrial expansion, in 1970, Japan joined Western Europe 
and the United States in the environmental revolution.258 
 By the late 1960s, after single-minded, post-war pursuit of Gross National 
Product, the accumulated evidence of Japan’s industrial pollution inspired 
widespread demand to consider, instead, what some Japanese observers called “gross 
national welfare.”259 Numerous cases of industrial poisoning from mercury, 
cadmium, arsenic, chemical pesticides, and atmospheric emissions led to public cries 
for government action against environmental pollution—or, in Japanese parlance, 
kōgai (literally, “public hazards” or “public damage”). In 1967, the Japanese 
Ministry of Health and Welfare proposed the Basic Law for Pollution Control. The 
Basic Law sought to “combat environmental pollution” and provided a moral 
authority to protect “the people’s health and the conservation of their living 
environment.” Yet, Japan’s business community and its powerful economic 
ministries lambasted early drafts for prioritizing environmental health over economic 
growth. As a result, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato weakened the bill, inserting an 
infamous “harmony clause” that stated, “preservation of the living environment shall 
be carried out in harmony with the healthy development of the economy.” Passage of 
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the Basic Law in 1967 thus became largely symbolic. It failed to specify standards 
for the emission of various pollutants and provided no mechanisms for relief or 
compensation to pollution victims. Public outcries mounted, however, as the scope 
and publicity of Japan’s pollution problems magnified.260 
 A few years later, as Americans prepared for Earth Day, the U.S. embassy in 
Tokyo announced that environmental “public hazards” had become Japan’s “sexiest 
political issue of 1970.” After years of Japanese politicians voicing “perfunctory 
concern of public hazards,” the Tokyo embassy told Washington that industrial 
pollution had “dramatically emerged as Japan’s number one domestic political issue 
in spring 1970.” Japan’s anti-pollution outburst harmonized with a similar surge in 
the United States and Europe, the embassy explained, after an “almost overwhelming 
scale of urban pollution began to impinge noticeably on [Japanese] daily life.” The 
embassy also reported how Japan’s “mass media gave intensive coverage to sudden 
U.S. preoccupation with [the environmental pollution] problem,” while Japan’s 
political opposition parties seized environmental concerns to critique the long-
standing rule of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.261 Many Japanese realized, in the 
words of historian Brett L. Walker, that their nation and their homes had become “a 
gargantuan hybrid environment … one interlaced with complex, historically 
constructed ecological pathways that, in inauspicious instances, eventually lead from 
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industrial facilities to human consumers.”262 A key event occurred that summer. In 
late July and early August 1970, several asthma suffers died and nearly 9,000 others 
in Tokyo sought treatment for lung, throat, and eye ailments after photochemical 
smog blanketed the megacity. Prime Minster Sato immediately created and chaired a 
new cabinet-level group called the Central Pollution Countermeasures Conference 
(CPCC), also described as the “anti-pollution supreme command headquarters.” 
Ministers of the CPCC wondered how to head off environmental emergencies 
without hurting Japan’s industry too abruptly.263   
Coincidentally, Japan’s summer smog emergency accompanied a severe air 
pollution episode affecting much of the U.S. eastern seaboard and prompting an 
exchange between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato. According to Russell 
Train, Nixon’s new environmental attaché, press reports of the twin events 
highlighted a shared dilemma: how to prevent severe environmental disruptions 
while continuing a rapid rate of economic growth. Nixon arranged for Train to visit 
Japan in October to explore cooperative efforts on their common concerns. In the 
meantime, the U.S. Congress responded to their environmentally charged 
constituents with new sweeping amendments to America’s Clear Air Act—
amendments that carried international implications.264 
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In September 1970, the Senate approved its Clear Air Act amendments and 
began reconciling their bill with a version passed by the House of Representatives in 
June. Feeding off America’s anti-pollution frenzy, the bills included strict new auto-
emission standards to control, as one reporter called it, “killer car-exhaust.” The 
challenge, however, was that the United States, the world’s largest automotive 
market, was then the only nation to pass such strict environmental standards—
meaning carmakers who relied on foreign sales to American consumers, like those in 
Britain, France, West Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Japan, might be “in for a nasty 
shock.”265 
The unknown international affects of the U.S. Clear Air amendments could 
cut two ways. If unable to meet American standards, foreign carmakers—then 
selling annually 1.7 million cars to American buyers, though only about one-fifth of 
the yearly total sold there—might be cut out of the U.S. market, essentially facing an 
environmental tariff that benefited American manufacturers. On the other hand, cars 
made by American companies, who focused increasingly on fresh leaps in foreign 
sales, could become even more over-priced for foreign buyers after passing to 
consumers their costs to accommodate new American exhaust standards. One 
reporter in Rome wondered, 
Was it necessarily a good idea for the United States to act on its own 
on this matter of planetary interest[?] … Did anybody in Congress 
stop to think of the possible effects on some of our closest allies 
abroad – the West Germans, say, or the British, a tenth of whose 
economy depends on car production? … Even if the answer is yes on 
                                                
265 Claire Sterling, “U.S. Auto Pollution Standards and Foreign Cars: Ecosystem Economics,” 
Washington Post, November 9, 1970, A22. 
  184 
both counts, mightn’t it have been better to try for a mutual agreement 
of all the world’s car-producing nations instead[?]266 
 
In world interconnected, both economically and ecologically, these questions 
highlighted the dilemma of enacting environmental policies without multilateral 
discussion. It seemed to encourage the need for an UNCHE that included LDC 
participation. But clearly, with American environmental envoy Russell Train 
scheduled to visit Japan soon, the ecosystem economics of pollution standards had 
already created an international challenge for both nations’ globalized industrial 
markets. 
 In October 1970, Train’s arrival in Japan, with a ten-man envoy of American 
representatives, caused a spurt of attention to environmental issues in Japan’s press 
and on television. Japanese Prime Minister Sato added to the attention by appointing 
Sadanori Yamanaka as Japan’s new environmental coordinator just in time for the 
American visit. Kiichi Miyazawa, then Japan’s influential Minister of International 
Trade and Industry, had recently announced it was time to focus on health and 
welfare, even if it meant “blunting to some extent” Japan’s economic growth rate.267 
Prime Minister Sato, however, emphasized the importance of maintaining economic 
growth while dealing with environmental issues. In oblique response to criticism his 
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government had received from opposition parties, Sato told Train that a healthy 
economy was a prerequisite to fighting pollution.268 
Train’s delegation met with their Japanese counterparts for several days of 
intensive exchange. In the wake of the United States’ earlier spate of environmental 
legislation that year—including the NEPA, the EPA, and the recently strengthened 
Clean Air Act—CEQ chairman Train, otherwise amiable, gave off a superior air. 
Train told reporters that Japan as “a long way to go” in comparison with the United 
States. While the new U.S. EPA commanded a $1.5 billion budget, the Japanese at 
that time planned to allocate only $325 million of their federal budget to anti-
pollution programs. Train, hinting at Sato’s earlier comments to him, suggested that 
Japan could comfortably pay for its pressing environmental needs given its healthy 
twelve percent growth rate. Japanese ministers, however, continued to express 
concern that significant expenditures for environmental controls might erode the 
competitive advantages of Japanese products in international trade. The new 
amendments to America’s Clear Air Act hovered over the exchange.269 
 Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun mass-circulation newspaper, credited with the 
largest circulation in the world, greeted Train’s delegation with a editorial on 
conflicts between international trade and protecting the world environment. The 
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editorial included extensive quotations from a recent statement by Christian A. 
Herter, Jr., the U.S. State Department’s new point man on International 
Environmental Affairs. “What happens in international trade,” Herter had asked, 
“when one nation requires an industry to bear the cost of environmental pollution, 
another nations does not, and the products of both compete in international 
commerce?” In a lightly veiled reference to America’s new auto-emission standards, 
Herter cited a hypothetical future law that required all automobiles sold in the United 
States to include a safety device that only American manufactures made. Such action 
would be “unwise and outrageous,” Herter proclaimed. “It won’t happen.” But, he 
wondered, “in this day of unhappily increasing protectionism, is any nation totally 
immune from temptation?”270 
Japanese cabinet ministers politely asked Train if the United States planned 
to use anti-pollution technology to restrict foreign goods from the American market. 
The ministers wondered whether the “real reason” for Train’s visit was to drive up 
the costs of Japanese products through anti-pollution mandates. Might environmental 
standards create new economic tariffs? To avert such issues and better maintain 
economic equalities, another minister encouraged the United States to make its anti-
pollution technology freely available internationally. Train noted recent U.S. 
legislation that required American businesses make available new discoveries to 
other firms for a fee or licensing agreement, but dodging the issue, he had to check 
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whether such laws extended to foreign firms.271 Despite some awkward moments, 
Train described his meetings with Sato and his ministers having occurred “in an 
atmosphere of warm cordiality.” Whether new environmental standards would 
encourage economic protectionism remained unresolved. Both Sato and Train agreed 
to forward such decisions to new environmental committees in the OECD, which 
Christian Herter would eventually chair.272 
Despite the Japanese government’s initial hesitation, Train’s visit and 
continued agitation for environmental reform in much of the Japanese public and 
press eventually made its mark. In November 1970, Prime Minister Sato’s anti-
pollution command took sweeping environmental action in Japan’s domestic laws. 
Just weeks after Train’s visit, Sato’s environmental committee submitted a tsunami 
of bills to an Extraordinary Session of Japan’s legislature, the National Diet. In a 
remarkably productive session known as the “Pollution Diet,” Japan passed fourteen 
new anti-pollution laws. Significantly, the new laws removed the notorious 
“harmony clause” shielding economic development from environmental 
improvement. They also established financial responsibilities for pollution cleanup, 
expanded environmental quality standards for air pollution, and, following recent 
American legislation, set new emission standards for its automobiles.273 Japan went 
from having some of the most lax environmental standards among industrialized 
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nations to the most stringent. Prime Minister Sato celebrated the laws as “the best 
pollution control system in the world.” Slightly altering his earlier comments to 
Train, Sato declared “public welfare is a prerequisite for economic growth.” By the 
following summer, Japan would establish a ministerial Environmental Authority, 
modeled loosely on the U.S. EPA, though institutionally weaker and with more 
shared authority.274 
Regardless, the environmental revolution seemed to reorder Japan’s 
obsession over economic growth at all costs. Some costs, after all, were not worth 
the consequences. Japan’s well publicized victims of Minamata methylmercury 
poisoning, the painful cadmium poisonings of itai-itai (“it hurts, it hurts”) disease, 
and the sulfur-oxide inducement of Yokkaichi asthma from petrochemical 
processing, among other tragedies, led Japanese environmental reporter Keikichi 
Kihara to declare Japan’s toxic industrial pollution problems as “much more intense 
and more sinister than those in other countries.”275 Yet, the Japanese government 
took revolutionary action to address its sinister environmental hazards.  Japanese 
court decisions favoring environmental victims over industries and corresponding 
enforcement of new domestic standards, especially for air quality, reflected 
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significant alterations that J.R. McNeill described as “the Japanese environmental 
miracle.” In surprisingly short order, Japanese air pollution went from among the 
world’s worst, to the best among industrialized nations, and it did so more rapidly 
than in Germany, France, Britain, or the United States. Notably, sulfur dioxide 
emissions declined nearly ninety percent.276 
In the context of the environmental revolution then sweeping across the 
industrialized nations of the global North, what did Japan’s remarkable turn toward 
environmental awareness and government action mean? For one thing, in the new 
global environmental moment, it showed how opportunities appeared ripe for 
revolutionary alterations, not just to domestic economies like Japan’s, but also to the 
entire international economic order. The wave of environmental legislation in both 
the United States and Japan, and importantly, the establishment of high-level 
environmental agencies within their governments also indicated the possibility for 
creating radically new international institutions for regulating the global 
environment, perhaps via new treaties or standards established at the upcoming 
UNCHE. At least in nations of the global North, the environmental moment seemed 
ready for revolutionary changes to international economic development. 
After all, the new environmental revolution had, according to Keikichi 
Kihara, already changed “Japan’s policy since the Meiji Period of giving priority to 
industrial development.” Keikichi Kihara had described popular and revolutionary 
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anti-pollution campaigns in industrial Japan as “similar to peasant uprisings”—like 
something from the earlier imperial era. Earlier that century, imperial competition 
had twice launched the world in global conflicts that saw soldiers fighting from 
foxholes and trenches in a desperate struggle for survival. Now, however, the new 
environmental revolution seemed bound to bring the world together in what Keikichi 
Kihara described as a new kind of “last-ditch fight” for survival on Spaceship Earth. 
He predicted the environmental revolution would only expand, particularly as 
planning for the upcoming UNCHE finally began to move at a quicker clip.277 
*** 
At the close of the 1960s and the dawn of the 1970s, across much of the 
global North, the warnings of leading environmental scientists and environmental 
advocates inspired profound anxieties over global environmental stability. 
Government leaders in industrialized nations, from Western Europe to Japan to the 
President of the United States, responded to the tremendous public outcry of their 
citizens about new environmental threats. Amid escalating rhetoric and concern 
about the dangerous affect of economic development on environmental stability, 
governments in industrialized nations enacted new domestic environmental policies 
with potential implications for the international economic order. And with the UN 
agreeing to hold and beginning to plan a global environmental conference in 
Stockholm, the stage seemed set for enacting similar environmental regulations 
internationally. For many in the global North, they were engaged in a fight against 
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global environmental degradation and battled for their future survival on Spaceship 
Earth 
The billions of people in the global South, however, faced a very different 
kind of fight for survival. In wealthy and industrial nations like Japan, the 
environmental moment might remind reporters of prior peasant uprisings. But for 
LDCs of the global South, another kind of peasant uprising was brewing. Nations in 
the Third World demanded a different form of revolution, one predicated not on the 
environmental problems of affluence, but on the primacy of development to produce 
such affluence. As the next two chapters reveal, rather than a global environmental 
revolution, LDCs of the global South sought an economic revolution, one that could 
lift their people beyond the daily struggle for survival. 
Seeking to rev the engines of growth on Spaceship Earth, not limit them, 
influential Third World states saw industrialization as their savior, not a demon. 
Brazil, in particular, took the lead in advocating these aspirations on behalf of the 
world’s LDCs. Development and economic expansion, not environmental control, 
was the steady-state revolution they desired. As one of the world’s largest, most 
populous, and resource-rich nations, Brazil leveraged its position within the UN to 
launch a counter-assault against the environmental revolution embodied by the 
upcoming UNCHE. In the global environmental moment, Brazil’s battle against 
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environmental limits would shape the structures of global environmental politics and 
the direction that Spaceship Earth sailed, both then and since.
  193 
Chapter 4 
 
DEVELOPMENT, NOT ENVIRONMENT: 
Revolutionary Brazil and the UNCHE Process  
 
 
“The paranoid spokesman … traffics in the birth and death of whole 
worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always 
manning the barricades of civilization. He constantly lives at a turning 
point. Like religious millenarians, he expresses the anxiety of those who are 
living through the last days and he is sometimes disposed to set a date for 
the apocalypse.” 
— Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 
Harper’s Magazine, November 1964. 
 
 
One prominent scholar of green development wrote “Credit for the insertion 
of environmental concerns into development discourse in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century lies in the first instance with environmentalists from Northern 
industrialized countries.”278 If the environmental revolution had reordered 
considerations of economic development in some industrialized nations of the North, 
this chapter shows how Brazil, a leader of the global South, positioned itself to 
reorder the role of development in the preparatory process for the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE). In the wake of Brazil’s political 
and economic revolution in the 1960s, foreign diplomats for its military government 
ensured in the early 1970s that global environmental policymaking at the UN did not 
impede Brazil’s priority of industrial development or infringe on its national 
sovereignty to exploit its own vast natural resources. In its promotion of economic 
development as the necessary key to global environmental political progress, Brazil 
thus played a little-recognized role in formulating the conceptual and institutional 
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foundations of the UN’s future environmental agenda on sustainable development, 
and it did so twenty years before that concept achieved international popularity. 
The notion of sustainable development seeks to synthesize the competing 
priorities of economic development and the need to maintain the long-term health 
and protection of the environment. According to many environmental scholars, the 
concept of sustainable development appears to arise in the 1980s and early 1990s 
based mostly on European and American thinking in the industrialized nations of the 
global North.279 Commonly, after brief reference to incipient environmental 
awareness in the 1960s and early 1970s—with dutiful mention of Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, or Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, or the Club of Rome’s Limits to 
Growth report280—the standard story of sustainable development focuses on notions 
of “ecodevelopment” promoted by Northern thinkers around the early 1980s. Those 
Northern thinkers, in turn, influenced and drew from the 1980 World Conservation 
Strategy (WCS), identified for first implementing the term “sustainable 
development.”281 However, the greatest praise for the development of sustainable 
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development typically goes to the Norwegian, Gro Brundtland, who in 1987 chaired 
the UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development. Her commission’s 
Brundtland Report is commonly celebrated for clearly codifying sustainable 
development and propelling its worldwide recognition to reformulate the 
environmental agendas of influential international organizations and development 
agencies.282 As a result, then, common assumptions attribute the conceptual 
emergence of sustainable development from the ideas and actions of the global 
North. And only afterward, in those narratives, did sustainable development become 
the driving theme in the 1992 Earth Summit – the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, held in Rio, Brazil.283 But the whole story is both broader and 
deeper, both more complex and more interesting. 
Brazil did play an essential role in forging environment and development into 
an inseparable pair for global environmental policymakers, but this did not occur not 
at Rio in 1992. Instead, Brazil’s greatest impact in developing sustainable 
development came during the preparatory processes leading up to the 1972 
Stockholm Conference. While Chapter 3 showed how Northern activists inserted 
environment into development discourse, the following two chapters show how 
Southern actors, led by diplomats from Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, ensured that 
development remained the dominant focus in the UN’s emerging global 
environmental discourse of the early 1970s. Twenty years before the Earth Summit 
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in Rio, Brazil and its vocal cohort of developing nations, by inserting the priority of 
development into environmental discourses, played a significant role in laying the 
conceptual roots of sustainable development within the UN. 
Chapter 4 first provides the political and economic context behind Brazil’s 
counter-assault against nascent efforts in the UN for instituting global environmental 
limits to growth. The context of Brazil’s domestic experiences in the 1950s and 
1960s, during the decades before the UNCHE, helps explain its lead policymakers’ 
insistence that international environmental policies not infringe either on Brazil’s 
dynamic economic growth or on its national sovereignty over the use of its rich 
natural resources. This chapter then explains how preparations for the UNCHE, in 
attempts to enlist the participation of LDCs, included appointment of international 
development expert Maurice Strong. Significantly, Strong instituted a new style in 
which planning for the UNCHE sought to shape its achievements long before the 
conference took place in the summer of 1972. As part of this process, Brazil and 
other LDCs introduced a new central subject titled “Environment and Development” 
into the UNCHE planning. Doing so not only invested LDCs with an interest in the 
UNCHE, it provided the primary political battle ground on which nation states 
would meet in the global environmental moment until the actual UNCHE in 
Stockholm. 
In the early 1970s, during planning for the UNCHE, Brazil’s foreign 
ministers took the lead in touting Brazil’s policies against international 
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environmental controls and strongly in favor of economic development. Chief 
among Brazil’s actors were Miguel Ozório de Almeida, special advisor on scientific 
and technological matters to Brazil’s foreign minister; Brazil’s permanent UN 
representative, Armando Sérgio Frazão; former UN ambassador and Brazil’s 
ambassador to the United States, João Augusto de Araújo Castro; and their 
supervisor, Mário Gibson Alves Barboza, the Minister of State for Brazil’s Foreign 
Affairs. The views of Brazil’s Foreign Ministry—often called Itamaraty in Brazilian 
diplomatic jargon after the palace that houses its headquarters in Brasilia—reflected 
those of Brazil’s chief policymakers, including President Emilio Medici; the 
Minister of the Interior, General Jose da Costa Cavalcanti; and the powerful Minister 
of Finance, Delfim Netto.284 Chapters 4 and 5 detail their actions in redefining the 
political direction of global environmental politics during the global environmental 
moment. The reasons for their redirection stem back to economic and political 
experiences of Brazil in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
The Brazilian Boom 
In the decades after World War II, Brazil— the fifth-largest and fifth-most 
populous country in the world, and the single largest, most populous country in Latin 
America—contained vast natural resources, including the immense Amazon River 
Basin. Yet, when comparing Brazil to the industrial juggernauts of the United States, 
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the United Kingdom, or Japan, like most of its Latin American neighbors, Brazil 
remained among the world’s less developed countries (LDCs). Like most other 
LDCs, Brazil harbored aspirations of industrialization and economic improvement 
for self-sufficiency. Throughout the 1950s, Brazil’s democratic governments 
pursued rapid economic growth and self-sustained national development through 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), based on the development strategies of 
Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch and Brazilian economist Celso Furtado. ISI 
sought to establish internal markets and induce domestic industrialization by 
replacing foreign imports with the local production of industrialized goods.285 
Brazil’s ISI approach combined high protective tariffs, foreign exchange 
controls, special inducements for foreign capital, and direct government investment 
in infrastructure and industry via a new government development bank. As a result, 
the Brazilian economy experienced relatively high growth rates from 1950 to 1961, 
where real GDP grew annually around seven percent. The intense ISI process 
bolstered Brazil’s nascent industrial development, with imports dropping from 12.6 
percent in 1950-1954 to 8.6 percent in 1955-1961, and yearly industrial production 
expanding toward ten percent. Yet this development also accentuated Brazil’s 
unequal regional and social concentration of income, produced a balance of 
payments problem for the government, and sent inflation skyrocketing. By 1961, 
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when the initial ISI boom faded, Brazil’s economy entered a seven-year period of 
stagnation.286 
In the 1960s, Brazil’s government and economy experienced dramatic 
changes, including a revolution and recession. Industrial decline, growing 
unemployment, and inflation soaring toward triple digits all escalated Brazil’s 
economic and political instability, with extreme polarization between its radical right 
and left. By 1964, Brazil’s industrial manufacturing output fell from an earlier high 
of 9.4 percent down to 0.4 percent, and its growth rate per capita slipped backward 
to negative three percent. In the spring of 1964, right-leaning military officers 
exacted a coup d’état to consolidate Brazil’s capitalist system on the guise of 
preventing communist insurrection within the existing left-leaning government. As 
the new military regime substantially increased executive authority, Brazil’s 
legislature lost what limited power it had. However, a class of civilian technocrats, 
almost all economists, colluded with the military dictatorship to redirect national 
economic development.287 
Amid deepening recession, the new military and technocratic regime 
produced its Government Economic Action Program, 1964-1966, which along with 
inflationary control listed its primary objective as “the acceleration of economic 
development.”288 To move beyond the stagnant ISI policies, the ruling elite would 
                                                
286 Werner Baer, “The Brazilian Growth and Development Experience: 1964-1975,” in Brazil in 
the Seventies, edited by Riordan Roett (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1976), pp. 41-62, here 42-43; Luiz Bresser Pereira, Development and Crisis in 
Brazil, 1930-1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 25-44. 
287 Pereira, Development and Crisis in Brazil, 84-85, 116-117, 129. 
288 Brazil Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination, Government Economic Action 
Program, 1964-1966, Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA, or Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada) Document no. 1 (November 1964), 15-17. 
  200 
re-modernize Brazil first through stabilization efforts, then by export-oriented 
growth driven by industrial development and extensive use of Brazil’s substantial 
natural resources. Combined with immense influxes of opportunistic foreign 
investment, the new economic policies eventually stabilized Brazil’s economy with 
forced reduction in real wages, banking and tax reform, deficit decline, and eventual 
reduction of inflation to about twenty percent. Even under military rule, the 
economic crisis peaked in 1965, when unemployment in São Paulo, one of the 
largest cities in the Southern Hemisphere, reached 13.5 percent. But, after 1967, 
Brazil’s economy entered a new period of expansion that Brazilian economist Luiz 
Bresser Pereira described as “technocratic-military interventionist liberalism” and 
“developmental nationalism.”289   
By 1968, Brazil’s technocratic economy began reaping the benefits of a 
remarkable seven-year boom justifiably known as the “Brazilian miracle.” Brazil had 
fueled its renewed development and industrialization by abandoning the ISI policies 
of high protective tariffs and opening up to international markets in a time of global 
economic expansion. The rates of Brazil’s external trade grew substantially higher 
than growth of its economy as a whole. From 1967 to 1973, Brazilian exports 
increased 275 percent, especially in manufactured products, which jumped from ten 
to nearly 300 percent in just five years. Although the nation ran a trade deficit from 
higher import growth in the early 1970s, massive inflows of private foreign capital 
and international loans more than covered the balance. From 1965 to 1969, the 
annual net inflow of direct investment averaged $84 million annually; but after 
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Brazil’s economic stabilization and renewed growth, direct investment soared to 
$977 million in 1973 alone. Brazil’s acceptance of net foreign loans was even 
higher, with an increase from an annual average between 1965 and 1969 of $604 
million up to $4.5 billion in 1973.290 Until the international oil shocks in late 1973 
slowed global rates of growth, Brazil’s developmental interventionism re-ordered the 
nation’s relations to the international market, which also expanded drastically its 
domestic development. 
The domestic effects of Brazil’s re-integration with the global economy were 
miraculous, indeed. From 1968 and 1974, Brazil’s annual real growth of GDP surged 
with yearly averages over ten percent. Industry led the way with yearly growth 
above twelve percent, including major manufacturing gains in transportation, 
machinery, and electrical equipment. The decade after 1964 also saw massive 
growth in both basic industries and consumer goods. Steel output grew from 2.8 to 
8.3 million tons; electric power capacity expanded from 6.84 to 19.5 million 
megawatts; poured cement rose from 5.6 to 17.9 million tons; and paper production 
climbed from 0.6 to 1.6 million tons. The total number of motor vehicles in Brazil 
leapt from 184,000 to 930,000, with units of passenger cars jumping from 98,000 to 
524,000. Internal development of new road construction increased from twelve 
percent between 1964 and 1967 to twenty-five percent in the period from 1968 to 
1972, while paving rates grew from six percent in 1968 to thirty-three percent in 
1974. By that same year, annual refrigerator production numbered 658,000 and 
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yearly television set production reached 831,000.291 By the end of its dramatic 
growth spurt, Brazil had leapt from fifteenth to eighth place in global rankings for 
economic growth, all heavily dependent on engagement with the global market and a 
continuous influx of loans from international development agencies.292 
Brazil’s miracle development made it the envy of other LDCs, which in the 
1960s and early 1970s had begun voicing collective critiques for industrialized 
nations to respect LDC sovereignty while aiding LDCs’ economic development. 
Throughout the 1960s, in the wake of post-WWII decolonization, the character of 
the UN and the work of its specialized agencies evolved as newly independent and 
relatively poor nations increasingly used their numerical majority to ameliorate their 
poverty and insecurity.293 In 1961, the UN General Assembly elected U Thant from 
newly independent Burma as its first secretary-general from the Third World. Under 
his ten-year reign, the UN declared the 1960s as the Development Decade and set a 
target for five percent average annual growth of national income in developing 
countries. In 1964, to better integrate LDCs into the world economy and improve the 
terms of their international trade, LDCs established and held regular meetings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In 1966, the 
UN’s Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and its Special Fund for 
investment and economic growth were merged into the United Nations Development 
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Program (UNDP). Other agencies and commissions were established in the 1960s to 
deal with LDCs challenges, both UN-directed and autonomous, including the UN 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the UN Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the 
International Development Association (IDA).294 
Additionally, throughout the 1960s, LDCs pushed the UN General Assembly 
to pass repeated resolutions reaffirming the inalienable right of all countries, but 
especially LDCs, to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in 
the interest of their national development. Nico Schrijver noted that the LDCs 
“actively pursed the implementation of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources because they perceived this to be a main basis for their economic 
development and for a redistribution of wealth and power in their relations with the 
industrialized world.”295 The LDCs wanted sovereign control over their 
environmental goods, but like Brazil’s military-technocratic regime, they required 
international support to enable their use and inducement of industrial development. 
By 1968, the LDCs had gained significant traction in international 
organizations, and some, like Brazil, began showing extreme promise with rapid 
development. Despite discouraging early returns during the Development Decade, as 
the decade progressed, global economic growth accelerated. Brazil and other LDCs 
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thus felt apprehensive when, in the spring of 1968, the Swedish government 
followed through on earlier suggestions to launch a formal initiative for the UN to 
host in Stockholm a global conference on the environment. The Swedish initiative 
aimed to explore, among other issues, whether industrialization threatened 
humanity’s future survival on Earth.296 Would sudden international awareness and 
concern about the environment create new limitations on international trade and 
finance? Would it impose added barriers to LDCs’ natural resource use and 
industrial development? Would Brazil’s new military regime, which predicated its 
rule on industrial growth, face new environmental restrictions for the influxes of 
foreign capital and economic development on which it depended? 
 
Brazil Upends Environmental Perceptions 
 Brazil’s military regime, which tied tautly its notions of national security to 
the growth of its new export-oriented and international finance-dependent economy, 
saw industrialized nations’ responses to the environmental revolution as grave 
threats. New domestic policies establishing environmental standards in industrialized 
nations might negatively affect the cost of Brazil’s exports and sales in those wealthy 
markets. Instituting environmental considerations into foreign aid and international 
development projects might limit the capital flows Brazil and other LDCs had grown 
increasingly reliant upon. If the UN were to initiate international conventions to 
inaugurate global environmental standards or create international controls on natural 
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resource use, it would not only directly challenge Brazil’s national sovereignty but 
also threaten Brazil’s pell-mell efforts toward further industrialization. For other 
LDCs, global standards and environmental conventions might completely foreclose 
their opportunities to even initiate industrialization. Worse yet, suggestions among 
growing publics in the global North to end economic growth and completely 
reconsider economic relations threatened to freeze international economic 
hierarchies and relegate LDCs to permanent positions of inferiority. With none of 
these possibilities acceptable, Brazil’s government launched a concerted counter-
attack within the UN to limit discourse and forestall action against environmental 
limits. 
 By 1970, the explosive growth of the Brazilian economic miracle reasonably 
qualified Brazil as an “emerging power.” In the UN, Brazil projected this image in a 
bid for LDC leadership with aspirations to be a great power.297 Though it clashed 
with the UN’s new environmental obsessions, Brazil sought to keep and control 
international politics within the UN as a means to shift global power dynamics on its 
axis from East-West to South-North. In the era of Cold War détente, Brazil sought to 
use the UN, with its majority membership of Southern LDCs, as an institutional 
alternative to the power politics that, for decades, had split along the North’s East-
West divide. In September 1970, General Debate would open for the UN General 
Assembly’s twenty-fifth session with several important deliberations on its docket. 
Foremost consideration would go toward an official development strategy for the 
UN’s Second Development Decade. The twenty-fifth session also aimed to outline 
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initial plans for the approaching yet thoroughly unplanned UNCHE. That September, 
in preparation for the General Debate and in light of its suspicions that 
environmentalism was a Trojan horse for antidevelopment policies, Brazil’s Foreign 
Ministry Office prepared a special working paper on the subject of the “Human 
Environment.”298 This working paper laid the outlines of Brazil’s anti-environmental 
counter-attack and, in the words of historian Iris Borowy, set the stage “for years of 
acrimonious debate on the relationship and relative priority of environment and 
development.”299  
 Brazil’s working paper demanded explicitly that any environmental policies 
not limit economic development for developing nations, and it rejected global 
environmental standards on the grounds that environmental conditions were not 
globally uniform. Although Brazil acknowledged some industrial centers in the 
developed world had experienced a recent “imbalance of ecology,” it emphasized 
that, in the developing world, “the problem differs both in characteristics and in 
intensity and, as a consequence, solutions and priorities cannot be the same.” For 
instance, Brazil’s nascent industrialization had not yet experienced the extent of 
environmental hazard as in industrial centers of Northern nations. Unplanned 
development may have caused ecological imbalance in the North, the Brazilian 
paper acknowledged. But, it maintained that wherever environmental problems 
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might exist in LDCs, “it is easy to trace it back to its origins: the condition of 
underdevelopment itself.” Policy solutions to international environmental challenges 
therefore needed rethinking. “Instead of being a justification for stagnation,” Brazil 
maintained, “environmental policies can only be meaningful if planned in the 
context of development.” In fact, Brazil claimed, a nation in the early stages of 
development and industrialization might, “in spite of less desirable environmental 
effects,” require polluting production processes to fulfill its priority development 
targets.300 By invoking the perspective of the global South, Brazil had turned the 
environmental revolution on its head. Rather than identify economic development as 
the cause of environmental problems, Brazil proclaimed poverty and the lack of 
development as the real environmental hazard for most of the world.  
 Brazil’s working paper preemptively rejected possible efforts at the 
upcoming UNCHE for global environmental standards or the establishment of 
planetary nature reserves. To Brazil, the increased “insistence upon drafting 
conventions, recommendations, and agreements” for the global environment 
reflected “the predominant philosophy of enforcing in the developing countries a 
‘hands off’ policy ultimately designed to freeze the process of development and deny 
the same countries the right to exploit freely their own natural resources.” With its 
treasure trove of Amazonian resources, Brazil rejected any external attempts to 
legally restrict access to its own sovereign assets. Brazil also repudiated the notion 
that unique or ecologically essential areas of the world—like its Amazonian 
regions—should become “preserves of unspoiled nature, capable of compensating 
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the pollution factors lavishly created in the developed countries.” To Brazil, such 
notions seemed “a new ‘justification’ of underdevelopment which is obviously 
unacceptable.” In fierce protection of its national sovereignty, Brazil maintained that 
any action taken in the field of natural resources was “only conceivable as an 
internal measure,” not to be forced through external interference or pressure.301  
 Brazil’s working paper established a crucial precedent in international 
environmental debate. For solving international environmental issues, the Brazillian 
paper declared, “An economic and not a juridical approach should prevail.” Since 
Brazil defined the unequal distribution of wealth as the basis for environmental 
problems in LDCs, and since it deemed development as the solution to this problem, 
Brazil sought to ensure the flow of foreign capital for achieving its developmental 
goals. In the process, Brazil introduced what has since become a major sticking point 
in international environmental diplomacy: the concept of environmental 
additionality. Additionality in this early context argued that wealthy nations must 
maintain their established commitments to international development, but when 
corrective environmental measures are required in the LDCs, the rich nations should 
provide additional resources and aid for environmental amelioration.302 After all, 
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Brazil argued, all environmental problems trace their roots back to the industrialized 
nations. With their comparative wealth, should not the rich industrial nations pay to 
clean up the mess they created? Brazil’s foundational paper on international 
environmental action argued, in sum, that, 
[P]olicies for the protection of the environment must be planned as a 
means to promote development and not as an obstacle and a barrier to 
the rising expectations of the underdeveloped world. They must be 
defined also clearly in terms of redressing an ill-conceived pattern of 
geographic distribution of economic activities and of channeling to 
the developing world the additional resources it will need both to 
offset the detrimental effects its environment has already endured … 
and to pay for the economic transformations that might be required.303 
 
In the final months of 1970, in the midst of the industrialized world’s 
environmental revolution, Brazil’s platform defined the bounds of 
environmental political-economy not just for the UNCHE, but for 
environmental diplomacy over the next several decades. And in the coming 
months of UN debate and UNCHE planning, Brazil welcomed every 
occasion to collect LDC support to its point of view. 
Since the UN’s first Special Session in 1947, every September, a Brazilian 
representative has accepted the honor of opening General Debate in the UN General 
Assembly. On September 17, 1970, Mario Gibson Alves Barboza, Brazil’s new head 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, opened the twenty-fifth session of the UN 
General Assembly in New York. Barboza emphasized the importance of elaborating 
a clear strategy for the UN’s Second Development Decade. Yet he expressed 
Brazil’s concern that the existing system of international economic cooperation for 
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development seemed torn between two possible futures. The world must choose, 
Barboza declared, “between a ‘strategy of stability,’ designed only to maintain the 
indices of poverty at their present levels, or a ‘dynamic strategy’ of development.” 
Barboza chastised the strategy of stability as one of stagnation that laid the greater 
objective of development on a sacrificial altar of localized goals and controls. Brazil, 
he continued, of course favored the dynamic strategy of growth for the UN’s 
majority LDCs—a strategy designed with both global and sectoral goals “to increase 
their GNP so significantly as to narrow the income gap between the North and the 
South.” Barboza celebrated Brazil’s recent economic successes, but on behalf of 
other LDCs, he expressed Brazil’s “doubt as to the possibility of developing 
countries as a whole finding viable formulas for economic and social progress if we 
have a continuation of present tendencies towards stagnation in the flow of trade and 
of economic cooperation.”304 
Though Brazil’s Minister of State never mentioned environment or ecology 
in his speech, he ensured UN debate opened in assault on any strategies—
environmental or otherwise—that sought to freeze international development and 
economic growth. Members of Brazil’s Foreign Ministry repeated this argument 
regularly as UNCHE planning finally and rapidly advanced. As a member of the 
twenty-seven-nation UNCHE Preparatory Committee, Brazil would ensure the 
conference endorsed its perspective, or it would work so that no conference would 
occur at all. 
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Strong’s UNCHE, Where Process Is Policy 
In next month, October 1970—as environmental representatives of the Nixon 
and Sato administrations exchanged ideas on environmental controls in Tokyo—the 
twenty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly and its majority of LDCs 
confirmed their focus on economic development. Among the UN’s earliest actions 
that term included General Assembly Resolution 2626, which declared the 1970s as 
the Second UN Development Decade beginning that coming January 1971. The 
resolution also outlined an ambitious international development strategy with an 
average annual growth-rate goal of “at least six percent, with the possibility of 
attaining a higher rate in the second half of the Decade.”305 
Just as significant, UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Canadian 
businessman and international development administrator Maurice Strong to become 
Secretary-General of the future UNCHE. In November, Strong accepted 
responsibility for planning the world’s first intergovernmental summit on the world 
environment, and he soon established a Conference Secretariat to support his 
monumental task. In light of Brazil’s admonitions against any encroachment on 
economic growth, the UN’s appointment of Strong sought to sooth LDC concerns 
over potential conflicts between development and environment. 
Maurice Strong, who was born in Canada in 1929, developed a profound 
interest in money as a child during the Great Depression. In 1945, at age sixteen, 
Strong fled school for an apprenticeship as a fur trader with the Hudson’s Bay 
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Company. While still a teenager, Strong and fellow prospectors founded a mining 
company before he returned to Toronto and worked in stock promotion. In 1947, 
having read the text of the Atlantic Charter with fascination, Strong briefly worked 
at the UN in New York as a minor bureaucratic assistant. He realized, however, the 
UN was no place to start low and climb up. He returned to Canada where he resumed 
stock analysis and oil exploration. By age twenty-three, Strong had made a fortune 
and gotten married. For two years, Strong and his new wife explored the world. In 
East Africa, he took a job with an oil company opening gas stations, and he founded 
another mining operation. Strong’s travels through LDCs inspired him, upon his 
return, to seek work from international development agencies; but without a 
university degree, no agency accepted him. Then twenty-five, Strong returned to the 
business world of natural resource exploration and exploitation. Over the next 
several years, Strong made another substantial fortune, eventually becoming 
President of the Power Corporation of Canada.306 
In 1966, Strong fulfilled his international development desires when 
Canada’s Prime Minster invited Strong to head Canada’s External Aid Office. 
Strong accepted, renamed it the Canadian International Development Agency, and 
greatly increased both the quantity and quality of Canadian aid. As a Deputy 
Minister in the Canadian government, the new position afforded Strong opportunities 
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to sharpen his political sensibilities as well as work closely with key personalities in 
the world of international development.307 By the time Strong accepted responsibility 
for organizing the UNCHE in 1970, he had spent more than two decades either 
developing natural resources or encouraging the economic development of LDCs. 
Strong believed scientists’ warnings that environmental degradation threatened the 
natural foundations of economic growth, and with it, the long term stability of 
human survival. But he remained equally convinced that any solutions to 
international environmental challenges must occur within the socio-economic 
contexts of international development.308 Strong’s background proved essential for 
encouraging UNCHE participation from all nations, especially LDCs. 
Strong, renowned for boundless energy, knew he had much work to do to 
achieve a successful UNCHE. By late 1970, with the UNCHE barely a year and half 
away, conference preparation had fallen far behind schedule. Strong still needed to 
staff a competent and globally balanced Conference Secretariat with experts who 
hailed from beyond just North American and Western Europe. Additionally, suitable 
subjects for formal discussion at the conference needed finalizing; national State-of-
the-Environment reports needed drafting, collection, and analysis from participating 
nations; and environmental action proposals that stood a chance at passage still 
needed adoption.309 Strong’s first priority, however, remained ensuring planetary 
participation in the UNCHE, not merely from the industrialized nations who had first 
called for its creation. 
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At that time, several LDCs, with Brazil’s encouragement, had threatened to 
boycott the UNCHE.310 In late 1970, the tentative issues on the conference agenda 
focused on controlling industrial pollution and promoting conservation. The LDCs, 
as Strong later recalled, feared the UNCHE’s “preoccupation with the environmental 
‘fad’ would deflect attention and resources from their first priority of dealing with 
the critical problems of poverty and underdevelopment.” As such, Brazil and other 
boycott-threatening nations saw environmental concerns about excess industry as a 
“rich-man’s” problem. Additionally, Strong added, LDCs “worried…that 
industrialized countries might seek to impose new constraints on developing 
counties in the name of environment.”311 Strong moved quickly to quell those 
concerns. 
In early November 1970, Strong formed a small but dedicated UNCHE 
Secretariat who brainstormed concrete steps to facilitate the active participation of 
LDCs. The UNCHE Preparatory Committee, which included Brazil, planned to meet 
informally that month. And soon after, the Second Committee of the UN General 
Assembly would debate a new resolution concerning UNCHE planning. With the 
new possibility that many of the world’s LDCs—that is, most of the world’s 
nations—might avoid the conference, Strong had to capture their attention and 
somehow promote their interests in participating. His solution involved investing 
nations in an intricate planning process where LDC voices would have numerous 
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opportunities to shape the Conference proceedings. Strong believed the preparatory 
process could be as important as the actual results of the Conference. Intricate 
preparations by numerous participants could gradually increase the quality and level 
of consensus. In that way, the preparatory process itself would produce a result 
satisfactory to all. With such a process, the UNCHE’s greatest conflicts and even its 
ultimate results might be mainly secured before the Conference even began. In short, 
Strong placed faith in a formula where “the process is the policy.”312 
In their early November meeting, Strong and his Secretariat explored several 
possibilities to invest LDCs in his planning process. One idea included “establishing 
a small panel of well known personalities in the field of development and developing 
countries.” This panel could then take responsibility for preparing a report that 
addressed LDC concerns on reconciling economic development with international 
environmental issues. Notes from Strong’s meeting made explicit that the selected 
experts “should work in a developing country e.g. Brazil.”313 Strong knew early on 
that the UNCHE required incorporation of Brazil’s perspective on the human 
environment, and preferably, Brazil’s participatory leadership. Days later, at the 
informal Preparatory Committee meeting, Strong formally accepted his appointment 
as Secretary-General of the UNCHE and announced a new emphasis that would 
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place environmental policies firmly within “the socio-economic context of 
development.”314  
Later that month in New York, on November 24, 1970, Strong opened the 
UN General Assembly’s first substantial discussion on the UNCHE since he 
accepted appointment as its Secretary-General. In a bid to capture global 
participation, Strong first announced to UN members that “the relationship between 
environment and development” constituted “his most important concern in relation 
to his new responsibilities.” In a direct challenge to the First-World-first 
environmental advocacy of George Kennan, Strong argued that the UN was “the 
proper, indeed the only forum” to resolve potential disharmony between 
development and environmental considerations.315 The global implications of that 
debate, he argued, required global participation. Next, Strong outlined his vision for 
how UNCHE preparatory work would. 
Strong planned for conference activities to proceed at three levels. First, on a 
broad conceptual or intellectual level, he would call upon the world’s scientific and 
intellectual community to compose the first global “report on the state of the 
environment,” which would define major areas of environmental consensus, identify 
major gaps in knowledge, and indicate for political leaders priority issues where 
action should proceed. This later became the book authored by Strong’s friend and 
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colleague, Barbara Ward, with the support of Pulitzer-Prize winning microbiologist 
René Dubos titled, Only One Earth.316 Second, in what Strong envisioned as the bulk 
of preparatory work for the conference, he said preparatory members would draft a 
preliminary Action Plan with specific measures that nations would approve during 
the conference and could implement in the post-Stockholm period. Ideally, the 
Action Plan would provide an agreed-upon international basis for environmental 
priorities and the allocation of resources to meet them. Finally, for the third level, 
Strong saw the UNCHE as a site for the “ratification of relevant conventions, 
treaties, or agreements” on the international environment. Despite Brazil and other 
LDCs’ distain, Strong still hoped UNCHE preparatory work could outline the shape 
of global environmental accords. To conclude, Strong reiterated that “the Conference 
should be conceived of not as an end in itself but as part of a process”—a process 
that had begun before the UNCHE and would continue after it, but both, he hoped, 
with global participation.317 
After Strong finished, other nations enlivened the debate. Sweden, the future 
host for the UNCHE, spoke first to celebrate Strong’s new leadership. Sweden also 
underscored how the conference must “result in substantive action and not be 
confined to speeches.” Sweden intended the conference to confront and resolve 
environmental threats to the very survival of humankind. Sweden therefore reprised 
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its emphasis on controlling the problems of growth and industrialization. The 
environmental crisis arose, Sweden declared, “from the fact that the environment had 
been neglected in the early days of the process of industrialization.” As such, notions 
of economic growth required reconsideration for more qualitative aspects, less on the 
quantitative side. Somewhat aghast, the Czech ambassador retorted that “there could 
be no question of Czechoslovakia’s reducing its economic growth rate when its 
people were just beginning to experience the well-being derived from economic 
development.” Environmental action and economic growth “had to be pursued 
simultaneously,” Czechoslovakia declared.318 In this ripe moment, Brazil’s seasoned 
ambassador, João Augusto de Araújo Castro, stood to address the General Assembly 
debate. 
Before the military coup took over Brazil’s government in 1964, Araújo 
Castro had served as Brazil’s head Minister of State for Foreign Affairs under soon-
to-be disposed President João Goulart. In 1968, after four years of ostracism, Araújo 
Castro returned in full commitment to Brazil’s new military-technocratic leadership 
to become Brazil’s ambassador to the United Nations. Ruben Ricupero, another 
career diplomat in Brazil’s Foreign Ministry and later secretary-general of 
UNCTAD, described Araújo Castro as “perhaps the most influential thinker Brazil 
has had in foreign relations.”319 Araújo Castro was a strong critic of what he called 
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the UN’s freezing of the structures of international power in 1945 and from the 
ensuing development of the Cold War. Araújo Castro wanted Brazil to break through 
those structures to take its places as a new global power. Later, in the spring of 1971, 
Araújo Castro accepted an influential position as Brazil’s ambassador to the United 
States; but in the environmental moment of November 1970, he arose within the UN 
to elucidate Brazil’s position on global environmental issues and the UNCHE. 
At the dawn of a new UN Development decade, Araújo Castro announced 
that for Brazil and other LDCs, nearly all challenges—including environmental 
ones—found solution in greater development, not environmental protection. Brazil, 
he made clear, refused to “sacrifice the standards of living of its population through 
economic restrictions dictated by environmental policies.” Despite rumors to the 
contrary, Brazil did not seek a boycott and believed the UNCHE should be “truly 
global in scope.” But Brazil strongly rebuffed any efforts toward “uniform 
measures” for environmental standards. Environmental policies, Araújo Castro 
argued, were not subject to international debate; rather, such action “fell under the 
exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction of the countries concerned” and depended on 
their sovereign needs and interests. Global dialog was important, but global 
standards made no sense. “It was essential from the outset,” Araújo Castro 
explained, “to take into account the specific problems of the environment in the 
developing countries.” Where they existed, LDC environmental problems included 
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issues like soil erosion, deforestation, unclean water, and urban concentration. For 
LDCs, Araújo Castro declared, “development was the only solution.”320 
Toward that end, Araújo Castro also reiterated Brazil’s claims for 
additionality. “The developed countries,” he stated, “should earmark additional 
financial and technical aid to assist developing countries in the context of future 
international cooperation for the protection of the environment.” International 
cooperation should be directed towards correcting economic policies which had 
harmful repercussions in the developed countries.” In sum, Araújo Castro concluded 
that Brazil “was opposed to international measures which did not take account of the 
special needs of the developing countries … and to proposals which ignored the 
responsibility of the developed nations for the imbalance caused by current patterns 
of international trade or the economic and financial obligations they incurred as a 
result.”321 Brazil welcomed Maurice Strong as new Secretary-General of the 
UNCHE, namely because of his development experience. Araújo Castro made clear, 
however, that while the Earth may be one, the world was not.  
Within weeks, the UN General Assembly passed several new resolutions 
reflecting LDCs’ growing realization that the UNCHE would have institutional 
implications requiring their input. On December 7, 1970, the General Assembly 
refined plans for the upcoming UNCHE with resolution 2657. While the resolution 
                                                
320 João Augusto de Araújo Castro quoted in United Nations General Assembly (XXV), Second 
Committee, Provisional Summary Record of the One Thousand Three Hundred and Fiftieth Meeting: 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, New York, November 24, 1970, 
A/C.2/SR.1350 (November 30, 1970), 12. 
321 João Augusto de Araújo Castro quoted in United Nations General Assembly (XXV), Second 
Committee, Provisional Summary Record of the One Thousand Three Hundred and Fiftieth Meeting: 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, New York, November 24, 1970, 
A/C.2/SR.1350 (November 30, 1970), 12-13. 
  221 
encouraged continuation of “vigorous” conference preparations, it stressed the need 
that preparations “should be considered in the context of economic and social 
development, taking into account the special needs of development in developing 
countries.” The resolution also stated the UNCHE Preparatory Committee would 
meet officially in February 1971 and again in September 1971. For those UNCHE 
planning meetings, the resolution required inclusion of new and specific agenda 
items to “safeguard and promote the interests of developing countries.” It also 
encouraged the UNCHE Preparatory Committee to address the financing of 
“additional resources” to LDCs in the context of their environmental protection.322 
To further ensure the sacredness of economic development despite possible 
environmental protections, the UN General Assembly passed yet another resolution 
on the sovereign use of natural resources—this time with explicit focus on LDCs’ 
economic development. Resolution 2692, passed on December 11, 1970, declared 
“Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Nations and 
Expansion of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development.” For 
additional protection of national sovereignty in environmental planning, the UN 
General Assembly also moved to avoid discussion of population problems at the 
1972 UNCHE by declaring 1974 as World Population Year, when it would host a 
separate conference on population issues.323 
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If the environmental revolution had reordered economic considerations in 
some industrialized nations, Brazil had positioned itself to reorder the UNCHE 
preparatory process. Given Maurice Strong’s new leadership in which “the process is 
the policy,” that meant Brazil’s environmental arguments might ultimately define the 
UNCHE’s eventual achievements. But only if Strong could get LDCs to attend the 
UNCHE, and then, only if Brazil could rally other LDCs to embrace its arguments 
about the centrality of development despite continued concerns in the global North 
by vocal environmental experts about environmental survival on Spaceship Earth. 
 
Two Sides of the Global Coin 
In January 1971, the month after the UN resolutions demanded the UNCHE 
better account for LDC needs, Maurice Strong met with two very different groups of 
experts whom he hoped could both promote and inform UNCHE planning.324 
Strong’s two meetings that January reflected opposite sides of the debates over the 
need for global environmental protection, and the need for advancing global 
economic development. 
First, Strong met with a group of MIT scientists working on computer 
simulation projects for an atypical international group called the Club of Rome. The 
second group of experts Strong met that January included a select core of leading 
developmental economists, most of who came from LDCs. Each of the two groups 
held drastically opposing views about global environmentalism and the role of 
economic growth and development within it. In that still-early phase of the UNCHE 
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planning process, Strong’s meeting with both groups signaled that the UNCHE 
might yet move in any number of directions. 
The MIT scientists Strong met included entrepreneurial expert on energy and 
management, Carroll Wilson, and pioneering computer engineer, Jay Forrester, both 
professors in MIT’s Sloan School of Management, as well as Donella Meadows, a 
former student of Forrester’s and an expert on systems dynamics. Both Forrester and 
Meadows were then conducting computer-modeling projects funded by the Club of 
Rome—a loose, independent, and international assortment of industrialists, 
intellectuals, political leaders, economists, and scientists that included both Wilson 
and Strong as members. A wealthy Italian industrialist named Aurelio Peccei, who 
had grown increasingly concerned about the interconnections of global crises and 
their ecological implications, had founded the Club of Rome in that revolutionary 
year of 1968. Since then, Peccei and other Club of Rome members sought solutions 
to what they called the “world problématique”—an array of global, systemic 
problems they believed threatened the future survival of humankind.325 In addition to 
their membership in the Club of Rome, Wilson served as a key scientific advisor for 
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Strong. And Strong already appreciated Wilson’s earlier work in organizing world-
scale environmental research reports. 
In 1970, Wilson had organized the Study of Critical Environmental Problems 
(SCEP)—a month-long meeting of various scientists to explore humanity’s impact 
on the global environment. Following the meeting, Wilson produced an 
interdisciplinary report as a scientific contribution to the UNCHE planning process, 
including ideas relevant to LDCs. First, the SCEP emphasized that the existence of a 
global environmental problem did not imply the need for a global solution. Remedial 
environmental action, it suggested, might best proceed at regional, national, or local 
levels. Although, as might be expected from a group of scientists, the report 
underscored the importance of international cooperation in environmental research 
and global monitoring, especially since the existing global data remained 
fragmentary and sometimes unreliable. The SCEP also noted that rich and poor 
nations should necessarily have different perspectives on environmental problems. It 
argued that, at that point, most LDCs had few reasons to shift their attention from 
industrial development to the environment. For the “foreseeable future,” it advised, 
“the advanced industrial societies will have to carry the load of remedial action 
against pollution.”326 Though informative and credible, that declaration did little to 
help Strong’s recruitment of LDCs to the UNCHE. 
Strong met with Wilson and his MIT colleagues in January 1971, in part, to 
discuss Wilson’s organization of another month-long meeting of scientists: the Study 
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of Man’s Impact on Climate (SMIC).327 Wilson would hold the meeting later in 
1971, where several of the world’s leading atmospheric scientists examined 
humanity’s role in the inadvertent modification of the global climate. Wilson 
produced another report on the SMIC. Both the SCEP and SMIC reports helped 
bolster the scientific credibility of the UNCHE, and in light of limited global-scale 
environmental data, both endorsed expansion of global monitoring programs, which 
the UNCHE later established.328 Scientists and policymakers still cite Wilson’s 
studies as key events in spurring early political awareness of anthropocentric climate 
change.329 But back in January 1971, Strong also wondered whether the work that 
Wilson’s MIT colleagues were doing for the Club of Rome might help rally LDCs, 
or at least help promote the UNCHE’s effort to expand global environmental 
understanding. 
Jay Forrester and Donella Meadows, then working with the Systems 
Dynamics Group at MIT, explained that their studies supported by the Club of Rome 
had serious implications for LDCs, but would not likely inspire their excitement for 
global environmental action. Forrester and Meadows’s work incorporated innovative 
computer models of industrial pollution, population, food production and other 
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global systems to better understand the nature of planetary-scale crises. Despite LDC 
desires for the contrary, the MIT computer models suggested societies should shift 
away from industrial growth and transition toward a state of global equilibrium. 
Forrester was then writing a technical book on the subject, which he expected would 
appear in the summer of 1971. Meadows expected her draft for the Club of Rome, 
which sought a more mainstream audience, would appear prior to the UNCHE in 
1972. In the meantime, during their meeting with Strong, the MIT researchers helped 
sketch a slogan to promote what they saw as the UNCHE’s purpose: “to protect and 
enhance the environment for present and future generations.”330 Strong liked the 
slogan’s consideration of subsequent generations. But given his need for LDC 
inclusion in the UNCHE, and given the research conclusions from the scientists who 
drafted it, Strong couldn’t help but note the slogan’s failure to incorporate economic 
development into environmental issues. 
Later that month, also in January 1971, Strong met with a different group of 
experts with very different priorities. Strong hoped this second set of experts could 
help him better incorporate LDC perspectives on the environment into the UNCHE 
planning process, and thereby encourage greater LDC participation in Stockholm. 
Strong had asked his British friend and well-connected developmental economist 
Barbara Ward to convene a small group of leading development experts. Strong 
hoped they could “help us think through how the Conference process and agenda 
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could be re-cast to accommodate developing country concerns.”331 Though from the 
global North, Barbara Ward was widely respected as a champion of LDC interests. 
Ward invited a core group of leading LDC economists including Uruguay’s Enrique 
Iglesias, Columbia’s Rodrigo Botero, Kuwait’s Abdlatif Y. Al-Hamad, and 
Pakistan’s Mahbub ul Haq—who later became a World Bank vice president, served 
as finance minister of Pakistan, and helped design the human develop index for the 
United Nations Development Program.332 Strong also invited Gamani Corea, a 
developmental economist and diplomat from Ceylon (soon renamed Sri Lanka). 
Corea, who later became Secretary-General of the UNCTAD, had worked in 1964 
during planning for the first UNCTAD with Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch, 
whose theories on economic dependency helped inspire formation of the Group of 
77 (G-77). As a diffuse coalition of seventy-seven LDCs in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, the G-77 aimed to promote their collective economic interests in 
negotiations with industrialized countries. Corea had written the first ever 
declaration of the G-77. The economic experts Strong assembled that day had, and 
continued to have, strong influences over developmental governance. 
In Strong’s New York office at the UN, he explained his hope that the 
assembled LDC economists might, according to Corea, “have a little group to do a 
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think piece on the relevance of the environment issue for developing countries.”333 
Strong recalled that Mahbub ul Haq immediately “launched a scathing attack on both 
the purposes and the agenda of the Conference, articulating brilliantly and 
caustically the position of developing countries.” Mahbub ul Haq’s arguments 
mirrored those first clearly enunciated by Brazil: that environmental problems thus 
far addressed by the UNCHE were problems for the rich, yet they presented severe 
economic threats to developing countries. Strong, taken aback by ul Haq’s outburst, 
emphasized his own deep commitment to development. He told the group he had 
accepted responsibility for planning the UNCHE on his belief that growing 
environmental concern in industrialized countries might offer a new rationale for 
bolstering their support of LDCs, because the state of LDC environments was 
“critical to the health of the entire global environment.” Strong knew, however, he 
did not have enough reliable knowledge and analysis to make that case. Strong 
invited ul Haq and other participants to partake in a rigorous examination on 
development and the environment, which had only recently become central to the 
purpose and prospects of the UNCHE. With Barbara Ward’s persuasion and to 
Strong’s relief, Mahbub ul Haq and the others accepted the challenge and planned to 
meet later that summer with a group of fellow LDC developmental economists and 
diplomats. And given their new prominence on the issues of development and 
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environment, Strong made sure he invited a Foreign Minister from Brazil to 
participate.334 
 
Courting LDCs 
In the meantime, early in 1971, Strong prepared for the second meeting of the 
UNCHE’s twenty-seven nation Preparatory Committee, the first such gathering since 
the UN General Assembly declared that Conference preparations must include a 
specific agenda item on the special needs of LDCs. On February 8, 1971, Strong 
opened the ten-day second session of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva with a 
speech that emphasized his growing appreciation of LDC concerns. Strong affirmed 
that although much of the developing world still considered environmental pollution 
a rich man’s problem, such problems were “a disease they would be prepared to 
risk” if it accompanied the economic growth LDCs urgently desired. Additionally, 
he noted, LDCs believed the industrial nations who produced most of the world’s 
pollution should assume responsibility for its consequences. Strong explained that, 
“before jumping enthusiastically on the environmental bandwagon,” LDCs wanted 
greater assurances on safeguarding their development interests and priorities. After 
all, he said, the global environmental crisis encompassed far more than industrial 
pollution.335 
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Strong made clear his personal view that the crises facing Spaceship Earth 
included “the environmental problems of poverty,” which were “no less acute and 
certainly more widespread than the environmental problems of affluence.” In fact, he 
continued, “it is the poor who stand to gain the most from enhancement of their 
environment; they have fewer resources to waste on costly mistakes or remedial 
action; and their voice must be fully heard with respect to activities which, even if 
taken by others, will affect vitally their own interests.” In light of his recent meeting 
with LDC economists, Strong concluded that, “Most importantly, it is coming to be 
recognized that while improperly planned economic development can have 
deleterious effects upon the environment, effective environmental planning and 
action can make a positive contribution to development.”336 Strong made clear his 
interest in reshaping the UNCHE along LDC interests to ensure their participation.  
In accord with the UN General Assembly’s recent resolution, Strong’s 
revisions to the UNCHE agenda included introducing a new subject heading of 
“Development and Environment.” Debate under this new subject aimed for special 
consideration to economic versus social trade-offs among different development 
alternatives; the economic implications of environmental policies and programs; and 
the possibility of additional resources for development assistance. As such, the 
UNCHE would now confront “the impact of environmental action on economic 
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growth, and the impact of growth on the environment.”337 As expected during the 
preparatory meeting in Geneva, most discussion occurred under this new heading on 
development. 
Conflicts arose over financing the protection of the environment amid 
economic development and concern over the impact of environmental policies on 
international trade. Views also diverged between LDCs and some western nations 
whether the planned Declaration of the conference should include detailed action 
statements or whether such actions should be part of the global conventions and 
policies still on the table as a central element of the conference. Strong still hoped 
for an action-oriented UNCHE, where those actions would represent first steps 
toward global environmental solutions. Strong explained, “These first steps, even 
when they are relatively small ones, will be of great importance, as they will 
establish the pattern for future action.” His comments were quite prescient. 
To ensure LDC participation, Strong also announced another new component 
of UNCHE preparations. Before the end of 1971, the UNCHE Secretariat would host 
four regional seminars—in Bangkok, Addis Ababa, Mexico City, and Beirut—for 
LDCs to address their concerns and interests separate from the industrialized 
nations.338 Strong gambled that the summer meeting he had set with leading LDC 
economists would produce a report that LDC governments could debate in those 
regional seminars. Strong wanted LDCs invested in the UNCHE, and his means of 
accomplishing that goal was reordering UNCHE planning around LDC concerns. 
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The arguments of Brazil and other LDCs seemed to be making their mark within the 
UN. However, not all nations confined their environmental visions to the UN. 
On February 8, 1971, while Strong opened the second preparatory meeting 
for the UNCHE, President Nixon announced before Congress the environmental 
program of the United States for 1971. While Nixon’s earlier environmental message 
in 1970 focused mostly on domestic concerns, his vision for 1971 included a new 
international agenda shaped in part by the rising chorus of LDC voices against global 
environmental limits. Nixon sought to quell concerns of any American intents to 
limit growth, yet his rhetoric remained unclear. Reiterating that the cost of goods 
should reflect their environmental totalities, Nixon admitted that “adjustments by 
governments at all levels, by our industrial and business community, and by the 
public” would require necessary changes and paying the appropriate costs to 
“prevent problems from reaching the crisis stage.” Nixon still sought regulatory 
actions for environmental protections, yet he encouraged supplementing regulation 
with market solutions. “Our goal,” Nixon declared, “must be to harness the powerful 
mechanisms of the marketplace, with its automatic incentives and restraints, to 
encourage improvement in the quality of life.” The President of the world’s largest 
economy concluded that the United States and all nations of the world “must better 
understand how economic factors induce some forms of environmental degradation, 
and how we can create and change economic incentives to improve rather than 
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degrade environmental quality.”339 While obviously not abandoning growth, Nixon’s 
comments left the issue of growth open to further debate. 
Nixon’s desire to move “toward a better world environment” also 
incorporated recommendations from a State Department report by his Committee on 
International Environmental Affairs. The report encouraged continued U.S. 
leadership on the global environment, especially for the UNCHE. But the State 
Department remained concerned that political conflict on environmental problems 
revolved around how to transcend national interests against “increasing the power of 
intergovernmental organizations to act.” International organizations, the report 
concluded, would need to “enforce decisions which subordinate sovereign rights to 
human rights” in order to protect the global commons. Sovereignty, it seemed, 
required a reorientation for global environmental protection. To attain this ultimate 
goal, nations needed to “become accustomed to thinking of the environment as a 
heritage that can be used more rationally and improved for the welfare of future 
generations.”340 Toward those ends, Nixon’s special message to Congress in 1971 
reiterated U.S. commitment to the UNCHE, but it also proposed a new idea for a 
World Heritage Trust. The World Heritage Trust, as Nixon envisioned it, would 
preserve ecologically unique landscapes and cultural sites around the world. 
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While Nixon’s proposals regarding the international environment for the 
coming year of 1971 sought, in part, to mollify LDC concerns about limits to 
growth, it remained open to suspicion. Despite Brazil and other LDCs’ incremental 
gains over UNCHE planning within the UN, LDCs still harbored concerns that 
international environmentalism aimed to limit their sovereignty over natural resource 
use. Nixon’s proposed World Heritage Trust did little to assuage their fears. From a 
perspective grounded in LDC anxiety over regulatory rhetoric on the environment, a 
World Heritage Trust might be an attempt to use international conservation as a 
means to restrict the sovereign use of natural resources in the global South. In fact, 
Brazil later used this very argument to generate suspicion of American actions 
among fellow LDCs.341 The LDCs clearly had more work before them to ensure that 
sustaining economic development became the leading priority in international 
environmental policymaking. 
In 1971, Brazil and other LDCs had plenty of opportunities and new reasons 
for pushing the priority of development amid environmental planning. LDCs did so 
during foundational planning sessions for the UNCHE while responding to renewed 
concerns in the global North about the environmental dangers of economic growth.
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Chapter 5 
 
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT? 
Growth Dynamics and Debating Doom 
 
 
“I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with 
the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political 
economists of the old school. ... It is only in the backward countries of the 
world that increased production is still an important object: in those most 
advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution … If the 
earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things 
that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from 
it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or 
a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they 
will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it.” 
— John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy IV, Chapter VI, 
1848. 
 
 
 The remainder of 1971 saw major events in defining the long-term 
implications of the global environmental moment, particularly during final 
opportunities in the planning process prior to the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) held in the summer of 1972. Throughout 1971, 
significant public sectors in the industrialized North continued to call for an 
environmental revolution that would reorient traditionally destructive practices of 
economic growth and development. At the same time, however, Brazil and other less 
developed countries (LDCs) continued to crystallize and publicize their own 
demands in favor of growth. The LDCs sought not to limit or reconsider growth, but 
to harness the UN’s new international attention on environmental issues as a means 
to escalate their desires for rapid economic development. 
 In June 1971, two key occurrences reflected the contingency of what 
directions Spaceship Earth might move in light of newly realized global 
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environmental hazards. As part of his effort to enlist LDCs in the UNCHE planning 
process, Maurice Strong held a small meeting in Founex, Switzerland with economic 
development experts from mostly poor LDCs. With strong participation by Brazilian 
Ambassador Miguel Álvaro Ozório de Almeida, the report from this meeting in 
Founex elucidated the importance of synthesizing development and environment as 
the primary focus of LDCs. The clear enunciation of these needs and its wide 
dissemination around the global South allowed other LDCs to embrace the UNCHE 
as an opportunity to meet their developmental needs in terms of environmental 
issues. 
However, that same June, a systems-based computer model of global 
dynamics by MIT computer scientist Jay Forrester predicted massive die-off and 
future human suffering at a global scale unless worldwide limits to economic growth 
were soon instituted. Just when LDCs began seriously participating in UNCHE 
planning, the debate that economic growth would lead to global doom found 
renewed and heightened concern at high levels of domestic and international dialog. 
In the midst of renewed anxiety on the environmental implications of growth, the 
United States unilaterally dismantled the existing system for international currency 
exchanges, which offered for the first time since the end of the Great Depression an 
opportunity to renegotiate the entire international economic order. Would the 
upcoming UNCHE provide a forum for reoriented global economics along more 
ecological lines, despite LDCs’ clear prioritization of economic growth? The LDC-
influenced report from Founex and the frightening rhetoric of doom by leading 
scientists and economists who questioned growth offered two very different paths for 
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how the global environmental moment might proceed both before and during the 
UNCHE. 
 This chapter provides detail on the continued debate over development and 
the dynamics for global growth at their apex, at least in the context of the upcoming 
UNCHE. The excitement produced over these events in 1971 culminated that winter 
in an impassioned confrontation between ambassadors of Brazil and the United 
States in the last UN General Assembly held before the UNCHE that following 
summer. The dynamics of these debates throughout 1971, and especially in the UN 
General Assembly, not only circumscribed much of what would and could happen 
during the actual UNCHE, they formalized an early institutionalization for what 
evolved eventually, decades later, into the agenda of sustainable development. In 
terms of international environmental politics, the events in 1971 and early 1972 
significantly affected the direction in which Spaceship Earth would sail into the 
future. 
 
Development and Environment at Founex and Beyond 
 In early June 1971, one year before the start of the UNCHE the next June, 
Maurice Strong and Barbara Ward held their scheduled meeting for a small group of 
international development representatives from LDCs to clarify and debate the issues 
of development and environment. As the year had progressed, various voices in 
industrialized nations continued to call for action against the environmental crisis. In 
the spring of 1971, about a year after America’s initial Earth Day, Pope Paul VI 
delivered in Rome his first public expression on environmental challenges. In it, the 
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Pope warned against “the technical progress of civilization turning against itself,” 
and he bestowed his Apostolic Blessing to those protecting Earth’s “indispensable 
natural resources.” Japanese newspapers continued to report that, despite 
government action, their national pollution had reached a “grave stage.” And in the 
U.S. Congress, a bipartisan collection of Senators including eight members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee pushed for creation of global environmental 
standards. They pushed (unsuccessfully) for passage of Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 53, which sought a workable agreement at the UNCHE to globally 
“harmonize the environment quality standards that are necessary to maintain and 
improve the biosphere.”342 Despite LDC concerns on the issue, much rhetoric in the 
industrialized world still saw the environment as a crisis requiring drastic revisions 
to business as usual, especially for international development. 
Amid those unresolved tensions over economic growth, environmental 
protection, and global standards, Maurice Strong gathered some thirty experts to a 
small motel in the village of Founex, Switzerland, just outside Geneva, where 
Strong’s UNCHE Secretariat had since moved. There, international experts debated 
the interrelation of development and environment as it affected LDCs. Barbara Ward 
helped Strong organize the meeting by inviting papers with provocative inputs from 
the main participants of developmental economists, leading LDC diplomats, and 
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some organizations involved in issues of international trade, like the UNCTAD. 
Peter Stone, an informational aid in Strong’s UNCHE Secretariat, described the 
Founex meeting as “long on economists but short on ecologists. … It made one 
realize that Stockholm was going to be a political conference.”343 The planning 
process getting to Stockholm remained political, too. 
Gamani Corea chaired the Founex meeting while Mahbub ul Haq, with 
Barbara Ward’s assistance, oversaw drafting of a final report on their deliberations 
and conclusions.344 Miguel Álvaro Ozório de Almeida, a leading voice in Brazil’s 
government’s stand on development and environment, also became a central 
participant at Founex and at ensuing UNCHE planning sessions. Throughout his 
career, Almeida had counseled Brazil’s foreign ministry in various industrialized-
world cities, including Hong Kong, Montreal, Washington, and Moscow.345 He now 
served as special advisor on scientific and technological matters to Brazil’s foreign 
minister, and he had become Brazil’s lead delegate for UNCHE planning. It fell to 
Almeida to reiterate Brazil’s demands for unrestrained development and absolute 
sovereignty and, in the process, exhibit Brazilian leadership in international affairs. 
He did not disappoint.  
Debates in Founex revolved around the arguments presented earlier by 
Brazil, but they also moved toward an integration of environment and development. 
Mahbub ul Haq’s report on Founex, titled Development and Environment, argued 
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that environmental problems “should not be presented as a pollution problem in the 
developed world and a poverty problem in the developing countries; instead it 
should be treated as a problem of the most efficient synthesis of development and 
environmental concerns at different stages of social transitions.”346 The Founex 
report concluded, just as Brazil initially intoned, “that, in large measure, the kind of 
environmental problems that are of importance in developing countries are those that 
can be solved by the process of development itself.” Additionally, the experts in 
Founex agreed to the Brazilian argument that wealthy nations who benefited from 
industrial growth and also produced most global environmental pollution problems 
had an obligation to bear the costs of dealing with those problems. This translated 
into a new need for rich nations to supply new and additional resources to LDCs to 
better incorporate environmental protections into their development, otherwise 
known as additionality. The Founex report’s demands for financing of LDC 
development, in addition to funding for environmental protection, thus mirrored 
Brazil’s earlier arguments. The Founex report concluded that, 
Additional aid funds will be required to subsidize research on 
environmental problems for the developing countries, to compensate 
for major dislocations in the exports of the developing countries, to 
cover major increases in the cost of development projects owing to 
higher environmental standards, and to finance restructuring of 
investment, production or export patterns necessitated by the 
environmental concern of developed countries. A suitable mechanism 
for channeling these funds should be devised.347 
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The immediate publication of the Founex report included a selection of the 
meeting’s most influential working papers, including the provocative statement by 
Miguel Álvaro Ozório de Almeida. Almeida’s arguments were thus distributed 
around the world, especially for other representatives from LDCS, to help appraise 
the conflict between environment and development. “In confronting the problem of 
development and of the protection of the environment,” Almeida wrote, “it’s thus 
necessary to obtain, right at the beginning, a series of restrictions.” As such, rather 
than open discussion, Almeida sought to contain it. These restrictions Almeida 
sought emphasized that environmental concern must not restrict growth nor infringe 
on a nation’s right to develop its sovereign natural resources according to its own 
domestic needs. Almeida’s primary conclusion reprised Brazil’s argument that “the 
main environmental responsibility belongs to the developed countries, and that the 
main responsibility of undeveloped countries is accelerated economic 
development.”348  Brazilian diplomacy had managed to make its environmental 
views required reading for the UNCHE planning process, which thus made them 
central to the UNCHE itself. Ultimately, Brazil’s efforts both before and at Founex, 
and their spread to other LDCs as a primary part of UNCHE planning, helped enlist 
more LDCs to attend and participate in Stockholm.  
Additionally, historian Steven Macekura concluded correctly that “the 
Founex report lent credence to the Brazilian cause, claiming that the major problems 
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facing developing countries were of a ‘different kind’ than the ecological issues 
plaguing the industrialized North. It called for a ‘redefinition’ of development that 
would address endemic poverty and environmental degradation.”349 Political 
scientist Roberto A. Guimarães also noted the striking resemblances between the 
arguments that emerged in Founex with the positions advocated by Brazil over the 
prior year. Brazil’s government officials, he noted, even boasted about the ways that 
the Founex Report reflected Brazilian positions. Guimarães concluded narrowly, 
however, that such similarities reflected how Brazil’s concerns were not unique 
among LDCs.350 Instead, the near mirroring of Brazilian arguments suggests an 
undue Brazilian influence over the LDCs and, eventually, over the global 
environmental agenda. 
Maurice Strong described the meeting of experts in Founex as “one of the 
best that I have ever experienced in terms of spirited intellectual discussion and 
creative interchange.”351 Instead of dramatizing diametric opposition between 
development and environment, debates in Founex helped clarify connections 
between them. Their discussions indicated that environmental concerns included 
more than industrial pollution and were therefore more relevant to LDC situations 
than initially appreciated. The general lesson Gamani Corea took from Founex was 
that environmental issues were “not only caused by the process of development, it is 
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also brought up by the lack of development. … Therefore developing countries need 
to focus on both the environmental aspects of the lack of development and the 
environmental aspects of getting onto the development path.”352 Instead of relegating 
environmental protection as a barrier to development, the Founex discussions 
affirmed it as part of the process. Brazil’s Foreign Ministry had helped define a 
development-centered environmental perspective, and its message quickly spread. 
Founex totally changed the tone of UNCHE planning and, ultimately, came 
to define the UN’s early approach to international environmental policymaking. 
Strong described the Founex meeting as “the single most influential meeting in terms 
of my development of the [UNCHE] agenda.”353 Realizing the importance of the 
Founex report, Strong quickly had it translated and widely disseminated to 
encourage full LDC participation in the UNCHE. He used it as the starting point for 
his personal diplomacy to excite LDC interest in the UNCHE 
 For the remainder of the year before the UNCHE, Strong circled the globe 
nearly nonstop to assuage LDC apprehensions over the UNCHE and secure broad 
LDC participation. According to Wade Rowland, Strong “traveled hundreds of 
thousands of miles over every continent except Antarctica in the months preceding 
the conference. He personally guaranteed scores of African and Asian leaders that 
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their interests would be respected.”354 Strong also dispatched Gamani Corea, 
chairman of the Founex meeting, to promote its message in several Asian countries, 
including Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Corea recalled that as a result of his 
and Strong’s devotion as environmental missionaries and “as a result of the Founex 
report, the developing countries did come to Stockholm in all their numbers and did 
get intimately involved in it.”355 Brazilian perspectives remained at the heart of that 
involvement. 
Both in the published Founex report and in separate publications, Brazil’s 
Miguel Álvaro Ozório de Almeida reiterated his point that responsibility for 
preserving the environment increased with an increased level of development. 
Therefore, for the sake of saving the global environment, the world’s wealthy 
nations should further finance LDC industrialization. His writings and speeches 
carried his message throughout later planning sessions for the UNCHE, especially at 
the regional meetings held that year in underdeveloped locations.356 In the months 
following the Founex meeting, four regional seminars held between August and 
October 1971 addressed UNCHE planning in Bangkok, Addis Ababa, Mexico City, 
and Beirut. The Founex report, full of Brazil’s original arguments, provided a 
baseline for discussion at each regional meeting, all of which examined the 
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environmental problems of their respective developing regions in attempt to define 
action proposals aligned with LDC interests. 
For instance, according to the report from the first UNCHE regional planning 
seminar, which was held in mid-August in Bangkok and co-organized by the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), “the seminar shared the 
fear expressed in the Founex report that interests in the developed countries might 
use the argument of differences in the costs of environmental regulation for products 
exported by them as a reason for a new kind of ‘neo-protectionism.’ … The seminar 
also shared the fear that excessive preoccupation with environmental problems 
would lead to a diminution in the flow of resources from developed to developing 
countries.”357 
The second regional seminar, held the following week in Addis Ababa, 
reiterated Brazil’s arguments in the Founex report regarding additionality. The report 
of the first all-African seminar on the human environment declared that “Additional 
funds would be required to subsidize research into the environmental problems of 
the developing countries to compensate for major dislocation in the proceeds of their 
exports to cover additional costs of development projects to restore their investment 
or production patterns.”358 Political scientist Steven F. Bernstein noted that by the 
time of the third meeting of the twenty-seven-nation UNCHE Preparatory 
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Committee in September 1971, “the influence of Founex and increased public 
attention had combined to put pressure on the intergovernmental working group to 
produce a [draft UNCHE] document that represented concrete action.”359 That 
action, it seemed, would now incorporate development, not limit it. 
Brazil’s diplomats had reason for satisfaction. As a result of Founex, nearly 
all LDC ideas about the UNCHE reflected Brazil’s view that environmental action 
must integrate LDC demands for development. But just when it seemed Brazil could 
rest more comfortably about the upcoming UNCHE, a new collection of arguments 
for constricting global economic growth on Spaceship Earth exploded across the 
international scene. As one Brazilian government official recalled, LDCs suddenly 
faced new worries from a “renewed outburst of the environmentalist campaign, 
under the direct or indirect inspiration of the so-called Club of Rome.”360 Brazil’s 
battle to make development central to the UNCHE and to future international 
environmental policy was far from won. 
 
The Global Dynamics of No-Growth Ideas 
Although the Founex meeting in June 1971 eventually rallied most LDCs 
around the Brazilian arguments that environmental action must incorporate 
developmental assistance, the environmental argument against freezing economic 
growth was far from buried. The summer of 1971 saw continued international 
attention to environmental issues. Despite success at Founex, Brazil’s foreign 
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ministry ensured its international environmental ideology spread widely, both abroad 
and back at home. On June 11, Brazilian diplomat João Augusto de Araújo Castro 
delivered a speech in Rio de Janeiro at Brazil’s National War College, the Escola 
Superior de Guerra. Before departing the UN to become Brazil’s ambassador to the 
United States, Araújo Castro warned that developments in the UN seemed set on 
“freezing of the world power structure.”361 
Araújo Castro told his audience of Brazilians that the Second UN 
Development Decade of the 1970s seemed destined to fail just like the first. His 
assumptions stemmed from growing restrictions against LDC desires to, as he 
phrased it, “transpose into the international field certain principles of social justice 
and redistribution of wealth.” A particular problem with transposing those principles 
of justice and economic development, Araújo Castro warned, was an exaggerated 
environmental focus on the “dangers of pollution” and “an unduly strong accent on 
the dangers of rapid industrialization.” Sovereign nations of the UN, he argued, 
could never agree to environmental limitations when “two-thirds of mankind are far 
more threatened by hunger and poverty than by the evils of pollution.” Instead, 
Araújo Castro continued, LCDs must “start from the premise that schemes to 
preserve the human environment ought to take into account the basic factors of 
development since underdevelopment is, itself, one of the worst forms of 
pollution.”362Araújo Castro’s speech, later published by Cambridge University’s 
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leading journal on international affairs, might have seemed superfluous given 
Brazil’s simultaneous success in Founex. But such assumptions would be premature. 
Also in June 1971, the University of Michigan hosted in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan a Conference on Asian Environments. The conference brought together for 
the first time a diverse group of young scholars from countries across Asia—from 
Israel, India, and Iran, to China, Vietnam, and Japan—all interested in the 
environmental problems affecting the world’s largest continent. Conference panels 
addressed issues including Asian overpopulation, the environmental implications of 
international development, and socio-environmental effects from unequal 
distribution of resources. During conference deliberations some participants, 
especially American professors, proposed environmental policies for zero-growth. 
For instance, Rhoads Murphey, the director of the University of Michigan’s Center 
for Chinese Studies, proclaimed the solution to Asia’s environmental problems was 
for Asians “to stop wanting more.”363 
Hamilton S. Amerasinghe, Ceylon’s ambassador to the UN and a colleague 
of Gamani Corea, also attended the Michigan conference as special representative. 
Like Brazil’s Araújo Castro, Ambassador Amerasinghe resented suggestions that 
environmental concerns meant restraining Asian development and industrialization. 
He found particularly ridiculous any notions on no-growth. “The governments of 
developing countries, their economists, and planners,” he declared, “must not and 
will not allow themselves to be distracted from the imperatives of economic 
                                                                                                                                     
Power Structure,” International Organization 26:1 (Winter 1972), 158-166, here 162 and 164. 
363 M. Taghi Farvar, Margaret T. Thomas, Howard Boksenbaum, and Theodore N. Soule, “The 
Pollution of Asia,” Environment 13:8 (October 1971), 10-17, here 17. 
  249 
development and growth by the illusory dream of an atmosphere free from smoke or 
a landscape innocent of chimney stacks.” Most importantly, he concluded, the UN 
“must not, generally speaking, allow our concern for the environment to develop into 
a hysteria.”364 However, agitation for restricting growth soon received a major boost. 
That same month, in June 1971, MIT computer scientist and systems expert 
Jay W. Forrester published what he considered an unassuming and rather technical 
book titled World Dynamics.365 In thick prose and with pages of equations, the book 
outlined Forrester’s computer simulation of world-scale social and economic 
interactions—the first such planetary computer model of its kind. Forrester’s book, 
with its computer-based predictions, re-ignited the global debate on growth. 
Both the book and the debate it kindled provided a peak moment in what was 
already Forrester’s idiosyncratic and multifaceted career as a computer engineer and 
management scientist. At the end of World War II, while completing a graduate 
degree in electrical engineering at MIT, Forrester pioneered the construction and 
programming of digital computers with mathematical models to help solve complex, 
interrelated problems. In the 1940s and early 1950s, he helped construct the 
Whirlwind, one of the world’s first digital electronic computers at MIT. And amid 
existential Cold War threats, he helped develop for the U.S. military an early air-
defense scheme called the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, by the late 1950s, Forrester began applying his computer 
programming and systems techniques to model interconnections first for industrial 
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businesses, which he then scaled up to model entire cities by the late 1960s.366 
Continuing to scale his computer models upward, Forrester’s next project had global 
ambitions. It also connected him to members of the Club of Rome, who harbored 
deep concerns about the world’s environment and the role of economic growth 
within it. 
In June 1970, Carroll Wilson invited Forrester to the Club of Rome’s first 
general meeting at Bern, Switzerland. Carroll Wilson, a scientific advisor to Maurice 
Strong and an early member of Club of Rome, worked with Jay Forrester at MIT’s 
Sloan School of Management at the intersections of science, technology, and policy. 
In 1968, when Aurelio Peccei founded the Club of Rome and Forrester was working 
on modeling city-scale systems, the Club’s membership remained small and 
idiosyncratic. By 1970, the Club’s informal and “invisible college” of experts 
comprised some seventy-five members from twenty-five countries. At the Bern 
meeting, Peccei and other Club of Rome members listed no less than twenty-six 
“Continuous Critical Problems” of global, systemic predicaments for humankind. 
Historically, the Club of Rome is best remembered for producing the Limits to 
Growth report in 1972. But, as argued here, Jay Forrester’s association with the Club 
of Rome and his efforts to address the Club’s critical global problems played an 
essential role in re-igniting the global debate on growth. 
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The challenges addressed at the Club of Rome’s meeting in Bern led 
Forrester to suggest that his systems dynamics approach, which featured complex 
series of weighted feedback relationships similar to cybernetics, might model the 
links within the Club’s critical global problems. From his prior studies, Forrester 
determined that growth in complex systems was a developmental phase, not a 
constant, and that after growth periods, stable systems evolved and realigned toward 
a state of equilibrium. Forrester thus proposed the concept of growth as a possible 
unifying thread throughout the Club of Rome’s planetary problématieque. Excited 
by the idea of building a global system, Forrester drafted on his flight back from 
Bern what became the first computer-based model of planetary socio-economic 
systems, which he called WORLD1. Over a few weekends of work, Forrester had 
programmed his draft of WORLD1 into a rough computer simulation.367 
In July 1970, three weeks after first proposing it, Forrester unveiled his initial 
world simulation back at MIT during a two-week meeting with the executive 
committee of the Club of Rome. Forrester’s rudimentary WORLD1 computer model 
divided global systems into five basic subsystems of natural resources, pollution, 
population, agriculture, and capital investment. To chart the relationships of growth 
among those variables, his model initially linked those subsystems with some 
guesswork and cursory data inputs. Establishing a solid system structure and their 
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dynamics mattered more to Forrester than precise data. Forrester’s WORLD1 model 
thus shared structural characteristics from his previous industrial and urban models 
while also sharing their dynamics of overshoot and collapse. Regardless of any 
technological fixes to reorder the variables, all of the computer runs in WORLD1 
predicted, at some point in the next century, a global-scale collapse. Based on 
existing trends of increasing pollution, escalating population, and consumption of 
resources, Forrester’s basic model foresaw exponential growth on a finite and closed 
system like Spaceship Earth as dangerously unsustainable. If global growth 
continued, it seemed that planetary systems were doomed.368 
Though it contained only 120 lines of equations and jammed several intricate 
problems into singular and simple variables, the WORLD1 model made an 
enormous impact on the Club of Rome leaders, especially Aurelio Peccei. For 
Peccei, Forrester’s model confirmed his fears of global collapse and the hazardous 
implications of growth. Upon seeing WORLD1, Peccei soon convinced the 
Volkswagon Foundation to fund an 18-month modeling project that became the 
Systems Dynamics Group at MIT. The funding initiated the first phase for what the 
Club of Rome called its Project on the Predicament of Mankind. Over the next 
several months, Forrester ordered his early computer runs onto consistent time scales 
and refined WORLD1 into a new model simply called WORLD2. Forrester wrote a 
technical report based on WORLD2, which he published midway through 1971 as 
the book World Dynamics. 
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Forrester’s World Dynamics laid the conceptual foundations and lubricated 
media attention on the potential of global doom from growth on which Limits to 
Growth later capitalized. By the time Limits to Growth appeared, Jay Forrester’s 
earlier work had already done much to elevate public attention on computer analyses 
of global growth. Both studies built off Forrester’s systems dynamics models, and 
both shared similar conclusions: that a variety of economic and social collapse 
scenarios awaited with savage consequences if humanity’s industrial production and 
consumption of resources continued on their exponential trajectories. Their shared 
message was that human survival demanded drastic reordering of the global systems 
for its growing ecological footprint. In short, growth must halt or human civilization 
would overshoot Earth’s carrying capacity. Forrester’s global models earned 
surprisingly wide recognition for its novel computerized approach, its planetary 
perspective, and the timing of its appearance prior to the UNCHE—the first world 
conference on the environment.369 
When Forrester’s World Dynamics came out in the first week of June 1971—
the same month that LDC diplomats and developmental economists met in Founex—
Forrester expected little public response, if any. The middle of his technical book 
contained thirty-four pages of equations; its interesting results appeared as graphs 
over time that much of the public would not easily understand; it dealt with issues a 
century into the future, typically outside presumed public interest; and its publisher, 
with only one prior book, seemed to lack the commercial stature to garner substantial 
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reviews of the book. Forrester recalled, “I believed the World Dynamics book was 
for perhaps a hundred people who would like to see how one can organize a mental 
model into an interesting simulation exercise. That was the worst prediction I have 
ever made. … The public response was a good hundred fold over what could have 
been rationally expected.”370 With much of society in the industrialized North 
predicated on growth, and with a clamoring for growth in the underdeveloped South, 
the anti-growth arguments in World Dynamics became a new touchstone for the 
debate on ecology and economics. 
Within weeks of its release, World Dynamics’s message against growth made 
world headlines. In the last week of June, the book received a front-page review in 
the London Observer, which then circulated around the world. In Europe, World 
Dynamics became the subject of prime time documentary television. Forrester 
received a request for more information from a New York professor who, while 
traveling abroad, read about the book in the Singapore Times. World Dynamics even 
earned a full-length article in Playboy. The book achieved broadest recognition 
across the United States. That August, the Christian Science Monitor devoted a full 
front page of its second section to the book; in September, Fortune magazine gave it 
a full page and a half, while the Wall Street Journal carried columns on Forrester’s 
harsh predictions and warnings against growth. Conservative newspapers across 
Middle America debated its merits, while the anti-establishment student and 
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countercultural press celebrated its zero-growth environmental message.371 For a 
technical book that Forrester expected only a hundred people to read, World 
Dynamics made quite a splash. 
In the book and in interviews, Forrester advocated for a viable future by 
transitioning toward global equilibrium. Forrester readily acknowledged that some of 
his formulas and computer inputs were educated guesses. Yet, based on his appraisal 
of existing evidence, he declared that “A society with a high level of 
industrialization may be nonsustainable … From the long view of a hundred years 
hence, the present efforts of the underdeveloped countries to industrialize may be 
unwise.” Like austere religious ascetics, Forrester suggested the wisdom and sanctity 
of LDCs might lie in their poverty. Because of their lack of industry, Forrester 
explained, poor nations “may be in a better condition for surviving forth-coming 
worldwide environmental and economic pressures than the advanced countries.”372 
The implication was that all humanity, but especially the LDCs, should subsume 
their growing aspirations for industrial growth for the sake of planetary ecological 
survival.  
Under the title “Economists vs Ecologists,” the New York Times reprinted a 
September speech by Hazel Henderson, the director of the U.S. Council on 
Economic Priorities, delivered to America’s National Association of Business 
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Economists. “From an ecological perspective,” Henderson declared, “our economy 
is grievously distorted.” Henderson concluded that classical economic theories of 
“profit” and “economic expansion” needed total reconsideration, especially in light 
of “Jay Forrester’s planetary models and their gloomy scenarios in World 
Dynamics,” as well as the recent work of “economists such as Kenneth Boulding, J. 
Kenneth Galbraith, [and] Barbara Ward.” Together, their work showed in a global 
perspective that “Industrialization may be a more fundamentally disturbing force in 
world ecology than population.” Instead of discarding environmental invectives for 
drastic change as unrealistic, Forrester’s computer-based scenarios implied the 
opposite for Henderson: “that businessmen, in fact, aided and abetted by traditional 
economic theories of unlimited growth, may be the ones whose expectation 
trajectory has soared out of line with the reality curve of the earth’s available 
resources.”373 Remarkably, national organizations of economists in the world’s 
largest and most dynamic economy were reconsidering the very merits of profit and 
economic growth. In the global environmental moment, Jay Forrester’s computer 
models had taken a life of their own. 
  
American Shock and LDC Rejoinder 
If the media coverage and rhetoric against economic growth were not enough 
to frighten LDCs about what might occur at the UNCHE, other coinciding events 
certainly could. On August 15, 1971, without any prior consultation with American 
allies or even the U.S. State Department, President Nixon decided unilaterally that 
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the United States dollar would no longer be convertible to gold. For the first time in 
the post-World War II era, the U.S. dollar was quite literally no longer “good as 
gold.” Often dubbed the “Nixon Shock,” the President’s unexpected dismantling of 
the international system for fixed exchange rates and dollar-to-gold convertibility 
upended the existing economic system for international trade. In the context of 
debate over international environmental standards, with the possibility of global 
conventions to avert ecological damage from industrial pollution, and amid renewed 
rhetoric about radical shifts to equilibrium economics, Nixon’s autocratic decision 
opened the door to the first opportunity since the end of World War II for a major 
renegotiation of the international economic order.374 
From its establishment under American leadership in 1944, the Bretton 
Woods monetary system—named after the New Hampshire resort where the system 
was formulated—had secured the international order of fixed monetary exchange in 
place of the broken gold standard, which was abandoned at the start of the Great 
Depression. Under the Bretton Woods agreement, the U.S. government agreed to 
make the American dollar redeemable for gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce. The 
agreement aimed to bolster postwar recovery of international trade and lubricate the 
flow of international capital by making it easy to convert one currency into another. 
By pegging its value to gold, the U.S. dollar became the basis for setting the values 
                                                
374 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: ‘The Challenge of 
Peace,’” August 15, 1971, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3115#axzz1UZnES7PMon, accessed January 22, 
2014; Lewis E. Lehrman, “The Nixon Shock Heard ‘Round the World,” Wall Street Journal, August 
15, 2011; William R. Cline, “Brazil’s Emerging International Economic Role,” in Brazil in the 
Seventies, edited by Riordan Roett (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1976), 81. 
  258 
of all other foreign currencies. The United States agreed to exchange dollars 
presented by foreign governments for gold at the fixed rate of $35 per ounce, and 
foreign governments agreed to maintain their currencies in a balanced relationship to 
the dollar. American dollars, which then flowed freely around the world, thus 
became the lynchpin of the international currency market and the bedrock of the 
postwar economic order. The Bretton Woods system successfully sped economic 
recovery, and thereafter, it facilitated the remarkable expansion of the global 
economy. But this system for global growth created a new set of challenges for the 
United States.375 
Although the United States benefited handsomely as the hegemonic core of 
the postwar international economy, the recovery and growth of foreign nations’ 
economies contributed to the outflow and accumulation of U.S. dollars abroad, 
which eventually produced an American balance of payments problem. The foreign 
accumulation of American dollars resulted from a combination of U.S. overseas 
investments as well as Cold War commitments to contain communism. Those costly 
commitments included funding the U.S. military abroad, expenditures for American 
diplomatic networks, the provision to allies of expensive military hardware and 
advisors, as well as massive distributions of economic aid, first to rebuild Europe 
and Japan, then to align Third World nations. In addition, the eventual recovery and 
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growth of foreign economies further contributed to an unfavorable balance of 
payments for the U.S. economy.376 
In the past, U.S. exports exceeded its imports to create a U.S. trade surplus; 
but by 1971, Americans imported more than they sold abroad for the first time since 
1883. The commercial trade deficit, which resulted from declining competitiveness 
of American goods in international markets and the growing allure of foreign 
products to U.S. consumers, led Washington to print more money. Pegged to gold, 
the dollar was theoretically the world’s stable currency, but it was clearly 
overvalued. As early as 1958, accumulated foreign holdings of U.S. dollars 
outweighed American gold reserves, which theoretically challenged the Bretton 
Woods commitment to exchange dollars for gold at the rate of $35 per ounce. By in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, nations like Japan, Switzerland, and France began 
redeeming tens of millions, and then hundreds of millions of dollars for gold, 
threatening a run on American gold stocks. Domestically, the United States also 
faced rising inflation, expanding unemployment, increasing social outlays, and 
ongoing expenditures in Vietnam. Despite excessive spending, an approaching 1972 
election year meant no elected official was willing to raise taxes to fund these 
outlays. For the United States, the Bretton Woods system had become 
unsustainable.377 
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In August 1971, no longer able to sustain the fixed dollar-to-gold price ratio 
of $35 per ounce, Nixon announced in a nationwide televised address that the United 
States would unilaterally devalue its dollar and suspend its convertibility to gold. At 
the same time, Nixon utilized provisions in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 
to impose a ten percent surcharge on foreign imports while dictating temporary 
domestic wage and price controls. In Executive Order 11615, Nixon declared “the 
present balance of payments situation makes it especially urgent to stabilize prices, 
rents, wages, and salaries.”378 For a quarter century, the dollar’s link to gold had 
established U.S. currency as the primary reference point for international trade and 
investment. But, in the words of Michael Hunt, “the dollar now ‘floated’ 
ingloriously, subject like any other currency to the tides of the market.”379 No one 
knew how this change would affect foreign currencies or the flow of international 
trade. But America’s abandonment of Bretton Woods and the dollar’s collapse did 
signal that the international economic order was ripe for drastic changes. 
Brazil witnessed these changes with a mix of fear and excitement. A potential 
renegotiation of the global economic order offered Brazil an opportunity to portray 
itself as an emerging power and possibly secure better trade terms for LDCs. Given 
Brazil’s large size and recent economic dynamism, it considered itself a logical 
contender for the international economic leadership of LDCs, and thus in a primary 
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position to speak on the economic behalf of the global majority. Yet, the unilateral 
behavior of the United States raised concern that economic decisions of broad 
significance might proceed without international consultation of that majority. 
Furthermore, hegemonic actions like the Nixon Shock induced fear in the 
context of international environmental anxiety. LDCs like Brazil saw trends across 
the industrialized North of increasing concern and attention over international 
environmental challenges, efforts to institute conventions on global environmental 
standards, calls for the preservation of ecological World Trust sites, and leading 
scientists with computer models encouraging the end of economic growth. By 
Presidential fiat, the United States had just stabilized prices and wages. Was this an 
initial step toward that no-growth, steady-state economic equilibrium? 
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers caught wind of the LDCs’ 
environmental anxieties and acted to contain them. In a letter to Senator Howard 
Baker Jr., who chaired the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on the UNCHE, 
Rogers noted that, “Some of the developing countries have evidenced concern that 
the forthcoming Stockholm Conference will tend to emphasize environmental 
improvement at the expense of their economic development.” In attempt to “assuage 
these fears,” Rogers sent Senator Baker on an 18-day world tour of developing 
countries, including stops in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Bangkok, New Delhi, and Hong 
Kong. Baker’s mission, according to State Department publicity, was to “dispel 
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notions that environmental legislation would retard economic growth.”380 Many 
LDCs, especially Brazil, remained skeptical. 
To prevent the international economy being reordered along anti-growth 
environmental lines, Brazil’s government redoubled its efforts to ensure that 
environmental actions for LDCs increased, not decreased development. Brazilian 
diplomats took their offensive to Mexico City, which hosted the third UNCHE 
regional seminar for LDCs from September 6-11, 1971. This regional seminar, co-
organized by the UNCHE Secretariat and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), met to address LDC concerns about the UNCHE and, like the 
prior two regional seminars, used the Founex report for its starting point. Brazil 
dominated the seminar. According to a British diplomat who observed the meeting, 
Brazil refused any environmental discussions that “might slow down their unfettered 
race to join the ranks of the industrial super-league, pollution and all.” In what the 
British observer called “the Brazillian steamroller” that “flattened rather than 
convinced,” the Brazilians worked to “impose their pre-conceived policies on [the 
seminar’s] final product. In this they proved most successful.”381 
The Latin American regional seminar document, unlike the others before it, 
emphasized development as a right. It also stressed the need to use “all possible 
means of international financial and technical cooperation to aid the developing 
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nations, including the Latin American countries,” not just for their environmental 
problems, but for “minimizing the adverse effects that environmental preservation 
policies of the industrialized nations might have on their development efforts.”382 
Led by Brazil, the Latin American LDCs declared brazenly their consideration of 
environmental policies at the UNCHE would only occur in the context of their 
escalated economic growth. Maurice Strong’s UNCHE Secretariat took note. 
At the third meeting of the twenty-seven-nation Preparatory Committee for 
the UNCHE, held at the UN headquarters in New York, Maurice Strong recognized 
LDC desires for financial assistance and noted ongoing fears of a conflict between 
accelerated development and environmental protection. In setting the tone for their 
planning session, the UNCHE Secretariat declared the following as “basic 
considerations: concern for the environment should be an integral part of the 
development process; the limited resources available to developing countries could 
not be diverted from the urgent needs of development; the quality of life in 
developing countries was directly dependent on accelerated development; and 
measures adopted by the developed countries could have adverse consequences on 
the economies of the developing countries.” Due in part to continued Brazilian 
agitation and to discussions in Founex and at the regional seminars, the LDC 
majority in the Preparatory Committee further declared, “there should not be any 
basic contradiction between the goals of development for the developing countries 
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and environment-oriented actions.”383 The subject of development and environment 
had been a new addition to the prior Preparatory Committee meeting. By the time of 
this third meeting, it seemed the UNCHE was less an environmental conference than 
about development.  
The Preparatory Committee made clear its stance against limiting 
development on account of environmental protection. It recognized a basic 
difference “between the environmental problems that arose out of the process of 
development itself, and those related to the state of poverty of many of the 
developing countries. The basic solution for most of the latter problems could be 
achieved through an accelerated process of development.” Along those lines, the 
committee declared that, “Concern for the environment must therefore be an integral 
part of the development process.” In direct challenge to anti-growth rhetoric among 
some Northern environmentalists, the report concluded that, “under conditions 
prevailing in the developing countries any additional cost involved in improving the 
quality of the environment could only be envisioned in the context of accelerated 
growth. Resources cannot be diverted from the urgent needs of development.”384 
Brazil not only worked its arguments into the Founex report, its developmental 
agenda was now ingrained deep into the UNCHE planning process. It ensured that 
no-growth was a non-starter. But Brazil did not stop there. 
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Later that month, on September 27, 1971, Brazil’s Minister of State, Mario 
Gibson Alves Barboza, again took the honor of opening the debate of the UN 
General Assembly. At the end of 1971, this twenty-sixth meeting of the UN General 
Assembly would be the last before the start of the UNCHE that coming June. 
Barboza directly challenged notions against economic growth with ethical 
invocations for development. Rich nations, he declared, had a “moral duty and 
political obligation” to aid “the acceleration of growth of developing countries,” or, 
he continued, “at the very least, not to raise obstacles to their development.”385 In the 
wake of the Nixon Shock and the end of the convertibility of dollars to gold, 
Barboza also expressed Brazil’s outright panic over a tyrannical reformulation of the 
international economic policy without consideration of other nations who it affected. 
With regard to the prior month’s collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 
Barboza told the General Assembly that Brazil felt “deep concern” over the “new 
trends and developments that now characterize the international monetary and trade 
scene.” Fear best described the feelings of Brazil’s technocratic dictatorship. “I very 
much fear,” Barboza said, “that if Governments and specialized organs adopt 
measures to reshape the international monetary system without previously consulting 
the developing countries in the appropriate international organs – I very much fear, I 
repeat – that the action program for development embodied in the International 
Development Strategy adopted last year by this Assembly will be gravely impaired 
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in the very first year of its existence.”386 Brazil’s economic planners and 
policymakers had no intentions of seeing their industrialization progress limited by 
Northern environmental anxieties or hegemonic economic behavior. 
Yet, the next month, as if to further stoke Brazilian fears, Democrats in the 
U.S. Senate, led by the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, J. William Fulbright, succeeded to kill the bill for the entire U.S. foreign 
aid program. The Senators did so in part out of frustration at the ongoing Vietnam 
War and resentment over their exclusion by the Nixon administration from the 
foreign policy process. Before that surprising vote, no U.S. foreign aid bill in the 
history of the foreign aid program had ever been defeated on the floor of the 
Senate.387 
The Senate vote against foreign aid occurred just as Brazil turned to the UN 
General Assembly to announce its ongoing concerns about U.S. efforts to enact 
international environmental policy as a means for freezing global economic growth. 
The Senate eventually voted to approve $1.14 billion for economic and humanitarian 
aid and $1.5 billion for foreign military support. But even this total was nearly a 
billion dollars fewer than the original aid request.388 These circumstances further 
encouraged Brazilian demands within the UN and among fellow LDCs to combat 
environmental policies and demand industrialized nations take greater responsibility 
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for escalated LDC development. As debate on the UNCHE continued in the UN, 
Brazil made clear that environmental issues could not become an excuse for limiting 
growth and freezing global hierarchies. 
 
Embedding Development in Environment 
At the end of 1971, it fell to the UN General Assembly’s second committee, 
which addresses economic and financial issues, to debate a final resolution on the 
UNCHE before it began in June 1972. Sergio Armando Frazao, Brazil’s permanent 
ambassador to the UN, delivered Brazil’s ongoing concerns about environment and 
development. Frazao first called for unity among LDCs toward the reorganization of 
the international monetary system, which he then connected to the relationship of 
development and the environment. “The concept of one earth,” he announced, 
“should be something more than a slogan focused on ecological interdependence: it 
should also stress that the thesis of global management of earth’s resources makes it 
mandatory for the world economy as a whole to function evenly.” Frazao clarified 
the LDC position for the industrialized nations, explaining that “the pollution of air 
and water is less disturbing to us than the pollution of poverty and misery.” The 
primary goal for the Second UN Development Decade, he reminded the UN, was not 
establishing environmental limits but, in language that later evolved with 
environmental connotations, the UN’s focus must be providing the conditions of 
“sustained development.” Bluntly, Frazao then labeled scientific claims about the 
limits to growth as unsubstantiated:  
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Let me make it clear that I do not share the opinion of those who hint 
that the limitation of the biological capital of the world justifies the 
argument for a ceiling on global development. In point of fact, with 
respect to either pollution phenomena or to an alleged curtailment or 
exhaustion of world resources, nothing really convincing in the 
present state of scientific knowledge would seem to support the 
gloomy predictions of those who believe that it is impossible to 
expand our consumer society in such a manner as to benefit all the 
peoples of the world.389 
 
The UNCHE Secretary General and the U.S. State Department both noted the 
speech and recognized that Brazil’s aggressive anti-environmental stance came from 
its top policy-makers. Maurice Strong commented that Brazil was “obviously laying 
their plans carefully and thoroughly, and the shots are being called from the highest 
levels of their government.”390 Brazil’s government sought other governments to 
their join cause. 
In late October, Brazil continued its renewed campaign for LDC unity 
against environmental encroachments on development. In Lima, Peru, the Ministers 
of the Group of 77 met to address issues emerging amid the North-South conflict. 
Their meeting produced the Lima Declaration. Under Brazil’s influence, the 
declaration addressed briefly the potentially negative effects of environmental 
policies on developing nations. Again, Brazil pressed for sustained development, not 
environmental limits. Among the concerns listed in the declaration included the 
express desire that environmental policies should not adversely affect development, 
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especially the flow and terms of financial assistance. Any new environmental 
policies must not obstruct LDC efforts “towards the sustained economic 
development of developing countries.” Instead of limiting growth, the declaration 
stated that, “the environmental policies of the developed countries should facilitate, 
as far as possible, the development of developing countries.”391 Once again, the 
rhetoric on development in the new international environmental context represented 
the seeds of what would become, more than a decade later, the environmental 
concept of sustainable development. 
In late November 1971, back at the UN, the ongoing debate over the role of 
development in UNCHE planning reached a crescendo. Brazil’s Miguel Álvaro 
Ozório de Almeida spoke for Brazil and escalated his anti-environmental rhetoric. 
As special advisor on scientific and technological matters to Brazil’s foreign 
minister, Almeida lampooned Northern scientists’ warnings on environmental risks. 
Before the General Assembly, Almeida labeled the scientists fear-mongers who 
indulged in “para-or-psuedo scientific extrapolation.” How else, he asked, could you 
describe the scientists’ sensational warnings? After all, Almeida continued, we are 
now threatened with science fiction stories about “the melting of polar ice-caps, the 
consequent increase in sea levels, and the wholesale drowning of some of the largest 
cities and capitals in the world.” Such reckless statements, he complained, had 
caused the price of real estate to escalate at higher elevations in Rio de Janeiro! He 
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extended special criticism for the audacity of Northern environmentalists to 
complain about Brazil’s depletion of the Amazon rain forests, which absorbed great 
amounts of atmospheric CO2 and produced equally significant amounts of the 
planet’s atmospheric oxygen. Almeida stated that it was not Brazil’s responsibility to 
compensate for the North American and European excesses of pollution by limiting 
Brazilian development of Amazonian resources, or, for that matter, any other parts of 
its sovereign territory.392 
But Almeida was just getting warmed up. He chastised the claims of 
doomsday environmentalists as “terroristic or brain-washing” of the passengers of 
“our little half-scuttled spaceship.” He accused American and other industrialized 
nations for their Calvinistic sense of self-satisfaction and judgment of others, which 
implied that wealthy nations had proved their right to salvation and perpetuation, 
while those who remained in a backward state should be punished for their sins. In 
an unveiled reference to American scientists like Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner, 
Almeida mocked the “body of ecologists who have been free to escalate their threats 
and adopt an apocalyptic approach to public opinion.” In light of the no-growth 
rhetoric then popular in the U.S. media, Almeida described American environmental 
inclinations as “anti-developmental” and accused the UN delegation of the United 
States of formulating a “grandiose master plan” of legal conventions to impose 
severe constraints on growth. Unlike American over-dramatizations, Almeida 
                                                                                                                                     
circulated to the Third Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development as Document 
TD/143 (November 12 1971), 30-31. 
392 Almeida quotations cited in Jacob Darwin Hamblin, “Environmentalism for the Atlantic 
Alliance: NATO’s Experiment with the ‘Committee of Modern Society,” Environmental History 15 
(January 2010), 54-75, here 68-69. 
  271 
boasted that Brazil’s approach utilized “a little bit of good old common sense.” 
Almeida hoped other nations, especially the United States, might do the same.393 
For Daniel Patrick Moynihan—an American academic, public intellectual, 
and occasional diplomat—Almeida had gone too far. For the past two years, 
Moynihan had consulted the Nixon administration on international environmental 
matters, and at the time, he represented the United States in the final UN General 
Assembly debate on the upcoming UNCHE. Moynihan assured the General 
Assembly the United States was not “sponsoring an anti-development conference,” 
and it had no intention, implicitly or explicitly, to place a ceiling on LDC 
development. But, Moynihan also moralized how “neglecting environmental 
problems can prove to be most costly in the longer run, but the poor developing 
countries can least afford greater cost.” Moynihan next spoke directly to Almeida. 
The American diplomat berated Brazil for its disrespect of the American delegation 
and its scientists. Moynihan celebrated the contributions of MIT scientists, naming 
Carroll Wilson, who, Moynihan said reminded, had contributed to the UNCHE with 
his reports on the SCEP and SMIC. Finally, Moynihan chastised Brazil for its 
dangerous delusions about real international environmental challenges. Moynihan 
even quoted Richard Hofstadter to describe the LDCs’ paranoid style. “There are 
limits to the degree to which such a [paranoid] style should be indulged,” Moynihan 
concluded, “and just as surely there are limits to the good nature with which it will 
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be endured.” Instead of tolerating such paranoia, Moynihan said before sitting down, 
he hoped the UN General Assembly could proceed with more relevant and mature 
matters.394 
Almeida refused to give the Americans the last word and delivered his reply 
on December 2, 1971. Clearly irked, Almeida spoke for nearly an hour, delivering a 
twenty-three-page treatise to rally LDCs in support of sustained development. “Part 
of our task,” Almeida made clear, “is exactly to focus the attention of the great 
developed Powers upon essential aspects of the environment problem and to try to 
obtain their support for our own priority for the developmental drive in the next 
decade.” While the industrialized nations’ intentions for environmental protection 
may be valid, their Whole-Earth vision remained myopic. The “very serious 
problem” that rich nations suffered from, Almeida explained, was not seeing “the 
collateral consequences” of their environmental actions. Such blindness, Almeida 
claimed, had misguided UNCHE planning. Those misguided actions required 
“necessary changes,” Almeida said, in the direction of development and away from 
the environmental limits advocated by groups like the Club of Rome.395 
Since Moynihan had made special mention of MIT scientists, Almeida also 
felt it necessary to highlight for the UN the apparently intimate “symbiosis” between 
MIT and the Club of Rome. Almeida explained how MIT’s Systems Dynamics 
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group, particularly Jay Forrester and Forrester’s former graduate student Dennis 
Meadows, were colluding with the Club of Rome. For its part, Almeida noted, the 
Club boasted its close contact with “key people in Ottawa, Moscow, Washington, 
Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Stockholm, Bern, Vienna and other capitals.” Members of the 
Club had even attended the UNCHE third regional seminar in Mexico City, Almeida 
recalled, where it sought to “monopolize discussions and condemn Brazil.” But 
what, exactly, were the Club and its MIT scientists advocating?396 
With increasing agitation, Almeida distributed throughout the UN General 
Assembly a collection of documents prepared, he said, by this “symbiotic group of 
Romans and MIT researchers.” The first documents, he claimed, had been used in 
high-level meetings with Canadian officials. Quoting at length, Almeida read the 
Club’s own words that, “the overwhelming task for the Club of Rome is to identify 
and implement that set of policies which will permit us to negotiate an orderly 
transition to equilibrium.” Quoting from another document, this one published by 
Club founder Aurelio Peccei, Almeida highlighted the Club’s stated proposition “to 
negotiate a deliberate transition from world-wide growth to global dynamic 
equilibrium.” For Almeida, it was too much. “How can this desideratum be 
simultaneous with the U.N. Second Decade?,” Almeida exclaimed. “Why are [the 
Club of Rome’s] members being seen as very active [and] specially invited guests at 
international meetings? Why is public opinion being flooded with their side of the 
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truth on environment? Why are their works and members being frequently seen in 
National Academies of Sciences?”397 
Almeida accused the Club and Moynihan’s MIT scientists of seeking to 
implement the international control over resource use, but even worse, he saw 
indications for similar control in the UNCHE planning documents. First, the 
American government, on the directives of President Nixon, continued promoting 
the creation of a World Heritage Trust to supposedly “save for future generations the 
most outstanding natural areas.” Was it a coincidence, Almeida wondered, that under 
the heading of “The Planning of Natural Resources,” that UNCHE planning 
documents indicated “the need for a world inventory of natural environmental 
resources,” and that such information was listed as “essential for control at the 
international level?” This was not paranoia, Almeida retorted to Moynihan. Brazil 
simply felt forced to fight what Almeida called “the apocalyptic approach that has 
colored Stockholm so strongly from the first days.” Brazil’s efforts, he continued, 
were aimed “at what seemed us to be a mounting pressure to impose on the world 
community legally binding instruments which might suit the interests of a few, but 
which in fact marginalize developmental and other priorities of the developing 
countries.” The environmental moment, Almeida declared, would not be an excuse 
for neocolonial control of LDC growth. If there was to be a revolution, Brazil 
ensured it would be developmental, not environmental.  
As part of his efforts to ensure that legally binding instruments would not 
occur at the UNCHE, Almeida then introduced to the UN General Assembly a 
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resolution titled “Development and Environment,” already sponsored by thirty-three 
other nations. Almeida described the resolution as a “preventative action.”  It 
indicated, he said, “the only possible perspective in which the developing countries 
are prepared to accept the exercise to be undertaken at Stockholm.”398 For Brazil and 
its LDC supporters, the resolution codified their starting point for international 
environmental policymaking—a point from which future negotiations from then to 
now have yet to move beyond. 
The “Development and Environment” resolution reiterated ideas Almeida 
and other Brazilian foreign ministers had championed since the recent environmental 
revolution dawned in industrialized nations. The resolution re-defined what once 
might have been possible at the UNCHE. In particular, it addressed the potential of 
legally binding international instruments at the UNCHE by ensuring that “minimal 
standards of preservation of the environment” could only be defined and controlled 
at the national level. And it prescribed the conference’s ability to enact any 
environmental policies that might threaten national sovereignty over natural 
resources. It laid clear blame on wealthy nations for causing environmental problems 
with their “improperly planned and inadequately coordinated industrial activities,” 
and it determined “therefore the main responsibility for the financing of corrective 
measures falls upon those countries.”  As for LDCs, their priorities remained 
“integrated and rational” industrial growth, not the unplanned, polluting activities of 
the North. “Such [rational] development,” the resolution explained, “represents at the 
present stage the best possible solution for most environmental problems in the 
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developing countries.”399 Development, for LDCs, offered the solution to any 
possible problem, apparently even problems that some styles of development caused. 
The resolution also reiterated Brazil’s continued call for additionality, noting 
the “need for developed countries to provide additional technical assistance and 
financing,” beyond the Second UN Development Decade targets, “and without 
affecting adversely their programs of assistance in other spheres.” Toward those 
ends, the resolution requested Secretary-General Strong prepare a scheme for a 
special fund of voluntary contributions to provide the additional funding for LDCs. 
Finally, it stressed that the UNCHE Declaration and Action Plan “must … recognize 
that no environmental policy should adversely affect the present or future 
development possibilities of the developing countries.”400 In short, the resolution 
ensured that the UN General Assembly would not accept any environmental policies 
that did not focus primarily on the predominance of economic development.  
Within weeks, before the end of December 1971, the “Development and 
Environment” proposal became official Resolution 2849 of the twenty-sixth UN 
General Assembly—its definitive statement before the UNCHE occurred, setting 
both the tone and boundaries of the conference. During voting in the General 
Assembly, the resolution found support from an overwhelming majority of eighty-
five LDCs. While several industrialized nations abstained, only two voted against it: 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Despite widespread public concern in the 
industrialized North about humanity’s survival aboard Spaceship Earth and dire 
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predictions of environmental catastrophe from growing populations and polluting 
industrial technologies, Brazil ensured that, within the United Nations, development 
would become forever inseparable from the environment. Here, as a result of 
Brazil’s continued advocacy, lay the roots of an institutionalized policy for the UN’s 
future agenda of sustainable development. At the end of 1971, however, Brazil and 
its LDC allies ensured that the international focus remained not on sustainable but on 
sustained development.  
The UNCHE’s contested path toward Stockholm ran through Founex and the 
UN resolution on “Development and Environment,” and once through, the 
conference carried those burdens into its final planning sessions. Given Maurice 
Strong’s format where “the process is the policy,” that meant the determinations of 
those planning documents would be embedded as the heart of the UNCHE itself.  
LDC dominance of the UNCHE planning process continued in the months leading 
up to the actual conference in Stockholm. Brazil and other LDCs, especially those 
from Africa, maintained their rhetoric against environmental restraints to 
development, particularly in the face of growing popular unrest about the ecological 
limits of industrial growth.  
 
Doom Still Ahead, but Development Still Enshrined 
At the start of 1972, with the UNCHE scheduled to begin that summer, 
debates over the role of growth in planetary survival were further enflamed by the 
worldwide popularity of two “doomsday” publications: The Ecologist magazine’s A 
Blueprint for Survival, and the official release of another Club of Rome report titled, 
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Limits to Growth. The Club of Rome and Jay Forrester’s World Dynamics inspired A 
Blueprint for Survival, which was published by Edward Goldsmith and his British 
editors of The Ecologist magazine in January 1972. Its opening sentence declared, 
“The principle defect of the industrial way of life is that it is not sustainable.” It 
claimed that “termination” of industrial development and growth, within the next 
eighty to one hundred years, was “inevitable” if human survival should continue. In 
addition to persuading “governments, industrial leaders, and trade unions throughout 
the world to face these facts and to take appropriate action while there is still time,” 
the authors of Blueprint hoped to inspire “national movements to act at national 
levels, and if need be to assume political status and contest elections.” Its radical 
proposals to create a “society that is sustainable” included global freezing of 
industrial growth, voluntary stabilization of population growth, and decentralized 
social and economic practices.401 
A Blueprint for Survival quickly generated heated debate. Thirty-three 
prominent scientists endorsed the report, including longtime environmentalist Sir 
Julian Huxley. Coverage in The Times of London returned another letter of general 
support from 187 other scientists, while the New York Times write-up on Blueprint 
stirred a spate of favorable letters to the editor. Yet, in a long editorial in the 
influential British science journal Nature, editor John Maddox chastised both the 
Blueprint and its scientist supporters, who he scolded “should have known better.”402 
Sick of apocalyptic environmentalism, Maddox eventually produced a book-length 
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critique against what he titled The Doomsday Syndrome. In addition to deriding 
much of the science behind apocalyptic environmental visions, Maddox argued that 
overblown fear mongering would ultimately backlash against the environmental 
movement.403 Perhaps intrigued by such critiques, the popularity of Blueprint in the 
January 1972 edition of The Ecologist inspired “teach-ins for survival” at British 
campuses, featuring debates with British MPs. After selling 100,000 copies in a few 
months, it was quickly published as a book, both in Europe and the United States, 
with an introduction to the U.S. edition by Paul Ehrlich.404 That spring, mass media 
attention to the challenges of growth escalated further with publication of the Club of 
Rome’s Limits to Growth report, which MIT’s Systems Dynamics group based 
directly on Jay Forrester’s earlier work in World Dynamics. 
After completing work on WORLD2 and publishing World Dynamics, 
Forrester moved on to other projects, although he continued as a consultant to the 
Systems Dynamics Group at MIT. Two of Forrester’s former students, Dennis and 
Donella Meadows, who had recently married, led that group at MIT and added layers 
of complexity to Forrester’s original models. Throughout 1971 and early 1972, 
Dennis and Donella Meadows’s team further refined and produced another global 
computer simulation called WORLD3.405 As part of the Club of Rome’s Project on 
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the Predicament of Mankind, Donella Meadows drafted their findings and 
eventually, in March 1972, published it for general readership as The Limits to 
Growth.406  
In March 1972, at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., the Club 
of Rome unveiled to massive media fan-fare its Limits to Growth report, which 
summarized for a popular audience the ideas in World Dynamics.407 The 
distinguished invited audience at the Smithsonian included U.S. senators and 
representatives, ambassadors, business leaders, heads of government agencies, and 
fleets of reporters who further spread the Club of Rome’s message. Like Forrester’s 
technical book, the computer-aided analyses of interdependent global systems in The 
Limits to Growth warned that continued trends for exponential economic, industrial, 
and human population growth would inevitably produce catastrophic global die-off 
and worldwide environmental disruption. 
 The official release of The Limits to Growth stirred a hornet’s nest of new 
agitation about economic growth. While some economists earlier embraced 
Forrester’s similar claims, because of its wider appeal, The Limits to Growth 
immediately garnered pungent critiques from economists and other social scientists. 
Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal declared, “I think it is nonsense to talk in global 
terms about limits to growth with American use thirty times as much of the natural 
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resources as poor countries. We must look at redistribution.” The economics editor 
of the London Times lambasted the advocated against growth as “schoolboy howlers 
of logic and fact cloaked in portentous, but specious, computerized models.”408 
Nonetheless, The Limits to Growth appeared in thirty languages, sold four million 
copies, and became an international best seller with extensive media coverage. Time 
magazine’s asked of the report, “Is the Worst Yet to Be?” While the Washington 
Post warned that The Limits to Growth report “has already made the coming 
planetary conference on the human environment in Stockholm look hopelessly old 
fashioned.”409 Though both the Limits and Blueprint publications came from mostly 
Northern and Western supporters, each had global intentions with significant 
audiences of influence, and both directed their messages toward the upcoming 
UNCHE. 
Despite international debates about economic growth amid the global 
environmental crisis becoming increasingly mainstream, Brazilian and LDC-
influence over the UNCHE planning process ensured that the UN would not be the 
forum for hosting such debates. American intelligence reports revealed the on-going 
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challenge from Brazil and other LDCs. The same week the Smithsonian hosted the 
coming-out party for Limits, a U.S. intelligence report described Brazil’s beliefs 
about environmental issues, titled “Brazil: If Development Brings Pollution, So Be 
It.” It told U.S. policy-makers how “Brazil’s official policy, reflected in preliminary 
discussions, places developmental goals above pollution control and seeks to force 
the developed countries to assume responsibility for controlling pollution.” And it 
confirmed that “those who make policy, such as President Medici, the Foreign 
Office, and powerful Minister of Finance Delfim Netto, are in close agreement and 
claim international standards will be used to keep the developing nations 
dependent.”410 That issue of international standards and the passage of conventions 
in Stockholm remained the final challenge for Brazil to knock down. It sought to do 
so at the UNCHE’s fourth and final meeting of the twenty-seven-nation Preparatory 
Committee, scheduled from March 6-10, 1972, in New York. 
 
A Soviet Surprise and Final Pre-UNCHE Preparations 
 Between December 1971 and the Preparatory Committee meeting in March 
1972, Strong and his Secretariat again traveled the globe for private meetings with 
various governments to settle differences that might impede their conference 
participation or stymie completion of remaining business for the fourth and final 
Preparatory Committee meeting. One difference left unresolved, however, was the 
exclusion of East Germany from the UNCHE, which prompted the withdrawal of the 
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Soviet Union and most of its Eastern-European allies from the UNCHE. The Soviets 
were protesting the UN General Assembly decision in December 1971 to uphold the 
Vienna formula, which would limit attendance at Stockholm to only those nations 
that were either members of the UN or to one or more of its specialized agencies.411 
Such restrictions for participating at UN events were traditional protocols at the UN, 
nearly as old as the UN itself.  However, the proposal of this General Assembly 
motion by Great Britain and the United States added to its distinct Cold War drama. 
With regard to Germany, it meant that West Germany, as a member of UNESCO 
and the World Health Organization, could attend the Stockholm Conference. 
However, East Germany, which was not a member of any UN organization, could 
not attend.412 Strong’s negotiations to find a compromise failed to produce any 
result. 
The growth of LDC concerns regarding development and environment had 
put the Soviet Union in a bind. If the Soviets continued to move forward in 
promotion of international environmentalism, as it had done in conference 
preparations up to this point and as part of the processes of détente with the United 
States, than LDCs might perceive the Soviet Union as another imperialistic Northern 
power seeking to impose economic restrictions on LDCs in the name of the 
environment. The Soviet Union was, after all, quite industrialized with self-identified 
roots in the Western world. In an effort to untangle itself from such dilemmas, the 
Soviets relied on the not-quite dead horse of the status of East Germany to announce 
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its withdrawal from final Preparatory Committee meeting in March. The USSR also 
declared its intention to boycott the UNCHE altogether.413 The Soviet Union would 
deny the Stockholm Conference the important presence of European communist 
nations in order to protect its socialist credibility and ensure a positive image among 
Third World nations. 
West and East Germany’s ongoing Ostpolitik provide an ironic background 
to this dilemma for the UNCHE. Essentially, Ostpolitik enabled détente between 
western and eastern Europe. Ostpolitik, conceived and lead by West German 
chancellor Willy Brant, signified the normalization of relations and the careful 
control of people, goods, and ideas between West Germany and the eastern bloc, 
including East Germany.414In the months preceding the UNCHE, negotiations 
ensued to secure a solution to East Germany’s hopeful participation at Stockholm, 
and thereby allow the Soviets and other eastern bloc nations to also attend. However, 
Brant felt pressure to keep East Germany out of the UNCHE in order to appease 
West German’s anti-Soviet hardliners. Those hardliners threatened Brant’s control of 
a fragile West German government coalition of social democratic-liberals, which 
Brant needed to secure his Ostpolitik policies.415 
In May 1972, after years of difficult negotiations, Brant narrowly survived a 
vote of confidence and squeezed the approval of opening relations with East 
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Germany through the West German parliament. Brant’s success had the short term 
impact of keeping East Germany, and therefore the rest of the Soviet bloc including 
the USSR, away from Stockholm; yet, it helped Brant move closer to achieving his 
long-term goal of eventually opening relations with East Germany after thirty years 
of isolation and tension.  Ironically, on June 4, 1972, the same week the UNCHE 
opened in Stockholm, newscasts announced the signing of a British-French-
American-Soviet accord to officially normalize Ostpolitik, which later resulted in the 
Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in December 1972, as well as the 
SALT II nuclear arms control agreement signed earlier in May 1972, just before the 
UNCHE. The Basic Treaty in Germany finally paved the way for East Germany’s 
eventual entry into the UN simultaneously with West Germany.  In the end, Poland 
arrived at the Stockholm Conference, yet the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia, and, of course, East Germany did not.416 The absence of the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European communist nations from the final UNCHE 
planning session and the actual conference lent further drama and awareness of the 
new state of international politics. If it had not already, the UNCHE exemplified a 
shift in global conflict from its recent East-West axis to a clear North-South 
confrontation.  
Despite the Soviets’ self-removal from the UNCHE planning process, the 
fourth and final UNCHE Preparatory Committee in New York proceeded. Having 
secured the resolution on “Development and Environment,” which ensured an overt 
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focus on LDC growth, the Preparatory Committee noted with satisfaction the “ever-
increasing involvement of developing countries in the Conference process.”417 Two 
of the key remaining issues for the March meeting included the status of Draft 
Declaration on the Human Environment and the possibility of submitting five 
conventions that Strong hoped to have ready for signature in Stockholm as a 
reflection of its orientation toward action. The proposed conventions included 
control over the export, import, and transit of endangered species; the conservation 
of wetland of international importance; the conservation of certain island for science; 
the conservation of world heritage; and an ocean dumping convention. 
However, according to an observer who attended the fourth meeting on 
behalf of the World Bank, “Brazil again questioned the wisdom of and propriety of 
hastening to prepare conventions for signature at Stockholm.”418 The report from the 
meeting noted that, along with Brazil, several LDCs “felt that the adoption of 
conventions by the Conference was not essential to its success and indeed might 
endanger the consensus which it was hoped to achieve on all the substantive issues 
before the Conference.”419 Since none of the draft conventions expected to be ready 
by the UNCHE in June, rather than rush their delicate crafting, Brazil and other 
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LDCs successfully deflected their introduction to the UNCHE. Global environmental 
conventions simply would not appear in Stockholm.420 
 With that, only the draft of the Declaration on the Human Environment 
remained for debate at the final Preparatory Committee gathering. Early drafts of the 
UNCHE Declaration spurred the Washington Post’s disappointing report that 
Stockholm would see “no sacrifice of sovereignty, no worldwide codes or 
injunctions … in a word, no commitments.” Instead, it anticipated correctly that “the 
Stockholm Conference will be largely hortatory.” Maurice Strong had hoped the 
Declaration would become an inspirational document akin to the Declaration of 
Human Rights, but in subcommittee debates, lofty rhetoric on global environmental 
aspirations created little consensus. Instead, the Declaration reflected what the 
Washington Post described as “the deadening compromises made to satisfy some 
130 widely disparate governments.”421 
At the final Preparatory Committee meeting, the working group on the Draft 
Declaration debated more than sixteen versions of revisions. Brazil again led a 
contingent of LDCs, including Costa Rica, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Zambia to 
demand that meeting the environmental responsibilities of the global community 
required meeting its economic consequences with additional financial assistance. 
Toward that end, and in effort to display its leadership in international environmental 
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affairs, particularly with the absence of the Soviets, the U.S. delegation submitted a 
separate draft resolution for a voluntary fund creating specifically for environmental 
aid. It proposed a five-year target of $100 million, of which the United States would 
contribute $40 million on a matching basis. While far below the target recommended 
by the Secretariat, the funding resolution moved to the UNCHE for final passage. 
Eventually, the Preparatory Committee agreed upon a delicate draft preamble 
and several principles for its draft declaration. Many of Brazil’s theses on the 
international environment permeated both the UNCHE’s Draft Declaration and its 
proposed Action Plan of recommendations. Yet total agreement on the Declaration 
remained very fragile. Few nations liked the Draft Declaration but in hopes of 
making the UNCHE a symbolic success in terms of global cooperation, the draft 
moved to the UNCHE for its hopeful approval there.422 According to a retrospective 
by the International Institute for Environment and Development, published ten years 
after the UNCHE, Brazil’s triumph in securing development as the essential 
component for the conference meant that “developing countries joined the 
Stockholm conference in 1972 with their suspicions allayed but not removed.” 
Allaying LDC concerns enabled their participation in the UNCHE planning and their 
attendance in Stockholm; but, the fact that their concerns were not removed meant 
that many of Stockholm’s recommendations became watered down compromises.423  
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In March and April, Maurice Strong released to the general public the Draft 
Declaration and the Action Plan for the Human Environment, with its vague 
assortment of recommendations for nations to agree upon and enact after meeting in 
Stockholm. Neither document offered requirements for formal commitments, and the 
hundred-plus Action Plan recommendations rambled over a disparate array of issues, 
from atmospheric pollution to technology transfer to the environmental impact on 
trade relations. The recommendations focused mostly on environmental assessment 
and national management, without clear guidance for resolving the social or 
economic roots of the global environmental crisis. That these or any 
recommendations emerged from the tense UNCHE preparatory process was a feat in 
itself, even they lacked clarity and concrete direction. 
In making public the details of the UNCHE’s two-year planning process, 
Strong made the best of the preparatory dialogs by promoting further attention to the 
UNCHE itself. He declared that, through the UNCHE planning, environmental 
issues had finally come to be seen globally as some of “the most pervasive, 
profound, and revolutionary issues that man has ever faced.” The ongoing 
environmental crisis, he continued, “requires us to confront such fundamental issues 
as the possible limitations to growth, the purposes of growth, the control of 
technology, the utilization of the world’s resources and distribution of its 
opportunities.”424 His words seemed tailored to nations in the North, who had first 
called for this world conference. 
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Not wanting to scare LDCs with his reference on the limits to growth, Strong 
also emphasized the “special importance” and “the compelling new imperative” that 
international environmental concerns provide to “the priority task of accelerating the 
development of the majority of mankind whose principle environmental concerns 
derive from their very poverty and underdevelopment.” Nonetheless, the UN Press 
Release called for nations to embrace a “significant redirection of its industrial and 
scientific capabilities” and that the “ultimate goal must be to achieve a dynamic 
equilibrium between man and the natural environment.”425 This rhetoric, which 
combined equilibrium and limits with appeals for accelerating development, came 
off as Orwellian double-speak, even as it sought to appease and popularize the 
UNCHE in both the industrialized North and in the LDCs. The global environmental 
moment produced the rhetoric on which efforts to synthesize global growth with 
global environmental protection proceeded. Yet, the moment also saw weak 
institutionalization of actions to accomplish such a synthesis. 
Even if the UNCHE planning process had completed its final work before the 
conference commenced in June 1972, debate and concern over the conflicting issues 
of development and environment continued around the world. In the weeks leading 
up to the UNCHE, the growing popularity of ideas for limiting industrial growth 
amid environmental crisis inspired African nations to voice their continued 
suspicions. At a meeting in Dakar in April 1972, experts with the Organization for 
                                                                                                                                     
Release HE/ 102, April 21, 1972, in Folder 6210, Box 1021, RG 3.1 Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. 
425 “Global Environmental Action Plan Proposed for Stockholm Conference: Reports and Action 
Recommendations Culminating Two-Year Effort Made Public at UN Headquarters,” UN Press 
  291 
African Unity (OAU) produced a statement declaring that the UNCHE documents 
still did not give enough serious attention to the needs and preoccupations of the 
LDCs. They explicitly rejected the “false dilemma” of a choice between “no growth” 
as suggested in the Club of Rome, or “ruinous continuation of the present 
exploitation of natural resources.” The OAU experts even moved beyond Brazil’s 
calls for additionality to assert the “right to reparations” for prior colonial 
exploitation as well as present exploitation of African resources by foreign powers. 
At the same time, the experts at Dakar recognized the environmental need to alter 
traditional methods of development. To avoid the prior ruinous exploitation of 
African resources, the experts insisted on “reappraising all methods and models 
imposed from abroad.” The Dakar group saw no conflict between development and 
environment, provided development fell “within the framework of a model 
specifically designed to serve the interests of Africa's population.” In light of the 
African statement, the Washington Post reported that, “the world’s rich and poor 
countries are evidently going to be hopelessly at odds in Stockholm. … [T]he poor 
ones especially seem more suspicious and mutinous than ever.”426 
Brazil, having successfully incorporated its arguments on development as a 
central component in the documents that emerged from the UNCHE planning 
machinery, and having inspired other LDCs in Africa and elsewhere on the 
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importance of their arguments, next spread their message beyond the UN. That 
spring, Brazil’s recently appointed ambassador to the United States, João Augusto de 
Araújo Castro, worked to insert the priority of development into the academic global 
environmental discourse. For Araújo Castro, the obvious specters of World 
Dynamics and The Limits to Growth hung ominously. Speaking for Brazil and on 
behalf of the world’s LDCs, Castro argued in the spring issue of Cambridge 
University’s International Organization journal that the “developing countries, while 
rejecting the implementation of any ecological policy which bears in itself elements 
of socioeconomic stagnation, could only share a common responsibility for the 
preservation of the environment if it was accompanied and paralleled by a 
corresponding common responsibility for development.” Each country, he explained, 
“must evolve its own development plans, exploit its own resources as it thinks 
suitable, and define its own environmental standards.” Any notion of having those 
priorities or standards imposed on nations or groups of nations was unacceptable. 
“Ecological policies,” he declared, “should rather be inserted into the framework of 
national development.”427 It was on that framework, and on that framework alone, on 
which LDCs like Brazil agreed to build the foundations of international 
environmental policy in Stockholm. 
*** 
After years of advocacy, Brazil and other LDCs had successfully established 
the boundaries of the UNCHE around their priority of development, even as events 
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outside the UN encouraged continued questioning on the role of economic growth. 
Brazil’s message to synthesize development with environment was clear. Yet, in 
their UN speeches, in the Founex report, in the UN resolutions they inspired, and 
even in the recent statement by African experts, no clear description appeared for 
how to combine continued economic development with environmental protection. 
Instead, LDCs during the UNCHE planning process expressed their belief that 
development and environment could be combined in a way to optimize both 
ecological and economic systems. LDCs’ demands that development become the 
central component of environmental planning seemed to envision the achievement of 
industrialization without side-effects, but no one ever explained how this idealized 
alteration to development would occur. Without a clear conception for how to 
combine a sustainable environment with sustained development, expressions that no 
conflict existed between development and environment remained pure statements of 
faith.428 And it was under the rubric of this faith that 114 members of the UN would 
meet in Stockholm to address the future of the Human Environment. 
Despite the UNCHE’s inability to question the role of economic development 
as part of global environmental policymaking, Chapter 6 shows how the actual 
events that occurred in Stockholm during the UNCHE’s ten days of meetings 
included some surprises and unexpected conflicts. Similar conflicts unfold in 
Chapters 7 and 8, which expand back in time and place to explore the developments 
leading to two alternative conferences in Stockholm, as well as what occurred at 
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Stockholm in the summer of 1972. The remaining chapters thus analyze how the 
global environmental moment climaxed in Stockholm, where national governments, 
non-governmental environmental actors, and leading environmental scientists all met 
in hopes of saving Spaceship Earth from destruction, while also seeking to serve 
their own individual political aims.  
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Chapter 6 
 
A HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: 
How Nations United in Stockholm  
 
 
“Stockholm is a battlefield of conflicting reports, recommendations and 
manifestos. … The most basic dispute at Stockholm, however, involves 
money.” 
— “Woodstockholm,” Time, June 19, 1972. 
 
“A country that has not yet achieved a minimum standard of living is not in 
a position to spend its valuable resources protecting the environment.” 
— General Jose da Costa Cavalcanti, Brazil’s Minister of the Interior, 
plenary speech at UN Stockholm Conference, June 1972 
 
 
After several decades of conceptual and scientific framing for “seeing” the 
global systems of Spaceship Earth and recognizing environmental threats to those 
planetary systems, and after several years of intense planning processes within the 
United Nations (UN), the environmental circus in Stockholm finally commenced in 
the summer of 1972. As Maurice Strong’s senior information advisor Peter Stone 
described it, Stockholm proceeded like a giant circus within a set of inner rings and 
outer rings. Britain’s Stanley Johnson described Stockholm as “a gigantic ritual, a 
three-ring circus played out in the three conference sites.”429 The remaining chapters 
describe the events and conflicts that occurred in Stockholm during its 
environmental circus, in both its inner and outer rings. The last two chapters, 
Chapters 7 and 8, step back in time to explore events that produced to two alternative 
gatherings in Stockholm, as well as proceeding to address the events that actually 
occurred in those outer rings at Stockholm. However, this chapter details and 
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analyses events at the center attraction of Stockholm’s environmental circus—the 
main event of its inner ring—the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE).  
From June 5 to 16, 1972, during the UNCHE, some 1,200 delegates from the 
governments of 114 nations, nineteen intergovernmental agencies, and over 400 
officially UN-recognized non-governmental organizations met in Stockholm, 
Sweden to discuss for the first time at a UN intergovernmental forum how the world 
community should take its first steps toward corrective action against problems of 
the global environment. The optimists promoting the UNCHE hoped that the shared 
environmental threats facing the world’s nations might provide a common bond by 
which sovereign nations might subordinate some of their individual interests to the 
global cause of environmental survival.430 The end of the UNCHE would realize 
those hopes for global environmental unity, but only on the surface. Instead, self-
interested political conflict permeated Stockholm’s inner ring, but it did so in ways 
not entirely expected by nations like the United States and Brazil who had worked 
hard before the UNCHE to shape what would occur there. 
Despite Stockholm’s surprises and, ultimately, what I describe here as its 
failures to move beyond rhetoric and toward actual action on global environmental 
problems, the UNCHE remains celebrated as a success in much academic literature. 
Political scientists interested in the international realm of environmental protection 
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and politics typically hail the UNCHE as a seminal event and a resounding success. 
Political scientist Caroline Thomas championed the Stockholm Conference as “a 
milestone in the recognition of environmental issues in international relations,” while 
fellow political scientist Marvin S. Soroos christened it a “major landmark” in the 
history of building global environmental institutions. In his memoirs, Maurice 
Strong also praised it as “a major landmark launching a new era of international 
environmental diplomacy.” Political scientist John McCormick named the UNCHE 
“the single most influential event in the evolution of the global environmental 
movement, and of a global environmental consciousness.”431 
As evidence, these scholars celebrate the UNCHE for adopting a Declaration 
on the Human Environment, consisting of a preamble and twenty-six principles that 
aimed to provide “a common outlook … to inspire and guide the peoples of the 
world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment.”432 The 
numerous nations at the Conference also agreed upon 109 separate recommendations 
in an Action Plan intended as a blueprint for launching a coordinated international 
attack on environmental challenges and a baseline for future environmental 
agreements. The plan included creation of a new global environmental monitoring 
system called Earthwatch to assess the condition of the global environment, evaluate 
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data, and exchange information. In answer to additionality, the UNCHE secured the 
inception of a special Environment Fund, proposed under U.S. initiative and 
intended to reach $100 million over the ensuing five years, to cover Earthwatch’s 
operational costs. However, one observer wondered what practical effect Earthwatch 
would have. “The image that comes to mind is of a man who is given a thermometer 
and a fever chart to see him through a serious illness.”433 
Yet the UNCHE’s most conspicuous accomplishment was instituting a 
permanent UN-based environmental secretariat and Governing Council for 
Environmental Programs with a rotating committee originally of forty-eight (later 
expanded to fifty-eight) nations. A year after the UNCHE concluded, this council 
became the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Despite protests by 
existing UN organizations, UNEP established an entirely new intergovernmental 
body within the UN to coordinate international environmental activities.434 Political 
scientists often commemorate UNEP for launching an institutional approach to 
common international environmental problems and celebrate the UNCHE as a 
seminal first step toward solving those problems. 
Viewed through a different lens, however, the UNCHE can be seen equally 
as a limitation on international environmental action, as a means of closing options 
and of institutionalizing creative thought for solving global environmental challenges 
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within the bounded structures of the UN. In one of the few critical analyses of the 
UNCHE, political scientist Lee-Anne Broadhed argued that “what happened in 
Stockholm was the start of the absorption of critical thinking that was attempting to 
call into question the basic assumptions of modernity that can be seen as the root of 
the problem.”435 Among the reasons why most political scientists celebrate the 
UNCHE’s accomplishments on paper, rather than recognize its constrictions, is their 
lack of focus on the details of the UNCHE. 
They tend to overlook the UNCHE’s challenging preparatory process in 
which LDCs, with Brazilian leadership, captured and re-oriented the conference’s 
agenda against international standards, away from global conventions, and as a 
means to promote their own development. They also tend to overlook the rhetoric 
and events of the Conference itself, including the details of the UNCHE’s final 
agreements. Such a detailed focus, however, reveals on-going conflict over the 
issues of growth while also highlighting the ultimate triumph by an assortment of 
LDCs in securing their development-focused rhetoric in the UNCHE documents and 
in the location of the UN’s ensuing environmental institutions. Securing LDC 
rhetoric in the UNCHE documents, however, was not the same thing as securing 
their development demands in reality. As a result, the success and legacy of the 
UNCHE remains mixed at best and, at worse, an utter failure in terms of the existing 
inability for unified action on global environmental protection today. 
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Commencing the UNCHE, Still Debating Growth 
 The UNCHE proceeded in stages at various locations. The center of attention 
and the greatest publicity centered on the conference plenary sessions, which all 
delegates attended and where each nation delivered their government’s statement on 
global environmental issues. The Plenary also heard from special invited guests, 
ranging from leading NGOs on environmental issues and key figures like Barbara 
Ward, to awkward environmental groups like the Boy Scouts and the pacifist 
International Fellowship of Reconciliation.436 Additional work toward the Action 
Plan in the UNCHE’s major agenda issues—human settlements; natural resources 
management; control of international pollution; educational, information, and socio-
cultural aspects of the environment; international organizational implications; and 
development and environment—occurred in separate committees beyond the main 
plenary hall. The committees witnessed bland re-wording of Action Plan 
recommendations while the plenary hosted the UNCHE’s most memorable speeches.  
Strong opened the UNCHE on June 5, 1972with a plenary speech that carved 
middle ground between the conference’s underlying North-South tensions. Strong 
outlined the purpose of the UNCHE as seeking “to reconcile man’s legitimate, 
immediate ambitions with the rights of others, with respect for all life supporting 
systems, and with the rights of generations yet unborn.” On behalf of all of 
Spaceship Earth’s passengers, he expressed a wish “to advance—not recklessly, 
ignorantly, selfishly and perilously, as we have done in the past—but with greater 
understanding, wisdom and vision.  We are anxious and rightly so, to eliminate 
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poverty, hunger, disease, racial prejudice and the glaring economic inequalities 
between human beings.” With the recent publication and global buzz around The 
Limits to Growth report and A Blueprint for Survival, Strong felt pressed to address 
the issue of economic growth head on. Rather than end growth, as suggested by 
some radical environmentalists, Strong suggested reconceptualizing it. One of the 
most promising aspects of the debate on development and environment, he 
proclaimed, was its newly emerging yet still unclear synthesis. “There is still 
unresolved controversy over the concept of growth,” Strong admitted. But he 
definitively stated, “I do not believe we can cease to grow—no growth is not a viable 
alternative.” Development must proceed, but only when considered in dynamic 
harmony with nature. “To achieve this,” Strong stated, “we must control and redirect 
our processes of growth.  We must rethink our concepts of the basic purposes of 
growth.” To do so, he warned, the world’s wealthy nations “will have to make the 
most profound, even revolutionary changes in attitudes and values.”437 Though 
speaking collectively for the world, Strong was not the only citizen from the North in 
a position of power who questioned growth in Stockholm. 
Buichi Oishi, the head of the Japanese delegation and Japan’s Minister of 
State for Environmental Affairs delivered an ominous address on Japan’s industrial 
history and its recent environmental challenges. He explained how “the Japanese 
people, who had thought that greater production and greater GNP are the guidelines 
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for human happiness and had passionately bent their efforts to those objectives, were 
disillusioned and awakened to their mistaken idea.” Instead, he warned, “the 
pollution of the environment has caused a serious hazard to human health and lives.” 
In the wake of their painful experiences with toxic illness and chemical poisons, 
Oishi noted how Japan people’s began asking, “GNP for whom? For what?” As a 
result, he disclosed, “Japan’s politics has been re-oriented from priority on economic 
growth to respect for human life.” Oishi retold the industrial experience of Japan to 
sound a warning for LDCs seeking rampant growth.438 
Sicco Mansholt, the newly elected president of the European Common 
Market Commission, which later evolved into the European Union, shared similar 
concerns. As a Dutch farmer who witnessed the dreadful famine in the wake of 
World War II, Mansholt suggested the reexamination of uncontrolled growth in light 
of his fears about dwindling resources and the potentially violent consequences of 
the growing gap between rich and poor nations. Mansholt told the hundred-plus 
nations at the UNCHE that “we must ask ourselves whether we can continue to 
pursue our economic growth, at least along present lines; … whether our present 
social structure and production processes are still defensible; … whether we in the 
rich countries are willing to face the consequences or will take refuge in a fight 
against symptoms to avoid answering the question.”439 Clearly influenced by 
publications from the Club of Rome, Mansholt suggested a planetary shift from 
growth to equilibrium. 
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However, Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank, suggested 
modifications to growth, not the end of it. McNamara still stressed the 
interdependencies inherent in the symbol of Spaceship Earth. “But what we must not 
forget,” he cautioned, “is that one quarter of the passengers on that ship have 
luxurious first-class accommodations and the remaining three-quarters are traveling 
in steerage.” On behalf of the World Bank, McNamara declared economic growth in 
LDCs as essential to deal with their human problems, including environmental ones, 
and that properly planned growth need not cause unacceptable environmental harm. 
Moreover, he admonished rich nations to assist LDCs in achieving high economic 
growth with low environmental harm through additional, even if minimal, aid.440 
The issue of growth echoed in the halls of the UNCHE plenary, even if the draft text 
of the Declaration and Action plan had been securely formulated in the lengthy 
preparation process. 
As expected, the LDC architect of that planning process, Brazil, delivered a 
plenary speech that also took a clear stance on growth. Brazil’s Minister of the 
Interior, José Costa Cavalcanti, headed his nation’s delegation and spoke before the 
plenary. Rather than address environment protection, Cavalcanti remained focused 
on the imperative of growth. “To combat pollution,” he announced, “is to create 
industries, to create jobs, to combat misery, to favor health, to promote education.” 
As in Maurice Strong’s opening statement, Cavalcanti announced no-growth as not 
an option. “Economic development must be faced in the future,” he stated, “as a 
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conciliation between the necessity of increasing the productivity of man to assure his 
well-being and dignity, and the necessity of reducing to the minimum the predatory 
aspect that progress has assumed in the past.” After all, he continued, “it was 
economic growth that allowed the developed countries to show great progress in 
eliminating mass poverty, ignorance, and disease.” Remaining on key with prior 
Brazilian announcements, Cavalcanti stated that if the rich nations wanted 
environmental protections for themselves and for the world’s majority, those wealthy 
countries should “therefore assume major responsibilities for the necessary 
corrective actions, as well as for making up for what has been damaged.” He 
concluded that “a country that has not yet achieved a minimum standard of living is 
not in a position to spend its valuable resources protecting the environment.” As 
such, Brazil would spend toward its own development, and the wealthy nations 
should help. Brazil had fought hard through two years of UNCHE planning to secure 
the language embodied in the draft Declaration and Action Plan. They worked to 
ensure the UNCHE would enshrine those victories remained as the bedrock of future 
environmental diplomacy.441 
In the plenary, the United States, struck a pragmatic—even conciliatory—
tone. Russell Train of Nixon’s CEQ chaired the large U.S. delegation, with the State 
Department’s Christian A. Herter, Jr. as vice-chair. In the absence of the Soviet 
Union, Train’s straightforward plenary speech noted American global leadership and 
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progress, particularly in their global quest for environmental protection and for a 
better quality of life. Train’s plenary reiterated American commitment on a matching 
basis to an Environment Fund; supported creation of a UN environmental secretariat; 
encouraged a coordinated environmental monitoring network; backed the prevention 
of ocean dumping; and promoted Nixon’s proposal for a World Heritage Trust. He 
also told delegates, “The fact of national sovereignty entails frank recognition that 
many or even most of the crucial environmental actions have to be taken freely by 
governments and by citizens in their own interest as they see it.” Uniform pollution 
standards, he capitulated, were “not practical or appropriate at this time … 
[although] it is important that every effort be made to harmonize differing national 
environmental policies.” Train reiterated American commitment to national 
sovereignty even if it limited the potential of international cooperation, a message 
that seemed to cater to the world majority of LDCs at the UNCHE.442 
While pragmatic in the plenary, however, American delegates appeared 
bullish and intransigent in committee debates, particularly against Action Plan 
recommendations for additional funding of LDCs. Back in Washington, as the 
conference got underway, Henry Kissinger reminded President Nixon of Russell 
Train’s multi-year preparations for the UNCHE and reiterated that the overall U.S. 
objectives for the UNCHE were “to raise the level of national and international 
awareness and understanding of environmental problems and to increase national, 
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regional and global capabilities to recognize and solve problems that seriously 
degrade the environment. “By doing so,” Kissinger’s memo explained, “we will 
maintain and improve our overall international economic, competitive position as 
other countries adopt control measures comparable to our domestic programs.”443 
The United States realized that the UNCHE would set a precedent for international 
environmental politics, and allowing international precedents on additionality would 
complicate achievement of American economic goals. The United States thus sought 
for the UNCHE to raise environmental awareness, but it would give only limited 
additional money in the Environment Fund as a means to secure American economic 
hegemony. 
As a result, during early Conference debates in Stockholm, the United States 
offered amendments to quell each of the four specific Action Plan proposals on 
additionality. One American delegate defended U.S. intransigence by stating, “We 
expect the LDCs to fight tooth and nail to get special treatment and exemption from 
environmental standards.” He continued, “While we really want to go as far as we 
can to be accommodating, we must draw the line. Even if we are dealing simply with 
recommendations here, not formally binding on any government, we cannot accept 
the setting of such precedents for the next round of … negotiations on international 
trade. We simply do not want our hands tied.”444 Toward those ends, on the second 
day of the UNCHE, in the Second Committee on Environment and Development, the 
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U.S. delegation worked especially toward revising the additionality principle in 
recommendation 103, which stated “that where environmental concerns lead to 
restrictions on trade, or to stricter environmental standards with negative effects on 
exports, particularly from developing countries, appropriate measures for 
compensation should be worked out.”445 However, all of the American amendments 
were defeated by majorities of thirty-five or more nations, mostly but not all LDCs. 
Virtually all other nations—including other industrialized aid-giving allies 
like Britain, Italy, West Germany, Canada, and Japan—had endorsed the principle of 
additionality and gone on record as favoring increased international aid to support 
LDCs in accomplishing necessary environmental adjustments. Two U.S. delegates, 
Senators Clairborne Pell and Clifford Case, recalled in their report to the Senate that, 
“unfortunately for the U.S. image, the American delegation was operating under 
strict instructions from the [Nixon] Administration to vote against any proposals that 
would increase aid to the developing nations.” U.S. delegates must oppose any forms 
of additionality beyond their offered contributions to the proposed Environment 
Fund, even though that U.S. offer was paralleled by its freeze in increments for 
funding environmental projects in other UN specialized agencies. Those instructions, 
the Senators claimed, “left the U.S. delegation in singular dissent on a number of 
issues.”446 As a result, the Washington Post, which described U.S. delegates as 
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“harried and weary,” recorded backroom comments by U.S. allies describing 
American positions as “pigheaded,” “stiff-necked,” “mulish,” and “short-sighted.”447 
While most American allies relegated their off-the-record comments to committee 
hallways, other nations proclaimed their displeasure with the United States 
publically. 
 
American Ecocide and China’s Invective 
As the host nation for the UNCHE, Sweden’s Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, 
accepted the early honor of addressing the assembled world representatives in 
Stockholm. As leader of Sweden’s Social Democrat Party, Palme emphasized how 
his government placed “the greatest importance to the stress laid in the Declaration 
upon the need for development.” Palme spoke on the need for greater equality and 
distribution of resources, and he quoted the draft Declaration, which lamented 
continued consumption of immense resources for environmentally damaging 
military armaments rather than ecological restoration. Then, to the surprise of the 
plenary and without overtly naming the United States, Sweden’s head of state openly 
chastised the UN for a glaring absence in the draft Declaration: its avoidance of the 
environmental horrors inflicted by the war in Indochina. “The immense destruction 
brought about by indiscriminate bombing, by large scale use of bulldozers and 
herbicides is an outrage sometimes described as ecocide,” Palme declared. He was 
shocked that only preliminary discussions on this issue had occurred in the UN. “It is 
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of paramount importance,” he concluded, “that ecological warfare cease 
immediately.”448 For several years, Swedish leaders had criticized U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam and American scientists had fought a protracted campaign against the use 
of herbicides, in which they had invented the term “ecocide.”449 But tacit evasion of 
Vietnam had been a precondition for American participation in the UNCHE. Few 
expected such accusations to appear there, and certainly not from the host nation’s 
head of state. 
Russell Train became visibly incensed at Palme’s plenary provocation. U.S. 
delegates nearly walked out, and they received White House instructions to threaten 
as much if criticisms did not subside inside the Conference.450 Things were already 
bad enough outside it. Several hundred environmental activists had descended on 
Stockholm in hopes of participating or protesting the first worldwide environment 
conference, many of whom conflated their environmental activism with their 
opposition to the Vietnam war. The streets of Stockholm were filled with protestors 
just as likely holding signs in Swedish or English that read, “Long Live the Earth,” 
as they did signs announcing, “United States: Stop Polluting Vietnam with Dead 
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Bodies.”451 Palme’s accusation of ecocide inside the Conference shocked the 
American delegation, as did his suggestion to insert such radical language into the 
fragile draft Declaration. 
The following morning, Russell Train called a special news briefing to 
denounce Palme, stating in a bitter tone how “the Prime Minister of Sweden took it 
upon himself to inject a highly emotional issue into the proceedings,” and the United 
States took “strong exception” to both his “charges of ecocidal warfare” and 
“gratuitous politicizing of our environmental discussions.” Train announced, “I am 
personally an environmentalist, not a politician. I wish to see the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment a success. … The injection of a highly charged issue can 
only do a disservice to this objective.”452 Yet Sweden was not the only nation at the 
UNCHE to level overt accusations against the United States. To American dismay, 
so did China. While China and the United States were both pro-growth and recently 
initiated a new détente, China saw the UNCHE as a major opportunity to boost its 
credentials as a radical communist power on a global stage. 
China’s attendance to the UNCHE marked its first appearance in a major UN 
meeting since the creation of the UN more than two decades earlier. For most of 
those years, Taiwan (under its official name as the Republic of China) occupied the 
Chinese spot at the UN and its influential seat in the UN Security Council. However, 
President Nixon’s visit to the mainland People’s Republic of China in February 
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1972, four months before the UNCHE, propelled the People’s Republic back in the 
mainstream international political order. Nixon had announced his planned visit to 
China in July 1971, and by October 1971, the People’s Republic resumed all its legal 
rights in the UN. When new UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim formally invited 
China to the UNCHE, Beijing placed great value on the overture.453 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai considered the UNCHE an opportunity to 
reestablish political and economic ties with the rest of the world, while also 
affirming the superiority of the socialist system for securing environmental 
protection. This opportunity became even greater when the Soviet Union and its 
European allies announced their boycott of the UNCHE over the status of East 
Germany. Zhou ensured a large and diverse Chinese delegation would attend the 
UNCHE, including representatives from various Chinese ministries. Before they 
headed to Stockholm, Zhou told them not to overstate China’s achievement and to 
learn from the experience of the advanced industrial nations; but he also said they 
should voice China’s support for all people harmed by pollution, particularly those in 
the Third World, as part of an “environmental justice movement.”454 The 
environmental moment, it seemed, even briefly influenced China’s leadership. Yet, 
the environmental circus in Stockholm provided too great a geopolitical opportunity 
for China to emphasize the environment. Several observers at the UNCHE 
considered China’s actions in Stockholm “as a bid for leadership of the Third 
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World,” particularly China’s vitriolic attacks against the United States.455 China’s 
first action at the UNCHE, however, was to call into question the prior consensus 
reached on the draft Declaration, in which more than 100 widely disparate nations 
sought agreement on a few general environmental principles. 
On the fourth day of plenary proceedings, Tang Ke, the chairman of the 
Chinese delegation and Chinese vice-minister of fuel and chemical industries, 
suddenly asked for the floor midway through a long pre-established list of speakers. 
To everyone’s surprise, China’s first comments to the Conference resolved to re-
open debate on the delicate draft Declaration on the Human Environment. Tang Ke 
explained that China did not have the opportunity to debate the draft Declaration due 
to its late invitation, nor had other nations excluded from the UNCHE’s twenty-
seven nation Preparatory Committee. He noted that the Declaration, as the defining 
document of the Conference, should offer important guiding principles, but it needed 
to better address Third World concerns. After all, he said, the Declaration must 
“rally the support of the majority if it were to have any moral effect.” Delegates from 
Iran and Algeria immediately concurred and proposed a special Working Group for 
all nations to submit new amendments to the draft Declaration. Argentina also 
agreed, noting that the draft Declaration had been merely transmitted, not approved, 
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in the Preparatory Committee. Sudan, speaking on behalf of the Africa group, and 
the Philippines, speaking for the Asian group, all supported the Chinese proposal.456 
Fearing rupture and hoping to calm the rising storm, an American 
representative expressed concern that the UNCHE would become overburdened by 
reopening the Declaration debate, as it had taken more than a year to forge that draft. 
He recalled Maurice Strong’s warning to respect the fragility of the compromise 
already reached. Canada said the draft Declaration was more than an inspirational 
message or educational tool, that it represented the first step in developing 
international environmental law. Any nations “that disturbed the delicate balance of 
the existing draft would carry a heavy responsibility.” However, Canada felt it unfair 
to deny delegations who had not participated in elaborating the draft to express their 
views. Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland all expressed trepidation at re-
opening discussions on the draft. The representative from Singapore admitted the 
draft Declaration was not a perfect document but it represented a careful balance 
between the interests of the developed and developing nations. However, none who 
expressed their reservations to the Chinese proposal would stand against it. In the 
absence of objections, the Chinese resolution passed and a Working Group began 
deliberations on the draft Declaration the following day. 
Just as the American delegation feared, re-opening discussion on the 
Declaration threatened to swamp its approval before the end of the UNCHE, thereby 
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jeopardizing the success of the Conference. During the first full day of closed debate 
on the newly opened Declaration, China sought to further elevate its Third World 
credibility with a scathing attack against American policies in Indochina. The 
Chinese desired explicit language inserted into the Declaration recognizing the 
primary “social” cause of environmental pollution as “the policy of plunder, 
aggression, and war carried out by imperialist, colonialist, and neo-colonialist 
countries, especially by the superpowers.” Furthermore, if the Conference proceeded 
to vote on Declaration principles for which full agreement had not been reached, the 
Chinese delegation announced it would simply not participate in the voting.457 The 
exasperated American delegation was baffled and hinted as the possibility of 
walking out again. Questioned by the press as to the American reaction, especially in 
the wake of Nixon’s famous visit to China a few months earlier, one U.S. delegate 
wistfully sighed, “I wish the Russians were here.”458 
The morning after the Chinese delegation’s closed-door assault, Tang Ke 
moved China’s critiques into the open during his plenary address, which the 1200 
international journalists attending the UNCHE enjoyed as a present to the press. 
Wasting little time, Tang Ke declared China’s position that “increasingly serious 
pollution and damage of the human environment … is mainly the result of the 
development of capitalism into imperialism,” namely by the superpowers. In his next 
breath, Tang Ke decried America’s “barbarous atrocities” in Vietnam, which 
resulted in “massive killings of innocent old people, women, and children, as well as 
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unprecedented and serious destruction of the human environment.” China called 
upon the UNCHE to strongly condemn the United States for its “wanton bombing 
and shelling, use of chemical weapons, massacre of the people, destruction of human 
lives, annihilation of plants and animals and pollution of the environment.” And 
while other nations spoke on Spaceship Earth’s imperatives of interdependence, 
China affirmed the right of LDCs “in building their national economies on the 
principle of independence, exploiting their natural resources in accordance with their 
own needs.” Tang Ke denounced the claim that population growth as a factor for 
environmental pollution, described Earth’s resources as inexhaustible, and declared 
that future technology would be able to clean up any environmental dislocations 
caused by industrial expansion.459 
On the topic of unrestricted development, despite its environmental impact, 
Tang Ke announced, in a phrase worthy of Chairman Mao, that, “One does not stop 
eating for fear of choking.” Tang Ke firmly told the UNCHE attendees that, “each 
country has the right to determine its own environment standards and policies in the 
light of its own conditions, and no country whatsoever should undermine the 
interests of the developing countries under the pretext of protecting the 
environment.” And on the issue of additionality, China believed that LDC “victims” 
of superpower aggression and environmental plunder “have the right to apply 
sanctions against and demand compensation from those culprit countries which 
encroach on their sovereignty, damage their resources, and pollute and poison their 
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environment.”460 At its first major UN event, China made its presence and positions 
both loud and clear. 
The U.S. delegation did not know quite how to respond. Nixon and 
Kissinger’s visit with Chairman Mao in Beijing just months earlier had inaugurated a 
historic new U.S. policy of détente and rapprochement with China. In Stockholm, 
the State Department’s Christian Herter twice announced and then twice canceled a 
media briefing for the U.S. delegation’s rebuttal, reflecting the American’s 
confusion. When the U.S. reply finally came, it was surprisingly muted, particularly 
compared to the barbed reply Olaf Palme earned for his much more mild address. 
Russell Train told the media in Stockholm that the United States simply found the 
Chinese address “regrettable” and “inappropriately laden with political and 
ideological invective.” The common goal of a successful UNCHE, Train maintained, 
would not be served “by bringing into our deliberations highly charged issues, 
extraneous to our agenda and impossible to solution in this forum.”461 For the White 
House, cultivating nascent relations with China remained far more important than 
issuing a biting retort in a UN conference. 
Rather than intensify an already tenuous situation at the UNCHE, or 
exasperate a geopolitical row in a clearly delicate Chinese relationship, the U.S. 
delegation chalked up China’s outburst as a public bid for LDC authority. Christian 
Herter’s classified report after the UNCHE explained that, China, “from the outset of 
the Conference sought to establish a leadership role with the Third World, 
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particularly the Africans and Asians.”462 Instead retaliating, the U.S. delegation 
would put it efforts into securing other successes in Stockholm. Thankfully, not all 
of the UNCHE boats were sinking. After some seventy to eighty hours of 
negotiations that began before the UNCHE and continued into it, those Action Plan 
successes included what Christian Herter called “an extraordinarily good 
compromise” on establishing the new UN environmental secretariat, as well as 
progress on the Environment Fund and approval for establishing a World Heritage 
Trust.463 
However, in the newly formed Working Group on the Declaration, debates 
appeared increasingly intractable. Emboldened by the radical Chinese posture, 
several LDCs moved to rewrite the declaration to make it pointedly anti-superpower 
and even more pro-LDC. With the floodgates opened for revisions and new 
amendments, the second day of renewed debate on the Declaration saw twenty-seven 
new amendments from fourteen different countries, which affected all but three of 
the existing twenty-three articles in the draft document. As the days of debate 
continued, the Working Group saw some forty new amendments and seemingly 
endless nit-picking revisions proposed, picked-apart, discarded or incorporated, and 
replaced by new ones. China’s bold move to re-open debate galvanized LDCs to 
reiterate their views in revising the Declaration. However, the process moved slowly. 
The Washington Post reported that, “barring a miracle of reconciliation, this would 
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almost certainly kill any chances of agreement” before the Conference’s close. Even 
the indefatigable Maurice Strong feared agreement on a revised Declaration would 
prove impossible.464  
 
Compromise and Compassion in the Spirit of Stockholm 
Just past the UNCHE’s midway point, Charles Bierbauer, a correspondent for 
Environment Action Bulletin, described Stockholm as “gill-high in a river of rhetoric, 
largely polluted with political and emotional issues.” Rather than the stately 
symposium he hoped would alleviate the planet’s environmental crisis, he instead 
saw a collection of “chaos, power plays, reams of meaningless rhetoric, waste, and 
toothless resolutions.” Nigel Hawkes, for the journal Science, attested that, “so 
confused did the conference become that at times even the delegates themselves 
were not quite sure what they had approved.” And in the plenary, an endless tide of 
speeches spurred Barbara Ward’s comment that, in Stockholm, “Truth is moving to 
platitude with alarming speed.”465 As for the Working Group on the Declaration, it 
met no less than fifteen times between June 9 and 15 in failed attempts to resolve its 
conflicting positions. Late in the UNCHE’s second week the Stockholm Conference 
Eco—a snarky and unofficial Conference newspaper co-published by The Ecologist 
magazine and Friends of the Earth—declared in its front headline, “Declaration 
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Dismembered.” The next day, the Eco’s front headline wondered, “Declaration 
Dead?” So unclear was the Declaration’s fate that the Eco next reported, “It is 
overwhelmingly probably that a draft Declaration will be finalized this evening. Or 
that it will not. This is the unanimous opinion of those privy to the deliberations now 
taking place.”466 But all was not yet lost. 
Although the Working Group on the Declaration remained bogged by oratory 
and revision, other Conference committees proceeded to approve most of the 
numerous recommendations from the draft Action Plan. Several speakers 
emphasized that, unless positive action by nations, regional organizations, NGOs, 
and the UN proceeded, the value of the preparatory process and of the Conference 
itself would be nullified. Delegates eventually approved 109 Action Plan 
recommendations. They agreed to establish an International Referral Service for 
environmental information, and to initiate an international data registry on 
chemicals’ effects on the environment. As a whole, the UNCHE accords agreed that 
there should be more study of environmental problems, and more monitoring of 
environmental problems. But it offered few effective and no enforceable agreements 
for engaging in clear environmental improvements. 
Many components of the approved Action Plan remained vague, like its 
bland emphasis on the importance of environmental education without explanation 
for how or what it should include. An UNCHE observer from Time magazine 
reported that, “The astonishing thing about the official meetings was that almost all 
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the recommendations on the agenda were approved, though often watered down.”467 
Only the final eight of the 109 recommendations addressed “Development and 
Environment,” and all expressed concern with minimizing the potential costs of 
environmental protection. While the intentions of those final recommendations were 
clearly conveyed, the means for how such protections or additional financing would 
occur remained unspecified. As a result, those nods toward LDCs—like the general 
proclamation that environmental issues not be used as a pretext to limit trade or the 
development of resources for export—sat oddly in the Action Plan rather than the 
Declaration. But in the “spirit of Stockholm,” at least delegates found some 
consensus on the UNCHE’s recommendations, even if nations like the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan regularly registered formal reservations against 
compensation and additionality.468 
The UNCHE plenary also continued to host a stream of speeches from all 
114 delegations as well as specially invited guests and NGOs. But each day, fewer 
delegates attended its lengthy and breathy sessions. That is, until the second to last 
day of the UNCHE, when the only other head of state aside from Sweden’s appeared 
in Stockholm. On June 14, the penultimate day of the Conference, with diminished 
hopes of producing a draft Declaration, India’s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi 
arrived to address the UNCHE plenary, which quickly filled to standing-room only 
capacity. Ms. Gandhi agreed to attend the UNCHE at Maurice Strong’s imploring to 
speak on the human environment from India’s perspective and on behalf of all 
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developing nations in the global South. Standing before the plenary, wrapped in a 
colorful sari, Gandhi calmly delivered a conference-defining speech that, in sharp 
contrast to Chinese bluster, struck a conciliatory tone between rich and poor, and 
development and environment.469 
Indira Gandhi’s speech often mirrored the environmental outlooks first 
championed by Brazil, yet she did so in elegant prose, full of compassion and 
personal observations. “We are gathered here under the aegis of the United Nations,” 
Gandhi told the capacity crowd. “We are supposed to belong to the same family 
sharing common traits and impelled by the same basic desires, yet we inhabit a 
divided world.” On the one hand, she said, “the rich look askance at our continuing 
poverty—on the other they warn us against their own [industrial] methods.” The 
people of the developing world, she told the UNCHE, of course do not seek 
environmental degradation. Yet the leaders of LDCs “cannot for a moment forget the 
grim poverty of large numbers of people.” She reminded the plenary that the original 
initiative for the UNCHE emerged four years earlier with wealth nations’ sudden 
concern over the dangers of pollution. Yet, in a memorable query, Gandhi quietly 
asked, “Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters? … How can we speak to 
those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers, and the 
air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source? Improving the 
environment for a better quality of life cannot be improved in conditions of poverty.” 
She reminded the Conference that environmental problems in LDCs were not the 
side effects of excessive industrialization, but were produced by “the inadequacy of 
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development.” If the rich saw development as the cause of environmental 
destruction, the poor saw it as “one of the primary means of improving the 
environmental for living, of providing food, water, sanitation and shelter, of making 
the deserts green and the mountains habitable.” In the name of justice, to truly make 
the world one, and for the sake of both human rights and environmental quality, Ms. 
Gandhi explained, development must proceed.470 
Gandhi spoke directly to the insurgent issue of growth, with all its recent 
attention and concern. Like Maurice Strong and others, she agreed the concept 
needed reconsideration, but not renunciation. “The feeling is growing,” she 
observed, “that we should re-order our priorities and move away from the single-
dimensional model which has viewed growth from certain limited angles, which 
seems to have given a higher place to things rather than to persons and which has 
increased our wants rather than our enjoyment.” Yet, for her and the people she 
spoke for, a computerized and technocratic invocation to end growth would not 
suffice, nor would reducing products and people to statistics. “Pollution is not a 
technical problem,” she declared. “The fault lies not in science and technology as 
such but in the sense of values of the contemporary world which ignores the rights of 
others and is oblivious of the longer perspective.” As in the Vedic scriptures from 
which she quoted, Gandhi affirmed that compassion both for people and the planet’s 
life-giving systems must provide the guide forward. 
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With one day remaining in the Conference and the fate of the UNCHE 
Declaration still unclear, Gandhi concluded her speech with a challenge and with 
hope. She asked, “Will the growing awareness of ‘one earth’ and ‘one environment’ 
guide us to the concept of ‘one humanity?’ Will there be a more equitable sharing of 
environmental costs and greater international interest in the accelerated progress of 
the less developed world? Or will it remain confined to a narrow concern, based on 
exclusive self-sufficiency?” The answers, she hoped, would rest on the shared 
realization that “Life is one and the world is one, and all these questions are 
interlinked.” Dwelling on the past or assigning blame, she advised, served little 
purpose, “for none of us is blameless.” Instead, what mattered most in Stockholm 
was reassuring the poor that environmental progress “will not work against their 
interest, but will bring an improvement in their lives.” Gandhi reminded the 
delegates that the world had come to Stockholm, “not in the expectation that this 
Conference can achieve miracles or solve all the world’s difficulties, but in the hope 
that the opinions of each nation will be kept in focus, that these problems will be 
viewed in perspective and each project devised as part of the whole.” After ten days 
of parlance in Stockholm, Indira Gandhi’s speech received the UNCHE’s first 
standing ovation. And at the end of two years of a difficult Conference planning 
process, Gandhi’s address elegantly captured the concerns and hopes of the world’s 
majority, while inspiring conscientious compromise on behalf of both the global 
North and South to make the Conference a success.    
That evening, the Working Group on the Declaration met in its final attempt 
to issue a new UNCHE Declaration before the Conference concluded the following 
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day. For Brazil, the Working Group and revision process for the Declaration had 
placed it in a curious position. In the years preceding the UNCHE, Brazil emerged as 
the LDC’s leading and most vocal critic against the Conference and against 
international environmental standards. The concentrated campaign by Brazil’s 
authoritarian leadership worked to ensure the sanctity of its economic development 
and to safeguard its cherished sovereignty, particularly for control over its vast 
Amazonian resources. Brazil’s rhetoric in the UNCHE planning process earned its 
image of opposition to environmental efforts. Yet, the success of Brazil’s foreign 
ministers in clarifying and communicating its arguments to fellow LDCs in the 
UNCHE Preparatory Committee was remarkably successful. 
As a result Brazil’s preparatory success, the draft documents to emerge 
before the UNCHE reflected most of Brazil’s original demands. Indeed, the original 
draft Declaration and Action Plan so embodied Brazil’s arguments as to instill 
significant international prestige on Brazil. As such, by the time the UNCHE began 
in Stockholm, Brazil developed an interest in securing successful passage of its 
primary arguments in those documents. Re-opening debate on the Declaration and 
the Chinese outflanking Brazil in terms of radicalism threatened to diminish Brazil’s 
new stature. With a touch of irony, the U.S. State Department’s Christian Herter 
recalled of Stockholm that, “because the [People’s Republic of China], and to some 
extent Tanzania and Algeria, tended to preempt the traditional extremist LDC 
positions, Brazil found itself working very closely with the United States and other 
countries that had participated extensively in the preparations for the Conference.” 
As a result, Herter reported how the Brazilian delegation worked “long, hard, and 
  325 
effectively” to re-negotiate a draft Declaration on which all nations, including 
industrialized ones, could agree, while still securing Brazil’s propositions on 
development. China and other LDCs might have hoped for totally new and radical 
Declaration for the UNCHE, but as Herter noted, “Rather than go along with efforts 
to change these documents, Brazil defended them stoutly.”471 Brazil worked to 
secure its arguments in the new draft, while also attempting to contain radical 
additions to the Declaration to ensure the its approval by wealthy nations like the 
United States. 
Motivated by Indira Gandhi’s stately address, the delegates in the Working 
Group on the Declaration pushed through a marathon session of debate that lasted 
fifteen hours through the night, and did not conclude until 5:00 am on the final day 
of the Conference. After much haranguing, the Working Group finally agreed upon a 
preamble and twenty-five principles in a new Declaration, which the assembled 
nations in the plenary could vote upon. None seemed happy with all of it. But quite 
literally, in the final hours, with the world watching under the international media’s 
brief spotlight, the planet’s first intergovernmental gathering on global 
environmental concerns did produce a Declaration on the Human Environment. The 
final document differed from the original Declaration, though not nearly as radical as 
some feared and others hoped. The original wording was not adopted, and the new 
Declaration included four additional principles. 
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Although the Working Group on the Declaration acquiesced to four new 
principles to bring the Declaration’s sum to twenty-six, two original principles stood 
beyond agreement. 
First, Brazil and Argentina remained at odds over a principle that could have 
established something similar to an international environmental impact statement, 
whereby one nation would notify others of development plans that might adversely 
impact the environment beyond its national boundaries. Brazil had initiated plans for 
what later became the massive Itaipú Dam on the Paraná River, near its boarder with 
Argentina.472 The Argentine government feared the project would reduce the river’s 
navigability, decline fish populations that travel upriver to spawn, and reduce 
essential water supplies to six major cities, including Buenos Aires. Argentina 
sought revised language requiring analysis and sharing of information about 
international environmental incursions, while Brazil firmly defended its sovereign 
right do as it wished with its own resources.473 
At an impasse, the Working Group resolved to submit the draft of what 
eventually became Principle 21 to the UN General Assembly, which eventually 
sided with Brazil. The final language of Principle 21 declared “the sovereign right” 
of nations to exploit their own resources based on their own environmental policies, 
but also notes “the responsibility” of states not to damage the environment beyond 
their jurisdiction. The nonbinding principle became a key feature of nascent 
international environmental law, and its language on national rights by far outweighs 
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the mild encouragement for environmental responsibility. As such, the Working 
Group dispute, and Brazil’s eventual victory, reflected the predominance of politics 
over environmental considerations within the Working Group and the UNCHE 
generally.474 
The final point of disagreement as the UNCHE’s closing ceremony drew near 
concerned nuclear weapons. In the Working Group, Japan sought to broaden 
Principle 26 from a bland condemnation against atomic weapons generally, to 
include any testing and use of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass 
destruction in all spheres. While the principle particularly addressed the world’s 
nuclear powers, it was aimed especially at China and France, which still conducted 
atmospheric nuclear tests. After lengthy debate, all members of the Working 
Group—except China—agreed to limit Principle 26 in pithy but limp language 
stating, “Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear and all other 
means of mass destruction.” China had tried and failed to rework the text to 
awkwardly condemn nuclear weapons, while nonetheless defend its right to conduct 
nuclear tests, which it said was for the sole purpose of self-defense against the 
superpowers and to break their nuclear monopoly. China refused to approve even the 
bland otherwise agreed-upon text. 
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China was the only nation not willing to consent to the strained compromises 
in the revised Declaration. True to their words from their plenary address, China thus 
threatened not to participate in voting for a Declaration on which all nations had not 
mutually consented. However, in the UNCHE’s final ceremonies later that day, the 
Conference President avoided China’s lone veto with a parliamentary maneuver to 
verbally adopt the Declaration via acclamation.475 In his report to President Nixon on 
the UNCHE results, Russell Train noted how the Chinese were clearly “using the 
Conference to identify strongly with the ‘Third World’ and to establish their 
leadership in that regard. … [I]t is my view that they failed to win any new ground in 
this respect, and actually seemed to be losing ground at the end.”476 While China 
entered its first major UN convention with great fanfare and international attention, it 
left the UNCHE isolated. 
In the end, the final Declaration on the Human Environment embodied 
Maurice Strong’s hopes for “first steps” toward founding guidelines for future 
international environmental policy and law—what he called in his opening speech “a 
new and important—indeed, an indispensible—beginning attempt to articulate a 
code of international conduct for the age of environment.” The process and final 
product of the Declaration clearly reflected the world’s emerging North-South 
political dynamic and the eventual twilight of its once-dominant East-West axis. It 
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also signaled a slow-growing realization that international law and policy should 
embrace not just states, but individuals and international organizations; and to do so, 
it must include appraisal of social issues and become an instrument of distributive 
justice. 
Yet, according to the journal Science, the revised language of the final 
Declaration also “betrayed the enormous efforts that had to be made to achieve 
consensus.” Louis B. Sohn, a leading authority on international law at Harvard, 
explained of the revised Declaration that, “the necessary compromises resulted in an 
inconsistency of formulas and the constant shifting from one approach to 
another.”477 The wide-ranging principles ran from human rights and nuclear 
disarmament to the need for environmental research and education. It included 
general beseeching against pollution, the need to safeguard wildlife and natural 
resources, and the importance of cooperating on international issues, as well as a 
puzzling admonition to “share” non-renewable resources. Some of the new additions 
lost sight of the environment entirely in favor of social protest. To South Africa’s 
chagrin but to China’s preference, the revised version included as its new first 
principle that, “policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, 
discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand 
condemned and must be eliminated.”478 
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Nonetheless, the Declaration’s general tone still called for nations to 
recognize that their internal activities may have harmful impact on the environment 
of other nations and people, and that states must accept the responsibilities 
associated with this recognition. It laid clear claim for sovereign nations to determine 
and control their own policies on population and resource use. Its paramount points 
were that environmental protection need not—indeed, must not—impair economic 
development; that rational planning could resolve conflicts between development 
and environment; and that development, which was needed to improve the 
environment, required financial assistance. Like the Founex report, the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment expressed the need to synthesize 
development and environment, but to its detriment, neither gave any indication for 
how to do so. Vague intonations for “integrated development” or “rational planning” 
lacked substance and concreteness, as did much of the disjointed Action Plan. 
However, as Paul Lusaka, a delegate from Zambia, noted at the end of the 
Conference, “We have not achieved miracles but we must be realistic, and this 
Declaration surpasses all our earlier expectations.”479 
 
Assessing Winners and Losers: Brand New World or Business As Usual? 
The plenary’s acclimation in Stockholm of the final Declaration and Action 
Plan concluded the UN Conference on the Human Environment after four years of 
anticipation, after two years of actual preparation, and after two weeks of hard-
fought debate. By the end of the Conference, most delegates—aside from the 
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Chinese—sounded approval for the UNCHE’s accomplishments. Peter Walker, head 
of the British delegation and England’s Secretary of State for the Environment, 
described being “delighted with the results, and disappointed only that important 
detailed agreements have been overshadowed by political battles on non-
environmental issues.” Barbara Ward suggested, “We may be on the way to a new 
moral reality.” The New York Times headline proclaimed, “Sense of 
Accomplishment Buoys Delegates Leaving Ecology Talks.” Even Brazilian delegate 
Carlos Calero Rodrigues said, “Yes, we are satisfied with the results. We didn’t 
expect too much, but we approve the recommendations—they are good.”480 But was 
the UNCHE a success? Was it a “landmark,” a “milestone,” a “pivotal event” for 
international environmental politics and diplomacy, as some political scientists 
claim? 
Like many political scientists, both North and South could claim the UNCHE 
as a triumph. To the delight of LDCs, the UNCHE protected sovereign use of natural 
resources and evaded passage of international environmental conventions. The final 
documents of the UNCHE eschewed the environmental drama of non-governmental 
actors who advocated limits to growth and, instead, promoted LDC admonitions that 
development and additionality offered the primary solutions to their environmental 
problems. The final resolutions of the UNCHE reflected clear LDC successes. Yet, 
wealthy nations also left Stockholm similarly claiming the UNCHE as a success in 
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bringing new awareness to environmental issues while the conference’s non-binding 
resolutions still secured industrial nations’ economic hegemony over global North-
South relations. As such, the UNCHE was less a success in establishing a new 
international environmental order as it was in institutionalizing the status quo of 
existing geopolitical power dynamics into the processes of global environmental 
policymaking. 
In the eyes of the LDCs, the immediate aftermath of the UNCHE appeared as 
a remarkable success for them. First under Brazilian leadership, and later with strong 
assists from China, India, and several African states, the LDCs entered the UNCHE 
emphasizing the priority of their development amid any international environmental 
considerations. LDCs also held strong desires to avoid global standards or 
conventions limiting either their national sovereignty or economic growth. The 
UNCHE process shined a bright light on LDC arguments for how nations should 
approach environmental problems and, in that context, encouraged industrialized 
nations to reconsider the moral implications of the wealth divergence between the 
global North and South. Upon the UNCHE’s conclusion, one sympathetic observer 
noted, “it will be difficult for Western environmentalists ever again to view ‘the 
environment’ in a parochial way. The developing countries of the world offered the 
West a new, expanded perspective on environmental issues. The developing 
countries dominated [the UNCHE] … in practically all aspects.”481 In those regards, 
the UNCHE appeared as an LDC success. 
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Furthermore, the UNCHE, and the long planning process for Stockholm, 
served to unify LDC arguments toward revising the global economic order, with the 
accompanying contention that doing so provided the only means for resolving global 
environmental challenges. In light of the controversy in the industrialized world over 
the wisdom and sustainability of economic growth, the journal Nature reported in the 
wake of the UNCHE that, 
the conference has not served so much as a rallying point for those 
who espouse the new fad of zero economic growth but rather as a 
platform for those who insist that environmental problems are not 
soluble unless more resources are available, that there is in any case no 
necessary conflict between economic growth and careful management 
of the environment, and that, in any case, the most serious 
environmental indignities are not those of pollution, however 
international, but those of poverty, disease, and unjust government. … 
The truth is that if what advanced societies hanker after is a decent 
environment, they must first set out to create a decent world.482 
 
Toward those ends, two years later, LDCs in the UN General Assembly formally 
appealed for fundamental changes to the world economic system with resolutions for 
establishing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and outlining the UN 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. While those LDC economic 
stipulations went unheeded amid the economic dislocations of the mid-1970s, the 
UNCHE’s unifying process in confronting global environmental issues through 
increased development provided important earlier opportunities in clarifying and 
promoting the economic and environmental imperatives of LDCs demands.483   
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 During the preparatory process for the UNCHE, not only did LDCs insure 
that their demands on the primacy of development and the terms of additional 
financing were embedded within the Conference’s draft documents, but at the actual 
Conference, LDCs successfully bolstered their arguments—especially on 
additionality—through the revised Declaration and the accompanying Action Plan. 
For instance, Principle 6 of the revised Declaration emerged anew from the Working 
Group to call for “the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological 
assistance.” A revised Principle 10 stated LDC’s need for “stability of prices and 
adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw materials.”484 These 
principles—which reflected specific changes made to the draft Declaration—and 
other explicit requisitions in the approved UNCHE documents, infer an obligation 
for the wealthy and industrialized nations to expedite the economic development of 
LDCs as part of any international environmental imperative. Although it would be 
naïve to overemphasize these LDC accomplishments as decidedly altering the 
allocation of power in the North-South political dynamic, the LDCs could rightfully 
consider these results from their participation in the UNCHE process a success.    
If LDCs considered the UNCHE a success, a zero-sum view of the 
Conference would thus presume industrial superpowers like the United States would 
consider the UNCHE a failure. Not so. The reports on the Conference by lead 
American delegates and advisors all identified the UNCHE as more than favorable to 
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the United States. With regard to the final Declaration, a State Department summary 
explained that, “The final text, although uneven in the view of the United States 
Delegation, preserves a number of extremely important principles of conduct for 
states in dealing with environmental problems of international significance.”485 
Moreover, Christian Herter told U.S. Secretary of State Rogers that, “On the whole, 
the Conference was a considerable success in terms of U.S. interests.” Russell 
Train’s report to President Nixon gushed, “It is my personal assessment that the 
Conference was a success. The United States played a strong role and gained 
practically all of its objectives. We consistently opposed ‘politicizing’ of the 
Conference with war and similar issues, and had good success, given the makeup of 
the Conference.”486 For America’s two lead delegates in Stockholm, the UNCHE 
successfully secured its superpower objectives while also provoking widespread 
international awareness and participation in addressing global environmental 
issues—regardless of the Soviet boycott.487 
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Similarly, Nixon’s domestic advisor on natural resources and the 
environment, John C. Whitaker, told the President that, “Despite the efforts of a 
number of demonstrators both those representing particular countries and private 
groups, the UN Conference on the Human Environment … was in my opinion 
successful from our point of view.” Like Train, Whitaker explained that, “The 
attempts to gain headlines by embarrassing the United Stated delegation with 
charges of ‘ecocide’ in Vietnam and militant disarmament requests by some of the 
peripheral attending nations tended to overshadow the following concrete 
accomplishments which I believe will long outlive the demonstrators.”488 Russell 
Train’s summary to President Nixon further highlighted the U.S. delegation’s 
success in solidifying its economic position in the international environmental realm, 
despite LDCs deeply embedding additionality in the revised Declaration and other 
UNCHE documents. Train reported that the American delegation “consistently 
opposed using the Conference as an excuse for new development ‘add-ons.’” 
However, he continued, “it is evident that it is not possible to discuss environmental 
protection with the LDCs completely outside the context of development 
objectives.” The United States, which was heavily involved in the UNCHE planning 
process from the start, clearly considered its interests served by the Conference’s 
final results—even with the UNCHE’s ultimate melding of development into 
environmental matters. 
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Although LDCs made clear commands, the United States considered the 
UNCHE results a triumph because the UN’s nonbinding obligations carried little 
weight with regard to actual assets and financing, especially when so many industrial 
nations like the United States included reservations and limiting interpretive 
statements with the UNCHE Declaration.489 For instance, the additionality request in 
the revised Declaration’s Principle 12—which called for additional financial aid to 
LDCs to integrate environmental safeguards into their development planning—
included an official interpretation that “the U.S. does not regard the text of this 
principle, or any other language contained in the Declaration, as requiring it to 
change its aid policies or increase the amounts thereof.”490 In short, the United States 
need not pay a penny more to LDCs, for their increased development nor to 
safeguard the environment. The UNCHE may have promoted environmental 
awareness and projected a successful image of international efforts toward resolving 
the global environmental crisis, but it merely secured the status quo. 
With vocal constituents in industrialized nations questioning economic 
growth as a means to combat environmental harm, and with LDCs clamoring for 
additionality to better integrate development with environment, the UNCHE 
accomplishments absorbed both. As Lee-Anne Broadhead argued, “This is not to say 
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that those individuals gathered together at the official conference in Stockholm were 
not sincere in their desire to improve the state of the world’s environment. … 
[However,] through acceptance of the status quo, thinking about solutions is 
inevitably limited to tinkering rather than any kind of fundamental reevaluation.”491 
For the United States and other industrial nations, the UNCHE successfully 
institutionalized international environmental requirements in the UN’s global 
structure, with its fierce defense of national sovereignty, and with its entirely 
unenforceable agreements. The international environmental avenues pursued through 
the UN required neither a no-growth approach nor efforts to re-order global wealth 
inequalities. No wonder delegates from industrial nations like the United States were 
satisfied. The UNCHE, with its non-binding declarations and suggestions for action, 
amounted to a world-scale public relations coup for the industrialized nations. 
To be fair, the UNCHE was successful toward the original aim of its earliest 
ECOSOC charge in 1968 to “create a basis for comprehensive consideration within 
the United Nations of the problems of the human environment.”492 The UNCHE did, 
after all, permanently place consideration of the environment as a whole on the UN 
agenda through its creation of UNEP. A common claim to LDC success in 
establishing the nascent international environmental regime on their own terms was 
securing UNEP’s headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya—the first major UN body located 
in the global South. However, because of UNEP’s small size, insufficient funding, 
and its peripheral position in Nairobi, it has failed to have significant effectiveness in 
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combating international environmental challenges. From the start, UNEP was 
institutionally weak and removed from the centers of influence within the UN. 
Additionally, the UNCHE saddled UNEP with an impossibly broad remit, a vague 
list of priorities, and little funding to accomplish its aims. Money for UNEP came 
from the voluntary Environment Fund—a key feature for the U.S. delegation in 
Stockholm—but the fund’s meager and voluntary contributions fell far short of its 
targets. UNEP has been unable to accomplish much toward rectifying or preventing 
significant international environmental problems other than monitoring their 
continuation.493 
In 1968, the ECOSOC’s original vision for the UNCHE also aimed to “focus 
the attention of governments and public opinion in various countries on the 
importance of the [environmental] problem.” If environmental awareness was not on 
the radar of nations before the UNCHE, recognition of environmental challenges in 
systematic and comprehensive terms did gain significant global recognition leading 
up to, during, and even after the Conference. Claire Sterling admitted after the 
UNCHE that, “Consciousness of environmental matters had undoubtedly been 
heightened. At least some of the talk here seems bound to rub off on governments 
sooner or later.” Indeed, in the wake of the UNCHE, many nations followed the lead 
of the UN and other advanced industrial nations to institutionalize environmental 
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issues with new national environmental ministries or agencies. Despite Brazil’s 
strong initial resistance to environmental organizations, in 1973, it established the 
Special Secretariat for the Environment (Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente, or 
SEMA), Brazil’s first national environmental institution. Brazilian scholars agree 
that SEMA was Brazil’s response to Principle 17 of the UNCHE Declaration, which 
stated that “Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of 
planning, managing, or controlling the environmental resources of the states with the 
view to enhancing environmental quality.”494 
Even China, upon returning from its humbling experience in Stockholm, 
established in 1973 the country’s first official environmental protection organization, 
called the Leading Group on Environmental Protection in the State Council, as well 
as its first “Ten-Year Program for Environmental Protection.” Similar to the eventual 
environmental dynamics with the UN, China’s environmental measures earned little 
oversight and very limited funding, leading to their failure.495 Other nations, 
especially in Africa, failed to take any environmental action after the UNCHE. 
Nigeria, for instance, did not establish a Ministry for Environment until June 1999, 
more than a quarter century after the UNCHE. Adebayo Adedeji, who led the 
Nigerian delegation to the UNCHE, later recalled “There is no doubt that in Nigeria 
we could have done more to internalize all the major decisions of the conference. 
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Unfortunately, the UN had no mechanisms for follow-up on conference decisions. … 
[Stockholm] provided the basis for action but unfortunately not the resources to take 
such actions.”496 In both China and Nigeria, as with the intergovernmental UNEP, 
failure stemmed from weak commitment and lack of funding. 
Perhaps the UNCHE was not quite the success so many participants and 
scholars believed—particularly in light of the extremely limited commitments and 
interpretive reservations by wealthy nations to the development of LDCs. When 
assessing the final results of from Conference, the Italian-based Washington Post 
reporter Claire Sterling offered the clear-eyed view that, “Any suggestion that the 
wealthier states mean to carry out all the recommendations here would strain the 
credulity.” Naming the UNCHE documents “a lengthy roll of diplomatic wallpaper,” 
she observed that, “Should the recommendations indeed be respected, they would 
involve a massive transfer of resources beyond the wildest dreams of [the LDCs].” 
However, since none of the UNCHE recommendations included a binding signature 
nor real money, “what they boil down to is an appeal to the poor countries to behave 
with more environmental virtue while trying to get richer, and to pay for the virtue 
themselves.” With regard to the LDCs in Stockholm, Sterling concluded that, 
“Having asked for absolutely everything, they got it, on paper. They might have 
ended up with at least a little more in real terms if they had asked for less.”497 These 
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observations beg the question whether the UNCHE could ever have been a real 
success for LDCs. Given a UN so predicated on securing national sovereignty and so 
devoted to development that it could neither recognize the fundamental relationship 
of traditional economic expansion to global environmental degradation, nor alter 
international structures to combat such degradation—how could the UNCHE have 
achieved real success in saving Spaceship Earth? 
In short, the LDCs in Stockholm failed to grasp the realistic political and 
economic limits of the UNCHE, despite having worked so hard during the 
preparatory process to establish those limits. LDCs were likewise unable in 
Stockholm to sense how far industrialized nations might reasonably follow LDCs’ 
appeals toward additionality for environmental improvement. Ironically, the LDCs’ 
success in foreclosing binding commitments on planetary environmental standards 
during the UNCHE planning process also foreclosed the possibility of progressive 
funding to combat global environmental hazards, and made impossible any 
opportunity that the UNCHE might re-order the international structures that 
perpetuate such hazards. Tony Brenton, a career British diplomat on international 
environmental issues recalled of UNCHE results that, “it is difficult to argue that 
they have had more than a marginal effect on the subsequent history of international 
environmental action.” The lengthy UNCHE documents may have catalogued 
several existing international environmental concerns and activities, but they “failed 
to redirect them or propel them in any significant way.”498 In those regards, both the 
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preparatory process for the UNCHE and its spate of activity in Stockholm signaled 
both the cresting and culmination of the global environmental moment.  
*** 
Thirty years after the UNCHE in Stockholm, Maurice Strong assessed its 
legacies. Strong admitted that “The Stockholm Conference starkly brought out the 
differences between the positions of developing and more industrialized countries, 
but did not resolve them.”499 He would know. The UNCHE remained vague on 
operational details and virtually no action was taken on its Declaration and Action 
Plan for two decades. In 1992, twenty years after the 1972 UNCHE in Stockholm, 
the UN decided to hold another intergovernmental conference on the global 
environment. That year, Brazil hosted the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development—the Rio Earth Summit—which Strong also organized as that 
conference’s Secretary-General. Yet many of the same problems from the UNCHE 
also infected Rio. 
Looking back on the dawn of global environmental diplomacy in the early 
1970s, Strong acknowledged the inability then in Stockholm, later at Rio, and 
afterward to move beyond issues of additionally or to think anew on resolving global 
environmental problems. Since the first institutionalization of environmental matters 
at Stockholm, Strong admitted “the issues of finance and the basis for sharing 
responsibility and costs continue to be the principal source of differences and 
controversy between developing and more developed countries and have become 
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central to international negotiations on virtually every environment and sustainable 
development subject, most notable in the climate change and biodiversity 
conventions.”500 That is to say, the failures of Stockholm still continue to plague 
today’s progress on solving global environmental problems. 
In the early 1970s, Brazil’s demand for development in environment 
eventually allowed for global participation at Stockholm. And the LDCs’ insertion of 
development into environmental discourse within the UN helped lay the intellectual 
framework for what evolved as the concept of sustainable development. However, 
opening this conceptual door closed others. At least within the structures of the UN, 
these developments helped end the global environmental moment as a time for 
nation states to institute radical transformation away from traditional paths of 
modernization. In exchange for global participation of LDCs in Stockholm, the 
UNCHE simply transformed environmental problems into development issues and 
further grounded the UN as another vehicle legitimizing rapid industrial growth. 
Thus, solutions to global environmental problems within the UN were significantly 
narrowed to revolve henceforth almost entirely in terms of more money, more 
technology, and more management. Contrary to the historical myopia of some global 
environmental scholars, this process of environmental institutionalization in the UN 
had its origins in the 1972 UNCHE.501 
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Because of the LDC counter-assault during the UNCHE planning process, 
the UN’s Stockholm conference was unable to sufficiently deal with the socio-
cultural, economic, or political problems that lay at the heart of global environmental 
problems. Instead, the UN remained superficial and limited to transboundary 
environmental issues like preservation of world heritage sites and monitoring 
ongoing environmental decline. It would not confront the more prevalent and 
socially challenging issues of environmental degradation that occur inside sovereign 
territories or that stem from global systems of economic inequality, which often 
result from typical methods of economic growth and development. As a result, the 
UNCHE enabled some progress toward nature protection and spurred global 
awareness of environmental challenges, but it did little to resolve the main problems 
at the root of global environmental problems: the social systems of development that 
reinforce inequality and re-produce patterns of ecological degradation.  
However, during the global environmental moment and throughout 
Stockholm’s environmental circus, the voices of governments within the UN were 
not the only actors addressing environmental challenges. Ironically, Brazil and other 
LDCs’ success in institutionalizing global environmental matters within the UN—
which inherently enshrined national sovereignty for resource exploitation and 
promoted economic growth and development as the primary solution for global 
environmental problems—actually encouraged increased participation at Stockholm 
by nongovernmental actors who sought different solutions. Nongovernmental 
actors—like the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation and its transnational peace 
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effort called Dai Dong, or the newly formed Friends of the Earth, or the Scientists 
Institute for Public Information, among others—strove to make their voices heard 
before the UNCHE and during it while expressing very different solutions to global 
environmental problems than those promulgated by national governments within the 
UN. 
As addressed in the final two chapters, these non-state actors saw the 
excitement surrounding the UN’s environmental conference in Stockholm as an 
opportunity to capture world attention, to make their unique views heard, and to 
possibly influence the debate within the UN meeting to something beyond the status 
quo. To better understand the broader impact of the global environmental moment 
and how it climaxed in Stockholm, Chapters 7 and 8 step back in time to explore 
how alternative voices formulated and sought to express their views on the global 
environment, both before the UNCHE and during it. Eventually, in the outer rings 
and as part of Stockholm’s environmental circus, many nongovernmental activists 
held separate environmental conferences or attended the NGO Environment Forum 
in Stockholm during the official UNCHE proceedings. In Stockholm’s outer rings, 
these actors expressed their own creative solutions to global environmental 
challenges outside the international regimes of sovereign nation states.
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Chapter 7 
 
GLOBAL POTENTIAL, TRANSNATIONAL LIMITS: 
The Triumphs and Tragedy of Dai Dong 
 
 
“the [scientists] of this world...have examined the parts and missed the 
whole, and their blindness is even worthy of wonder.” 
— Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 1880 
 
“[Dai Dong’s] function will be to help people all over the world 
understand…that only by transcending barriers of language and race, class 
and national interests, and by reconciling differences of religion and 
ideology, can we make the effort to save the earth for ourselves and future 
generations.” 
— Dai Dong (The Community of Man), promotional material, 1971 
 
 
The environmental circus in Stockholm included many more actors than 
those confined to its inner ring at the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE). At Stockholm in the summer of 1972, the outer rings of 
events included organizations and individuals who saw efforts of the UNCHE as 
woefully limited by, among other things, the artificial yet rigid boundaries of 
national sovereignty and national self-interest, as well as the UN’s refusal to 
seriously reconsider the environmental consequences of economic growth and 
development. Due in part to the success of the UN’s less developed countries to 
restrict reappraisals of sovereignty or the priority of economic growth during the 
UNCHE, non-governmental organizations and individuals developed their own 
solutions for saving Spaceship Earth and promulgated them both before and during 
the environmental circus in Stockholm. 
In order to expand our view of the global environmental moment as it moved 
toward culminating events in Stockholm, this chapter initially steps back in time to 
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the late 1960s to analyze the formation and efforts of a unique non-governmental 
organization named Dai Dong. Dai Dong was a brief but influential pacifist 
fellowship with environmental interests that rose and fell during the global 
environmental moment, mostly in relation to the planning and performance of the 
UNCHE. Dai Dong ultimately organized its own Independent Conference on the 
Environment as one of the outer rings in Stockholm’s environmental circus in 1972. 
A focus on Dai Dong thus broadens our understanding of the dawn of global 
environmentalism beyond the inner ring of nation-state politics that dominated the 
UNCHE. Both before and during Stockholm, Dai Dong promoted a transnational and 
systems-based political approach to global environmentalism. The rapid rise and fall 
of Dai Dong, however, reveals the limits of such an explicitly transnational 
environmentalism. 
Dai Dong was founded in 1969 by an American pacifist named Alfred 
Hassler, who directed Dai Dong until early 1974 under the sponsorship of the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, Dai Dong’s parent international pacifist institution. 
The name Dai Dong derived from the Chinese phrase Dai Dong Thé Gioi, which 
translates as “world of the great togetherness.” Hassler selected this pre-Confucian 
concept of all Earth’s people as a unified, interdependent family to reflect Dai 
Dong’s ideology of global integration and its worldly aspirations beyond the 
interests of the global North.502 In 1969, for instance, Hassler told the War Resisters 
International Conference that, “I am a North American by accident; by choice I am a 
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citizen of the world. My loyalty is not primarily to the United States of America, but 
to that world community.”503 
When Alfred Hassler died in 1991, The New York Times honored his lifelong 
pacifism and, for his direction of Dai Dong, celebrated Hassler as “a pioneer in the 
environmental movement.”504 Hassler’s world-peace work with Dai Dong made him 
a pioneer of global environmentalism during the global environmental moment. Dai 
Dong promoted widely Hassler’s socio-ecological conviction that “the great 
problems humanity faces—war, overpopulation, exploitation, environmental 
destruction—are interrelated, global in nature and demand global solutions.”505 Dai 
Dong thus expressed Hassler’s conviction in the late 1960s and early 1970s that only 
an interdependent peace fellowship that looked beyond national divisions and 
embodied Earth’s interdependent systems could find solutions for the world’s dire 
and interconnected challenges. In the global environmental moment, Dai Dong 
dramatized the need for a worldwide fellowship—one not tied to single nation 
state—to find global solutions for saving Spaceship Earth. 
Hassler’s ideology and activism through Dai Dong integrates several aspects 
of the global environmental moment. Through Dai Dong, Hassler leveraged the 
knowledge and authority of environmental scientists and systems thinkers in 
attempts to synthesize ecosystem ecology not with development, as sought through 
the United Nations, but with the prerogatives of social justice. Dai Dong thus 
became a knowledge broker of environmental science and ethics, which launched its 
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meteoric rise in global environmental politics alongside but separate from the growth 
of global environmental awareness from the UNCHE planning process. Nonetheless, 
Hassler’s greatest successes and widespread international attention for Dai Dong 
came from a contested relationship with the preparations for the UNCHE. Between 
1970 and 1971, Dai Dong's creation and distribution of the Menton Statement, with 
support from thousands of the worlds’ scientists, influenced UN policy-makers like 
U Thant and Maurice Strong to include greater scientific expertise in the UNCHE 
preparations.506 Hassler, however, remained unsatisfied. 
In the 1970s, many environmental scholars and global activists like Hassler 
believed the ecological health of the planet and the survival of human civilization on 
Spaceship Earth demanded an end to geopolitics based on national sovereignty.507 
Hassler thus reacted to the UNCHE’s unrepentant support of national sovereignty, its 
emphasis on environmentally damaging economic development, as well as its silence 
on the issue of overpopulation by inviting thirty environmental scientists and 
scholars, many from the global South, to Dai Dong’s own Independent Conference 
on the Environment, held alongside the UNCHE at Stockholm in 1972. Dai Dong’s 
diagnosis of global environmental challenges captured international headlines and 
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earned an invitation to read its independent declaration before the UNCHE’s plenary 
meeting. 
However, Dai Dong’s attempt to apply its countercultural systems approach 
to the complexities of international environmental politics ultimately proved 
unsustainable. Ironically, especially for an organization like Dai Dong that self-
identified as transnational, many of the same political conflicts between nations of 
the global North and South within the UN ultimately played out within Dai Dong at 
Stockholm. Hassler’s prescriptive emphasis on transnationalism and his 
preoccupation with overpopulation nearly tore Dai Dong’s conference apart. 
Consequently, and despite its initial successes, Dai Dong financially collapsed early 
in 1974. Hassler’s orthodoxy toward transnationalism reflects how many global 
activists first confronted the apparently intractable conflict between new 
transboundary threats to the environment and the deeply embedded systems of 
national sovereignty. To paraphrase Mark Twain, however, reports on the death of 
the nation state and its systems of sovereignty were greatly exaggerated. The 
ultimate failure of Hassler’s dogmatic transnationalism and Dai Dong’s eventual 
collapse reveals how global environmental activism and sovereign authority need not 
exist in total opposition.  
As this chapter ultimately shows, other international environmental 
organizations like Friends of the Earth attenuated some of Dai Dong’s approach and 
have since become an important component of today’s system of international 
environmental politics. The success of international environmental organizations like 
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Friends of the Earth, which formed around the same time as Dai Dong, suggests that 
contemporary environmental actors work not against existent global systems—
environmental or political—but through or around them. It was a lesson Alfred 
Hassler never learned. Some pioneers, after all, aim to leave a better world by 
leveling the forest and reshaping the landscape. Alfred Hassler’s direction of Dai 
Dong thus reflects important elements of the global environmental moment and 
exemplifies the diverse activities at Stockholm’s environmental circus. Hassler 
pioneered and widely promoted important messages about our interdependent global 
environment. His particular methods, however, reveal both the triumphs and 
tragedies of Dai Dong.  
 
From World Peace and World Systems to World Environment 
Alfred Hassler dreamed big and nurtured non-violent networks to reach for 
utopia. Born in Allentown, Pennsylvania in 1910, Hassler came of age in New York 
City, where he took night classes in journalism at Columbia University. In 1942, 
after imprisonment as a conscientious objector during World War II, Hassler became 
editor of Fellowship, a journal for the United States’ Fellowship of Reconciliation 
(FOR-USA). The FOR, founded by European Protestants in 1914, had since grown 
into a worldwide Christian association of radical pacifists. Hassler’s direction of 
publications for FOR-USA placed him amid the center of non-violent activism, both 
in the United States and abroad. In 1958, Hassler published a comic book publicizing 
Martin Luther King and the Montgomery bus boycott that remains FOR-USA’s 
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bestseller. Later that year, Hassler, who closely read developments in science as well 
as disarmament, sailed to Europe and the Soviet Union aboard Albert Bigelow’s 
yacht, Golden Rule, to protest nuclear testing and raise awareness of global fallout. 
In the mid-1960s, Hassler’s visits to Vietnam helped establish the International 
Committee of Conscience on Vietnam, which, among other endeavors, orchestrated 
an international tour of Buddhist monks who spoke against the Vietnam War. And in 
1969, with support of international pacifist colleagues, including the Vietnamese 
Buddhist monk and anti-war activist, Thich Nhat Hahn, Alfred Hassler founded Dai 
Dong, a self-described “transnational peace effort” that sought to link war and other 
worldwide problems with the world environment.508 
Dai Dong realized Hassler’s long-held ambition, which he first announced 
back in 1963, for a trans-religious and transnational fellowship directed at 
individuals, not nations, to express how one person’s distinctive existence related to 
the whole human community. In 1969, Hassler would use his new positions as 
General Secretary of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and 
Executive Secretary of the FOR-USA to secure limited funding for what he 
originally called the Order of Humanity. At a planning meeting with Hassler in 
France, the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh recommended a different 
name for the new organization. Nhat Hahn suggested the Order of Humanity take on 
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the Chinese-inspired name Dai Dong—based on Dai Dong Thé Gioi or the “world of 
the great togetherness”—for a more global and less Western allure. Hassler agreed, 
in part because he liked how such global “togetherness” loosely reflected a social 
and ethical extension of the systems thinking embodied in the symbol of Spaceship 
Earth.509 
Hassler, like other environmental and socially concerned thinkers in the 
1960s, understood global challenges in terms of interconnected systems and through 
the rhetoric of holism. Hassler read closely and highlighted scientific and popular 
articles on systems analysis and cybernetic thinking.510 A social application of the 
systems approach, Hassler concluded, could help identify the root causes of complex 
social problems and point toward their solution. Hassler thus adapted systems 
thinking into Dai Dong’s holistic approach to world peace. This general and more 
philosophical lens of systems thinking, as Hassler saw it, envisioned nearly all 
aspects of the world interacting as a dynamic and interdependent system—and, 
importantly, one capable of being managed for improvement. The North American 
and European counterculture applied similar notions when rejecting systems of 
cultural oppression and calling for new, holistic modes of human interaction and 
organization. And because of the popularity of systems approaches in various 
scientific field throughout the 1960s, as addressed in Chapter 1, the philosophical 
systems approach adopted by Dai Dong loosely identified with and even drew upon 
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the legitimacy of modern science to justify its own visions of globally integrated 
harmony.511 
 Although Hassler followed scientific developments of the systems approach, 
he may have adapted the idea of applying systems thinking to social problems from 
his pacifist colleague, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In 1964, at age thirty-five, King 
became then the youngest recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and used his Nobel 
lecture to explain humanity’s most pressing problems, as well as offer solutions in a 
global systems framework. Just after Hassler began exploring his idea for a 
transnational Order of Humanity, King called for a “worldwide fellowship,” 
grounded in nonviolent activism that “lifts neighborly concern beyond one’s tribe, 
race, class, and nation.” Counterbalancing the world from “drifting rapidly to its 
doom,” King noted something new and profoundly meaningful had begun: “Old 
systems of exploitation and oppression are passing away, … [and] new systems of 
justice and equality are being born.” In celebrating the end of colonialism, King even 
expressed an inchoate combination of ecological and economic consciousness, 
noting how “The earth is being redistributed.”512 In the eyes of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., the whole world, and all the people in it, functioned as an integrated system. 
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And, with the aid of a global fellowship, both King and Alfred Hassler believed that 
new social systems could emerge to correct old ones.  
In 1967, King’s sermon at Riverside Church in New York City further 
inspired Hassler’s efforts to form what became Dai Dong. King castigated the 
American war in Vietnam, yet he encouraged looking “Beyond Vietnam.” King 
again expressed his vision for a “radical revolution of values” in terms of global 
systems. Recalling his Nobel lecture in 1964, King reiterated how “All over the 
globe men are revolting against old systems of exploitation and oppression, and out 
of the wounds of a frail world, new systems of justice and equality are being born. 
… We in the West must support these revolutions.” King preached a need for 
“collective solutions” to work for a global “brotherhood of man … beyond national 
allegiances.” In a world of overwhelming poverty, racism and militarism, King 
argued our only hope meant, “Every nation must now develop an overriding loyalty 
to mankind as a whole.” Emphasizing the “fierce urgency of now,” King concluded, 
“let us rededicate ourselves to the long and bitter, but beautiful, struggle for a new 
world.” After King’s pacifist battle cry, Hassler contacted Thich Nhat Hanh to 
discuss a global and transnational peace fellowship that could explain and find 
solutions to the broken systems of social integration. 
The transnational links between Alfred Hassler, Thich Nhat Hanh, and 
Martin Luther King mirrored their corresponding visions of the world as an 
interconnected system. In 1958, after collaborating on the comic book about non-
violent resistance, King joined the FOR-USA, just as Hassler began his first year as 
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its director.513 King and Hassler maintained friendship and contact, particularly 
during Hassler’s journeys to Vietnam in the mid-1960s to halt American war efforts 
and promote Vietnam’s indigenous, nonviolent Buddhist movement.514 Hassler met 
Nhat Hanh through this work and promoted Nhat Hanh’s pacifist activism through 
world tours sponsored by the International FOR. In 1966, Hassler introduced King 
and Nhat Hanh, who together promoted peace in Vietnam at press conferences.515 
And early in 1967, as Hassler built momentum in the FOR to found Dai Dong, King 
nominated Thich Nhat Hanh for the Nobel Peace Prize, stating, “I do not personally 
know of anyone more worthy of [this prize] than this gentle monk from Vietnam. 
His ideas for peace, if applied, would build a monument to ecumenism, to world 
brotherhood, to humanity.”516 Following King’s murder, Hassler and Nhat Hanh 
created Dai Dong, a fellowship for humanity, to globally expand and shape the social 
systems King saw emerging in the mid-1960s. By the late 1960s, during the global 
environmental moment, Hassler aimed to unify those holistic social integrations 
through the systems of ecology. 
By the time Alfred Hassler founded Dai Dong in 1969, just as the global 
environmental moment triggered a set of environmental revolutions across much of 
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the global North, the observations and predictions of ecologists and biologists 
appeared to Hassler “like a compilation of nightmares by Hieronymus Bosch.”517 As 
addressed in Chapter 2, scientists like Linus Pauling, Barry Commoner, and Paul 
Ehrlich moved beyond academia to publically pronounce worldwide dangers about 
nuclear fallout radiating children’s bones, poisonous chemicals coating crops and 
water sources around the globe, and burgeoning populations surging past planetary 
food supplies. At the same time, American rivers were igniting in flames, oil had 
drenched coastlines from southwest England to Southern California, and pollution 
belching technologies from Siberia to South Africa blackened skies and threatened to 
make the newly christened Spaceship Earth ecologically uninhabitable for 
humans.518 
The newly realized threats of global environmental collapse influenced 
Hassler to use his new non-governmental organization to take action on the global 
environmental crisis, just as it did for many nation states in the UN with their 
nascent plans for the UNCHE. For his part, Hassler committed Dai Dong to the 
important task of highlighting the magnitude of the global environmental crisis as a 
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means to communicate simultaneously the magnitude of the social, political, and 
economic changes he deemed necessary for human survival. Dai Dong’s message, 
therefore, identified the environmental crisis as a moral crisis that demanded 
systemic change on a planetary scale, including changes not just to industrial 
economics but also to the structures of geopolitics beyond its basis in national 
sovereignty.519 
To better promote Dai Dong’s global message for change, Hassler tapped 
limited FOR funds to open two offices. Although notwithstanding Dai Dong’s 
Chinese name and its transnational self-identification, both offices were located in 
nations of industrialized global North: one was outside New York City, where 
Hassler operated as Executive Director; and another was in Copenhagen, lead by 
European director, Jens Brøndum, chairman of the Scandinavian FOR and a pastor at 
the Technical University of Denmark. A shoestring budget limited both staffs to just 
a handful of paid workers who relied heavily on volunteers and donations. Despite, 
its humble beginnings and geographical placement in the global North, Dai Dong 
projected a broad front by leveraging the authority of scientific experts on global 
environmental threats.520 
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Leveraging Scientific Authority 
 After adopting systems thinking to synthesize ecological concerns with 
notions of social justice, Hassler identified global environmentalism as an all-
encompassing tool for ending war, overturning sovereignty, arresting 
overpopulation, and promoting an equitable balance for both humanity and nature. 
By the end of 1970, Hassler concluded that global collapse “could be averted only by 
a world-wide effort designed to curb the ambitions of the great sovereign states and 
the great, almost equally sovereign corporations, and to redirect our culture and 
technology toward planned, humanistic, and environmentally acceptable goals.”521 
Dai Dong’s purpose, one staff member wrote, was to build a “sense of world 
community by dramatizing through a variety of actions the interrelatedness of our 
global problems, and the practical (not to say moral) necessity of coming together to 
solve them.”522 Who better to express this message than a collection of authoritative 
biologists and ecologists? 
Shortly after forming Dai Dong, an article in Science caught Hassler’s 
attention. Writing with urgency, professor of biophysics, John R. Platt, framed the 
era’s “crisis of crises” as “all beginning to be world problems.” Solutions required 
efforts similar to “the mobilization of scientists” in wartime: 
we are going to need large numbers of scientists forming something like 
research teams or task forces for social research and development.  We 
need full-time interdisciplinary teams combining men of different 
specialties…who can put together our stores of knowledge and powerful 
new ideas into improved technical methods, organizational designs, or 
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‘social inventions’ that have a chance of being adopted soon enough and 
widely enough to be effective. 
 
The world, Platt concluded, needed “a deeper systems analysis” led by 
interdisciplinary, scientific councils who could devise “new mechanisms to help us 
survive.” Hassler channeled these insights into Dai Dong’s earliest efforts.523 
Hassler took seriously the opinions of scientists regarding global problems 
and their ideas for resolving the world’s greatest challenges. He saw scientists in a 
progressively secular society as the most universal authority figures, as revered 
experts who could best annunciate the challenges of the modern world, and also 
offer solutions. The application of scientific systems thinking for diverse 
challenges—from fighting wars against communism or poverty, to renewing urban 
planning, even sending humans to the moon—reflected general faith in the sanctity 
of science and scientist’s expertise.524 Hassler would use scientific authority to 
impress on the planet’s citizens and political leaders the need for peaceful, planetary 
change if humanity was to survive the onslaughts of environmental destruction, 
social exploitation, and deadly wars, like the one then raging through Vietnam. 
In May 1970, one month after millions of Americans mobilized in the first 
Earth Day demonstrations, Hassler organized along the Riviera in Menton, France an 
intimate conference intended as “the first step in the launching of [Dai Dong’s] 
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world-wide, transnational peace movement.”525 In Menton, six international 
environmental scientists met under the sponsorship of Dai Dong and the FOR. 
Hassler tasked the scientists with drafting a declaration based on their special 
knowledge of the nature and broad threat of the global environmental crisis, which 
voiced their conclusions for overcoming the crisis. Once the scientists in Menton 
crafted their declaration, Hassler aspired for the success of earlier scientists’ 
declarations—like Linus Pauling’s appeal to abolish nuclear weapons—by 
circulating the statement for signatures from other authorities and pushing 
collectively for global change.526 Hassler hoped the statement created in Menton 
would garner signatures from other environmental specialists across the world’s 
ethnic, political, and religious traditions, which Dai Dong would use to highlight the 
importance and authority of their own message for establishing global peace with 
and on Spaceship Earth. 
By organizing the Menton conference, Hassler positioned himself, and, by 
association, Dai Dong, as a knowledge broker that leveraged the authority and 
expertise of science for its own political purposes. Throughout the twentieth century, 
especially in the industrialized world, scientists gained unprecedented prestige and 
authority through vast accumulation of empirical and theoretical knowledge, which 
in turn fostered technological innovations and solutions to practical problems. 
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Hassler sought to hitch Dai Dong’s prestige to that of the scientists in Menton and its 
later signatories. With the scientists’ statement, Dai Dong could assert the reliability 
and authority of science while translating it and making it accessible to a broader 
audience, thereby positioning itself as a knowledge broker and mediator between 
scientific and political communities. In Hassler’s eyes, Dai Dong could then help 
influence the growing awareness of global environmental challenges and encourage 
the particular actions it believed necessary for linking the global environmental 
moment with Dai Dong’s broader consideration of worldwide problems like war, 
racism, and economic exploitation.527 
Over several days, the six scientists in Menton drafted a statement that 
redefined Dai Dong’s identity and shaped its future activism. The scientists included 
a Vietnamese biologist who was also an exiled Buddhist nun living in France; two 
American biology professors; a zoologist and former university rector from Holland; 
a physicist from the Max Plank Institute in West Germany; and a French physician 
and biologist who directed the Pasteur Institute in Paris.528 Reflecting Dai Dong’s 
systems approach, they argued that, despite great geographic, linguistic, cultural, and 
political differences among the world’s people, “unprecedented…global and 
interrelated” dangers now forced humanity’s unification. Solutions, they wrote, 
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demanded people abandon their “limited selfish interests to the realization of a 
common need.”529 Addressed not to national governments of sovereign states, but to 
individual citizens of the world, they entitled their declaration, “A Message to Our 
3.5 Billion Neighbors on Planet Earth,” otherwise known as the Menton 
Statement.530 
 
The Menton Statement 
The Menton Statement highlighted four interrelated problem areas. The first 
two, environmental deterioration and depletion of natural resources, seized upon the 
newly realized concerns in industrial nations of the global North about the 
environmental dangers of industrial development and pollution. Noting that the 
unprecedented rate of environmental deterioration seemed irrelevant to less-
industrial parts of the world, the scientists applied a global systems viewpoint that 
“there is only one environment; what happens to a part affects the whole.”531 And, 
similar to the ecological sentiments of economists like Barbara Ward and Kenneth 
Boulding, the Menton scientists’ focus on depleting natural resources noted how 
Spaceship Earth could not provide resources in amounts sufficient for everyone to 
live at consumption levels enjoyed by the rich. Additionally, they warned, disparities 
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in life style and wealth provided a dangerous feedback loop, fueling escalation of 
conflict and revolution.532 
Overpopulation and war constituted the Menton scientists’ other interrelated 
problem areas. Their neo-Malthusian fears of over-crowding and hunger echoed 
similar concerns among biologists like Garrett Hardin and Paul R. Ehrlich.533 With 
world population then at 3.5 billion, the Menton scientists doubted new technologies 
could feed the 6.5 billion people expected on Earth by the year 2000. Even if 
technology could “produce enough synthetic food for all,” they warned, the over-
crowding of rising populations would likely generate “disastrous social and 
ecological consequences.” The Menton scientists accounted for consumption and 
global equity in their neo-Malthusian analyses, preempting Paul Ehrlich’s eventual 
consideration of global contexts.534 They noted specifically how Americans 
consumed far more than people in highly populated India, with those fewer 
Americans producing much greater pollution. 
The Menton scientists lastly castigated the horrors of war, particularly the 
arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Emphasizing Dai Dong’s 
pacifist and transnational objectives, the scientists argued the dangers of war focused 
on two points of global justice: rising inequity between industrialized and non-
industrialized parts of the world, as impoverished millions determined to improve 
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their lot; and, competition for power and economic advantage between anarchic 
nation-states unwilling to relinquish selfish interests for the greater planetary 
good.535 The scientists invited to Menton by Dai Dong were clearly caught up in the 
global environmental moment. While many of the same issues addressed in Chapters 
1 through 3 of this dissertation led nation states to direct their concerns through the 
United Nations, Dai Dong’s Menton scientists suggested an approach that looked 
beyond the confines of national boundaries.   
To combat the interrelated torments of pollution, resources, population, and 
war, the Menton scientists suggested four responses—not as panaceas, but “holding 
actions”—to prevent global crises moving beyond “the point of no return.” They 
proposed a total moratorium on untested technologies not essential to human 
survival, including “new weapons systems, luxury transport [like supersonic planes], 
new and untested pesticides, the manufacture of new plastics, [and] the 
establishment of vast new nuclear power projects.” This included ecologically un-
researched projects like damming great rivers, clear cutting forests, and deep-sea 
drilling projects. They next encouraged slowing the exhaustion of resources with 
existing pollution-control technologies for energy and industrial production, and 
rapidly establishing international accords on environmental quality. Third, the 
Menton scientists urged intensified programs to halt global population growth, 
noting carefully these must avoid abrogation of human rights. Lastly, mirroring Dai 
Dong’s pacifism, the scientists demanded the abolishment of war to prevent “the 
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extermination of the human species.” These actions must be demanded and adopted 
not just be the world’s nations but achieved through the concerted actions of 
individuals all around the world.536 
The Menton scientists concluded that the Earthrise photo and recent moon 
landing showed how “Earth, which has seemed so large, must now be seen in its 
smallness.” Humanity, they continued, must realize “we live in a closed system, 
absolutely dependent on Earth and on each other.” To ensure survival, the Menton 
scientists believed it “literally true that only by transcending our divisions will men 
be able to keep Earth as their home.” Solutions to the global challenges of war, 
pollution, hunger, and over-population, they warned, “may be simpler to find than 
the formula for the common effort through which the search for solutions must 
occur, but we must make a beginning.”537 It offered a humble finale to an otherwise 
alarming statement by biological and environmental authorities. Their statement, 
Hassler mused after the conference, “lacks the kind of melodrama to be found in the 
speech in Missouri by C. P. Snow … or of the works of Paul Ehrlich, but seems to 
me to be even stronger by reason of its restraint.”538 
In the realm of science, knowledge is most valid and persuasive when 
presented as universal and applicable everywhere.539 If Dai Dong was to become 
truly transnational, it first must become a global, universal knowledge broker. 
Hassler’s global ambitions lead to distributing the Menton declaration for signatures 
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by environmental scientists from all around the world. Hassler hoped a uniformly 
supported Menton Statement could capture enough media attention that millions 
around the world would realize the common environmental predicament then facing 
the world, and join the newly authoritative Dai Dong in its transnational effort 
toward planetary solutions.540 Hassler’s use of the Menton Statement to promote 
both Dai Dong and its transnational message for planetary unity to confront 
planetary dangers eventually catapulted Dai Dong into the realm of global 
environmental politics. Dai Dong’s efforts soon intersected with those of the UN, 
though each organization had very different ideas for how to save Spaceship Earth in 
the global environment moment. 
 
From Menton to the United Nations and Beyond 
After the Menton conference, Dai Dong promptly sent its statement to 
biology departments mostly in nations of the global North, like Europe and North 
America, but also throughout the global South to environmental experts in Asia, 
Africa, and South America. In less than a year, over 2,200 biologists, ecologists, and 
environmental experts from twenty-four nations had signed the Menton Statement, 
including four Nobel laureates: Salvador Luria, Jacques Monod, Albert Szent-
Gyorgi, and George Wald. Other noted signatories included Paul R. Ehrlich, Garrett 
Hardin, Margaret Mead, E. W. Pfeiffer, Sir Julian Huxley, Thor Heyerdahl, Gerado 
Budowski, René Dumont, Jean Rostand, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Enrique Beltran, and 
                                                                                                                                     
539 Bocking, Nature’s Experts, 18-19. 
540 Dai Dong staff, “Letter to Prof. Larry Slobodkin,” March 25, 1970, Box 2, Menton 
Conference of Scientists, 1970, SCPC. 
  369 
Mohamed Zaki Barakat. Some signatories, like Ehrlich, also sent checks to support 
Dai Dong’s efforts. Dai Dong’s reply to Ehrlich gushed, “As you must know, your 
writings have influenced us a great deal in our thinking.”541 Less than two years after 
Hassler founded it, Dai Dong, achieved global recognition from environmental 
experts. Next, Hassler sought global influence. 
What better organization for Dai Dong to deliver its global message than the 
United Nations, the world’s best-known forum for global political dialog? In the 
spring of 1971, Hassler contacted the UN headquarters in New York in hopes of 
presenting the Menton Statement to U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, and to 
Maurice Strong, who had recently accepted the responsibility of planning the 
UNCHE that would occur the next year in Stockholm. In writing to U Thant and 
Strong, Hassler emphasized how the Menton Statement, supported by thousands of 
the world’s environmental experts, diagnosed the “overwhelming problems that face 
humanity today” and made explicit “the interrelationships between the problems.”542 
U Thant and Strong, looking to publicize the upcoming UNCHE, welcomed the 
opportunity both to formally receive the Menton Statement and meet with prominent 
scientists who supported it.543 
Even before Hassler’s meeting with Maurice Strong and U Thant, Dai 
Dong’s Menton Statement helped encourage the UN to adopt more scientific support 
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for the UNCHE. Immediately after scheduling Hassler and the Menton scientists’ 
reception, Strong asked acclaimed microbiologist René Dubos to create and head an 
international committee of environmental experts to assemble the first scientific 
report on the world environment.544 Economist Barbara Ward used material from 
Dubos’s committee for the book, Only One Earth, which both Dubos and Maurice 
Strong described as the “conceptual framework” for the UNCHE. Strong celebrated 
its “invaluable guidance in the formulation of scientific issues” as “an integral part of 
preparations” for the UNCHE.545 Dai Dong thus helped instigate one of the first 
reports on the state of the global environment. 
On May 11, 1971, U Thant and Strong received Dai Dong’s Menton 
Statement and also met several of the Menton Statement’s authors and signers, 
including Nobel laureate George Wald. In a public relations boon to Dai Dong’s 
transnational message, Thant reiterated the scientists’ “grave warning that our world 
may be irremediably damaged unless a concerted global effort” was made 
“simultaneously at the individual, the national, and the international level.” Thant 
proclaimed how the scientists’ “urgent message … must be heeded—and acted 
upon—without delay.” Thant hoped Dai Dong’s warning about humanity’s shared 
global dangers, which he agreed carried “the seeds of extinction for the human 
species,” just might be “the elusive force” to bind humanity together. The “battle for 
human survival,” Thant concluded, could “only be won by all nations and peoples 
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joining together” in a concerted effort to preserve life on Earth. Thant wished 
Hassler continued successes in expanding Dai Dong’s program.546 
Hassler, through Dai Dong’s presentation of the signed Menton Statement, 
provoked increased scientific input for the upcoming UNCHE in 1972, while also 
gaining greater global notoriety for Dai Dong. In July 1971, The UNESCO Courier 
printed the Menton Statement as its cover article, where it was translated into twelve 
different languages and distributed to more than a half-million global subscribers, 
including tens of thousands in the Soviet Union alone.547 The Courier’s publication 
of Dai Dong’s first initiative further catapulted the young organization to its brief but 
widespread recognition in the global environmental moment. In less than two years, 
while working from a shoe-string budget, Dai Dong managed to capture global 
notoriety, to wield a small degree of international influence, and widely proclaim its 
message that the world’s people must forgo their national, racial, and economic 
differences to overcome the threats then endangering the planet. 
Despite their success and influence with the Menton Statement, Hassler and 
many of the Menton scientists remained unsatisfied. After all, one of the Menton 
Statement’s primary points, and a driving construct for Dai Dong, was that 
environmental pollution, depletion of resources, overpopulation, and warfare were, 
in Hassler’s words, “concomitant of present-day nation states,” both communist and 
capitalist, and “all of them are direct threats to human survival.” Hassler’s letters to 
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Menton signers emphasized that humanity could find salvation only through a 
transnational, global fellowship “in which the sovereign ambitions of nations, the 
narrow objectives of giant corporations, and the self-seeking desires of individuals 
are subordinated.”548 Dai Dong sought global fellowship and environmental 
harmony by overturning the structures of national sovereignty. With the UN 
predicated on the promotion of global politics within the confines of nation-state-
based diplomacy, Hassler knew Dai Dong’s next step must transcend the UN and its 
upcoming UNCHE in Stockholm. 
 
Challenging Sovereignty and the UNCHE with an Independent Conference 
After their private meeting with U Thant and Maurice Strong, Hassler and the 
Menton signers became increasingly convinced that the problem with the UNCHE 
lay in the structure of the UN itself. The foundation of the UN, after all, was built 
around the sanctity of nation-state sovereignty. And the traditional rights of 
sovereignty enabled nations to pollute, populate, and exploit resources, even at the 
expense of global neighbors and despite awareness of the interconnected 
biosphere.549 Hassler and the Menton scientists thus found the UN an improper 
institution for fostering global, transnational change. As the global environmental 
moment coalesced toward Stockholm, Hassler looked outside the confines of the UN 
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to promote Dai Dong’s message that solving global problems—including 
environmental ones—required transnational unity and new modes of equity, not just 
between nations, but in a worldwide human fellowship of individuals. Nonetheless, 
with worldwide attention to global environmental problems soon to be focused on 
Stockholm, the UN gathering there offered an opportunity to spread Dai Dong’s 
alternative message. As a result, Hassler announced near the end of 1971 that Dai 
Dong would hold its own Independent Environmental Conference in Stockholm, 
parallel to the UNCHE in June 1972. Dai Dong thus helped create an outer ring of 
events at Stockholm’s environmental circus that simultaneously challenged the 
UNCHE while also seeking to influence it.550 
Due to the UNCHE’s multi-year planning process, as detailed in Chapters 3 
through 5, the UN’s first intergovernmental summit on the global environment 
eventually unfolded as a limited convocation of diplomats, where influential 
delegations sought to secure, despite much rhetoric of environmental independence, 
a continuation of the industrial and sovereign status quo. As addressed in the prior 
chapter, the UNCHE did narrowly produce a Declaration on the Human 
Environment, numerous non-binding recommendations for action by UN member-
states, and what eventually became the underfunded United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP). But, ultimately, the UNCHE reified national sovereignty and 
institutionalized the UN’s favor for promoting sovereign industrial development as 
an unclearly defined solution for international environmental problems.551 Those 
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developments were exactly what Alfred Hassler hoped to forestall and challenge 
with Dai Dong’s Independent Conference on the Environment. 
Hassler scheduled Dai Dong’s Independent Conference to occur just before 
the UNCHE and also in Stockholm, yet he maintained that Dai Dong’s conference 
was not an anti-UN meeting. Instead, Hassler hoped Dai Dong could capture some of 
the international attention focused on global problems at Stockholm to better 
promote Dai Dong’s transnational message of a global fellowship for saving 
Spaceship Earth. Hassler also harbored hope that Dai Dong’s message might actually 
re-direct the UNCHE’s debate. In advance of Dai Dong’s Independent Conference, 
Hassler and his small international staff created Dai Dong’s own draft declaration to 
dramatize the depth and interrelation of global crises, noting how environmental 
problems required a strong, unified response that included but moved beyond the 
separate interests of sovereign states. Looking to replicate Dai Dong’s triumph with 
the Menton Statement, Hassler hoped Dai Dong’s Independent Conference would 
then agree uniformly upon this Independent Declaration, which explained the 
inherent interconnection of the global environmental crisis with other worldwide 
social and economic problems. 
Hassler and his Dai Dong colleagues in Europe envisioned Dai Dong’s 
Independent Declaration would address inclusively the problems of war, the 
redistribution of wealth, and the incompatibility of ecology and industrial 
development, none of which the UNCHE planned to discuss.552 By holding the Dai 
Dong conference before the UNCHE, they not only hoped Dai Dong’s Independent 
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Declaration would gain global attention in its own right, they also hoped Dai Dong 
own powerful and unified declaration could encourage the UNCHE to incorporate 
Dai Dong’s broader perspective. As the global environmental moment moved toward 
its apex, and as various international environmental NGOs like Dai Dong began to 
flower, Dai Dong held firm to its transnational identity and aimed to overcome the 
limitations of nation-state-centered politics inherent in the UN.553 
Dai Dong thus rode the waves of the global environmental moment to 
Stockholm in the summer of 1972. While intersecting at times with the UN, Dai 
Dong’s trajectory from Menton to Stockholm reveals its alternative interpretation for 
how to confront global environmental challenges and the interrelated social and 
economic issues associated with and producing environmental degradation. Rather 
than advocate environmental solutions through the structures of national 
governments, Dai Dong sought to promote a grassroots approach for addressing 
global challenges. Scheduled to overlap slightly with the UNCHE, Dai Dong’s 
Independent Conference on the Environment established an outer ring for 
Stockholm’s environmental circus. Despite Dai Dong’s message of transnational 
unity as a prerequisite for solving global problems, its Independent Conference on 
the Environment would eventually fracture in ways quite similar to the North-South 
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divisions between sovereign nations during the preparatory process and performance 
of governments at the UNCHE, inside Stockholm’s inner ring. 
 
Dai Dong’s North-South Debate at Stockholm’s Environmental Circus 
Hassler invited a diverse collection of environmental scientists and other 
scholars—both men and women from sundry racial, religious, political, and national 
backgrounds—to meet in Stockholm from June 2 to 6, 1972. Seeking to represent the 
vision of global togetherness represented in Dai Dong’s very name, Hassler was 
adamant that Dai Dong’s Independent Conference “must not be dominated by 
Americans or United States ideas.”554 As a result, Dai Dong’s conference featured 
thirty-two participants from twenty-four countries in regions across the world. 
Nearly half of Dai Dong’s attendees came from less developed nations and, while 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies boycotted the UNCHE, Dai Dong’s 
conference featured three participants from Eastern Europe. These independent 
experts included doctors from Nigeria and Kenya, a chemical engineer from Japan, a 
biologist from Vietnam, an entomologist from India, ecologists from Iran, Poland, 
and Chile, a sociologist from Hungary, and other environmentally inclined 
specialists from North America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe.555 
Despite Dai Dong’s message of unity, and perhaps due in part to the global 
diversity of social and environmental backgrounds of its attendees, Dai Dong’s 
Independent Conference on the Environment in Stockholm failed to unite over 
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several major points that Hassler had included in Dai Dong’s draft Independent 
Declaration. Not unlike the challenges in finding rhetorical agreement in drafting the 
UNCHE’s environmental declaration, consensus among Dai Dong’s thirty-two 
environmental experts proved impossible over three main issues: sovereignty, 
pacifism, and population—the primary points that had set Dai Dong’s intentions 
apart from the UNCHE in the first place!556 Tom Artin, a humanities professor who 
volunteered with Dai Dong in Stockholm, recalled how Hassler and his delegates 
were “quite unprepared for the depth of the division over [these issues], which 
threatened at several points to tear the [Independent] conference apart.”557 Mirroring 
divisions between nations of the global North and those of the global South within 
the UN, the deepest divisions at Dai Dong’s Independent Conference arose between 
young scientists from less developed nations and older experts from relatively 
wealthy and industrialized nations. 
In an effort to maintain Dai Dong’s transnational identity, Hassler had invited 
to Stockholm several radical, young scientists who called themselves the Oi 
Committee International, including its de facto leader, M. Taghi Farvar.558 Farvar, 
originally from Iran, had just completed his Ph.D. at Washington University in St. 
Louis under the mentorship of environmental scientist Barry Commoner. Farvar’s 
thesis examined ecological and social damage caused by industrial exploitation in 
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Central America resulting from chemical pesticides. In addition to his experiences 
with Commoner at the Airlie House conference on ecological harm from 
international development, Farvar arrived in Stockholm well primed to argue how 
actions by governments and industries in the global North bore the greatest 
responsibility for global environmental damage.559 At Dai Dong’s Independent 
Conference, Farvar thus took on the role of radical advocate for people from the 
global South, similar in ways to the roles of Brazil and China at the UNCHE. Dai 
Dong volunteer Tom Artin described Farvar’s appearance in Stockholm as if he was 
a movie villain: 
Taghi’s face looks beaked like a hawk’s. Curly black hair comes almost to 
his shoulders; from his temples it flows down in thick muttonchops over 
his cheeks, then across his mouth as a mustache. Black horn-rims goggle 
his eyes. His articulate English is flawless…though he speaks with a 
peculiar, clipped intonation hard to place. … His viewpoints derive in 
large measure from Barry Commoner’s … [H]e says he has the Third-
World perspective. 
 
Additionally, Farvar, like his mentor, never signed the Menton Statement because of 
the statement’s advocacy that overpopulation was a global environmental problem. 
Both Commoner and Farvar considered Dai Dong’s neo-Malthusian prescriptions 
not only ecological wrong and unscientific; they believed the popularity in the global 
North of ideas to control overpopulation were imperialist and unacceptable.560 
Members of the Oi Committee rejected outright any concern for 
overpopulation and considered population control an affront to the hard-won 
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sovereignty of peoples from less developed nations in the global South. Some Oi 
members argued that only “racists and imperialists” worked toward population 
control. Furthermore, in opposition to Dai Dong’s deeply held faith in pacifism, 
many Oi scientists believed only direct, radical, and revolutionary action—including 
the use of violence—would enable oppressed people of the global South to overturn 
ongoing social and economic imperialism, rectify global inequities, and establish 
sovereign nationhood.561 Differences between delegates at Dai Dong’s conference 
were not primarily scientific; they were political—similar to the political conflicts 
between Northern and Southern nations during the UNCHE planning process and its 
activities in Stockholm. A journalist for Science complained that, in Stockholm, the 
Oi Committee’s politics so overshadowed its environmental concerns that 
“independent discussion ceased to be a possibility.”562 At the height of the global 
environmental moment in Stockholm, environmental politics fractured between 
North and South both within the UN’s inner ring of the UNCHE and in the outer ring 
of Dai Dong’s Independent Conference. 
Although Hassler later blamed Dai Dong’s failures in Stockholm explicitly 
on Farvar and the Oi Committee, both Dai Dong and Farvar’s group shared several 
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affinities.563 Just as Hassler had formed Dai Dong within the IFOR, Farvar and 
Commoner established the Oi Committee amid an international forum, at the 1971 
International Youth Conference on the Human Environment, in Hamilton, 
Ontario.564 And similar to Dai Dong’s systems focus on global environmental issues, 
the Oi group described itself as an “international committee of young scientists and 
scholars for a critical and holistic approach to development and the human 
environment.”565 Like Hassler, Farvar and Commoner expressed concern “that the 
voice of the independent scientific community would not be listened to carefully by 
the ‘72 [UN Stockholm] Conference.”566 And, like Dai Dong, the Oi Committee’s 
name reflected a combination of non-Western and global interests. Oi was a Swahili 
acronym for Ote iwapo, meaning “count everything,” or “all that is must be 
considered.”567 Ironically, the greatest difference between Oi supporters and Dai 
Dong was that the Oi Committee did not count humanity’s rising population as an 
environmental hazard. 
Before events unfolded in Stockholm, Hassler had invited the Oi Committee’s 
attendees in order to make Dai Dong’s Independent Conference more representative 
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of global diversity. He had hoped Dai Dong’s peaceful and transnational message of 
fellowship would encourage the Oi Committee’s scientists from the global South to 
harmonize with Dai Dong’s older environmental experts, most of whom hailed from 
the global North. As it played out, however, the presence of Farvar and his Oi 
Committee colleagues upset Hassler’s hopes for unity in producing a strongly 
worded Independent Declaration. Dai Dong’s conference in Stockholm’s outer ring 
featured as much conflict, if not more, than that within the UNCHE’s inner ring. 
Like the weak UNCHE Declaration, the Dai Dong Independent Conference 
eventually produced its own weak declaration. Attendees to Dai Dong’s conference 
agreed with Hassler’s diagnosis of environmental dilemmas as manifestations of 
global social crises that demanded new political and economic behaviors. However, 
beyond that broad agreement, Dai Dong’s global prescriptions—its neo-Malthusian 
concerns, its pacifism, and its efforts to overturn national sovereignty—ran counter 
to the Oi Committee’s political ideologies. As a result, the Independent Declaration 
to emerge from Dai Dong’s outer ring in Stockholm was riddled with statements that 
various attendees disagreed over, which was also similar to what unfolded in the 
inner ring of the UNCHE. 
Contrarian appendices and partisan signing statements weakened the 
declaration that emerged from Dai Dong’s independent conference in Stockholm. 
Hassler’s delegates achieved consensus on a few issues, agreeing that survival 
depended on consideration of the total, indivisible environment; that fundamental 
conflict existed between economic growth and environmental preservation; and that 
technology must be restructured ecologically. But divisions remained paramount. Oi 
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members insisted that, “Population is not the most important or the most decisive 
factor effecting the human environment,” while Dai Dong’s North American and 
European delegates complained that “ideological polarities” on the “population 
factor” had confused the declaration and reduced the issue to a misunderstood 
controversy. Additionally, Dai Dong’s pacifist delegates would only sign the 
declaration if it made clearer demands for abstinence from war and individual 
violence.568 Hassler’s pioneering vision may have appealed to many, but his means 
failed to foster global fellowship or sustain Dai Dong’s existence. 
On June 9, 1972, a few days after Dai Dong’s Independent Conference 
concluded, Hassler accepted a personal invitation from Maurice Strong to read Dai 
Dong’s Independent Declaration before the UNCHE’s plenary session.569 Despite 
Hassler’s hope to deliverer a hard-hitting declaration that inspired UN diplomats 
along Dai Dong’s transnational philosophy, one observer noted that, “Now it looked 
as though [Dai Dong’s] forthright declaration would just be swallowed, among 
hundreds of other papers arguing this position or that, like so much plankton down 
the maw of a whale.”570 After rising to worldwide stature in terms of global 
environmental issues with the Menton Statement, Dai Dong’s performance in 
Stockholm was ultimately a failure. Its weak and fractured Independent Declaration 
failed to re-direct the trajectory of the UNCHE. In fact, both conferences seemed to 
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reflect the North-South divisions that still plague international environmental politics 
today. 
For the remainder of its time in Stockholm, during the environmental circus 
there,  Dai Dong continued its efforts in capturing international attention on 
environmental issues it believed important. For example, during the UNCHE’s 
official deliberations, Dai Dong sponsored various independent seminars 
emphasizing its utopian hopes for a grassroots fellowship of individuals to solve 
global challenges. It even helped sponsor a conference against American ecocide in 
Vietnam. But not of these events generated much attention or influence. For 
instance, the vast majority of North American media overlooked Dai Dong’s events 
as side-shows, although some European and South Asian media offered limited 
coverage. Nevertheless, after several weeks in Sweden, Dai Dong’s staff and 
leadership left Stockholm exhausted, dejected, and after so much effort and expense, 
essentially broke.571  
After cutting much of its meagerly paid staff, Dai Dong’s remaining 
employees and volunteers attempted two new projects: an economist’s statement on 
the energy crisis and need to transition to a no-growth society, and a statement by 
world religious leaders relating the environment and religion. Only the former 
appeared with languid interest from international economists. Dai Dong never again 
achieved global attention or influence, and by early 1974, its constant financial 
struggles finally caught up to it. Dai Dong’s failure to create consensus at Stockholm 
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and its inability thereafter to strongly influence world opinion resulted in its financial 
starvation.572 
 
Addressing Sovereignty Differently: Dai Dong vs. Friends of the Earth 
Hassler leveraged the authority of scientists and interdisciplinary 
environmental experts to express the integrated nature of Earth’s social, political, 
economic, and ecological systems and reshape them. At that global scale, however, 
not all actors shared Hassler’s particular transnational and environmental 
perspectives. Despite its plea for transnational fellowship, Dai Dong disbanded 
shortly after failing to transcend differences in Stockholm over national sovereignty 
and overpopulation. It then slipped from most historical memories.573 
Friends of the Earth, however, another international environmental NGO 
with a grassroots fellowship now over two million strong in seventy-four countries, 
has survived—even thrived—since its establishment in 1969, the same year that Dai 
Dong was founded. Why, after Dai Dong’s initial surge to global attention with 
support from leading scientific experts, did it die and Friends of the Earth thrive? 
The answer rests on the central issue that limited Dai Dong’s environmental 
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declaration in Stockholm, the same issue Dai Dong sought to overcome by hosting 
its independent conference: namely, national sovereignty. 
The proliferation of environmental NGOs like Dai Dong in the late 1960s 
and 1970s saw many activists and international relations scholars identify those 
organizations as eroding sovereignty. Alfred Hassler, like others, believed national 
sovereignty and the interdependent biosphere could not co-exist; that a choice must 
be made between global environmental reconciliation—including control of 
planetary overpopulation—and a state’s exclusive authority within its territorial 
boundaries.574 Dai Dong rooted its transnational philosophy in such anti-sovereign 
environmental activism. However, influential and enduring environmental NGOs 
like Friends of the Earth have since encouraged scholars of international relations 
and politics to adopt more flexible understandings of sovereignty. They now see 
international NGOs not overturning national sovereignty but challenging and 
revising its norms and practices. Today’s scholars identify sovereignty as a socially 
constructed “cluster of practices undergoing multiple processes of unbundling, 
contestation, and reconfiguration.”575 When compared to the exploits of Dai Dong, 
Friends of the Earth helps reveal how global environmental activism and sovereign 
authority need not exist in opposition. 
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In 1969, when the Sierra Club discharged David Brower, its executive 
director, after his political activism severed the Club’s tax-exempt status, Brower 
founded a new organization named Friends of the Earth. Like Alfred Hassler, 
Brower’s vision became increasingly global and devotional. “There is something 
evangelical about Brower,” wrote John McPhee. “Brower is a visionary. He wants—
literally—to save the world.”576 And like Hassler’s efforts with Dai Dong, Brower 
led Friends of the Earth in campaigns to achieve maximum publicity and attention to 
issues he deemed critical to environmental sanctity.577 In 1971, in Roslagen, Sweden, 
shortly before the UNCHE, Brower and American Friends of the Earth members 
joined environmentalists from France, Great Britain, and Sweden to establish 
Friends of the Earth International.578 At the UNCHE, Friends of the Earth served as a 
knowledge broker by co-publishing a daily conference newspaper, The Stockholm 
Conference Eco, which Maurice Strong’s senior information advisor described as 
“required reading … by everyone [in Stockholm] from the Press to the heads of 
government delegations.”579 Although Friends of the Earth and Dai Dong shared 
many goals, Friends of the Earth’s foundational formula for its transnational 
coalition approached sovereignty differently. 
According to Brower, Friends of the Earth’s formula was “to find people in 
other countries who [shared Friends of the Earth’s] own ideas about the limits to 
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growth…and who [had] a respect for biological diversity. Then these people become 
the Board of Directors for their own country. They run their own show.”580 Today, 
Friends of the Earth exists in over seventy countries across the globe, North and 
South, yet each chapter in its international coalition remains essentially a national 
NGO. Friends of the Earth’s multinational coalition lobbies international 
organizations and shares support of individual national chapters. Yet, Friends of the 
Earth’s institutional and financial survival hinges on its ability to work within the 
existing global system based on national sovereignty. 
Dai Dong’s triumphs and its tragedy, made apparent in Stockholm, was its 
strict fealty to transnationalism and, in conjunction with neo-Malthusianism, its 
inflexible opposition to self-determined national sovereignty. Alfred Hassler also 
failed to establish a set constituency to provide Dai Dong with enduring political 
power and financial stability. Ironically, an overt focus on lobbying the UN system 
hampered Dai Dong’s effectiveness for global change. The UN, by design, has 
limited power and influence because UN decisions remain nonbinding over its 
sovereign members. Friends of the Earth’s formula for global activism and 
expansion accepted the necessity of national sovereignty in order to work toward 
broad social and environmental improvement. Dai Dong’s orthodoxy toward 
transnationalism and its strict anti-sovereignty led eventually to its dissolution and 
Hassler’s retirement from world-peace work. 
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Working Against World Systems or Within? 
Upon Dai Dong’s financial collapse, which led to Hassler’s retirement, 
Hassler reflected on Dai Dong’s ultimate contributions and impact. In a letter to the 
European director of Dai Dong, Hassler celebrated how they had “literally made Dai 
Dong known in much of the world [and made] the Menton Statement a fixture in 
environmental discussions.” However, Hassler could not overlook continued 
parochialism between different religions, nations, and economies. Dai Dong failed to 
foster the planetary fellowship Hassler deemed essential to enacting his vision for 
survival. The reason Dai Dong failed, Hassler suggested was “We lost our 
coherence.”581 When establishing Dai Dong, Hassler drew upon systems thinking, 
which arose for the very purpose of keeping complex interactions coherent and 
actionable. Dai Dong’s systems-based peace project lost itself in the complexity of 
interconnections it hoped to highlight. 
In the global environmental moment, Hassler’s utopian goals for Dai Dong 
sought to use environmental rationales to overturn the global order. In the spirit of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Dai Dong aimed to create new global systems of peace that 
could extinguish old systems of destruction that encouraged nationalism, war, 
exploitation, environmental damage, and the insatiable demand for economic 
growth. Hassler took seriously Barry Commoner’s pronouncement in 1971, “that the 
world is being carried to the brink of ecological disaster not by a singular fault, 
which some clever scheme can correct, but by the phalanx of powerful economic, 
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political, and social forces that constitute the march of history.”582 Hassler’s mission 
for Dai Dong, therefore, was to save humanity from itself, to re-direct history’s 
global trajectory, to transpose human systems for greater alignment with natural 
systems and, consequently, to achieve greater equality and security for all passengers 
on Spaceship Earth. 
Through Dai Dong, Hassler helped pioneer that new global environmental 
vision in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But, like most utopian efforts, Dai Dong 
ultimately failed to accomplish its goals of a new global order. In Dai Dong’s failure, 
we see initially the robust resiliency of an established global system of economic and 
environmental exploitation, and of North-South political intransigence to resist 
change. Yet, when comparing Dai Dong’s strategy with Friends of the Earth, a more 
complex picture appears. Today, Friends of the Earth thrives as an influential force 
in both national and international environments because it worked within established 
global systems. Friends of the Earth operated within the structures of national 
sovereignty, while still working toward global nature preservation, conservation, and 
environmentally sustainable technology for economic development. Friends of the 
Earth’s survival and expansion beyond the global environmental moment and into 
the twenty-first century reveals how our dynamic and sovereignty-based systems for 
political organization and economic growth can confront, accept, and even co-op 
challenges to its global order. The global system discarded Dai Dong but absorbed 
Friends of the Earth, so long as Friends of the Earth worked within it. The triumph 
and tragedy of Dai Dong was that it thought globally and also sought to act globally. 
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Friends of the Earth, however, and the Oi Committee, for that matter, thought 
globally but acted locally. This may be the greatest practical lesson Dai Dong has to 
offer for contemporary efforts of global environmental diplomacy. 
*** 
 As a major participant in the outer ring of Stockholm’s environmental circus, 
Dai Dong represented how some new international organizations both rose to 
prominence and struggled through the global environmental moment. Dai Dong 
captured worldwide attention with its systems-based message of transnational unity, 
best captured in the Menton Statement. Yet, in Stockholm, the inability of attendees 
of Dai Dong’s Independent Conference on the Environment to transcend their 
ingrained political divisions reflected the similar splits between nations North and 
South within the official UNCHE—political divisions that still define much of 
international environmental politics today. At the dawn of global environmentalism 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Dai Dong’s vision that global unity was necessary 
both for social equity and environmental survival failed to transcend the political 
realities of the period, which led ultimately to Dai Dong’s disintegration. Other 
organizations, like Friends of the Earth, also worked as knowledge brokers of 
environmental knowledge and sought similar global environmental objectives as Dai 
Dong, but the international environmental organizations that survived beyond the 
conflicts apparent at Stockholm found different political tactics that were more 
realistic to the contexts of the existing social systems. 
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 Elsewhere in Stockholm’s outer ring of environmental events, the politics of 
how best to understand the integration of social systems and environmental systems 
came into conflict. The next chapter addresses how two of the leading environmental 
scientists that helped create the global environmental moment—Barry Commoner 
and Paul R. Ehrlich—also contributed to the environmental circus in Stockholm.
  392 
Chapter 8 
 
TITANS IN THE FORUM: 
Commoner and Ehrlich in Stockholm 
 
 
“Although the agenda, issues, and procedures have been laid down rather 
firmly by pre-convention actions … the real issues are certain to arise in 
Stockholm, for the city will be host to much more than the official 
conference in June.” 
— Barry Commoner, “Motherhood in Stockholm,” Harper’s Magazine, 
June 1972. 
 
“Some confusion, political maneuvering and outright stupidity were to be 
expected. But … “First World” environmentalists and population planners 
perhaps now realize that, like it or not, questions of environmental sanity 
and population control in all nations – rich and poor – cannot be divorced 
from basic questions of peace and equity.” 
— Paul R. Ehrlich, “A Crying Need for Quiet Conferences,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, September 1972. 
 
 
The outer rings of Stockholm’s environmental circus in June 1972 included 
more than just Dai Dong’s Independent Conference on the Environment. While 
national delegations met in the inner ring of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE), another component of Stockholm’s outer ring 
included a convocation of individuals and non-governmental organizations who met 
at what was called the Environment Forum. There, diverse actors expressed their 
own ideas about the instigating factors behind the global environmental crisis and 
the best means for saving Spaceship Earth. While the points of debate at the 
Environment Forum often differed in content from those within the UNCHE, the 
politics concerning the social aspects of environmental issues remained somewhat 
similar at both. This chapter’s focus on two influential environmental scientists who 
attended the Environment Forum—Barry Commoner and Paul R. Ehrlich, both 
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famed biologists and rival environmental activists—offers a key example for how 
various environmental ideas clashed in Stockholm’s outer ring in ways that reflected 
many of the same divisions at other events during Stockholm’s environmental circus. 
Some fifteen miles away from the politicians and bureaucrats at the official 
UNCHE, on the other side of Stockholm, the UN-sanctioned Environment Forum 
provided a semi-official convention for the numerous citizens, scientists, and newly 
formed environmental NGOs who had first brought the environmental crisis to the 
world’s attention. But due to its poor funding and lack of structure, the Environment 
Forum became an uncontrolled space of heated debates for various players, 
including environmental activists, prominent scientists, a burgeoning international 
civil society, as well as for often-radical skeptics of the official UNCHE. 
Barry Commoner stood among the most prominent of these critics at the 
Environment Forum. Similar to Alfred Hassler and Dai Dong, Commoner believed 
the UN conference was avoiding discussion of controversial but fundamental issues 
for the global environment—issues like ecocide in Vietnam, environmental justice in 
the Third World, and the need to reconsider national sovereignty in order to solve the 
planet’s transnational environmental troubles. While Paul R. Ehrlich had his own 
skepticism about the UN conference, he arrived at them through the issue of 
overpopulation. These differences provided the fodder for Commoner and Ehrlich’s 
clash in Stockholm. Even before the UNCHE and Environment Forum had begun, 
one journalist explained that, “like the sorcerer’s apprentice, the [Environment] 
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Forum has developed a personality and will of its own. There may even be some 
trouble and goings-on.”583 Indeed, there would be. 
By the summer of 1972, the increasingly acrimonious debate between Barry 
Commoner and Paul R. Ehrlich had reached a fever pitch. Their disagreement began 
over the causes of the global environmental crisis and, therefore, the means to its 
solution. But it eventually shaped Commoner and Ehrlich into scientific, political, 
and even personal rivals. While Ehrlich remained wedded to his belief that 
overpopulation was the primary cause of global environmental problems and thus 
needed immediate—possibly coercive—control, Commoner refused to acknowledge 
human reproduction as anything more than a social choice to be made by sovereign 
individuals. For Commoner, the exponential growth of intrusive modern 
technologies—not growing human populations—was the main culprit behind the 
increasing destruction of ecological systems. In opposition to Ehrlich’s strict 
biological focus on population, Commoner argued that only by revising the social 
systems of political economies that governed invasive technologies could humanity 
solve global environmental problems. For Commoner, population control remained 
an environmental red herring. 
This chapter, like the prior one, aims to expand our understanding of the 
global environmental moment and how it climaxed in Stockholm. Doing so again 
requires stepping back in time to examine the origins of Commoner and Ehrlich’s 
debate in the late 1960s before the events that unfolded in Stockholm in the summer 
of 1972. By the time Commoner and Ehrlich arrived in Stockholm to attend the 
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Environment Forum, Commoner and Ehrlich had become enemies. At the peak of 
the global environmental moment, both Ehrlich and Commoner traveled to 
Stockholm in hopes of advancing arguments in their on-going debate before a 
worldwide audience. Though both men worked hard to promote awareness and 
achieve solutions for the global environmental crisis, Commoner and Ehrlich had 
become opposing gladiators, fighting one another for the heart and soul of the 
environmental movement, both with contending visions of very different futures—
for people and for the planet. In Stockholm, they brought with them their battle for 
the soul of environmentalism, and they put it on a global stage. 
Though prior scholars have examined the Commoner-Ehrlich debate, too 
little attention has focused on the important global contexts in which Commoner and 
Ehrlich argued, particularly for the planetary politics at play amid the apex of their 
debate in Stockholm. If at all, Commoner and Ehrlich’s experience in Stockholm 
barely registers a sentence or two. Instead, most scholarly treatments limit the 
Commoner-Ehrlich debate only to its domestic context and emphasize its 
connotations for the historical and philosophical evolution of North American 
environmentalism.584 Such a limited domestic view of their conflict, however, skews 
the history and the content of their debate. This chapter’s focus on the international 
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dimensions of the Commoner-Ehrlich debate helps shed light on why the debate 
became so heated between the two environmental icons, as well as why it exploded 
in 1972 both before and during Stockholm’s environmental circus. 
In Stockholm, the Commoner-Ehrlich debate became not only a conflict 
between leading experts over the science behind the environmental crisis; it evolved 
into a much deeper conflict over human values, fundamental freedoms, and social 
justice. Because of its global setting during the Stockholm Conference, Commoner 
and Ehrlich’s environmental argument transformed into a dispute over an 
individuals’ right to control their own reproduction, about issues of equity and the 
structure of global political economy, as well as about national sovereignty and the 
economic self-determination of nations in the global South. Due to the 
interconnected complexities of global environmental challenges, Commoner and 
Ehrlich’s debate transformed from a conflict over issues of science to a conflict over 
issues of politics. It eventually hinged on whether the world’s recently decolonized 
nations could confront the environmental crisis on their own terms, without 
interference or domination from the wealthy, former-imperial nations of the global 
North. 
 
Commoner’s Worldviews 
Between 1968, when Sweden first proposed and offered to host the UNCHE, 
and the summer of 1972, when the UNCHE and the Environment Forum occurred, 
concerns about the planet’s environmental crisis inspired dark questions about the 
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future of human civilization, particularly for many of the advanced industrialized 
nations. By 1972, for many citizens and for some policy-makers, their sudden 
realization of a global environmental crisis meant that run-away pollution; poisoned 
food, waters and soil; the escalating loss of habitat and biodiversity; dwindling 
resources; and human overpopulation—all dilemmas still with us today—were 
conspiring apocalyptically to threaten the very survival of human life on Earth. Both 
Commoner and Ehrlich had played major roles bringing these concerns to public 
attention, particularly in the United States.  
Commoner, a plant physiologist at Washington University in St. Louis and a 
seasoned activist in the science information movement against nuclear weapons, 
began his activism on behalf of the environment early in the 1960s, as noted in 
Chapter 2. Throughout the 1960s, Commoner earned widespread respect and popular 
appeal from both the American public and the scientific community. By the end of 
the 1960s, Commoner’s ideas about environmental destruction honed in on the social 
effects of technology and how power was distributed and reified in society. As a 
result, Commoner’s views about the environment became inseparable from his 
political considerations. 
 In Commoner’s view, the recently recognized environmental defects of the 
day, particularly pollution, were the direct results of modern, anti-ecological 
technology and the systems of political economy that supported and controlled those 
technologies. Corrections to the environment, Commoner explained, would have no 
substantive impact without the sweeping restructuring of industrial, political, and 
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social priorities along more ecological lines. At the first Earth Day on April 22, 
1970, Commoner declared, “the environmental crisis, together with all of the other 
evils that blight the nation—racial inequality, hunger, poverty, and war—cry out for 
a profound revision in our national priorities.”585 Not unlike the holistic vision of Dai 
Dong, though without their neo-Malthusianism, Commoner believed environmental 
issues were deeply interconnected with the world’s great social, political, and 
economic problems. Commoner further developed and publicized his views in 
numerous lectures, articles, and book publications throughout the global 
environmental moment.586 Commoner’s activism even landed him on the cover of 
TIME magazine as the face, for many, of the scientific environmental movement.587 
In these publications and through his work in the Scientists’ Institute for 
Public Information, Commoner revealed a tightly held belief that the day’s major 
issues of concern, from nuclear weapons to environmental degradation, were social 
issues that must be freely debated and ultimately decided by an informed and 
democratic public. Commoner was convinced that solving essential problems like 
the atomic threat and the environmental crisis, problems with such widespread 
impact on the lives of so many, must not be the decisions of the few who held 
political or economic power. Commoner believed that such decisions, either about 
building and testing nuclear weapons or about the use of certain polluting 
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technologies, were social issues that the general public should decide. That public, in 
turn, must be informed adequately to make proper decisions on such profound 
issues, particularly when the issues involved matters of complex science. If scientists 
disagreed, Commoner believed their moral duty demanded making their debate 
public, both to enable a public form of expert peer review to occur openly and to 
allow for the public to weigh in on the social and political issues involved in the 
debate.588 
For Commoner, the free expression of ideas and open debate were essential 
steps both to the greater empowerment of people and to remedying the technological 
problems at fault for the increasingly polluted environment. As he had stated at the 
Airlie House conference on Ecology and International Development in 1968, 
Commoner celebrated public controversy between scientists as the means for 
determining scientific truth. “We [scientists] get at truth not because we don’t make 
mistakes,” he explained, “but because we make our mistakes in public so that they 
can be corrected. And this is why controversy is essential. … Controversy should be 
encouraged.”589 His deeply held beliefs fueled Commoner’s tireless campaign to 
promote and save the environment and to challenge those who held views different 
from his own. Of course, not everyone agreed with his interpretations on the 
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essential causes of the environmental crisis. Nor was Commoner alone in his public 
activism. 
 
Ehrlich’s Worldviews 
As a prominent Stanford University biologist who helped discover the 
process of coevolution in 1964, Paul Ehrlich also had a long history of interest and 
concern about nature.590 His concerns soon became exceedingly public. Ehrlich’s 
controversial 1968 book, The Population Bomb, co-written with his wife Anne 
Ehrlich, breathed new life into timeworn, Malthusian fears of population growth. 
Commissioned by then-Sierra Club president David Brower after hearing Ehrlich 
give a rousing talk on the subject, The Population Bomb railed against explosive 
human population growth and the ensuing consumption of limited resources that 
rising populations demanded. After visiting India and experiencing its swarming 
mass of humanity in the mid-1960s, Ehrlich eventually concluded of all 
environmental problems that “Too many cars, too many factories, too much 
detergent, too much pesticide, … too little water, [and even] too much carbon 
dioxide – all can be traced easily to too many people.”591 For an American public 
increasingly aware and uneasy about environmental dilemmas, The Population 
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Bomb became one of the best-selling environmental books of all time, with three 
million copies in paperback by the mid-1970s.592 
Ehrlich believed that humanity’s increasing numbers would soon crash 
against the world’s finite limits—a problem that demanded drastic solutions. In light 
of the American moon-landing in 1969, Ehrlich explained how “The Earth is a 
spaceship of limited carrying capacity,” and attempts by humanity to stretch that 
limited capacity could only end with catastrophe.593 In numerous essays, public 
lectures, interviews to publications from Mademoiselle to Playboy, and in repeat 
appearances on The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson, Ehrlich’s message remained 
both consistent and drastic. He insisted that we either “find a way to bring the birth 
rate down or the death rate will soon go back up.”594 As an ideal solution, Ehrlich 
encouraged zero population growth, even negative population growth. In the spring 
of 1970, Ehrlich explained, “you try the least coercive and least obnoxious step 
first…and move gradually towards whatever is necessary to control the population.” 
If voluntary methods did not curb the growth, he called for coercive, compulsory 
methods of population control, including forced abortions and sterilizations.595 Not 
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one to mince words or miss a dramatic opportunity, Ehrlich continued, “Remember 
that the alternative to controlling the population is that all your kids die.”596  
Garrett Hardin, also a California-based biologist and advocate of population-
control, concurred. In his widely read essay, “Tragedy of the Commons”—first 
published in 1968, like Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, and reprinted repeatedly—
Hardin expressed concerns similar to Ehrlich about unsustainable population growth 
on a finite Earth. Hardin recommended that control of breeding should best be 
considered as “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of people 
affected.” He equated such mutually agreed upon coercion as akin to legal codes that 
limited the freedom of people to steal from one another.597 According to Ehrlich and 
Hardin, imagined laws to coercively limit population would not restrict freedom; 
they would help ensure increased freedom and protection for people, just like laws 
against theft. The other option, Ehrlich dramatically maintained, was death. “Rather 
than have everyone die,” Ehrlich explained, “we will limit the number of births.”598  
 The issue of overpopulation was not merely a localized problem for Ehrlich 
and Hardin, nor one that only threatened humans. Ehrlich’s biological worldview 
revealed to him and his many followers that unlimited and exponential growth in 
human population threatened the entire global environment. “It is fair to say,” he 
said, “that the environment of every organism, human and nonhuman, on the face of 
                                                
596 Paul Ehrlich, interviewed by Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) producer Bill Terry 
on March 6, 1970, “Population, Food, and Resources,” in Balance and Biosphere: A Radio 
Symposium on the Environmental Crisis (Toronto: The Hunter Rose Company, 1971), 69. 
597 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162:3859 (December 13, 1968), 
1247. While originally delivered as a presidential address to the Pacific Division of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science late in 1967, Hardin published his now infamous essay 
in December 1968, a few months after publication of Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb.  
598 Ehrlich, CBC interview, “Population, Food, and Resources,” 65. 
  403 
the Earth has been influenced by the population explosion of Homo sapiens.”599 
Indicating the international nature of the population problem, Ehrlich concluded that 
the United States government must therefore “adopt some very tough foreign policy 
decisions.”600 Both Ehrlich and Hardin eventually concluded that, given the dire 
nature of overpopulation, international aid and humanitarian interventions became 
unethical. 
Initially, Ehrlich and Hardin both argued that food aid and economic 
assistance from wealthy nations to overpopulated nations, even those suffering from 
famine, must cease. Sending food, Hardin argued, was actually the worst way to help 
a foreign country escape overpopulation. “Atomic bombs would be kinder,” he 
wrote. Those starving populations had already outstripped the carrying capacity of 
their land, and humanitarian aid would only exacerbate the planet’s problems. By 
receiving food aid, people who would have starved to death normally would now 
survive to reproduce, which further exacerbated population growth and future 
famines, as well as anthropogenic environmental damage. “For a few moments,” 
Hardin predicted, “the misery would be acute, but it would soon come to an end for 
most of the people, leaving a very few survivors to suffer thereafter.”601 By their 
hard logic of population control, selfishness became wealthy governments’ only 
ethical option for the protection of global ecological systems from the poor decisions 
and bad habits of foreigners. 
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Initial Contact and Conflict between Commoner and Ehrlich  
 Both Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich came separately to their different 
interpretations about the causes and solutions to the global environmental crisis. By 
1969, however, their relentless activism in announcing the planet’s perils made both 
men leading figures in the burgeoning environmental revolution, particular in the 
United States. Increased environmental concerns in the United States spawned rapid 
growth of an environmental movement that looked beyond its domestic borders to 
consider the planetary effects of harming nature.602 As a result, the U.S. National 
Commission for UNESCO selected as the subject for its annual conference, “Man 
and His Environment: A View Toward Survival,” held in San Francisco in 
November 1969. Given the eventual global contexts of Commoner and Ehrlich’s 
opposing interpretations of the environmental crisis, it seems fitting that this UN-
related conference first sparked their public disagreements over the world’s gravest 
environmental challenges. 
In his talk on the “Ecological Facts of Life,” Commoner argued that 
ecological destruction was “an intrinsic feature of the very technology which we 
have developed to enhance productivity.”603 Commoner offered not merely with 
scientific but also political advice. In order to save the earth from human action, 
“The most grave social judgments must be made.” Commoner devoutly believed 
such decisions must be public ones as they would have such a powerful impact on 
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society. In order to make these judgments and to “organize the vast restorative 
program, the public will need to have the relevant facts in understandable terms.”604 
Such was the duty, Commoner believed, of scientists like himself at conferences like 
the one he addressed. 
Ehrlich delivered the next lecture, titled “The Population Explosion: Facts 
and Fiction.” In a direct challenge to Commoner’s holistic approach to alter the 
social and environmental quality of life, Ehrlich concluded that the “problems of the 
quantity of life must have priority.” Ehrlich proclaimed, “it is unlikely that even the 
sorely needed, enlightened technology could support three and half billion people for 
long at a decent level of living without irreversibly harm to the environment.”605 
Like Commoner, Ehrlich advocated major changes in economic and social policy, 
but unless global population problems were confronted head-on, such social and 
political changes were futile. He insisted, “We must divert attention from the 
treatment of symptoms of the population explosion and start treating its cause.”606 
Ehrlich admitted a need to “switch from the present ‘Cowboy Economy,’ 
emphasizing planned obsolescence, exploitation for short-term gain, and waste, to a 
‘Spaceman Economy,’ emphasizing recycling and the preservation of the planetary 
life-support systems.”607 Yet, he maintained that this switch must be accompanied by 
immediate policies for domestic and international population control. No time 
remained for the public to make such decisions, and, according to Ehrlich, “Anyone 
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who stands in the way of measures to bring down the birth rate is automatically 
working for a rise in the death rate.”608 Commoner not only believed Ehrlich was 
scientifically wrong about the population problem, he considered Ehrlich’s inability 
to acknowledge social factors in biological and environmental issues to be morally 
reprehensible. 
Commoner experience at this UNESCO meeting fueled his personal crusade 
to discredit Ehrlich’s population thesis. Over the next few years, Commoner’s beliefs 
on the environmental crisis and fears about population control became further 
cemented in his own original focus on eliminating polluting technologies and the 
need for massive social and political restructuring. Commoner’s fears about 
Ehrlich’s views ultimately led to Commoner’s inability to even acknowledge 
population pressures as a legitimate environmental concern. Commoner and 
Ehrlich’s meeting at the U.S. commission’s UNESCO Conference sparked a major 
scientific debate that eventually played itself out in the public eye, with 
consequences both for the American and global environmental movements. 
In March 1970, the following spring, Commoner and Ehrlich’s debate 
escalated beyond differing scientific viewpoints to become a personal confrontation. 
Shortly after Ehrlich and Commoner’s initial meeting at the U.S. Commission’s 
UNESCO conference, Bernard Berelson, the president of the Population Council in 
New York City, invited several scientists, including Barry Commoner, to meet in his 
office in hopes of reaching a consensus on population policy in the United States.609 
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While Ehrlich could not attend the meeting, Ehrlich’s good friend and occasional 
writing partner from UC Berkeley, John Holdren, did. According to Holdren, a 
physicist at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and population control advocate, 
Commoner took the opportunity at the Population Council meeting to launch a 
“tirade” against Ehrlich, accusing the absent scientist of harboring population 
philosophies that were “improper morally” as well as “politically coercive and 
totalitarian.”610 Word of Commoner’s accusations returned to Ehrlich, resulting in 
deeper strain between the two scientists. 
At Commoner’s initiative, he and Ehrlich finally crossed paths again late in 
December 1970, a few months after the first Earth Day’s massive outpouring of 
environmental action and just as the UN initiated serious strides toward planning the 
UNCHE in Stockholm. Commoner organized a symposium specifically on the role 
of population growth designed to elicit their opposing views at the 137th annual 
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 
Chicago. For the panel, Commoner invited Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin, and 
demographer Ansley Cole. Ehrlich and Garrett Hardin again pushed a view toward 
taming wild population growth as fundamental to environmental preservation. Over 
the prior year, Commoner had become even stauncher in his belief that 
environmental problems did not come from population but resulted from the 
polluting technology of industrialized political economies. Commoner saw the 
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challenge of exploding populations not in biological terms, as Ehrlich and Hardin 
did, but as something to be resolved by reorganizing social and political systems, and 
those systems ways of using technology. As anticipated and duly covered by major 
media coverage of the AAAS symposium, Commoner offered impassioned 
opposition to Ehrlich’s views. Commoner boldly stated, “There is no ecological 
population problem….The issue is the nature of our technology and not the size of 
our population.”611 Neither seemed willing to concede or even collaborate with the 
other. Reporters found the debate confusing and acrimonious. One writer recalled, 
“they were screaming at each other.”612 
Ehrlich and Commoner’s extended debate continued to earn major coverage 
in the media. TIME magazine described the encounter as one between dreary 
environmentalists who “violently disagree” over basic causes and cures, locked in 
“vociferous” opposition. TIME also took note of the political challenges that either 
population control or technological changes might cause. As populations rose, that 
“removes citizens further from decisions made by their leaders.” Yet, as Commoner 
argued, coercive control of population limited individual freedom. TIME labeled the 
Ehrlich and Commoner’s view of the future as “potentially hideous,” particularly 
because “democracy can lose meaning.”613 When taken to a global level, where 
individual representation was already further removed, these opposing issues became 
even more dire. 
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Just when the world most needed wise direction on environmental issues with 
implications of deep political and personal importance, it seemed as though the 
nascent environmental movement was fracturing. Increasingly, both Commoner and 
Ehrlich appeared in the public eye as “prophets of doom.” Other times described as 
“the New Jeremiahs,” their debate nonetheless helped promote a more wide-ranging 
awareness and discussion about the causes and nature of crisis in the global 
environmental moment.614 While Commoner and Ehrlich fought for the heart of 
environmentalism, governments of the world also began to organize for ways to 
define and confront global environmental challenges. 
 
Commoner and Ehrlich in International Contexts 
In the early 1970s, as the debate between Commoner and Ehrlich became 
increasingly caustic, the planning process for the upcoming UNCHE evolved into a 
conflict over environment versus development. At the UN, industrialized nations 
called for global attention to problems of environmental decline while developing 
nations demanded on-going efforts to escalate their industrial development.615 That 
conflict reflected the elements of Ehrlich and Commoner’s debate when viewed 
through the frame of coercive change for population control versus individual 
freedom to select one’s own methods of economic improvement and environmental 
reform. Ehrlich’s initial argument to enforce population control, both at home and 
abroad, helped inspire the fears of developing nations who sought to retain their 
national sovereignty. Commoner’s faith in letting the public make its own decisions 
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of such social and political importance served to quell some of those fears, yet his 
arguments about the environmental crisis were no safe route for the developing 
world either. Countries in the developing world desired the very industrial 
technologies that Commoner chastised for disrupting nature’s replenishing 
ecological cycles. Both scientists’ viewpoints posed problems for the developing 
world —either as a challenge to their hope for increased development of industrial 
technologies, or as a challenge to those nations’ sovereignty, particularly if global 
population restrictions were enacted. 
 Throughout the early 1970s, as the preparations continued for the UNCHE, 
Ehrlich and Commoner’s debate came to incorporate elements of that global 
dialogue. Both Commoner and Ehrlich’s public advocacy about the environmental 
crisis became both more widespread yet also more nuanced to reflect a greater 
understanding of the global picture.616 For instance, after its wild success when 
published in 1968, Ehrlich revised The Population Bomb in 1971. Possibly due to his 
continued conflict with Commoner, Ehrlich’s views on population slowly became 
less sharp and more globally aware of other environmental issues beyond 
overpopulation. 
In Ehrlich’s new edition, his Prologue still emphasized the primary 
importance of population in environmental crises, but he removed from the newer 
version the last sentence from his earlier prologue that “Population control is the 
only answer.” Critics like Commoner and others who advocated on behalf of the 
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global South had decried Ehrlich as a racist and neocolonialist for his demeaning and 
harrowing description of a slum in Delhi, India. In his new version, Ehrlich removed 
the sentence, “since that night I’ve known the feel of overpopulation,” and he 
replaced it with reflections about the global and interconnected nature of 
environmental problems. The new version now explained that “the problems of 
Delhi and Calcutta are our problems too. Americans have helped to create them; we 
help to prevent their solution. We must all learn to identify with the plight of our less 
fortunate fellows on Spaceship Earth if we are to help both them and ourselves to 
survive.” Ehrlich also deleted from the new edition his prior policy suggestion that 
food should be withheld from countries like India if they were not doing enough to 
combat the threats of famine and death from their rampant population growth.617 
Slowly, by 1971, Ehrlich’s advocacy on overpopulation began to acknowledge both 
international political realities and the moral implications of his recommendations. 
Also in 1971, Commoner published his own best-selling environmental book, 
The Closing Circle, which placed his own arguments against Ehrlich in a global 
context that integrated environmental issues with politics and history. Commoner’s 
book expressed clearly his conviction that population problems in the developing 
world were a direct result of prior colonial exploitation by imperial, industrialized 
nations and the resulting unequal distribution of wealth. This, in turn, had negative 
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environmental effects, albeit not as damaging as polluting technologies.618 
Commoner believed that the demographic transition, a development in which death 
rates and birth rates in a population both declined as wealth and education increased 
from the processes of industrialization, did not occur in the developing world due to 
the processes of imperialism. Commoner argued that the wealth extracted from less 
developed colonies of the global South by the imperial nations of the global North 
contributed to a demographic transition only for the now-wealthy colonizing nations. 
The industrialized nations thus left the underdeveloped, exploited colonial nations 
without sufficient internal markets in order to effect their own demographic 
transition. The poorer nations of the global South benefited physically from the 
technologies that reduced their death rates, like modern medicines and agricultural 
technologies, but they did not benefit from the commercially generated higher 
standards of living associated with reductions in birth rates. Rather than declining, 
Commoner believed, the populations in less developed nations thus tended to rise. 
As a result, Commoner concluded that “Both the environmental and population 
crises are the largely unintended result of the exploitation of technological, 
economic, and political power.” Their solutions, therefore, “must also be found in 
this same difficult arena.”619 Commoner believed the only ways to effect significant 
change to these separate crises was not just to correct faulty technology but to 
radically reorganize global political economies for a greater distribution of wealth. 
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 Shortly before the UNCHE began in Stockholm, Commoner wrote in 
Harper’s Magazine and described the environmental crisis as a global concern. He 
also annunciated his increasingly radical views on how to properly correct the crisis. 
Commoner described Stockholm as a place where “ecological crusaders are about to 
clash with seekers of social justice,” and he denounced what he called “conventional 
wisdom” about environmental problems. 620 Three mostly misleading concerns, he 
believed, would likely be voiced in Stockholm: concern about rising population, 
played out in the form of “whites versus non-whites”; debate over demand and 
consumption of limited natural resources, which he framed as “haves versus have-
nots”; and, the “harmful help” in the form of industrial technologies meant to aid the 
global South, which simply promoted pollution and environmental damage.621 All of 
these issues, Commoner highlighted, exacerbated the divides between industrialized 
and less developed nations, yet in his eyes, most missed the real crux of the matter. 
 To solve the real issues of global environmental concern, Commoner 
announced, one must recognize that the source of the environmental crisis actually 
lay in “certain very specific changes in the ways goods are produced, which are 
themselves governed by powerful economic and political considerations.”622 In order 
for the UNCHE or other gatherings in Stockholm to address those “real” problems, 
Commoner believed the world must first recognize that the “origins of the 
environmental crisis” came from “economic inequalities, within nations and among 
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them, in militarism, and in cultural patterns.”623 As such, many nations from the 
developing world might have seen Commoner’s analysis and demands aligned with 
their own desires for greater economic development. 
Yet, Commoner’s argument differed in significant ways from many 
developing nations seeking development. Commoner advocated against reproducing 
the old ways of economic industrialization. Global survival, Commoner advised, 
demanded that the “economic principles” that governed all human productive 
activities “must obey…ecological imperatives.”624 That not only meant a complete 
transformation in the ways that global goods were produced and transported, more 
importantly, it meant a total revolution in the geopolitical and economic world order. 
When Paul Sears described ecology as “a subversive subject” as early as 1964, Barry 
Commoner took it very seriously.625 
 Over the course of his debate with Commoner and in light of the upcoming 
UNCHE, Ehrlich’s ideas about the environmental crisis continued to evolve and 
expand. Initially, however, Ehrlich kept a cool distance from the preparations for 
Stockholm. In the summer of 1971, he admitted having “heard with some interest of 
the ‘World Conference on the Human Environment’ to be held in Stockholm” the 
next June. After the release of the UNCHE draft Declaration and draft Action Plan 
proposals, Ehrlich received an anxious letter from an environmental advocate in the 
Netherlands concerned about rising populations. The Dutchman was astounded that 
the planned UN program included “no mention of the basic problem of unrestricted 
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human reproduction.”626 Indeed, in the thousands of pages of UN materials produced 
for the UNCHE, only two minor recommendations addressed population.627 The UN 
conference’s Preparatory Committee—dominated by less developed nations like 
Brazil—had argued successfully that population was too touchy a subject to 
introduce in the world’s first attempt to find common ground on environmental 
issues. As late as August 1971, Ehrlich replied he had not been invited and therefore 
was not planning to go to Stockholm. Nor, Ehrlich continued, would he attempt to 
“be of much help” in raising the question of “unrestricted human reproduction” at 
the conference. “As it seems that the conference may have a very political 
orientation,” Ehrlich incorrectly presumed, “it might be that my presence might not 
be of much use.”628 
By January 1972, however, Ehrlich’s interest and involvement in the 
environmental activities planning for Stockholm increased, partially inspired by his 
continuing debate with Commoner. Early that January, Ehrlich received an invitation 
from Ronald Eber, a Sierra Club representative and committee coordinator for a 
series of meetings throughout North America to stimulate awareness of international 
environmental problems and some of the issues to be raised at the UNCHE. Eber, 
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obviously aware of the rising tensions between Ehrlich and Commoner, handwrote at 
the end of his typed invitation, “Common has been active – chance to counter.”629 
Ehrlich, who had become increasingly obsessed with his ongoing debate with 
Commoner, quickly agreed to deliver the keynote address in early February. It would 
occur at a San Francisco meeting on the topic of “Ecology and Third World 
Development.” Ehrlich’s distant interest in the conference shifted as a result both of 
the preparatory processes and his desire to challenge Commoner’s interpretation of 
environmental threats. 
Ehrlich’s keynote address on Ecology and Third World Development 
announced a great deal of skepticism about the upcoming UNCHE in Stockholm. 
First, he feared it would merely be a convention full of “establishment 
representatives” praising each other’s governments for saving the environment when 
“virtually all governments are promoting environmental destruction.” Secondly, 
Ehrlich was shocked at the “nearly total absence of consideration of population 
problems from the Conference’s agenda,” which he attributed to “the overriding 
tendency of UN member nations to put the personal interests of their political leaders 
and governments before those of the world’s people.” While still maintaining a focus 
on population issues, Ehrlich then turned to the topic of the third world and, 
surprisingly, argued many of the same points Barry Commoner might have outlined. 
Nearly stealing Commoner’s words, Ehrlich explained how the world ecology 
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movement “has not paid enough attention to the critical problems of the 
redistribution of wealth and opportunity.”630 While clearly making some concessions 
to his overt focus only on overpopulation, Ehrlich still trafficked in neo-
Malthusianism. 
Ehrlich continued, describing the “three-pronged threat” facing the Third 
World: “growth of world population, absolute shortage of global resources, and 
misdistribution of those resources” which “all combine to keep them in poverty and 
raise the specter of world catastrophe.” Ehrlich again raised the point that population 
growth among the world’s affluent nations posed “a greater threat to the ecosphere 
than excess reproduction by the poor.” Ehrlich, however, placed his new, nuanced 
analysis in a global context and concluded that, “overdeveloped nations, like the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain and Germany [must] halt their 
population growth and…alter their economic systems.” Once those sweeping 
changes occurred, he claimed, the nations of the global South could then “move 
toward a kind of development not modeled on Western mistakes.”631 Ehrlich’s views 
on the causes and solutions to environmental crisis on Spaceship Earth had had 
evolved as a result of his debate with Commoner and as part of the global 
environmental moment’s rush toward Stockholm. 
 Nonetheless, Ehrlich emphasized that the third world must not be deceived 
into thinking that all problems lie in the overdeveloped nations of the global North. 
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“Rapidly growing populations” Ehrlich harped, and ongoing “problems of internal 
organization” still plagued the global South. Even if the world’s goods and resources 
were “suddenly and miraculously equitably distributed and nothing else was 
changed,” Ehrlich warned, “we would still have instant malnutrition world-wide and 
would continue down the path to ecocatastrophe.” While he adapted much of 
Commoner’s rhetoric, Ehrlich refused to abandon his own. Changes in economic and 
political systems were necessary, Ehrlich concluded, but “the problems of equity 
must be attacked simultaneously with the problems of population control.”632 From 
the perspective of nations in the developing world, many of which had recently 
decolonized from under the yoke of industrialized imperialism, Ehrlich’s rhetoric 
may have been favorable to their desire for equal development opportunities. 
However, his views still appeared as a direct challenge to their national sovereignty. 
Whereas Ehrlich’s scientific analysis focused strictly on biological limits, 
Commoner emphasized the social construction scientific knowledge and recognized 
the embedded politics in seemingly scientific processes. Commoner believed that 
“The task of restoring the planet’s ecological stability is vast, complex, and deeply 
rooted in economic, social, and political issues.”633 Commoner had already 
concluded that faulty industrial technology adopted since the end of WWII—
especially the increased use of petroleum-based synthetic chemicals instead of 
natural products—was the primary cause of run-away pollution and environmental 
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degradation. This un-ecological technology had nothing to do with the number of 
people on the planet; it reflected deficient human choices driven by politics and 
profits, not biological processes. 
Likewise, Commoner believed overpopulation was not the simple result of 
unchecked fertility; its roots lay in the socio-political conditions of global inequality, 
especially the conditions shaped historically by colonial processes that stunted a 
complete demographic transition in the global South. While Commoner 
acknowledged the dilemma of feeding a rising population on a finite planet, he 
differed drastically from Ehrlich in his scientific analysis and solution to it. In 
Commoner’s historical and scientific examination, western medicine and colonial 
management had extended the survival rate of colonial peoples, but the transfer of 
natural resources and wealth from the colonial periphery to the hegemonic core 
maintained the economic need for families to have multiple children. For 
Commoner, global poverty and inequity caused overpopulation and environmental 
harm, not unbridled biological processes. 
 Much more than Ehrlich, Commoner’s global environmental analysis 
included a social, political, and even moral component. Commoner concluded, 
“Thus, when any environmental issue is pursued to its origins, it reveals an 
inescapable truth—that the root cause of the crisis is not to be found in how men 
interact with nature, but in how they interact with each other—that, to solve the 
environmental crisis we must solve the problems of poverty, racial injustice and war; 
that the debt to nature which is the measure of the environmental crisis cannot be 
paid, person by person, in recycled bottles or ecologically sound habits, but in the 
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ancient coin of social justice; that, in sum, a peace among men must precede the 
peace with nature.”634 For Commoner, the global environment and humanity’s social 
webs were inseparably interconnected. As he succinctly put it, Commoner believed 
of Ehrlich that “Ecologists should go back to the butterflies and leave human 
populations alone because social things characterize them.”635 
 Commoner and Ehrlich’s profound conflict over root causes and concomitant 
solutions brought these two environmental scientists to a public conflict that 
threatened to tear the burgeoning but young global environmental movement in two. 
Additionally, Ehrlich and Commoner’s clash reflected, and perhaps even predicted, 
the global divisions between wealthy industrialized and poor underdeveloped nations 
over environmental matters. During preparations for the official UNCHE, the main 
debate between nations revolved around fears that industrialized countries and their 
citizens favored coercive environmental regulations to limit and freeze economic 
growth, creating a so-called space-man economy for all the passengers on Spaceship 
Earth. In response, the less developed nations of the global South declared their 
sovereign rights to economic development in order improve their peoples’ 
impoverished living conditions, even at the expense of the global environment 
decline. Pollution, many said, was an environmental problem for the North to fix and 
pay for, while poverty remained the primary environmental problem of the South, 
which only development could cure. It was under these circumstances in the summer 
of 1972, that both men arrived in Stockholm to participate in UNCHE events, 
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especially at the Environment Forum, where they would proclaim the scientific and 
social righteousness of their views. 
 
Another Outer Ring: Stockholm’s Environment Forum 
 Throughout 1971 and 1972, as preparations for the UNCHE continued, 
newly influential non-governmental environmental organizations, both old and new, 
demanded a say in the widely publicized international conference. Partially as a 
reflection of Commoner and Ehrlich’s acknowledgement of global environmental 
concerns, environmental organizations—including the Sierra Club, Friends of the 
Earth, International Planned Parenthood Federation, the Congress of African People, 
Socialist International, the World Wildlife Fund, the National Audubon Society, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and many others—all sought some sort of 
involvement at Stockholm.636 While they would not have much say over the inner 
ring of events in Stockholm, many of these groups arrived there to help create the 
outer rings of Stockholm’s environmental circus. 
 The UN responded to this popular interest by suggesting that NGOs already 
associated with UNESCO, as well as “other NGOs of genuinely international 
character,” should be invited to a separate in an NGO colloquium, provided they 
were “directly concerned with the subject matter of the Conference.”637 As a result, 
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the Conference’s Preparatory Committee made plans for a distinct gathering they 
called the Environment Forum—a separate, semi-official NGO conference in 
Stockholm that would run concurrently with the official UNCHE but he held several 
miles away from the inner ring of the UNCHE. In its original conception, Canadian 
journalist Wade Rowland explained the Environment Forum was to be a place where 
concerned individuals and NGOs could “air their views in the assembled presence of 
the world press.” Its intended function, Rowland believed, was to act as “a kind of 
official conscience for the U.N. conference delegates.”638 It would offer a place for 
public education about global environmental concerns. In practice, however, the 
Environment Forum became a chaotic mix of mostly unorganized actors agreeing on 
little while declaring their own ideological views for saving Spaceship Earth. 
Barry Commoner, who was unable to influence much of what happened in 
the UNCHE’s inner ring, knew he had to become a part of things in Stockholm’s 
outer ring. Commoner knew about the planning of the Environment Forum from his 
graduate student M. Taghi Farvar, who also planned to arrive in Stockholm along 
with members of his activist Oi Committee. Regardless of what was to happen on the 
floor of the official UNCHE, Commoner prophesized that, in Stockholm, “the 
delegates—and the world—are certain to be reminded that there is much more to the 
environment crisis that the [UNCHE’s proposed] monitoring of pollutants, control of 
effluents, or tax incentives.”639 Commoner saw the Environment Forum as a place 
where his “real” causes and solutions for the environment could be addressed. It was 
there where Commoner planned to teach the ecology of social justice to the world. It 
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was there that he believed, “new steps could be taken toward making peace among 
men that must precede a peace with nature.”640 And, it was there that he would clash, 
indirectly, with his great rival, Paul Ehrlich. 
The Environment Forum opened on June 5 1972, some fifteen miles away 
from the official UNCHE on the other side of Stockholm. The physical distance 
between the two conferences reflected the vast differences in how each was run and 
what they achieved. One observer of events at the Forum described the atmosphere 
inside as “charged with excitement and controversy.” At some of the Forum’s 
sessions, she recalled, over seven hundred NGO activists from around the world 
poured into a space designed for only five hundred, “filling the balcony, flowing out 
into the corridors which were already crowded with exhibits.”641 While the official 
UNCHE became highly regulated both in content and in terms of who could 
participate, the laissez faire attitude of the Swedish planning committee behind the 
Environment Forum allowed it to descend into a political free for all.  
Barry Commoner arrived in Stockholm and discovered that the poor planning 
for the Environment Forum permitted him an opportunity help redirect its focus 
toward his personal interpretation of the environmental crisis. The Environment 
Forum did not structure its debates around a set of formal rules of procedure. As 
such, another observer later explained, “it left itself open to the possibility to being 
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dominated by almost any determined group or individual with an axe to grind.” And 
this, the observer recalled, “was exactly what happened.”642  
Commoner opened the official sessions for the Forum along with the 
president of the International Center for Development, José de Castro, from Brazil. 
Their presentation clearly set the tone for what topics would dominate future 
sessions at the Forum. While Commoner opened and set the Forum’s tone, it was his 
former graduate student, Taghi Farvar, and the Oi Committee who worked the floor 
of the conference to dominate the Forum’s structure, information sessions, and 
discourse. Together, Farvar and Commoner teamed up to effectively dominate the 
agenda at the Forum and shape what eventually became its radical discourse, 
particularly against any NGOs or activists that espoused concern about population 
growth. 
 
Conflict in the Forum 
Before his own arrival into Stockholm, Paul Ehrlich had no knowledge of 
Commoner and Farvar’s control over the Environment Forum. The Forum, he had 
hoped, “was the place where taboo subjects of population control, zero economic 
growth, redistribution of wealth, etc., could have been rationally and constructively 
discussed by individuals free from the rigid constraints within which official 
delegates had to operate.”643 As such, Ehrlich accepted Planned Parenthood 
International’s invitation to appear on a panel addressing the opposing views 
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between he and Commoner. Commoner, however, refused to participate in the panel. 
When Ehrlich nonetheless agreed to arrive in Stockholm for the panel, Commoner 
was ready. Commoner had spent the much of the two prior weeks in Stockholm 
giving numerous public lectures and essentially turning the NGO Environment 
Forum into a platform for own his views on the global environmental crisis—a view 
quite sympathetic to many participants at the Forum from the global South, 
especially those who identified with Farvar’s Oi Committee. 
Intimately aligned with Farvar’s advisor Barry Commoner, the Oi Committee 
refused to count overpopulation as a viable environmental concern. Instead, at the 
Environment Forum just as they had at Dai Dong’s Independent Conference, Farvar 
and other Oi members vehemently defended less developed nation’s rights to 
sovereignty, encouraged revolutionary liberation from colonial economic 
frameworks, and demanded global redistribution of wealth as a means to mitigate 
environmental harm. Concerns about overpopulation, they declared, were part of a 
racist, neo-imperialist plot for Third World genocide, designed to keep mostly white 
peoples from industrialized nations at the top of the global economic food chain.644 
On the day of Paul Ehrlich’s presentation, Farvar and his Oi Committee 
effectively launched a coup. Ehrlich had arrived at the Forum for a program that was 
to begin with a press conference followed by his participation in a panel discussion 
on population to be chaired by Sir Peter Scott of the World Wildlife Fund, as well as 
a mix of demographers composed of Ehrlich, a Swede, a Kenyan, an Englishman, 
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and a Senegalese.645 During the press conference, Ehrlich, clearly comfortable with 
public attention, answered one or two questions from audience with confidence, 
although his frequent baseball metaphors—with references to a whole new ball-
game, curve balls, and knocking problems out of the park—likely confused those not 
from North America. Suddenly, just before Ehrlich’s panel on population problems 
was to begin, a flurry of activity occurred alongside the speaker’s platform.646 
Farvar and his Oi followers—several of who had earlier attended the 
fractured Independent Conference of Dai Dong in Stockholm—swept through the 
Environment Forum and forcibly took over the proceedings of Ehrlich’s panel. 
Along with Farvar, a Nigerian woman and Oi Committee member named Dora Obi 
Chezea seized the microphone from the shocked panel chairman and announced that 
the press conference had ended. Chezea declared that she would assume chair 
responsibilities of the panel and that it would be enlarged to include the perspective 
of Oi Members and anti-population advocates from the global South. In the anarchic 
melee, one of the original panelists from Survival International, an NGO supporting 
tribal peoples worldwide, was literally thrown off the platform.647 The Oi group 
replaced or added their own members to the session, while most of the international 
audience cheered and applauded in favor of the panel’s mini-revolution. Farvar stood 
behind Chezea as she fielded questions.648 
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Although Ehrlich managed to remain on stage, as he remembered it, the 
session largely turned into an attack on him. The new panel members berated him as 
a racist in front of the rambunctious crowd. Ehrlich recalled having “accusations of 
genocide” hurled at him along side the general “assertions that redistribution of 
wealth would automatically result in an end to population growth by means of a 
demographic transition.”649 Commoner did not participate in the actual coup of 
Ehrlich’s panel by his former graduate student Taghi Farvar and the Oi Committee. 
Nonetheless, in Stockholm at the Environment Forum, the Commoner-Ehrlich 
debate was playing out in a global context with real Third-World participation.  
In the wake of his keynote address at the colloquium on Ecology and the 
Third World months earlier, Ehrlich attempted to repeat his more globally nuanced 
view that population was only one of the major factors causing environmental harm 
and that the developed nations should shore up their own population issues before 
dominating peoples in the developing world. He also attempted to repeat the 
adaptation he made of Commoner’s argument that an equitable redistribution of 
wealth was essential to environmental corrections. However, Ehrlich still advocated 
a population control program, which met with continued resistance. According to 
one observer, Ehrlich “explained that he had changed his mind about (and now made 
public recantation of) his earlier view, expressed in The Population Bomb, that 
industrialized countries like the U.S. should tie foreign aid to programs of population 
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control. But his explanations were ignored by most of the revolutionary panelists.”650 
All of Ehrlich’s efforts at reconciliation found only hostility from the Forum crowd. 
Ehrlich suspected that Commoner had a role to play in this take-over, 
knowing that Commoner was already in Stockholm and seeing the actions of Taghi 
Farvar, Commoner’s former student, dominating the Forum scene. Some observers 
claimed to have seen Commoner stationed in a balcony overlooking the chaos in the 
Forum at the back of the room, from where he was apparently signaling to Farvar 
and the Oi group as well as sending down questions for panelists and rowdy 
audience to ask Ehrlich. Given the long history of their debate and the nature of 
those question, Ehrlich’s suspicions of Commoner’s involvement reached a boiling 
point. Amid the accusations of racism, an incensed Ehrlich stood up and shouted 
repeatedly, “Where’s Barry, baby!?,” He challenged Commoner to face him in a 
debate then and there. But, in the words of one report, “Barry baby would not 
budge.” According to this account, Commoner “refused to meet Ehrlich in a direct 
confrontation” and, instead, “lurked in the gallery,” remaining secluded on a balcony 
overlooking the proceedings.651 That chaotic scene in the outer ring at Stockholm’s 
Environment Forum reflected the messy environmental conflicts between North and 
South both within the UNCHE and at Dai Dong’s Independent Conference on the 
Environment. It displayed the dawn of modern global environmental politics in all its 
still-unresolved glory. 
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Placing Blame for a Failed Forum 
The Stockholm’s unofficial environmental newspaper, The Stockholm Eco, 
published its own account of the chaotic events. The Eco mentioned the rabble-
rousing performed at the Environment Forum by Farvar, but it clearly blamed 
Commoner for orchestrating the events against Ehrlich. The Eco painted a picture of 
Commoner “ventriloquising to his puppet army scribbling instructions carried 
downstairs” with probing questions for Ehrlich to be used by Farvar and other Oi 
members on the conference floor. Ehrlich’s personal assistant as well as the Eco both 
separately accused Commoner of masterminding the events. They claimed 
Commoner had even stayed up to plan the coup until three o’clock in the morning on 
the day of the confrontation.652 Recognizing the connections between the Oi 
Committee and Commoner, the Eco named Farvar as Commoner’s “chief lieutenant” 
who “wandered round the Forum prompting and orchestrating his Oi boys.”653 The 
Eco’s flamboyant coverage of the event revealed the newspaper’s severe distaste 
over the way events had devolved at the Forum, a site of much potential and hope 
before the environmental events in Stockholm had begun. Ehrlich and Commoner, 
who never exchanged words directly while in Stockholm together, nevertheless 
managed to bring their conflict on environmental issues out onto the world stage for 
the global media and environmentalists to witness in all its newfound bitterness. 
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For his part, Commoner defiantly ridiculed the Eco’s accusations of his 
masterminding the attack on Ehrlich. Although, Commoner did not challenge the 
reality of the Oi group’s role. Regarding the coup of Ehrlich’a panel, Commoner told 
a reporter, “It is scurrilous, absolutely scurrilous, to propose that the [Oi Committee] 
scientists in the Third World did that at anyone’s bidding.”654 Dr. Yusuf Ali Eraj, a 
family planning doctor from Kenya but also a member of the Oi Committee, 
acknowledged why the Oi Committee had behaved as they did. Eraj argued that if 
the Oi Committee had not taken over that day, then “a very different picture would 
have been given to the world. After all, the world at the moment is looking to 
Stockholm. That day they didn’t stop Paul Ehrlich from saying anything. But he 
didn’t have the monopoly of the panel. And he did admit where he had gone 
wrong.”655 At the peak of the global environmental moment, the Oi Committee, 
likely with Commoner’s encouragement, worked to ensure the rhetoric on saving 
Spaceship Earth did not infringe on the rights of people in poor nations to submit to 
population controls. 
Whether or not Commoner did help plan the attack on Ehrlich at Stockholm, 
he certainly did not step forward to ensure an open and rational discussion of the 
issues, which Commoner had previously announced as the moral duty of scientists. 
Publicly, Commoner took no responsibility for Ehrlich’s treatment, claiming it was 
simply the standard practice of spontaneous organizing that had evolved at the 
Forum throughout the week. Commoner had been there the entire time, he reasoned, 
and had acclimated to Oi Committee’s domination of presentations. Whereas Ehrlich 
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had only visited the Forum for one day did not understand what Commoner 
described as “the temper of the whole program.” The only temper Ehrlich seemed to 
experience, however, was that of the angry attendees from the global South who 
sought to publicly humiliate him and originally tried to throw him off the stage.656 
Although Commoner refused responsibility for the attempt to silence Ehrlich, 
numerous other attendees to the Environment Forum aside from the Eco squarely 
placed blame on Commoner for radical intransigence at the expense of the greater 
environmental movement. Jon Tinker, a reporter for New Scientist described the 
Stockholm’s Environment Forum as “hopelessly confused…mainly by the activities 
of Professor Barry Commoner and his followers.”657 Harry Pearson, the environment 
writer for the New York newspaper Newsday, covered several of the events in 
Stockholm. He determined that among the most important events in Stockholm was 
how Commoner had “dirtied” his once grand reputation. Pearson described 
Commoner as an “eco-star” and admitted how “Dr. Commoner’s arguments on 
technology and population are very much to my liking.” Thus, Commoner’s actions 
at the Forum, which Pearson described as complete “pigheadedness and perversity,” 
came as a great surprise and disappointment. Pearson mentioned a number of 
examples by which Commoner orchestrated control over open debate in Stockholm, 
including how “Commoner engineered a public humiliation for Ehrlich at the 
Forum.” Pearson lamented, “For reasons I find impossible to understand, 
[Commoner] caused environmentalists and scientists to polarize, to take rigid 
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positions on the question of population growth even though accommodation between 
the varying positions seemed possible.”658 Similar to the polarities elsewhere in 
Stockholm’s environment circus, both in its inner and outer rings, the Environment 
Forum reflected the North-South separation on issues of development and 
environment, of sovereignty and international regulations, and, due in part to the 
actions of Barry Commoner and his supporters, over the issues of population control 
and the social control of technologies.  
Other disappointed witnesses to events at the Environment Forum also 
blamed Commoner for its failures in Stockholm. For instance, when asked about 
Commoner’s behavior in Stockholm, the former head of the Sierra Club and founder 
of Friends of the Earth David Brower said of Commoner, “I’m afraid he’s become 
very unstable.”659 Additionally, Brian Johnson, a senior fellow at the Institute for the 
Study of International Organization at the University of Sussex also attended events 
at the Forum. Johnson received a letter requesting information from the Science and 
Technology Department of Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office to describe 
some of the events in Stockholm’s outer ring in order to supplement the official 
British records on the UNCHE. Johnson’s reply described the Environment Forum 
as “something of a fiasco” due in part to “the virtual ‘take-over’ staged by Barry 
Commoner and his thirty-odd strong group of ex-patriot ‘Third World scientists.’”660 
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Commoner’s hostility to accommodation on the issues of population, among other 
things, became part of Great Britain’s records for major events at Stockholm. 
George A. Binney, who attended the Environment Forum on behalf of the 
Nature Conservancy, also directed his accusations at Commoner. The Nature 
Conservancy was a major sponsor of Commoner’s work at the Center for the 
Biology of Natural Systems at Washington University in St. Louis. In a letter to 
Commoner, which he copied to Ehrlich, Binney explained how, prior to Stockholm, 
he had “very much looked forward” to the Environment Forum as “an expression of 
scientific fact and the attitudes of peoples of the world.” However, upon his arrival 
to Stockholm, Binney expressed “shock and disappointment” to Commoner “by the 
way in which you appeared to guide the Forum into polemics favorable to your own 
interests.” In particular, Binney found “the machinations which you devised to 
undercut your colleague Paul Ehrlich were very disturbing.” Binney told Commoner, 
“I deplore the way in which you turned the Environment Forum into a personal 
vendetta on Paul Ehrlich and his population theory.”661 Ehrlich’s reply to Binney’s 
copied letter reflected his concern about how the events in Stockholm and his 
seemingly endless conflict with Commoner might impact the global environmental 
movement. “I hope that this entire dispute can be cooled as rapidly as possible,” 
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Ehrlich confessed. “We have more than enough to do in the environmental 
movement without arguing among ourselves!”662 
Many others environmental advocates shared Ehrlich’s expressed hope that 
he and Commoner could cool their disagreements and shared sow unity within the 
broader environmental movement. For instance, Donald Aitken, then chairman of the 
Department of Environmental Studies at San Jose State College and acting director 
of the John Muir Institute, had attempted to reconcile the views of the warring 
scientists for members of the Sierra Club even before Ehrlich and Commoner’s 
confrontation in Stockholm. In the Sierra Club Bulletin, Aitkin argued that 
Commoner and Ehrlich were “Both Right!”663 Claiming to have “a personal 
friendship with, and admiration for, both Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner,” 
Aitken focused on the similarities between the opposing scientists. “Significantly,” 
Aitken began, “the two share insights and principle in common.” He continued, 
Both have stressed the need to apply scientific knowledge to social 
decision-making. Both men see society irretrievably mining the 
biological “capital” of the future and see this undermining the entire life-
support system, with particularly grim implications for he 
underprivileged. Both fear the future public health implications of our 
present actions, and both assume that the solution lies in treating the 
causes rather than the symptoms of environmental decay.664 
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Aitkin claimed the only real difference between the two was “on the role that 
scientists should play in leading the public toward ecologically rational decision 
making.”665 
Yet that role of powerful experts making decisions as opposed to letting the 
public make their own decisions over the underlying functions of society remained 
an important difference, for Commoner and for other actor in Stockholm. At the 
UNCHE, at Dai Dong’s Independent Conference, as at the Environment Forum, 
representatives of the global South exerted their right to resist the viewpoints of the 
wealthy and powerful advocates from the global North. Then, as today, there would 
be no unity over how to assess the political issues deeply embedded in global 
environmental challenges. 
 Still, the desire for global unity, now and then, remained a key inspiration for 
environmental advocates. Kendrick Frazier, chief editor of Science News, similar to 
Donald Aitkin, sought to bring his readers beyond the Ehrlich-Commoner dispute. 
Frazier announced that the “dispute between Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner over 
the roots of today’s environmental problems has gone far enough.” Frazier’s fear 
was that the two scientists’ personal dispute and “steadfast adherence” to their 
clashing viewpoints over population growth and new polluting technologies, “at the 
expense of any more moderate melding of the two,” was “likely to threaten the cause 
of a better environment that they and most other responsible persons espouse.” 
Frazier belittled both Ehrlich and Commoner for their “insistence that it must be one 
or the other.” Frazier concluded that the scientists’ inabilities to accommodate and 
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find a middle ground in their debate was “needlessly confusing the issues and 
delaying necessary solutions.”666 
At Stockholm, however, neither Commoner and Ehrlich nor other actors 
there would find such a middle ground. And the search for that middle ground 
remains an ongoing challenge for addressing global environmental issues. Today the 
notion of sustainable development—while conceptually popular but not often acted 
upon—seeks to synthesize the conflicts between development and environment that 
first permeated the UNCHE planning process. Additionally, actors at the global scale 
have yet to find a sustainable balance between the rights of national sovereignty and 
the responsibilities of individual nations to subsume those rights for the betterment 
of a world environment that knows no borders, which became a major political issue 
at Dai Dong’s Independent Conference in Stockholm. And the devolution of the 
Environment Forum in Stockholm, best represented by the conflict over neo-
Malthusianism and the social factors governing technology in the Ehrlich-
Commoner debate, also failed to find a middle ground from which to move forward. 
Few real efforts were made in Stockholm to transcend ideological issues and find 
consensus, either over population concerns and pollution problems, or between 
sovereignty and international agreements, or on the conflicts between environment 
and development. At least at the Environmental Forum, as another disappointed 
attendee of events at Stockholm explained, “The Third Worlders of radically 
different ideologies reacted more or less uniformly in violent protest against the 
concept of population as an issue and for absolute sovereignty as an unassailable 
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principle.”667 In Stockholm, at the peak of the global environmental moment, a 
divided politics on international environmental issues were forged in the much the 
form that they have essentially remained since. 
 
The Social Construction of Environmental Science 
Why did Commoner remain so committed to his debate with Ehrlich? The 
answer rests in their different views about the role of science and scientists in 
society. According to historian Thomas Robertson, Ehrlich sought to “place the 
responsibility for rational planning in the hands of scientific experts, especially 
ecologists. They alone understand the interrelations of nature, and only they can 
maintain the intellectual distance necessary to make hard choices.” On the other 
hand, the main priority of Commoner, according to historian Michael Egan, 
“remained a deep-seated belief that access to information constituted a vital form of 
public empowerment. The necessity of public participation and the perceived 
political power of an informed citizenry became his standard theme.”668 Rather than 
rely on the empowered few who sought to control people and nature, Commoner 
maintained faith in the idea of an informed democratic society that required a clear 
understanding of scientific issues in order to make knowledgeable decisions and 
exact social changes. Commoner believed adamantly that the size of a population 
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remained a social choice for society to determine, not one dictated by scientific 
knowledge.  
Instead of population as a problem, Commoner remained focused on the 
social dn political challenges posed by the increasingly global technologies of 
industrial development. Based on his experiences against the development of atomic 
weapons and indiscriminate nuclear fallout, Commoner came to see the 
implementation of technologies that unintentionally harmed people and the 
environment as ill-considered social and political decisions, not the result of natural, 
biological processes. Commoner thus understood the crisis of environmental 
degradation as the result of faulty, non-ecological technologies—technologies that 
were, in turn, the result of social, political, and cultural decisions. Resolution of the 
global environmental crisis, Commoner concluded, must begin with socio-cultural 
changes at a global scale. For humanity to save itself and Spaceship Earth, too, it 
must value and adopt new environmentally harmonious technologies and reform the 
social systems that govern their use. Commoner saw as insufficient any attempts that 
merely addressed biological issues, as Ehrlich had originally claimed. 
Increasingly, Commoner was unable to separate social problems from 
environmental problems, particularly as his understanding expanded about the ways 
in which various technologies of production—from atomic energy, to agricultural 
chemicals, to industrial smokestacks—were the result of social systems. As a result, 
Commoner saw inseparable connections, but not necessarily healthy ones, between 
the environment, capitalist production, and social oppression. Eventually, he applied 
this analysis to the ways that Western technologies and the social systems that 
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controlled them influenced rising populations in recently decolonized developing 
nations. For Commoner, the environment was less associated with non-human 
biological life as it was a place in which humans were the driving participant 
organisms. With their anti-ecological technologies and socio-political systems 
seeking control, humans were driving the environment and human civilization 
toward total collapse. Commoner’s argument with Ehrlich became more than a 
scientific dispute. It became for Commoner a political battle for the freedom of 
individuals and societies to choose the future direction for where they would 
navigate Spaceship Earth. 
Another major issue underlying the debate between Commoner and Ehrlich 
rests in giving too much authority to science as a set of objective truths, in not 
understanding the mechanics of science as a process, and not recognizing the social 
and political aspects embedded in constructing scientific knowledge. In other words, 
it is right to affirm and appreciate the value of scientific evidence and expertise; it is 
wrong to see science as a definitive truth-maker. Instead, we should recognize 
science as an on-going and contentious process for unfolding provisional yet 
increasingly definitive knowledge about nature. At the same time, we must also 
acknowledge the performance of this process by human actors, namely scientists. 
Giving blind authority and power to science and scientists, without recognizing 
reasonably the political and social construction of science, is dangerous. 
Paul Ehrlich’s call for coercive population control reveals these dangers of 
ignoring the social and political construction of science. Ehrlich’s technocratic view 
of population growth as an absolutely authoritative and undisputed science opened 
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the door to an authoritarian and undemocratic course of action. If a drastic reduction 
in global population was not achieved mutually and quickly, he argued, it must be 
forced on people coercively, for their own survival. Ehrlich’s purely scientific view 
of population growth in a strict biological framework wrongly rendered the 
expansion of human populations as apolitical. Doing so also painted the policies for 
coercive reduction as an equally apolitical and, apparently, necessary solution. 
Elevating science as uncontested truth removes it and its policy solutions from 
morals and democratic ideals. 
At the climax of the global environmental moment, the primary problem that 
the Oi Committee, Taghi Farvar, and Barry Commoner found in Ehrlich’s 
population-focused fears was exactly its elevation of science beyond the values of 
individuals and the choices of societies on Spaceship Earth. The pure population 
perspective for the global environmental crisis ignored the social and political 
elements of environmental science. For Commoner and Farvar, politics and society 
stood at the center of the global environmental crisis. This was the battle they found 
for at the Environment Forum in one of the outer rings of Stockholm’s 
environmental circus. Their views on science located the causes of environmental 
crisis in a complex interaction between polluting industrial technologies and the 
socio-political processes of economics and colonial history. 
Seeing science as pure truth also overlooks the inherent elements of 
uncertainty that exists in any honest science, and it hides from view the social and 
political aspects of science, especially science used to inform policies or courses of 
action. We can see such an avoidance of politics, for example, in the 1963 Limited 
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Test Ban Treaty, which banned atomic explosions in the atmosphere. While a great 
success in reducing the global threat of radioactive fallout, this limited treaty literally 
buried underground the environmental politics deeply embedded in the science of 
atomic weapons, as well as in the policies concerning their existence. Belief that 
“sound science”—or a totally definitive science—exists or that it leads to good 
policy is a fallacy, as seen clearly from the failure to pass policies regulating 
asbestos, or, for that matter, the failure to pass a comprehensive energy policy. To a 
certain extent, politics, power, and personal interests all play a role both in the 
creation of scientific knowledge and the creation of policy; getting the science 
“right” and doing “good” science, does not mean you will get good policy.  
As for Commoner, Farvar, and Ehrlich, they all clung to some extent to the 
idea that the “right” science supported their view of the causes behind the global 
environmental crisis. Yet only Commoner and Farvar included in their formulations 
a proper social and political understanding as a part of that science. Though Ehrlich 
eventually came to appreciate some of the political factors involved in global 
environmental complexities, he had originally proposed a coercive, technocratic 
solution to the environmental crisis in which expert scientists like himself would tell 
people how or how not to reproduce. Commoner, however, was adamant that 
decisions for correcting environmental problems “belongs not in the hands of 
scientists and technologists, but to all the people.” It was the scientific community’s 
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responsibility, “as the custodians of this knowledge,” to clearly explain the causes of 
the environmental crisis, not induce fear and undemocratic policy suggestions.669 
By the time it peaked during the global environmental moment in 
Stockholm’s Environment Forum, the Commoner-Ehrlich debate was not really a 
scientific disagreement. Rather, it centered on the weightier ideological issue of 
freedom: an individual’s reproductive freedom to control their body and family 
decisions, and a nation’s freedom to operate its political sovereignty, and use freely 
their natural resources to develop industrially according to national needs. While the 
individual details and context of Commoner and Ehrlich’s debate before and during 
the Environment Forum differed from the details of debates at the UNCHE and at 
Dai Dong’s Independent Conference on the Environment, they all shared broadly 
similar politics over those same ideological issues of freedom. While the global 
environmental moment that witnessed the dawn of international environmental 
politics has ended, those global environmental debates have not yet been resovled. 
*** 
Given the important issues and conflicts that the Commoner-Ehrlich debate 
highlighted at the dawn of global environmentalism, consider, now, what lessons and 
ironies it offers for our contemporary crisis of planetary climate change. A vast 
consensus of climate science experts tell us that limiting the drastic effects of climate 
change requires steep reductions of fossil fuel emissions and other heat-trapping 
gases. Might concerns for rapid reductions in greenhouse gases relate to Paul 
Ehrlich’s concerns about rapidly reducing rates of human reproduction? For 
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instance, if drastic reductions in greenhouse gases do not occur mutually and 
quickly, does the authoritative science of climate change justify the use of coercive 
force to save the planet and humanity with it? Do traditionally impoverished nations 
have a sovereign right to economic self-determination if their unchecked emissions 
threaten global health and security? Is the climate science authoritative enough to 
trump poor nations’ claims to political and economic equity? Does climate science 
justify the eventual use of economic, political, or even military force to restrict the 
procurement, trade, or use of fossil fuels? 
And what of Barry Commoner and Taghi Farvar? Would their focus on the 
social and political construction of global environmental problems lead them to 
question climate science that calls for immediate reductions in global emissions? 
Would they therefore become climate-change skeptics? Or, would Commoner and 
Farvar align with the traditionally poorer nations who justify growing carbon 
emissions with claims that colonialism and Western hegemony restricted their 
sovereign rights to economic development? Such questions are anachronistic. Like a 
counterfactual history, these questions seek the relative importance and applicability 
of actions, ideas, and lessons from the past. 
Nonetheless, some of the circumstances for the global environmental crisis in 
the early 1970s appear similar to the crisis of climate change today. For some, 
disagreement exists now, as it did in the early 1970s, over the primary causes of the 
environmental crisis. In the case of the debate between Ehrlich and Commoner in the 
early 1970s, blame for the global environmental crisis went either to natural but 
excessive biological reproduction, or to human use of faulty technology and 
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economic exploitation. Today, some climate skeptics cite natural cycles of 
temperature change as the cause of global warming, while most scientists implicate 
the human production of greenhouse gases. Similarly, in the 1970s and today, 
political conflict between and within the global North and South wrestled over issues 
of national sovereignty and economic development, on the one hand, and desires to 
limit global environmental degradation on the other. And both then as now, the 
United Nations provided the primary frameworks for reconciling the conflicting 
politics embedded in global environmental change. 
But the past is not the present; nor is it the future. The way in which the 
Commoner-Ehrlich debate unfolded in Stockholm highlights the contexts of 
environmental problems in global environmental moment of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. And, it helps us understand the deep political issues embedded in these global 
environmental problems, both then and now. While the contexts of global 
environmental crisis in the 1970s and today are quite different, the greatest similarity 
between the two is likely that finding solutions may prove equally impossible. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
“Past and present and future are not disjoined but joined. The greatest poet 
forms the consistence of what is to be from what has been and is. He drags 
the dead out of their coffins and stands them again on their feet … he says to 
the past, Rise and walk before me that I may realize you. He learns the 
lesson … he places himself where the future becomes present.” 
— Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 1855. 
  
“There is much difference of opinion in the scientific community over the 
severity on the environmental problem and whether doom is imminent or, 
indeed, inevitable. But one does not have to accept the inevitability of 
environmental catastrophe to accept the possibility of catastrophe. We need 
subscribe to no doomsday threat to be convinced that we cannot – we dare 
not – wait for all the evidence to be in. Time is no ally here unless we make it 
one. Whether the crisis is, in a physical sense, just around the corner or well 
over the horizon cannot obscure the fact that we have a policy crisis on our 
hands right now. We need only look at the unintended results of past 
decisions.” 
— Maurice F. Strong, 1972.670 
 
 
After years of planning and anticipation, the various events in Stockholm 
concluded in 1972 with little agreement on the proper paths for steering or saving 
Spaceship Earth. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE), the Dai Dong Independent Conference, and the Environment Forum all 
ended with limited victories, and their diverse attendees returned to their various 
homes around the world. What happened, then, to the global environmental 
moment? After addressing the end of the global environmental moment with a focus 
on its closure in the United States, I conclude this dissertation with a review of its 
arguments and an analysis on the legacy the global environmental moment has had 
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Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, by Wade Rowland (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & 
Co., 1973), pg ix. 
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on international environmental politics, as well as its meaning for the ongoing 
environmental movement. 
 
End of the Global Environmental Moment 
When modern environmentalism first exploded across the 1960s and early 
1970s, it was sometimes described as an issue as popular and unifying as 
“motherhood.”671 Almost everyone could agree on the value of motherhood, as 
everyone has a mother who gave him or her life. Similarly for environmental issues, 
who would argue against clean air and water, or against healthy and pleasant living 
conditions, or against the life-sustaining health of the planet, especially when its 
health determined the future survival of the human species? Yet, during the global 
environmental moment, as environmental issues evolved and expanded to the level 
of domestic and then international policymaking, it became quite clear that 
environmental action and remediation involved significant social and economic 
costs. And given the magnitude of those social and economic costs, perhaps 
environmental values were not so cherished and agreeable after all. 
As sociologist David L. Sills pointed out in his analysis of the environmental 
movement and its critics in the mid-1970s, support or criticism of environmental 
action typically depended on one’s self-interest. For example, he noted that 
“Industrial managers resist changes in manufacturing techniques that will be 
troublesome and costly; land owners and land developers resist controls over their 
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244:1465 (June 1972), 49-54; Kendrick Frazier, “The Men Who Cry Doomsday,” Science News 
102:24 (December 9, 1972), 371. 
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profit-seeking activities; and utility companies resist the efforts of environmentalists 
to control their methods of power production and transmission.”672 If environmental 
topics first appeared as a unifying motherhood issue, eventual realization of its costs 
created social and political conflict over those costs. Such realizations, and desires of 
self-interest to avoid those costs, lent to significant declines in the early consensus 
regarding and popular support for the early environmental movement. Collected 
evidence from the late 1960s and early 1970s showed a broad build-up of support for 
environmental issues between 1968 and 1970, peaking on Earth Day 1970. But by 
1972, the same year that the environmental circus culminated in Stockholm in a 
collection of conferences, the once-widespread and unifying environmental 
movement underwent substantial decline.673 
A focus on events in the United States offers a specific example and the 
particular historical contexts for this decline, with both local and international 
interconnections. By early 1973, having secured the 1972 election in a landslide 
victory, President Nixon—who had once championed environmental issues—
excised himself and the U.S. government from the environmental movement. Just 
years earlier, Nixon had been quick to harness environmental excitement for his 
domestic and international political gain. He had proposed and passed foundational 
environmental legislation like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); he 
had established the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970; and he had 
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673 For an extensive review of this evidence, see Kenneth E. Hornback, “Orbits of Opinion: The 
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encouraged American leadership on the international environment both in NATO 
and through the UNCHE planning process. Yet, in the wake of the UNCHE and the 
growing realization of the social and economic costs and conflicts embedded in 
environmental issues—especially the costs and conflicts in the context of global 
North-South relations—Nixon and his advisors shifted away from environmental 
advocacy and away from the economic costs such advocacy required. 
In February 1973, Nixon declared a rhetorical end to the environmental crisis 
in his annual environmental address. “When we came to office in 1969,” Nixon 
recalled, “we tackled this [environmental] problem with all the power at our 
command. Now there is encouraging evidence that the United States has moved 
away from the environmental crisis that could have been and toward a new era of 
restoration and renewal.” Notwithstanding the gilded but shallow accomplishments 
at Stockholm in terms of the global environment, Nixon had overseen a host of new 
domestic environmental policies, especially with regard to clean air and water. Yet 
that legislation had hardly resolved the host of other on-going environmental 
problems, like chemical toxins in soil, food, and consumer goods. Still, at the dawn 
of his second and eventually tragic term, Nixon happily reported to Congress that, 
“we are well on the way to winning the war against environmental degradation—
well on the way to making our peace with nature.” Especially concerned with cutting 
costs, Nixon stressed a “balance between economic growth and environmental 
protection,” with environmental costs “more fully met in the marketplace, not in the 
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Federal budget.”674 As for the role government would play, Nixon announced that 
local and state governments would have to step up, which by implication, meant 
individual nations at the international level would have to face their own 
environmental challenges without U.S. support. 
Nixon’s allies began tying together excessive costs with environmental 
action. Also in February 1973, Nixon’s chief assistant for domestic affairs, John 
Ehrlichman, told the Economic Club of Detroit that “dogmatic environmentalists” 
were to blame for the nation’s growing economic challenges related to energy. 
“You’ve got to get it across to them,” Ehrlichman explained, “that there’s a cost to 
environmental protection.” Later in 1973, when Nixon’s Council on Environmental 
Quality issued its fourth report, his White House aids forced the removal of all newly 
proposed environmental restrictions, even those that followed guidelines set out in 
the NEPA. Ignoring the report’s still-exorbitant estimate for environmental 
remediation, Nixon adopted environmentalists’ systems-inflected rhetoric to 
celebrate his successful institutionalization of environmental issues: “In place of 
organizational disorder and fragmentation, we have developed institutions capable of 
dealing with environmental problems in a systematic and effective way.”675 Sensing 
declining public support for extensive environmental action, Nixon began rapidly 
backpedaling away from green initiatives, just as the Watergate crisis and the energy 
crisis escalated simultaneously. 
                                                
674 Richard Nixon, State of the Union Message to the Congress on Natural Resources and the 
Environment, February 15, 1973, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4102, accessed January 
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675 Ehrlichman and Nixon quoted in J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment 
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Rising gasoline prices and rolling brownouts in the summer of 1973 preceded 
the major energy crisis of 1973-1974. In October 1973, a major oil embargo initiated 
by several Arab states and exploited by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) with drastically raised oil prices ironically contributed to 
decreased interest and attention to environmental issues. Pinched consumers cared 
more about rising energy costs than the environmental pollution from energy 
production or threats about natural resource limitations. The high costs of 
environmental action could not compete with the high demands of consumers for 
some stability on the rising cost of energy products and manufactured goods. 
Energy-related industries, for their part, publically blamed environmental restrictions 
as the culprit for high costs and demanded relaxation of environmental standards.676 
The environmental movement was already in decline when the energy crisis 
peaked and stagflation set in. In January 1974, a Wall Street Journal editorial 
described “Environmentalists at Bay”; in February 1974, the New York Times 
reported, “Environmentalists Foresee ’74 as Toughest of Recent Years”; in March, 
the Deputy Administrator of the U.S. EPA, John R. Quarles, Jr., spoke to the 
Conservation Foundation on the for “Reenergizing the Environment Movement”; 
and later in March 1974, The Economist magazine’s “American Survey” declared 
that “the environment is short on friends.”677  When the affluence of industrialized 
society began to contract in the United States, much of the public seemed quick to 
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join the less developed countries (LDCs) in demands for greater economic growth, 
and not for environmental limitations. 
For Nixon, the end of 1973 and the start of 1974 saw the Watergate scandal 
move closer toward threats of impeachment, as the energy crisis continued to spread. 
American gas prices quadrupled in places with stations running out of gas and 
occasional fights erupting among angry motorists over the last few gallons. But the 
energy crunch was not restricted only to the United States. Other nations fared 
worse. Japan and much of Western Europe, which were even more dependent on 
cheap Middle Eastern oil from OPEC, suffered from the energy crisis, too. Japan 
declared a state of emergency and forced a new a system for energy rationing, while 
the British implemented a shorter workweek to compensate for the escalated costs of 
energy. As historian J. Brooks Flippen noted, “In only three months, from October to 
December [1973], the entire industrial West appeared on its knees.”678 Few wanted 
to hear environmentalists scolding about limited resources and the need to revise the 
industrial way of life. Instead, they wanted solutions to the energy crisis without 
sacrificing their standards of living. The realities of living within limits, 
environmental or otherwise, were far less appealing than notions of limitless growth. 
 The remainder of 1974 fared no better for environmental attention. Nixon, 
who became further engulfed in Watergate, sent no environmental message to 
Congress that year, the first such absence in four years. Instead, he privately stewed 
about impending impeachment while publically focusing his support for new energy 
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strategies through his “Project Independence.”679 Growth and energy became the 
new priority, while environmental issues appeared only as nagging restrictions that 
needed removal. Whereas the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969 helped spark political 
attention to the growing environmental movement, Nixon in late 1973 and early 
1974 encouraged increased oil drilling on the continental shelf, including in Santa 
Barbara. According to one of his aids, Nixon’s demand in February 1974 was to 
“prepare as soon as possible legislation that would remove all environmental 
roadblocks to energy production and supply by canceling environmental 
inhibitions.” In March 1974, just before the oil embargo ended, Nixon was even 
more explicit. He told his cabinet, “promote energy developments … Get off the 
environmental kick.”680 
After its rapid rise in domestic and international policymaking, the 
environmental kick was soon kicked aside, and demands for growth reclaimed center 
stage. By the end of the year, Nixon resigned ingloriously from office. Energy costs 
continued to rise, and environmental commitments continued to decline. Throughout 
the mid-1970s, the onset of economic stagnation in several industrialized nations, 
especially the United States, spurred a shift away from environmental concern and 
toward demands for renewed economic growth. This broad shift signaled the end of 
the environmental moment, both in the United States and internationally. Clearly, 
environmental problems were not suddenly solved, as many of the environmental 
challenges that inspired environmental concerns have only escalated since 1970, and 
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new global problems like ozone depletion and climate change appeared. Rather, 
environmental issues—and widespread advocacy to think creatively and boldly 
about their long-term solution—moved further away from mainstream public 
concern. 
The environment, after all, had been institutionalized at national and 
international levels, which removed much of the impetus for public anxiety and 
interest in environmental issues. As historian Jacob Hamblin has written, even if 
those institutions, like UNEP, lacked the funding and authority to combat the 
persistence of environmental problems, the mere “creation of the environmental 
regime itself exerted a placebo effect upon public opinion.” In essence, the new 
domestic and international environmental institutions served to absorb much public 
concern about environmental problems. Many of those problems had not gone away, 
as the root issues causing environmental problems—including the social, economic, 
and political ideologies and structures of modern life on Spaceship Earth that 
prioritized economic growth and exploitation of resources over sustaining 
environmental relationships—were never altered. Yet, some element of relief existed 
in the knowledge that many nations since Stockholm had established environmental 
agencies, even if weak and ineffectual, and that in Stockholm so many nations had 
met to declare a loosely agreed-upon set of international principles and actions to 
address global environmental challenges. Even as the global environmental moment 
ended, its weak institutions managed to serve, in Hamblin’s words, as “a custodian 
of international public opinion [rather] than of the environment,” which masked the 
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ongoing political split between North and South over environmental responsibilities 
for ongoing environmental decline.681 
 
Recapitulating the Argument: “The Global Environmental Moment” 
Having addressed the dissolution of the global environmental moment, let me 
review the arguments I have made throughout this dissertation. I have argued, first, 
that a global environmental moment arose in the 1960s and early 1970s that first 
conceptualized and sought to address the interconnected political, social, and 
ecological challenges that confronted the entire planet and all its inhabitants. That 
moment offered a unique opportunity to confront global environmental challenges 
by instituting possibly revolutionary changes to the functions of political economy 
and to the established structures of sovereignty-based geopolitics. This dissertation 
further argued that the political contours of international environmental politics were 
forged during that global environmental moment in the multi-year processes of 
planning for, and in the events that transpired at, the collection of environmental 
conferences held in 1972 at Stockholm. The questions driving this dissertation 
included, What were the conceptual and scientific causes for the global 
environmental moment in the 1960s and early 1970s? What happened during that 
moment, particularly in terms of planning for the set of conferences on global 
environmental issues that occurred in Stockholm in the summer of 1972? And what 
political conflicts over environmental progress ensued there? 
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In answering those questions, this dissertation has offered an in-depth 
examination on the evolution of systems thinking in the decades after World War II, 
which provided the conceptual and scientific frames of analysis that first inspired 
awareness of global interconnection, embodied in the mid-1960s by the symbol of 
Spaceship Earth. Such a perspective on global interconnection enabled an 
understanding of new planetary-scale environmental dangers, first seen in the 
worldwide threats of atomic fallout, which then expanded to include a host of issues 
including pollution, overpopulation, and the widespread dissemination of chemical 
toxins. This dissertation then explored the initial and seemingly revolutionary 
reactions in industrialized nations, especially in the United States and Japan, to those 
newly realized environmental threats, including the institutionalization of domestic 
legislation for prioritizing environmental protection. An important additional 
reaction by industrialized nations to new environmental concerns included their plan 
for the UN to hold a worldwide intergovernmental conference on global 
environmental issues in Stockholm, scheduled for the summer of 1972. 
This dissertation then analyzed the powerful political resistance against many 
of those environmental responses of the industrialized North, led by Brazil but joined 
by other LDCs, who utilized their numerical majority in the UN to successfully 
implement their priority of economic development at the center of international 
environmental policymaking. Despite continued questioning on the potentially 
negative effects of economic growth on the environment in the early 1970s, the 
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success of LDCs in focusing international environmental dialog on the importance of 
economic development laid the conceptual roots for what later evolved in the 1980s 
and 1990s as the UN agenda of sustainable development. 
Lastly, this dissertation offered a study of the events at three different 
environmental gatherings in Stockholm that sought to unify planetary cooperation 
toward resolving global environmental problems. However, in Stockholm, the global 
environmental moment climaxed and collapsed either in unresolved conflict or in 
nominal compromises with few intentions by wealthy Northern nations for carrying 
out demands by advocates of LDCs to provide additional funds for ameliorating 
global environmental damage. Both the Environment Forum and Dai Dong’s 
Independent Environmental Conference in Stockholm ended in discord over how to 
save Spaceship Earth. And while the UNCHE nominally approved a set of 
documents reflecting the demands of LDCs for wealth transfers in the name of 
environmental improvements, the majority of those demands have still never been 
met. Instead, the events leading up and occurring in Stockholm institutionalized 
international environmental politics in the rhetorical ruts from which it has yet to 
genuinely emerge. 
Ruts, like those worn into the ground by a wheeled wagon or a car on a 
heavily traveled dirt road, provide an apt metaphor for the continued challenges and 
disagreements involving the global environment. Ruts invoke an image of parallel 
lines, never intersecting, only growing deeper and moving further toward an 
uncertain endpoint. Similarly, the international politics involving, on one side, the 
need for ameliorating ongoing global environmental decline and, on the other side, 
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the demands for unrelenting economic development have, since the global 
environmental moment of the late 1960s an early 1970s, been standardized in ruts. 
Despite the UN’s promotion of a synthesis first between environment and 
development in Stockholm and later in the concept of sustainable development, the 
two ruts of regulatory environmental control and unrestrained economic growth have 
become standardized points of political debate, unable to intersect in concrete action 
and only able to move forward toward an unknown future. Philosopher of science 
Bruno Latour has used a metaphor of standards as the railroad tracks on which 
knowledge moves; without the tracks, knowledge gets stuck.682 The twin tracks of 
environmental politics, forged in the early 1970s, continue to move forward through 
time, yet they remain stuck in standard debates between limits and growth. 
 
Issues Unresolved, Demands Unmet  
While the environmental conferences in Stockholm all sought solutions to the 
global environmental crisis, they ended in conflict or with weak structures for 
constituting significant change to widespread and ongoing environmental decline. 
The brief global environmental moment ended with a continued political divide 
between advocates of the global North and South over the appropriate focus on 
which particular environmental problems were most important; on how best to 
organize global efforts for addressing planetary environmental problems; and over 
who remained responsible for the costs of resolving global environmental pollution 
and remediating environmental damage. The global environmental moment thus 
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ended with a return to the status quo of ideologies centered on economic expansion 
and the unfettered use of natural resources by sovereign nations. 
As a result, between the 1970s and the initial years of the twenty-first 
century, global environmental decline has continued apace, alongside continued 
economic expansion. Since the 1970s, half of Earth’s tropical forests have 
disappeared. By 2020, LDCs of the global South are projected to lose an additional 
fifteen percent of their tropical forests, as much of what remains is under contract for 
eventual logging. According to conservation biologists, human impact on Earth’s 
biological systems has now placed us in the midst of a massive extinction event, on 
par with the destruction of the dinosaurs, though today’s die-offs stem from human 
destruction of habitats rather than an asteroid collision. Human actions through 
exploitation and development of natural resources have so compromised the ability 
of other creatures to live on Earth that nearly 100 species disappear daily, and 
roughly one-quarter to one-third of all species appear headed for extinction by 2050. 
Globally, in terms of wild animals, nearly a quarter of known mammals, an equal 
number of reptiles and amphibians, and some thirty percent of fish species are 
threatened with total annihilation. In 1960, only five percent of marine fisheries were 
either fished to capacity or overfished, yet by the early twenty-first century, more 
than seventy percent of global fisheries existed at capacity or were overfished. 
Continued use of chemical fertilizers has produced no less that fifty deadzones 
throughout the world’s oceans, including one in the Gulf of Mexico the size of New 
Jersey. Freshwater supplies for drinking and other purposes grow increasingly 
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stressed, as humans already consume more than half of the planetary supply of 
freshwater with demands ever increasing. And human alteration of the atmosphere, 
with ozone-depleting substances and through increased burning of fossil fuels, 
threatens to transform global ecological systems in ways that, in turn, threaten the 
stability of our now global human civilization.683 
Despite this evidence of ongoing global environmental decline and despite 
the development of significantly different historical contexts since the global 
environmental moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the political demands by 
nations of the global South on the issues of development and environment—
formulated most clearly in the Founex report from 1971—have essentially remained 
unchanged and unmet.684 Those demands include, first, an insistence that 
industrialized nations of the global North remain responsible for global 
environmental problems. Further, any efforts made to ameliorate those global 
environmental problems must not limit prospects or actual projects of economic 
development by LDCs. LDCs also insist on the transfer of additional resources 
(additionality) from North to South to enhance environmental protection above and 
beyond established Northern commitment to international aid for development. 
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While those demands have become more nuanced, they have scarcely altered over 
the past four decades. In making these demands, LDCs of the South seek not only 
improved living conditions via economic development but also a greater say in 
global political decisions that affect their nations. Environmental politics thus 
becomes a tool for LDCs to attempt greater equity in power relations between North 
and South.685 
Despite this dissertation’s historical evidence that the events of the global 
environmental moment in the 1960s and early 1970s calcified environmental politics 
along their unresolved lines, much political science scholarship on international 
environmental politics still focuses on the linguistic formulation of sustainable 
development in the 1980s and on the 1992 UN Conference on Environmental and 
Development held in Rio, Brazil and otherwise called the Rio Earth Summit. At Rio, 
nations debated and eventually produced a text called Agenda 21 as a blueprint for 
achieving sustainable development in the twenty-first century. Yet the similarities 
between events in Stockholm and Rio remain uncanny. For one, Canadian Maurice 
Strong organized both conferences. And as with the preparatory process for the 
UNCHE and the eventual production of its Action Plan in 1972, the agreements 
reached in Rio in 1992 declared that wealthy nations shared a larger responsibility 
for having caused environmental damage than LDCs, and therefore had a larger 
responsibility for cleaning up that damage. As with the UNCHE, the Rio conference 
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requested “new and additional” financial resources from the North for environmental 
improvements across the globe, but especially for the South. But, in Rio as in 
Stockholm, no serious additional financial commitments were forthcoming. As 
before, the structural economic issues necessary to accomplish sustainable 
development remained unaddressed in the UN. As with Stockholm, Maurice Strong 
insisted the meeting in Rio not only include the UN meeting but an environmental 
forum for NGOs, too. And as with Stockholm, it was only the NGOs in that forum—
not the nations inside the UN conference—that suggested subordinating the 
globalized free market to the environmental imperatives of global sustainability. In 
Rio the developed and developing countries split just as they had in planning the 
UNCHE. The politics forged in the earlier global environmental moment leading up 
to and taking place in Stockholm remained unbroken, even over new global 
environmental challenges like climate change. On the issue of climate change in Rio, 
because of the continued political divide between North and South, nations there 
agreed only to pursue a framework convention on climate change, which left 
creation of actual standards and limits for future negotiations, which have famously 
failed to establish lasting international agreements.686 
 
The Moment Ended, but the Movement Continues 
But, even if the international politics on the global environment remain in 
ruts similar to those first formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, powerful forces 
today continue to impel those politics to clash. That is to say, global environmental 
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politics continue to grind out in public forums, even with limited progress, rather 
than simply fade away. One reason remains the ongoing decline and unresolved 
challenges of the global environment mentioned above. But something else arose in 
the global environmental moment that continues to push environmental politics 
toward their continued confrontations, even if they remain politically immobile. That 
something is the powerful ideology and philosophy of environmentalism itself.  
Environmentalism, as an ideology and social movement, offers a call for 
fundamental change. It provides a powerful force that can ally with other calls for 
change—for instance, in questioning the sovereign structures of geopolitical 
relations, in challenging the prevailing economic culture that promotes endless 
growth, and in seeking greater equity and justice in the dissemination of resources. 
But environmentalism offers something distinct from other demands and forces for 
change. Importantly, the ecological conscience of environmentalism provides a 
compelling and increasingly necessary set of priorities that extends moral 
considerations to nature itself—what forester and natural resources professor Aldo 
Leopold called a “land ethic,” which “enlarges the boundaries of the community to 
include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” Ethics has 
advanced intellectually from the individual to the community, and environmentalism 
broadens that extension to the Earth. Not unlike some of the systems thinkers who 
helped see the ecological whole of Spaceship Earth, Aldo Leopold wrote of an 
environmental land ethic that “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
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stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.”687 
Ecologically, then, environmentalism recognizes the biosphere’s inherent 
interconnection, which requires the protection not just of individual species but of 
their intertwined habitats to protect the whole web of biological diversity. Socially, 
environmentalism recognizes that ensuring the stability of life requires the 
reorganization of political economy along more ecological principles, and it requires 
the extension of justice and equitable treatment to fellow humans and to the 
sustaining Earth. And ethically, environmentalism encourages a moral extension of 
care, awe, and respect to nature—not just the wonders of the wilderness, but to all 
nature, including all that exists in the technosphere and the econosphere of human 
societies.688 It is this final extension of the environmental ethos—which includes not 
just non-human wilderness but human societies, with all their complex social, 
political, and economic actions and their technological creations—that opens 
opportunities for environmentalism as a transformative force for global change. 
The global environmental moment helped inspire new appreciation for 
human society’s unbreakable bonds to the interconnected biosphere, including not 
just biological nature but humanity’s social and technological accomplishments 
made possible by nature’s resources. The global perspective embodied in the symbol 
of Spaceship Earth sought to extend environmentalism’s ecological, social, and 
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ethical considerations at a planetary scale. That moment arose from the odd 
assortment and integration of scientific systems thinking, and from harrowing threats 
to the ecological integrity of those global systems, including anxiety over atomic 
fallout and fear of silent springs from killer chemicals. The global environmental 
moment crested and culminated in a collection of conferences that forged the 
structures of international environmental politics that still stand today, despite the 
continuation of global environmental problems and the addition of new global 
threats like climate change.  
The global environmental moment rose and fell in the 1960s and early 1970s 
with a potential for embarking in new directions for human action toward the Earth, 
toward each other, and for our political economy. But even as that moment ended in 
the early 1970s, the rise of Spaceship Earth helped generate a global environmental 
movement that still seeks to extend those realizations both locally and globally. 
While the global environmental movement still struggles for political progress inside 
the staid structures of geopolitics and a globalized capitalist economy that refused 
alteration during the earlier environment moment, the movement nonetheless still 
offers a call for fundamental change to our social relations, to our political and 
economic choices, and to our moral and ethical treatment of the webs of life that 
support our continued existence. The challenge remains, as it did in the global 
environmental moment, how to take these global realizations and transform them 
into actions of influence. But however we continue to struggle in our networks for 
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survival, a sense of history, a sense of where we have been on Spaceship Earth, can 
help serve as a partial guide to where on Earth we are going. 
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